Nelson E. Bowers, II v. Estate of Katherine N. Mounger
The plaintiff initiated this action, claiming, inter alia, a breach of contract. The plaintiff alleged that he was bringing the action as the assignee of a limited liability company, which was an original party to the contract at issue. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant estate, also an original party to the contract at issue, determining that the plaintiff lacked standing to file the action. The plaintiff timely appealed. Determining that the plaintiff possessed standing, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. We affirm the trial court’s decision to allow the estate to amend its responses to the requests for admission propounded by the plaintiff. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of James E. Miller
This is a probate case. Vickie Miller (Widow), personal representative of the estate of her late husband, James E. Miller (Decedent), petitioned the trial court for letters of administration. Decedent died intestate on July 17, 2010. At issue is the ownership of Jim Miller Excavating Company, Inc. (the corporation), the company operated by the Decedent. Widow argues that she is the owner of all of the 1,000 shares of stock that the corporation issued to “Jim Miller and Vicky [sic] Miller JTROS” shortly after the company’s incorporation on April 3, 1990. She filed a copy of the stock certificate, dated April 30, 1990. Mechelle Miller and Jamie L. Shannon, Decedent’s daughters and heirs of the estate, argue that the stock certificate was invalid and that the corporation’s assets should be part of Decedent’s estate. The daughters filed a copy of the corporation’s bylaws, in which the following language is found: “the Board of Directors shall consist of one individual, to-wit, its sole shareholder, James E. Miller.” The trial court granted Widow’s motion for summary judgment. Only Mechelle Miller appealed. We hold that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the corporation’s directors and incorporators intended that the company would be owned by Decedent and Widow as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. We vacate the trial court’s summary judgment and remand for further proceedings. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
In re Rylan G., et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court terminated Appellant/Mother’s parental rights on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home; (2) substantial non-compliance with the permanency plan; and (3) severe child abuse. Because Appellee, Tennessee Department of Children’s Services, did not meet its burden to show that it exercised reasonable efforts to assist Mother in obtaining suitable housing, we reverse the trial court’s finding as to the ground of abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home. The other grounds for termination of Mother’s parental rights are met by clear and convincing evidence, and there is also clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of the children. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. |
Claiborne | Court of Appeals | |
Tony E. Hancock v. State of Tennessee
Appellant was injured in an automobile collision with a State Trooper. After a trial, the Claims Commissioner found in favor of the State and dismissed the claim. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Erie Family Life Insurance Company v. Tiffany Dawn Sampson, et al
Insurer brought a declaratory judgment action asking the court to determine the proper beneficiary of the proceeds of a life insurance policy rider insuring the life of the named insured’s child; the named insured had designated her mother as the beneficiary of the policy and rider. Upon the child’s death, the named insured was prevented by law from receiving the proceeds, and the insurer asked for a declaration of whether the named insured’s disqualification also prevented the named beneficiary from receiving the proceeds or whether the estate of the child would receive the proceeds, in accordance with the designation of beneficiary in the policy. The trial court determined that the policy’s designation was inequitable and awarded the proceeds to the estate of the child. We have determined that the disqualification of the named insured from receiving the proceeds of the policy does not invalidate the designation of beneficiary and, accordingly, reverse the decision of the trial court. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re C.J.B., et al
This is a termination of parental rights case. The Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of C.F.B. (mother) and J.W.B (father) with respect to their two children, C.J.B. and C.C.B. As to mother, the trial court found clear and convincing evidence of four grounds supporting termination. By the same quantum of proof, the trial court found that termination of mother’s rights is in the best interest of the children. As to father, the trial court found clear and convincing evidence of three grounds supporting termination. By the same standard of evidence, the trial court found that termination of father’s rights is in the best interest of the children. Mother and father appeal. As modified, we affirm. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Lorese Douglas Jones, et al. v. Stephen W. Behrman, et al.
This is a medical malpractice action in which the trial court granted summary judgment for failure to file suit within the applicable statute of limitations. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Lisa Schnur v. James William Sherrell, III
This appeal involves a post-divorce order of protection. Mother obtained an ex-parte order of protection on behalf of the parties’ thirteen-year-old son alleging that Father had punched the child in the mouth while drunk on a family vacation. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court dismissed Mother’s petition for order of protection finding that she had not met her burden of proof. Mother appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Francis P
The appellant, Tony P., filed a “Complaint and Petition to Terminate Parental Rights and/or for Adoption” in the Circuit Court for McMinn County (“trial court”) on September 18, 2015. This petition sought to terminate the parental rights of the “unknown father” of a child for whom Tony P. had signed a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity (“VAP”). Jon F. filed a motion to intervene, asserting that he was the biological father of the child. The trial court allowed Jon F. to intervene in the action pursuant to an agreed order. The child’s mother later filed a motion seeking to dismiss Tony P.’s petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. By oral motion, Jon F. joined with the mother in seeking dismissal. The trial court entered a Memorandum and Order on August 15, 2016, finding that (1) Jon F. was the biological and legal father of the child, (2) Tony P.’s VAP had been rebutted, and (3) any and all parental rights of Tony P. as legal father were “terminated by operation of law under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(28)(C).” The trial court entered a subsequent order dismissing the petition filed by Tony P. Tony P. timely appealed. Having determined that the trial court properly found that Jon F. challenged and rebutted the VAP executed by Tony P., we conclude that Tony P. no longer enjoyed any parental rights with regard to the child. Although we determine that the trial court erred by applying Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-102(28)(C) retrospectively to this action filed before the statutory subsection’s enactment, we determine this error to be harmless inasmuch as Tony P.’s parental rights were a nullity. We therefore modify the judgment to reflect that Tony P. had no parental rights to be terminated following the court’s rescission of the VAP. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Tony P.’s petition seeking termination of Jon F.’s parental rights. We decline to award fees and costs to the mother and Jon F. |
McMinn | Court of Appeals | |
Kimberly K. Carr v. Floyd K. Sutton
The State of Tennessee filed a petition in 2013 on behalf of the mother of a child who was born in 1996 to legitimate the child and to require the father to provide health insurance for the child; the requested relief was granted. In 2014, the mother filed a petition to set child support and, following a hearing before a juvenile court magistrate, the father was ordered to pay child support; the magistrate determined that child support should not be made retroactive to the birth of the child but, rather, to the date that the petition to have the child legitimated was filed. Mother appealed the decision to the juvenile judge; after a de novo hearing, the juvenile judge adopted the findings of the magistrate and ordered Father to pay support of $549.00 per month from the date the petition to legitimate was filed. Mother appeals the ruling, contending that the obligation to pay support should be retroactive to the date of the child’s birth. Concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm the judgment. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
The Metropolitan Government of Nashville And Davidson County v. Delinquent Taxpayers As Shown On The 2006 Real Property Tax Records, et al
Delinquent taxpayer appeals the denial of his Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(3) motion to set aside a 2009 final decree confirming a tax sale of his property as void on due process grounds. Having determined that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded the delinquent taxpayer from relitigating the issue of notice, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Phillip Neal Kennedy v. Jane Kennedy
This post-divorce appeal concerns the father’s petition to modify the residential schedule in an agreed parenting plan. Following a hearing, the trial court found that a material change in circumstances necessitated a change in the schedule. The court modified the plan by awarding the father additional co-parenting time. The court also entered a new child support order and directed the mother to remit payment for retroactive child support and the father’s attorney fees. The mother appeals. We affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Brenda Ramsey v. Cocke County, Tennessee, Et Al.
In this wrongful death action, the decedent’s mother filed suit alleging that the county emergency communications district and the city police department refused to send help when the plaintiff called to report that her daughter was making suicidal threats and that, as a result, her daughter committed suicide later the same night. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the ground that the decedent’s suicide constituted an intervening, superseding cause. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we conclude that the decedent’s suicide was foreseeable and that the special duty exception to the public duty doctrine applies. We, therefore, reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings. |
Cocke | Court of Appeals | |
Jerry Faerber, et al. v. Troutman & Troutman, P.C., et al.
Appellees entered into a contract for the purchase of an undeveloped lot in a planned unit development. Appellants, an attorney and his law firm, prepared closing documents, including a warranty deed and settlement statement. The warranty deed included language that the property was unencumbered, and the settlement statement provided for payoff of the first mortgage and for the purchase of title insurance. Appellees later discovered that Appellants had failed to procure release of the first lien and had also failed to procure title insurance. The property was foreclosed, and Appellees filed suit against Appellants for negligent misrepresentation and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The trial court found Appellees liable on these claims. We concluded that the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act does not apply to Appellants, who were engaged in the practice of law in the preparation of the closing documents. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s award of attorney fees and costs pursuant to the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The trial court’s order is otherwise affirmed. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
J.P.Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Gary Eldon Finley, et al
A bank filed a complaint to reform a Deed of Trust to correct a scrivener’s error in the legal description of a parcel of property in order to foreclose on the property. While the litigation was pending, the mortgagors conveyed title to the property to a third party, who claimed to be a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. The trial court concluded that the third party did not qualify as a bona fide purchaser because he was aware of the bank’s litigation when he obtained title to the property. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Marshall | Court of Appeals | |
John F. Pinkard, M.D. v. HCA Health Services of Tennessee, Inc. D/B/A Summit Medical Center
We granted this interlocutory appeal to determine whether Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-11-272(c)(1) of the Healthcare Quality Improvement Act (“HCQIA”), as applied to the facts of this case, violates the separation of powers provisions in the Tennessee Constitution. Plaintiff, a physician whose medical staff privileges were terminated by Summit Medical Center, sued the hospital, alleging, inter alia, that it acted in bad faith and with malice during the peer review process. Following a lengthy discovery process, the hospital filed a motion for summary judgment asserting, inter alia, that Plaintiff’s anticipated evidence was confidential, privileged, and inadmissible under the HCQIA because it was derived from the activity of a Quality Improvement Committee (“QIC”). At the same time, the hospital filed a motion in limine to exclude all records of quality improvement activity pursuant to the evidentiary privilege under Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-11-272(c)(1). After ascertaining that Plaintiff intended to rely on QIC evidence, the trial court ruled that the peer review privilege could not be waived, and that Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-11-272(c)(1) violated the separation of powers provisions because it deprived the court of its inherent authority to make evidentiary decisions affecting “the heart of this case.” This Tenn. R. App. P. Rule 9 interlocutory appeal followed. We agree with the trial court’s ruling that the privilege cannot be waived. However, we disagree with the trial court’s ruling that Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-11-272(c)(1), as applied to the facts of this case, violates the separation of powers provisions in the Tennessee Constitution. This is because the General Assembly created the evidentiary privilege to effectuate one of its powers, the enactment of legislation that promotes the safety and welfare of our citizens. To that end, the primary concern of the challenged legislation is not to create court rules, but to promote candor within a hospital’s quality improvement process to ensure effective evaluation measures. Furthermore, Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-11-272(c)(2) provides an “original source” exception to the privilege whereby documents not produced specifically for use by a QIC, and are otherwise available from original sources, are both discoverable and admissible into evidence even if the information was presented during a QIC proceeding. Thus, the privilege is reasonable and workable within the framework of - 2 - evidentiary rules already recognized by the judiciary. For these reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Tracy Lynn Hallums v. Bruce Alan Hallums
In this divorce action, the trial court awarded alimony in futuro and attorney’s fees to Wife; Husband appeals both awards. Concluding that the court did not make adequate findings as to whether rehabilitative or transitional alimony was feasible, we vacate the award of alimony in futuro and remand for further consideration of the nature and duration of the alimony award; we affirm the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to Wife; and we decline to award attorney’s fees to either party for the appeal. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Jase P.
This appeal arises from the termination of a father’s parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition against Anthony G. (“Father”) in the Juvenile Court for Knox County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate Father’s parental rights to his son, Jase P. (“the Child”). Father had been incarcerated and unable to parent the Child since the Child’s birth. After a trial, the Juvenile Court terminated Father’s parental rights on the grounds of wanton disregard and various grounds coming under the putative father statute at Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1- 113(g)(9)(A). Father appeals. We affirm all grounds for termination found against Father. We further affirm that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court in its entirety. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Skylar P., Et Al.
Mother appeals the trial court’s decision to terminate her parental rights to two children on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home; (2) abandonment by willful failure to provide support; (3) substantial noncompliance with the requirements of the permanency plans; and (4) persistence of conditions that precipitated the children’s removal from Mother’s custody. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of the children. We reverse in part and affirm in part. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Terry Joe McBroom v. Kelly Loretta Folkers McBroom
In this divorce case, Terry Joe McBroom appeals the trial court’s award of alimony in futuro to Kelly Loretta Folkerts McBroom in the amount of $980 per month for three years or until Husband began drawing his retirement pension. The trial court ordered that once Husband began drawing his pension, which the parties agree will happen no later than April of 2019, the amount of spousal support will be reduced to $720. The court further ruled that Husband’s support obligation would cease when Wife began drawing Social Security benefits. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Western Farm Products, LLC, Inc. v. Sumner County, TN , et al
A property owner who wished to construct and operate a quarry sought a declaratory judgment that a Sumner County Zoning Resolution, which was alleged to exclude quarrying and mining activities, is unconstitutional and in violation of the Tennessee zoning enabling statutes. A group of adjoining property owners were permitted to intervene in the proceeding, and the court granted summary judgment to the county and adjoining property owners. The property owner now appeals. We find that the evidence relied upon by the property owner does not establish that the ordinance at issue prohibits all quarrying activities and affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Ronald Stringer v. Alecia Stringer
This post-divorce case concerns parental relocation. Mother, the primary residential parent, sought to relocate to Texas, citing an employment offer. Father objected to the relocation, arguing that the move had no reasonable purpose and that Mother’s real purpose for relocating is to be closer to her boyfriend. The trial court denied mother’s request to relocate based on mother’s perjury in the trial court’s presence and on the finding that the real purpose of mother’s proposed move is to be closer to her boyfriend. We reverse the trial court’s decision because we determine that father failed to carry his burden of proof. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Tennessee Firearms Association, et al. v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee
This appeal involves an attempt to challenge the legality of a gun show ban that was adopted for the Tennessee State Fairgrounds. The trial court dismissed the complaint on numerous alternative grounds. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Amy Ausenbaugh Sturdivant v. William Eugene Sturdivant
Father appeals the trial court’s denial of his request for equal parenting time with the parties’ children and failure to grant father a fault-based divorce based on mother’s infidelity. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Knox County, Tennessee, et al. v. Delinquent Taxpayers, et al.
This case involves an attempt by Omer G. Kennedy and Angela Helms (landowners) to exercise their right of redemption with respect to their property sold at a delinquent tax sale. Jon Johnson (tax sale purchaser) bought the property on January 13, 2015. Within the one-year redemption period, landowners paid $37,892.81, the amount they thought was required to redeem the property. Tax sale purchaser filed a motion for additional funds, consisting of payments he had made for insurance on the property and interest, under Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-2701 (Supp. 2016). The trial court granted the motion in an order entered January 11, 2016. The order gave landowners 30 days to pay the additional amount. Because notice of the order was not sent to their last known address, landowners did not receive the notice until after the 30 days had passed. They paid the additional amount of $5,869.43 on February 18, 2016. Tax sale purchaser moved the court to deny the redemption, arguing that the payment was not timely. The trial court denied the motion, holding that its order of January 11, 2016, was void because it was not effectively entered under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 58. and not effectively served under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 5. Alternatively, the trial court ruled that landowners were entitled to relief for excusable neglect under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60. Tax sale purchaser appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals |
