In Re E.Z. et al.
This appeal arises from a finding of dependency and neglect. S.Z. (“Mother”) is the mother of both E.Z. and B.G. (“the Children,” collectively). C.G. (“Father”) is the father of B.G.1 In the wake of certain non-accidental injuries sustained by B.G., Father’s father filed a petition seeking custody of the Children. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) intervened, and the Children’s maternal grandfather filed a petition, as well. Mother and Father both denied abusing B.G. The Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) found the Children dependent and neglected. The Trial Court found also that Mother or Father abused B.G. and the other parent knows who committed the abuse, but the Trial Court held it could not determine which parent committed the abuse. Consequently, the Trial Court declined to find severe child abuse. DCS appeals to this Court, and Mother raises additional issues. We find, inter alia, that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s factual finding that Mother or Father abused B.G. and the other knows who committed the abuse. Given that and other findings, we hold that the Trial Court erred in concluding that it could not find severe child abuse. We, therefore, reverse that aspect of the Trial Court’s judgment and hold that severe child abuse was proven by clear and convincing evidence. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Volha Purswani v. Krish Purswani
This action involves petitions for orders of protection filed by a wife against her husband. Following a hearing on the merits, the trial court entered an order of protection against the husband and in favor of the wife on May 23, 2018. The order of protection prohibited the husband from having contact with the wife and granted the husband co-parenting time with his four children every other weekend. The husband has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
Lequita Nix Hilliard v. Dolgencorp, LLC
Lequita Nix Hilliard (“Plaintiff”) sued Dolgencorp, LLC (“Defendant”) alleging discrimination in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-50-103, of the Tennessee Disability Act, and Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-311, of the Tennessee Human Rights Act; and retaliatory discharge for filing a worker’s compensation claim. The Chancery Court for Polk County (“the Trial Court”) granted summary judgment to Defendant. Plaintiff appeals. We find and hold that there is no genuine disputed issue of material fact with regard to the fact that due to her medical restrictions Plaintiff is unable to perform the essential job functions of a store manager. Given this, Defendant was entitled to summary judgment on both of Plaintiff’s claims. We, therefore, affirm. |
Polk | Court of Appeals | |
Innerimages, Inc. v. Robert Newman et al.
Innerimages, Inc. (“Innerimages” or “the developer”) filed suit against homeowners Robert Newman, David and Melba White, and David and Susan Schilt as trustees for the David Schilt and Susan Schilt Trust. It sought to recover unpaid maintenance fees required by the restrictive covenants governing their real property. The homeowners filed a counterclaim, seeking various forms of relief. The homeowners also joined the following third-party defendants: Sandra Gunn, the president of Innerimages, homeowners David and Joan Barrett, and property owner Cupid’s Rose, LLC.2 After a bench trial, the court dismissed the collection action filed by the developer. The court determined: (1) that the restrictive covenants are unenforceable as to the four homeowners and their successors in title; (2) that the developer is liable for breach of fiduciary duty for its failure to honor its obligations under the restrictive covenants; and (3) that Sandra Gunn is personally liable under an alter ego theory of piercing the corporate veil. Finally, the court awarded the homeowners damages in the amount of all fees paid since taking ownership of their property or, in the case of the Schilt family, fees paid over the last three years. In a subsequent order, the trial court clarified that only Mr. Newman was entitled to money damages because the other homeowners had not paid fees to the developer during the relevant time period. The court also denied the homeowners’ request for attorney’s fees. Innerimages, Sandra Gunn, and Cupid’s Rose, LLC appeal. Because this appeal presents novel issues relating to the enforceability of restrictive covenants, we take this opportunity to adopt the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 6.19(1)-(2) (Am. Law Inst. 2000). We modify the trial court’s judgment pursuant to the principles set forth in the Restatement. As modified, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Auto Glass Company of Memphis, Inc. d/b/a Jack Morris Auto Glass v. David Gerregano Commissioner, Department of Revenue, State of Tennessee
This is a taxation dispute between the Commissioner of the Department of Revenue and a Tennessee corporation. The primary point of contention concerns the proper tax classification of the corporation under Tennessee’s Business Tax Act. After paying an amount of taxes that it deemed improper, the corporation filed a claim for refund. The Department of Revenue subsequently denied the claim for refund, and the corporation thereafter filed suit seeking a refund in the Shelby County Chancery Court. The litigation quickly advanced with the filing of competing cross-motions for summary judgment. After a hearing, the chancery court ruled in the corporation’s favor, specifically rejecting the Commissioner’s tax classification of the business. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Rosalyn Small v. Memphis-Shelby County Airport Authority
This is the second appeal of this wrongful termination of employment case. Appellant/Employee appeals the amount of post judgment interest awarded. Because the trial court’s order does not comply with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01, we cannot conduct a meaningful review. As such, we vacate and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Penklor Properties, LLC v. Jo Ellen Buehler, et al.
Appellant Mid South Title Services, LLC agreed to act as escrow agent for a real estate transaction in which Appellee Penklor Properties, LLC was the buyer. Appellee tendered earnest money, which, under the Purchase and Sale Agreement, was to be held by Appellant unless and until the parties to the Purchase and Sale Agreement submitted a signed written agreement changing the terms of the escrow. Very shortly after the Purchase and Sale Agreement was signed, Appellant received a purported amendment from the seller’s former attorney and real estate broker. The amendment requested that Appellant release $53,000.00 of the escrowed funds in satisfaction of the attorney/broker’s “former legal fees.” Without inquiring further, Appellant issued the requested check. Appellant later discovered that the amendment was not, in fact, authorized by the parties to the Purchase and Sale Agreement. Appellee filed suit against Appellant for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty, and the trial court entered judgment against Appellant. Appellant appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
John Gunn Et Al. v. Jefferson County Economic Development Oversight Committee, Inc.
Because appellants’ notice of appeal was filed more than thirty days following the trial court’s final, appealable judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
Christy Keller Elrod Church v. Darrell Gene Elrod
In this post-divorce petition to modify, the Appellant (former Husband) contends that the trial court erred in concluding that his obligation to provide life insurance for the benefit of Appellee (former Wife) was part of a property settlement and therefore not subject to modification. The trial court’s order included an upward deviation for support of the parties’ youngest child for the twelve month period prior to her emancipation. The trial court also ordered Appellant to pay college tuition equal to that of the University of Tennessee at Knoxville without providing any allowance for scholarships and sponsor fees received by the parties’ daughter. The trial court further found that Appellant was not guilty of civil contempt for failure to make payments into Appellee’s retirement account under the terms of the parties’ Agreed Order of Legal Separation (AOLS). However, the trial court refused to relieve Appellant of his obligation to continue funding Appellee’s retirement account at the same level as he funds his own retirement account. We conclude from our review that the life insurance policy obligation constitutes spousal support, which is subject to modification. We vacate the trial court’s judgment concerning college tuition and hold that Appellant is obligated to pay the cost of tuition and books, less scholarships and sponsor fees received by the parties’ daughter. All other aspects of the trial court’s order are affirmed. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Cynthia P. Et Al.
In this parental termination case, the juvenile court found four statutory grounds for termination of a mother’s parental rights and that termination of parental rights was in her children’s best interest. We conclude that the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support all four grounds for termination of parental rights and that termination of parental rights is in the children’s best interest. So we affirm. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Ernest Ray Laning et al. v. Johnny Lawrence et al.
This case arises out of a dispute involving conflicting claims to the charter of a local affiliate of a national veteran’s service organization, the ownership of real property held by the local affiliate, and the right to manage a clubroom being operated on the property. The appellants, plaintiffs in the trial court, seek review of an order setting aside the deed upon which their claim to ownership derives and dismissing their claim for damages. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Larry Beckwith, Et Al. v. LBMC, P.C. Et Al.
A business retained a professional accounting firm to value its common stock and stock options. Almost four years after the requested valuation report was provided, the president of the business claimed that one of the firm’s accountants had disclosed confidential information about the valuation to a third party. The president and the accounting firm entered a tolling agreement for his individual claim. But after attempts to resolve the dispute failed, the president and the business filed a complaint against the accounting firm for breach of contract, accounting malpractice, and breach of fiduciary duty. The accounting firm moved for summary judgment, claiming the suit was barred by the statute of limitations. Applying the one-year statute of limitations for accounting malpractice actions and concluding that the tolling agreement established a filing deadline for the president, the trial court ruled that the plaintiffs’ claims were untimely. Upon review, we conclude that the tolling agreement paused the running of the statute of limitations on the president’s confidentiality claim. So we vacate the dismissal of the president’s confidentiality claim. We affirm the judgment of the trial court in all other respects. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Rebecca M. Little v. The City Of Chattanooga, Tennessee
Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of her complaint, which ostensibly alleged declaratory judgment, inverse condemnation, and due process violations. We vacate the dismissal of Plaintiff’s procedural due process claim because that claim was not actually addressed in the trial court’s order of dismissal. The trial court’s judgment is affirmed in all other respects |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Candance Gooch Spight v. Deangelo M. Spight
This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce. Father/Appellant appeals the trial court’s ruling regarding retroactive child support. The appellate record contains no transcript or statement of the evidence for our review as required by the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. However, the trial court’s order contains an inconsistency regarding the amount of the retroactive child support award. Specifically, the amount of arrears ordered does not comport with the accrual date for arrears listed in the trial court’s order. Because there are no findings, to resolve the inconsistency, we vacate the trial court’s award of retroactive child support. The trial court’s order is otherwise affirmed. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
United Supreme Council AASR SJ, et al v. Fredrick McWilliams, et al
This appeal concerns a derivative action brought on behalf of a non-profit corporation. Citing alleged embezzlement and misappropriation of funds by the directors, plaintiffs, members of the non-profit at the time of filing, brought a derivative action on behalf of the fraternal and charitable organization. After filing the derivative suit, plaintiffs established and became members of a competing organization. Pursuant to the original organization’s constitution, this caused the plaintiffs to surrender all their membership rights in the original organization. Defendants moved for summary judgment based on plaintiffs’ lack of standing to maintain the derivative action pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 23.06. The trial court granted the motion, dismissing all of plaintiffs’ claims against defendants, holding that plaintiffs could not fairly and adequately represent the interest of the organization’s remaining members because they themselves were no longer members and because of the conflict of interest inherent in their establishment of the competing organization. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Conservatorship of Gloriadean S. Porter, et al
This action concerns the closing of two estates and a conservatorship. A beneficiary appeals the court’s award of attorney fees and expenses to the attorney of record and the subsequent denial of his motion to continue the settlement of the estates. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Leah Keirsey v. K-VA-T Food Stores Inc.
This matter involves the grant of summary judgment to defendant, K-VA-T Food Stores Inc. (Food City), in a slip and fall case. Plaintiff, Leah Keirsey, filed an action alleging that, on a rainy day, defendant negligently maintained its premises and failed to warn her of hazardous conditions. Defendant moved for summary judgment arguing that it exercised reasonable care to prevent injury to its customers and warned them of potentially wet conditions; its motion was granted. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Vic Davis Construction, Inc. v. Lauren Engineers & Constructors, Inc.
A subcontractor brought suit against the general contractor for breach of contract and violations of the Prompt Pay Act. The subcontractor sought both damages, including punitive damages, and reformation of the subcontract based on fraud or mutual mistake. The general contractor counterclaimed for breach of contract. Upon the parties’ agreement, the trial court reformed the subcontract based on mutual mistake. The trial court also granted the general contractor summary judgment on the subcontractor’s claims for fraud and punitive damages. Then, following a bench trial, the court awarded a judgment to the subcontractor on its breach of contract claim and dismissed the general contractor’s counterclaim. The court declined to award the subcontractor a statutory penalty or attorney’s fees under the Prompt Pay Act. We affirm the trial court. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
Jack V. DeLany, ET AL. v. Martin R. Kriger, ET AL.
Owners of a cat filed a wrongful death complaint against the cat’s veterinarian and animal hospital. The defendants admitted liability for wrongly placing a feeding tube into the cat’s trachea rather than her esophagus, causing the cat to aspirate and die when she was fed through the tube. The trial court found the defendants were not liable because the cat was so ill she likely would not have survived long anyway, and it dismissed the complaint. We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the case for a determination of damages. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Stephen Teague Et Al. v. Shane Bruce
This is an appeal from a final order granting the petition, filed by the appellees, Stephen Teague, M.D., Mark Rasnake, M.D., University Infectious Disease, Lori Staudenmaier, D.O., and UT Family Physicians LaFollette, which sought a permanent restraining order against the appellant, Shane Bruce. The final order denying the pro se appellant’s motion to set aside the judgment, which the Trial Court treated as a motion for new trial, was entered on January 22, 2018. The appellant did not file his Notice of Appeal until November 21, 2018, more than thirty (30) days from the date of entry of the final order. The appellees filed a motion to dismiss this appeal arguing that the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed. We conclude that the appellees’ motion is well-taken and that we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
Tiffany "Whitaker" Kramer v. Phillip John Kramer
In this appeal, the wife challenges the trial court’s division of the marital assets and liabilities. We find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Angela Charlene Iveson v. Jeffrey Wayne Iveson
This appeal concerns a post-divorce effort to modify a residential parenting schedule. Angela Charlene Iveson (“Mother”) filed a petition against ex-husband Jeffrey Wayne Iveson (“Father”) in the Chancery Court for Sumner County (“the Trial Court”) seeking to modify the permanent parenting plan applicable to their minor daughter (“the Child”). The petition proceeded to a bench trial. Afterward, the Trial Court entered an order reducing and restricting Father’s parenting time as well as increasing his child support obligation. Father appeals to this Court, arguing, among other things, that the restrictions placed upon his parenting time are unwarranted and that the Trial Court erred by using his income for the most recent one year rather than a three year average of his income for child support purposes. We find that the Trial Court’s decisions with respect to these discretionary issues have a sufficient evidentiary basis and are consistent with applicable law. Thus, the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Enhanceworks, Inc. v. Dropbox, Inc.
This appeal involves the issue of personal jurisdiction over Appellee, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in San Francisco, California. The trial court, on Appellee’s Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, decided it lacked personal jurisdiction and dismissed the case. Appellant appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Sallie Lunn Tarver v. John Taylor Tarver, et al.
This appeal involves a unique divorce proceeding. Throughout most of the parties’ 29-year marriage, the husband worked as vice president of his father’s railroad construction business. Numerous properties, assets, and accounts were jointly titled in the names of the husband and his father over the years. When the wife filed a complaint for divorce, she named as defendants not only the husband but also his father. Shortly thereafter, the husband’s father drastically reduced the amount of money the husband was receiving from the company. The divorce trial was conducted over the course of twelve days. The trial court classified some of the disputed assets as belonging solely to the husband’s father. It found that the husband had an ownership interest in other property and included it in the marital estate subject to equitable division. The trial court imputed income to both the husband and the wife and ordered the husband to pay alimony and child support. The parties raise various issues on appeal regarding the classification, valuation, and division of marital property, the imputation of income for purposes of alimony and child support, and the alimony award. The wife also seeks an award of attorney’s fees on appeal. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s decision in all respects and deny the request for attorney’s fees on appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, Ex Rel. Herbert H. Slatery, III, Et Al. v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, Et Al.
At issue in this appeal is the breadth of federal preemption under Title II of the federal Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7521 to 7590, for claims that pertain to: (1) the initial manufacture and installation of “defeat device” software in emissions control systems in automobiles, and (2) post-sale software updates of emissions control systems during manufacturer recalls. The State of Tennessee brought this action against several automobile manufacturers for violating state anti-tampering laws by tampering with the emissions control systems in more than 8,000 of their “clean diesel” vehicles that were registered and operated in Tennessee from 2008 to 2015. The manufacturers responded by filing Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motions to dismiss arguing that all of the claims were preempted by the federal Clean Air Act. The trial court dismissed the claims that pertained to the initial manufacture and installation of emissions control systems for automobiles as expressly preempted by Section 209(a) of the act; however, the court denied the manufacturers’ motions to dismiss the claims that pertained to the post-sale software updates of emissions control systems during manufacturer recalls. We have determined that all of the State’s claims are preempted by the federal Clean Air Act. Therefore, we affirm the dismissal of the claims related to the initial manufacture and installation of emissions control systems, reverse the decision to deny the Rule 12 motions to dismiss the post-sale software updates and installations, and remand with instructions to dismiss all claims. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |
