Diane Drain Shackelford v. Jerry Robert Shackelford
In a case involving a long-term marriage, the trial court found that the husband performed most of the household duties and the wife earned most of the income. Moreover, the husband’s earning capacity was substantially less than that of the wife at the time of the divorce. The trial court denied the husband’s request for alimony, and the husband appealed. We conclude that the trial court erred in failing to award the husband alimony and reverse and remand that part of the trial court’s decision. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Andrea Renea Hopwood v. Corey Daniel Hopwood
This is another appeal arising from the divorce of Corey Daniel Hopwood (“Father”) and Andrea Renea Hopwood (“Mother”). In a previous opinion, we remanded for a new determination concerning the duration and amount of an award to Mother of rehabilitative alimony and the calculation of an award to Mother of attorney’s fees attributable only to child custody and child support issues. The Chancery Court for Williamson County (“the Remand Court”) addressed these two issues on remand. Father appeals to this Court, arguing in large part that he simply cannot afford to pay what the Remand Court ordered him to pay. Discerning no abuse of discretion, we affirm the Remand Court’s rulings with respect to rehabilitative alimony and attorney’s fees attributable to child support and child custody. However, we modify the Remand Court’s judgment to reduce the amount of life insurance Father is required to carry to secure his alimony obligation in light of the reduction of his alimony obligation. We further modify the Remand Court’s judgment to eliminate $750 in attorney’s fees assessed against Father for filing an improperly-styled motion when he was acting pro se. The judgment of the Remand Court is affirmed as modified. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
April H. v. Scott H.
This is a divorce case. Wife filed for divorce in February 2017 after twelve years of marriage. Following a three-day trial, the trial court ordered Husband to pay $1000 in transitional alimony to Wife for six months and $500 per month for the following six months. The trial court also entered a permanent parenting plan for the parties’ two minor children naming Husband primary residential parent. Husband received 233 days of parenting time, and Wife received 132 days. Wife appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Howard White, Et Al. v. Walter C. Grimes
This case involves an alleged contract for the sale of real property. The proposed buyers, who were originally lessees of the property, brought suit to enforce the alleged agreement, seeking specific performance and damages. After a trial, the Maury County Chancery Court held that a contract for the sale of the property did exist and that specific performance of the contract should be awarded. Certain monetary damages were also awarded to the former lessees. Having reviewed the record transmitted to us on appeal, we affirm in part and reverse in part. Although we affirm the chancery court’s decision that a valid contract exists and that the contract is properly subject to specific performance, we reverse the award of damages that is challenged on appeal for the reasons stated herein. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
John and Donna Cavin v. Independent Asset Group, Et Al.
The appellees have moved the court to dismiss this appeal as premature. Because multiple motions remain pending in the trial court, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Kaden W.
This is a termination of parental rights case involving the parental rights of the mother, Tora W. (“Mother”), to her minor child, Kaden W. (“the Child”), who was eleven years old at the time of trial. On January 19, 2017, the Anderson County Juvenile Court (“trial court”) found that the Child was dependent and neglected and entered an order removing the Child from Mother’s custody and placing the Child into the temporary legal custody of the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”). The Child was immediately placed in foster care, where he remained at the time of trial. On December 20, 2017, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother.1 Following a bench trial, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights to the Child upon determining by clear and convincing evidence that (1) Mother had abandoned the Child by failing to provide a suitable home for him, (2) Mother had not substantially complied with the reasonable requirements of the permanency plans, and (3) the conditions leading to the Child’s removal from Mother’s custody persisted. The trial court further found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of the Child. Mother has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Milcrofton Utility District Of Williamson County, Tennessee v. Non Potable Well Water, Inc. Et Al.
Appellant, a public utility, appeals the Davidson County Chancery Court’s dismissal of its complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Appellant argues that it has an exclusive right to provide water service under Tennessee Code Annotated section 7-82-301 and that Appellee is usurping its exclusive right by providing water to residents of a subdivision within Appellant’s service area. Because the gravamen of Appellant’s complaint is to maintain its exclusive franchise by the grant of injunctive relief prohibiting Appellee from providing water service, the case does not fall within the purview of Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-225. As such, we affirm the trial court’s conclusion that it does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the case. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Milcrofton Utility District Of Williamson County, Tennessee v. Non Potable Well Water, Inc. Et Al. - Dissenting In Part
While I agree with the majority’s decision regarding the timeliness of Milcrofton’s action, I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this case. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Express Signs Of Cookeville, LLC v. Mary Jane Patterson Lusk, Et Al.
Defendants appeal from the order of the Putnam County Chancery Court denying their Rule 60.02(5) motion to vacate default judgments against them. Because the trial court was correct in denying Appellants’ motion to vacate, we affirm. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Chris Whitney v. First Call Ambulance Service, Et Al.
This is an appeal from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment dismissing a plaintiff-employee’s THRA and TPPA claims against his employer. As to the employee’s THRA claim, the trial court found that the evidence of harassment and discriminatory conduct was not so severe or pervasive so as to establish a hostile work environment. As to the employee’s TPPA claim, the trial court found that the employer had a valid, non-discriminatory reason for termination. Additionally, the trial court found that the employee failed to establish that one of the entities was his employer for purpose of liability under either the THRA or the TPPA. Finding that the employee presented sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of disputed material fact with regard to his THRA and TPPA claims, we vacate the trial court’s order as to these claims and remand the case to the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jerry R. Clark, v. James M. Owens, Et Al.
This is an easement case. Appellant, the dominant land owner, appeals the trial court’s order fixing the width of the easement at 15 feet and limiting the use of the easement to residential and emergency ingress, egress, and utilities. The appellate record contains no transcript or statement of the evidence for our review as required by the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Accordingly, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s findings. Affirmed and remanded. |
Sequatchie | Court of Appeals | |
Matthew Lange, et al. v. Betty Jo Sullivan, et al.
Appellee’s father, decedent, died testate. Decedent’s will devised real property to Appellee in fee simple but also gave Appellants the right to use the house and curtilage for so long as Appellants’ did not abandon the property for a period of ninety consecutive days. The trial court held that decedent’s will gave Appellants a “license” to use the property—a holding that the parties do not appeal. On Appellee’s complaint for declaratory judgment, the trial court ordered Appellants to pay the mortgage debt, real estate taxes, maintenance, and insurance on the property. Appellants appeal raising the sole question of whether they should be responsible for the mortgage on the property. We hold that, as licensees, Appellants cannot be charged with the mortgage debt. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order as to its holding that Appellants are responsible for the mortgage payments. The trial court’s order is otherwise affirmed. |
Carroll | Court of Appeals | |
Marvin J. Butler v. First South Financial Credit Union
The plaintiff appeals the summary judgment dismissal of his claims against the defendant bank for discrimination and breach of fiduciary duty. We affirm the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Wayne Holloway, Et Al. v. Tanasi Shores Owners Association, Et Al.
Wayne Holloway and Jerry Brewington (“Plaintiffs”) appeal the April 20, 2018 order of the Chancery Court for Sumner County (“the Trial Court”) finding and holding, inter alia, that Plaintiffs, not Tanasi Shores Owners Association and Timmons Property, Inc. (“Defendants”), are responsible for maintenance and repair of decks connected to their respective condominium units. We find and hold that Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-27-303 applies and that, pursuant to the declaration, decks and porches are part of the condominium unit, not common areas, making Plaintiffs responsible for maintenance and repair of the decks connected to their respective condominium units. We affirm the Trial Court’s April 20, 2018 order. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Chad James Powell v. Tennessee Department of Correction, Et Al.
An inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”) filed this action in the Circuit Court for Davidson County seeking monetary damages from the State of Tennessee for injuries caused by “negligent acts or omissions” of TDOC employees acting “within the scope of their employment” in regard to a prison disciplinary hearing. The State filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the Tennessee Claims Commission had exclusive jurisdiction over the inmate’s monetary claims. The inmate responded by filing a motion to transfer the case to the Claims Commission. The trial court denied the motion to transfer and dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Allen K. Wallace v. City of Memphis
A City of Memphis firefighter was terminated based on alleged off-duty misconduct. The firefighter appealed his termination to the Civil Service Commission. After a hearing, the Civil Service Commission issued a decision recommending that the firefighter be restored to his previous position with full back pay and benefits. The City restored the firefighter to his previous rank and position but refused to pay the back pay and benefits owed. As a consequence, the firefighter filed a verified petition in chancery court to enforce the Civil Service Commission’s decision to which the City filed an answer without raising any affirmative defenses. Thereafter, the firefighter filed a properly-supported motion for summary judgment along with a statement of undisputed facts. Because the City did not file a response to the motion or the statement of undisputed facts as required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56, and the undisputed facts established that the firefighter was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment. The trial court also awarded post-judgment interest from the date of the trial court’s order granting summary judgment but not from the date of the Civil Service Commission’s decision as requested by the firefighter. Both parties appealed. We affirm the grant of summary judgment but reverse and remand for a calculation of post-judgment interest from the date of the Civil Service Commission’s decision. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Mohammad Naser Chorazghiazad v. Mohammad Chorazghiazad
This appeal concerns whether a quitclaim deed was forged. Mohammad Naser Chorazghiazad (“Plaintiff”) sued Mohammad Chorazghiazad (“Defendant”) in the Chancery Court for Wilson County (“the Trial Court”) alleging that Defendant took certain of Plaintiff’s properties by means of a forged deed (“the Quitclaim Deed”). The Trial Court found by clear and convincing evidence that Defendant had indeed forged the Quitclaim Deed to give himself three additional properties that Plaintiff never agreed to transfer. Defendant appeals to this Court, arguing among other things that the evidence did not rise to the level of clear and convincing necessary to prove forgery. Given the testimony and evidence including the attendant circumstances surrounding the drafting and signing of the Quitclaim Deed, as well as the Trial Court’s credibility determinations, we find, as did the Trial Court, that Plaintiff met his burden of proving forgery by clear and convincing evidence. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Karen H. Foster v. Douglas S. Foster
This is the second appeal in a post-divorce proceeding involving the computation of Wife’s portion of Husband’s military retirement pay. In the first appeal, we affirmed the trial court’s computation and remanded the case for further proceedings. On remand, the trial court assessed the arrearage of retirement pay that had accrued during the pendency of the appeal and awarded Wife her attorney’s fees. Husband appeals, contending that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that Wife lacked standing to raise the issue of calculation of military retirement pay; Husband also raises numerous other issues related to the propriety of the judgment that was at issue in the first appeal, each party’s entitlement to attorney’s fees, and the trial court’s denial of two motions to recuse itself. We vacate the award of attorney’s fees for services rendered in another proceeding, and affirm the judgment in all other respects; we award Wife her attorney’s fees incurred in this appeal and remand the case for a determination of the amount to be awarded. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Janella L. McCants v. Jacinta L. McGavock, Et Al.
This appeal involves a partition of jointly owned property. The trial court held that the plaintiff, the sole residing tenant, excluded the defendants, the three other cotenants, from the property owned by all four parties after relations deteriorated and a mutually agreed upon final disposition of the property could not be reached. The trial court further awarded $60,000, the amount of “repairs/improvements,” to plaintiff as reimbursement and compensation. Additionally, the trial court held that “ouster” was established and that the plaintiff excluded her cotenants and must pay rent to the cotenants for the use and occupation of the property. The trial court’s ruling included an order of partition of the property, that the defendants’ share of the amount expended by the plaintiff will be deducted from the sale proceeds to reimburse the plaintiff, and that those expenses are to be offset by the amount of rent owed to the defendants. The plaintiff appeals as to the finding of “ouster” and exclusion, whereas the defendants appeal as to the award of reimbursement in regard to the repairs and improvements made by the plaintiff. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Anna G.
A mother’s parental rights were terminated based on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to support pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1) and 36-1-102(1)(A)(i). The mother appealed, and we reverse the trial court’s judgment. Although the mother did not provide cash to the child’s guardians, she spent a portion of her disposable income that was not insignificant on the child during the relevant four-month period, thereby precluding the petitioners from proving abandonment by clear and convincing evidence. |
Overton | Court of Appeals | |
Cheryl Merolla v. Wilson County, Tennessee
Plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant county alleging mistreatment in the county jail resulting in physical and emotional injuries. Following a bench trial, the trial court dismissed all of the plaintiff’s claims. We affirm the trial court’s decision in all respects. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Randall Holt, et al. v. Billy Kirk, et al.
Residential property owners sued their neighbors alleging multiple causes of action, including intentional infliction of emotional distress, false arrest, and assault. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, which was approved by the trial court. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying pre-trial motions for summary judgment, excluding relevant evidence at trial, determining a potential witness was competent to testify, refusing to grant a directed verdict or a mistrial, failing to order a new trial when the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, and refusing to suggest a remittitur. After a careful review of the record, we find no reversible error. So we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Evangeline Webb, et al. v. Milton E. Magee, Jr., et al.
This appeal involves a re-filed health care liability action in which the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the health care liability act. The trial court upheld the constitutionality of the statutes and granted summary judgment in this action because the initial suit was not filed within the applicable statute of limitations. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Duane Southerland, Et Al. v. Danny Howell
This appeal arises from a boundary line dispute. Duane and Jean Southerland (“Plaintiffs”) sued Danny M. Howell (“Defendant”) in the Chancery Court for Van Buren County (“the Trial Court”) seeking declaratory judgment as to a boundary line and damages for the removal of a fence. The Trial Court found that Plaintiffs successfully established their claim of adverse possession over the disputed area. Defendant timely appealed to this Court. Defendant argues, among other things, that Plaintiffs cannot prevail because they did not own or adversely possess the property for a period of 20 years. We, as did the Trial Court, hold that, in keeping with Tennessee law, the requisite time period may be established by successive possessions. The unrefuted proof at trial was that Plaintiffs and their predecessors in title maintained actual, continuous, and exclusive possession of the disputed area for over 20 years. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Van Buren | Court of Appeals | |
Leslie K. Jones v. Andy L. Allman
The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment with regard to the plaintiff’s claim of legal malpractice. Upon the plaintiff’s motion to alter or amend the judgment, the trial court denied the motion. The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |
