Kevin Cash v. Turner Holdings, LLC a/k/a Prairie Farms Dairy, Inc.
This case involves the application of the doctrine of res judicata. Appellant filed a complaint against appellee alleging retaliatory discharge, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress in the first lawsuit. The trial court granted appellee’s Rule 12.02(6) motion to dismiss “in its entirety.” Appellant thereafter filed a second lawsuit against appellee alleging the same causes of action. The trial court granted summary judgment to appellee based on the doctrine of res judicata. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Randall Eugene Denton v. Deborah Meadows Denton
Appellant, a sixty-nine year old retiree, was found guilty of civil contempt for failure to comply with a marital dissolution agreement. We reverse the trial court’s order incarcerating Appellant “until payment of the debt” and instead order his immediate release from incarceration based upon his inability to pay the debt. |
Henderson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Gabrielle W.
In this appeal the biological father to the child at issue sought to set aside the Final Order of Adoption. Following a hearing, the trial court declared the Final Order of Adoption void on its face, finding that the court did not have personal jurisdiction over the biological father to terminate his parental rights. The guardian failed to sign his notice of appeal pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-124(d), requiring us to grant the father’s motion to dismiss the guardian’s appeal and leave in place the trial court’s decision to void the Final Order of Adoption. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Jennifer Kate Watts v. Scottie Lee Watts
In this divorce case, the parties owned three businesses that comprised a large portion of their marital estate. Prior to trial, they entered into a written agreement providing that they would retain a business valuation expert to analyze two of the three businesses and that they would accept the expert’s findings as conclusive evidence of their value at trial. At the outset of trial, Wife requested a continuance to allow the expert more time to complete the valuations. Despite having ordered Wife to sign a document retaining the expert five days earlier, the trial court denied the continuance and ordered the parties to proceed with trial. As a result, Wife did not present any evidence of either business’s value at trial. On appeal, we affirm the trial court’s award of a divorce to Wife. However, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Wife’s request for a continuance and that the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law are insufficient to enable a meaningful appellate review of its property division. We also conclude that the trial court’s rulings with regard to the Ferjo art collection, the two rings gifted to Wife during the marriage, and the children’s private school tuition expenses are not supported by the evidence in the record. As such, we affirm the trial court’s permanent parenting plan except that we vacate that portion of the plan concerning the children’s private school tuition expenses. On remand, the trial court should make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether an upward deviation in child support is appropriate in this case in light of the parties’ stated willingness to share the children’s private school tuition expenses equally. We affirm the trial court’s award of the original Ferjo painting to Wife as her separate property. We hold that the Ferjo reproductions should be classified as marital property and the two rings gifted from Husband to Wife during the marriage should be classified as Wife’s separate property on remand. We vacate the remainder of the trial court’s property division and remand to the trial court for an equitable division of martial property consistent with this opinion. Finally, we vacate the trial court’s rulings on spousal support and attorney’s fees and direct the trial court to reconsider those issues on remand following its equitable distribution of marital property. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Rita Goins v. Eugene Lawson, et al.
Rita Goins (“Plaintiff”) appeals the May 9, 2016 order of the Circuit Court for Campbell County (“the Trial Court”) dismissing her case. Plaintiff’s notice of appeal was filed on July 8, 2016, more than thirty days from the date of entry of the May 9, 2016 final order. As the notice of appeal was not filed timely, we are constrained to dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
Ann Calfee, et al v. Tennessee Department Of Transportation, et al
This case involves an attempt by several landowners to challenge a permit issued by the Tennessee Department of Transportation that allowed the placement of water pipelines along two state highways to connect an industrial facility to the Nolichucky River. The trial court dismissed the complaint based on its conclusion that none of the plaintiffs had standing to maintain this action. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Nedra B. Drayton v. Cooper Moving Services
This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, from the denial of a motion for judicial recusal filed by Nedra B. Drayton (“Plaintiff”) in her case against Cooper & Cooper Moving, Inc. DBA J. Cooper Self-Storage, Inc., identified in the style of the case below as Cooper Moving Services (“Defendant”). Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal filed by Plaintiff, and discerning no reversible error in the Chancellor’s ruling, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Deborah Lacy v. Hallmark Volkswagen Inc. of Rivergate, et al.
A customer at a car dealership filed suit against the sales manager and others for injuries she allegedly sustained due to an assault and battery by the sales manager. The trial court granted summary judgment to Defendants because Plaintiff failed to submit any affidavits setting forth specific facts that showed a genuine issue existed for trial, as required by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Defendants. Perceiving no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to Defendants. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Dawn Brown v. Maurice Nunley
This is an appeal from the entry of a six-month order of protection. Because the order of protection has already expired by its terms, we dismiss the appeal as moot. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Tanya G.
A mother’s parental rights to her child were terminated on the ground of mental incompetence and upon the finding that termination was in the child’s best interest. Mother appeals, contending that the ground is not supported by the evidence and that termination of her parental rights is not in the best interest of the child. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Bruce Thurman v. Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security
The owner of a truck was charged with driving on a revoked license, and the Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security initiated a proceeding to forfeit the truck. An administrative hearing was held, which resulted in an order that the truck be forfeited. The owner sought review of the forfeiture in Chancery Court pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act, and the court affirmed the forfeiture. Finding that the seizure of the truck constituted an excessive fine in violation of the United States and Tennessee Constitutions, we reverse the judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Emmett D.
This appeal involves competing petitions to modify a residential parenting schedule in a permanent parenting plan. The child’s mother sought changes to the day-to-day schedule, a modification of the existing child support order, and to be named sole decision-maker. The child’s father sought additional parenting time. Following a trial, the juvenile court modified the residential schedule, granting the father more parenting time. The court also ordered the father to pay his portion of the child’s preschool tuition, but the court denied the mother’s requests for sole decision-making authority and for attorney’s fees. Upon review of the record and the juvenile court’s findings concerning the father, we conclude that the court erred in adopting the modified residential schedule. We, therefore, vacate and remand for further proceedings on this issue. We affirm in all other respects. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Beard v. Arvin W. Glass, et al.
The plaintiff filed this action against the defendants, alleging that the plaintiff had been wrongfully expelled from the Prince Hall Masonic organization. The plaintiff further alleged that he had been defamed and his reputation damaged. The action was dismissed by the trial court due to the plaintiff’s failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiff timely appealed. Because the plaintiff has failed to comply with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27 and Tennessee Court of Appeals Rule 6, we dismiss this appeal. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Zane W.
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights based on the following grounds: (1) abandonment by wanton disregard for the welfare of the child; (2) persistence of conditions; and (3) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans. We reverse the grounds of persistence of conditions and substantial noncompliance. We, however, affirm the remaining ground of abandonment by wanton disregard for the welfare of the child and the trial court’s determination that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the best interest of the child. Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Braxton M. Et Al.
This is a termination of parental rights case, focusing on Braxton M. and Briley N., the minor children (“the Children”) of Kevin M. (“Father”) and Heather N. (“Mother”). On March 21, 2011, the Washington County Juvenile Court (“juvenile court”) entered an order removing the Children from the parents’ custody and placing them in the physical custody of Mother’s father and stepmother, William N. and Donna N. (“Maternal Grandparents”) in response to a dependency and neglect action initiated by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) due to Briley’s drug-exposed condition at birth.1 In September 2011, the juvenile court entered an order maintaining physical custody of the Children with Maternal Grandparents and directing that the parents would retain the option of petitioning for return of custody at a later date. On April 15, 2015, Maternal Grandparents filed a petition in the Greene County Circuit Court (“trial court”) to terminate the parental rights of the parents and adopt the Children. Mother subsequently surrendered her parental rights to the Children and is not a party to this appeal. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that statutory grounds existed to terminate the parental rights of Father upon its finding by clear and convincing evidence that Father had abandoned the Children by willfully failing to financially support and visit them. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1). Finding Father to be a putative father, the trial court also applied the statutory grounds provided in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(9)(A)(iv)-(v) to find clear and convincing evidence that Father had failed to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of the Children and that placing the Children in Father’s legal and physical custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to their physical or psychological welfare. The court further found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. Father has appealed. Having determined that the trial court erred in applying an amended version of Tennessee Code Annotated § 36- 1-113(g)(9)(A) not controlling in this action, we further determine the statutory grounds provided in subsection -113(g)(9)(A)(iv)-(v) to be inapplicable to Father under the controlling version of the statute. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects, including the termination of Father’s parental rights to the Children. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Kenya H.
This appeal concerns the termination of a father’s parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Hamilton County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of George C. (“Father”) to his minor child Kenya H. (“the Child”). After a trial, the Juvenile Court entered an order terminating Father’s parental rights. Father appealed. We reverse the grounds of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan and willful failure to visit, but affirm the ground of wanton disregard. We further affirm that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest. The judgment of the Juvenile Court is affirmed, in part, and reversed, in part. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Betty C. Thomas v. Bank of America, N.A., et al.
Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment to Defendants related to the foreclosure of Plaintiff’s home. She contends the trial court erred in summarily dismissing her complaint. She also contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying Plaintiff’s motion to alter or amend. Defendants insist the trial court should be affirmed in all respects. They also contend the appeal should be dismissed due to Plaintiff’s failure to comply with Rule 27 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and Rule 6 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Appeals. As Defendants contend, Plaintiff’s brief fails to comply with our appellate rules of advocacy and for this reason alone we would be justified in affirming the trial court. Nevertheless, we reviewed the record and the trial court’s actions and affirm the trial court in all respects. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Yvonne R.
A circuit court adjudicated a child dependent and neglected because her mother’s mental incapacity rendered the Mother unfit to properly care for the child. Upon review, we conclude that the circuit court’s decision is supported by clear and convincing evidence, and thus, we affirm. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Arzell A. Harmon
Arzell A. Harmon (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to attempted second degree murder and was sentenced pursuant to a plea agreement to ten years at thirty percent release eligibility with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve his ten-year sentence in confinement. The Defendant then filed a motion for reduction of sentence pursuant to Rule 35 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, which the trial court summarily denied. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35 motion. Alternatively, the Defendant contends that the trial court should have converted his Rule 35 motion into a petition for post-conviction relief. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the Knox County Criminal Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Global Mall Partnership v. Shelmar Retail Partners, LLC, et al
The landlord of a shopping mall commenced this action against a commercial tenant for breach of a lease. The tenant claimed it had an enforceable oral agreement to terminate the lease with the former landlord. The landlord contended that the original lease contained a “no oral modification” clause; thus, the oral agreement to terminate the lease was unenforceable. After the landlord presented its proof at trial, the court dismissed the case pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.02(2), ruling that the oral termination agreement between the tenant and the former landlord was enforceable despite the “no oral modification” clause in the lease. This appeal followed. When a defendant files a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.02(2) motion for involuntary dismissal at the conclusion of the plaintiff’s proof at trial, the only evidence the trial court may consider in determining whether the proof was sufficient to demonstrate a right to the relief is “the plaintiff’s proof” at trial. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.02(2). We have determined that the trial court erroneously considered facts and documents not found in the plaintiff’s proof. Excluding the extraneous facts and documents, the evidence presented at trial preponderates against the trial court’s factual findings and its conclusion that the landlord’s predecessor in interest and the tenant entered into a binding lease termination agreement. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Fisher v. State of Tennessee
An individual previously convicted of a felony drug offense petitioned for restoration of his citizenship rights. The trial court restored all his citizenship rights except the right to bear arms. In doing so, the court concluded that Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-17- 1307(b), which makes it an offense for certain persons to possess a firearm, prohibited the court from restoring the right to bear arms. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Mariah H.
This is a termination of parental rights case involving the child, Mariah H. (“the Child”), who was one year of age at the time of trial. On June 26, 2015, the Johnson City Juvenile Court (“trial court”) granted temporary legal custody of the Child to the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”). The Child was immediately placed in foster care, where she has remained since that date. Following separate hearings, the trial court entered two orders adjudicating the Child dependent and neglected in the care of the parents: one on November 25, 2015, as to the mother, Teresa H. (“Mother”), and the second on January 13, 2016, as to the father, Stafford B. (“Father”). On February 2, 2016, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father.1 Following a bench trial, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights to the Child after determining by clear and convincing evidence that Father willfully failed to visit the Child during the four months prior to the filing of the termination petition. Furthermore, the trial court dismissed the grounds alleged against Father of failure to establish paternity and persistence of the conditions leading to removal. Also finding clear and convincing evidence that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the Child, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights to the Child. Father has appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Johnson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Jamie B., et al
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to two of her children. Shortly after the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights, the juvenile court appointed counsel for the mother, who lacked the funds to afford one. However, on the day of trial, appointed counsel orally moved for leave to withdraw. The court granted the motion, and the trial proceeded with the mother representing herself. Ultimately, the court found clear and convincing evidence of five grounds for termination and that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. The mother argues on appeal, among other things, that the trial court erred in permitting her appointed counsel to withdraw. Because we agree, we vacate the judgment to the extent it terminated the mother’s parental rights and remand for further proceedings. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Pacer International, Inc.
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
City of Gatlinburg v. Maury R. Greenstein, Et Al.
This appeal involves post-judgment proceedings following a final judgment in favor of the city that the appellants pay $45,175 for unpaid maintenance fees on their commercial real property. The appellants appeal the trial court’s action overruling a motion to pay the judgment by installments under the so-called “slow-pay” statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 26-2-216. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals |
