Morgan Keegan & Company, Inc. v. Michael Starnes, et al.
The trial court vacated an arbitration award in favor of Petitioner/Appellant Morgan Keegan & Company, Inc., on the basis of “evident partiality” and remanded the matter for rearbitration before a different panel. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Willie Campbell & Ulysses Campbell, Sr. v. Memphis-Shelby County Airport Authority
This case involves a plaintiff who fell outside the Memphis International Airport and sued the Airport Authority for negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant Airport Authority, finding, based on the undisputed facts, that the plaintiffs and their witnesses are unable to identify what caused the fall. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Wilson R. Vasconez v. Shelby County, Tennessee, et al.
Appellant Shelby County appeals a portion of the trial court’s judgment in favor of Appellee, the purchaser of property formerly owned by Shelby County. After a bench trial, the trial court awarded the Appellee property damages, prejudgment interest, and attorney’s fees based on its finding that Shelby County committed inverse condemnation of the Appellee’s property by failing to inform the Appellee of the condemnation proceedings commenced by the City of Memphis. Because the City of Memphis, and not Shelby County, was the condemnor of the property, we conclude that the trial court erred in awarding damages against Shelby County on the theory of inverse condemnation, and further erred in awarding attorney’s fees pursuant to the inverse condemnation statute. Accordingly, we reverse the finding of inverse condemnation and the award of attorney’s fees against Shelby County. Shelby County does not appeal the trial court’s award of property damages or prejudgment interest. That award is, therefore, affirmed. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Practical Ventures, LLC d/b/a AAA Cash Fast v. James Neely, Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development, and Danyelle A. McCullough
This is an appeal from an administrative decision on unemployment benefits. The appellee Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development held that the claimant employee was “constructively discharged” and was therefore eligible for unemployment benefits. The appellant employer filed a petition for judicial review of the administrative decision. The chancery court affirmed, and the employer appeals. We hold that the doctrine of constructive discharge is inapplicable to proceedings under the unemployment compensation statutes. The facts as found by the administrative tribunal support a holding that the employee voluntarily terminated her employment. For this reason, we conclude that the administrative decision awarding benefits to the employee is not supported by substantial and material evidence and is arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, we reverse. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Ashley Evans v. Nigel M. Reid
At an earlier time, Ashley Evans (“the petitioner”) filed a petition against Nigel M. Reid (“the respondent”) seeking an order of protection. The trial court dismissed the petition due to “[in]sufficient cause.” In the same order, however, the court found “proof of the need of a restraining order.” Accordingly, the court restrained the respondent from coming about, calling or harassing the petitioner or her family. Several years later, the respondent asked the court to void the restraining order, which, on its face, was still in effect. The court refused. The respondent appeals. We reverse the trial court and hold that (1) the trial court was without jurisdiction to issue the restraining order and (2) the restraining order is, consequently, null and void. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Brennen T.
This is a termination of parental rights case. After the Appellants filed a termination petition against Biological Parents, Mother filed a counter-claim for malicious use of process, kidnapping, and perjury. The trial court dismissed the termination petition, but failed to rule on Mother’s counter-claim. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for lack of a final judgment. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
Jeffrey Wade Myrick v. Gloria Denise Myrick
The issue presented in this case is whether alimony in futuro was properly terminated by the trial court. The parties entered into a marital dissolution agreement, which provided that Husband/Appellee would pay Wife/Appellant alimony in futuro until death, remarriage, or “until a third person not the Wife’s child, moves into the Wife’s residence.” The marital dissolution agreement was incorporated, by reference, into the final decree of divorce. Thereafter,Wife’s mother moved into Wife’s home,and Husband filed a motion to terminate his support obligation based upon the occurrence of the suspending condition. The trial court granted Husband’s petition, finding that the parties’ agreement for alimony in futuro was contractual in nature and that the unambiguous language mandated cessation of Husband’s support obligation when Wife’s mother moved into Wife’s home. Based upon the provision for attorney’s fees in the parties’ marital dissolution agreement, the trial court also awarded Husband his attorney’s fees and costs. Wife appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Mary Lisa Gaston Luplow v. Martin Duane Luplow
This is an appeal in a divorce case, where Wife appeals the classification and division of marital property and debt, the calculation of the division of the proceeds from the sale of the marital residence, the dismissal of the contempt petition she filed against Husband, and the failure to award her attorney fees. Husband appeals the classification of certain real property and the division of marital debt; he also requests his fees on appeal. We modify the judgment allocating the marital debt and awarding $16,691 to Wife as alimony in solido; we affirm the judgment in all other respects |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Clayton Arden, Surviving Spouse v. Kenya L. Kozawa, M. D.
The plaintiff, as surviving spouse, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his health care liability action against the defendant doctor who treated the plaintiff’s wife prior to her death and the hospital wherein the treatment occurred. The trial court granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment based upon the plaintiff’s failure to strictly comply with the pre-suit notice requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-121 (Supp. 2013). We reverse the trial court’s ruling that the plaintiff had to strictly comply with the provisions of the notice requirement and conclude that the plaintiff substantially complied with said requirement. We affirm, however, the trial court’s ruling that the plaintiff could not rely upon the statutory 120-day extension of the statute of limitations due to his failure to properly serve the notice. We therefore affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims as barred by the statute of limitations. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Kason C. Et Al.
Father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his two children. The juvenile court found the Department of Children’s Services established four grounds for termination of father’s parental rights: 1) parent sentenced to ten or more years for any criminal act and the children are under eight years of age pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6); 2) parent sentenced to more than two years for conduct against a child or sibling/half-sibling of the child who is the subject of the petition pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(5); |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Aaliyah R.
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. The trial court found four grounds for termination of Mother’s parental rights: substantial noncompliance with the requirements of the permanency plan, failure to support financially, failure to provide a suitable home, and persistence of conditions; the court also determined that termination was in the best interest of the child. Mother appeals arguing the evidence is insufficient to establish any of the grounds and that termination was in the child’s best interest. We have determined that the evidence clearly and convincingly supported two of the grounds, that of substantial noncompliance with the requirements of the permanency plan and persistence of conditions. We have also determined that termination was in the child’s best interest. Therefore, we affirm the termination of Mother’s parental rights. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Jay Wilfong v. CRK Real Estate , LLC, Et Al
This case arose out of a contract for the sale of real estate. The contract included a provision requiring the buyer to make “commercially reasonable efforts” to sell the property, and to split any profits with the seller if the property was resold within 36 months. The buyer did not sell the property, and the seller brought suit, raising numerous claims, including breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, violations of the Real Estate Settlement Practices Act (RESPA), the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), the Fair Debt Collection Practice Act, the Consumer Protection Act, RICO, wrongful foreclosure, promissory fraud, civil conspiracy, collusion, intentional infliction of emotional distress, constructive trust, conversion and unjust enrichment. After a hearing, the trial court granted the buyer’s motion to dismiss thirteen of the seller’s claims, denied the motion to dismiss another six of his claims, and certified its order as final for the purposes of appeal under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02. We affirm the trial court. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Tina Wilder v. Union County Board of Education
This appeal arises from the dismissal of a tenured teacher. The Union County Board of Education (“the Board”) dismissed Tina Wilder (“Wilder”) following an incident involving underage drinking at Wilder’s lake cabin. Wilder, contesting her dismissal, filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Union County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court concluded that the evidence sustained Wilder’s dismissal. Wilder raises several issues on appeal. We hold, inter alia, that Wilder was afforded due process, that the Trial Court applied the correct standard of review, and that the evidence supported the Trial Court’s decision. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Union | Court of Appeals | |
Kathy D. Palmore v. Linda K. Neal, Et Al.
Former employee brought an action for retaliatory discharge and intentional interference with employment. The trial court dismissed the complaint pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6). Having determined the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, we affirm the dismissal. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Jerry Beech v. John Doe
The plaintiff in this case brought suit to recover uninsured motorist benefits. The insurance company moved for summary judgment contending that the plaintiff was not entitled to coverage because he was not “upon” the insured vehicle so as to “occupy” it. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurance company and we affirm. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Conservatorship of Maurice M. Acree, Jr.
The trial court approved and affirmed the final accounting of a trust held in a conservatorship estate and closed the conservatorship following the death of the Ward. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Cleveland Custom Stone, Et Al. v. Acuity Mutual Insurance Company
This case concerns Acuity’s refusal to pay insurance proceeds to Plaintiffs, who filed suit, alleging negligence, breach of contract, bad faith refusal to pay, and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 47-18- 101, et. seq. The case proceeded to jury trial. The jury awarded Plaintiff compensatory damages and found that Acuity’s failure to pay was in violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The jury declined to award punitive damages. Likewise, the trial court affirmed the verdict but did not treble the damages. Acuity appeals. We affirm. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
City of Athens v. Blair Strong Enterprises, LLC, d/b/a Open Door Cafe
This appeal challenges a citation for an alleged violation of a city ordinance prohibiting the sale of alcoholic beverages to a person under the age of twenty-one. A municipal judge and the trial court found against the appellant restaurant. We affirm. |
McMinn | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Hannah H., Et Al.
This is a termination of parental rights case. Following a hearing, the trial court found clear and convincing evidence existed to support the termination of the parental rights of both the mother and the father on the statutory grounds of abandonment based on failure to provide a suitable home, failure to substantially fulfill the requirements of the permanency plans, and persistence of conditions. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1)-(3), 36-1-102(1)(A)(ii), 37-2- 403(a)(2). The court further concluded that termination was in the best interest of the children. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i). The mother and father appeal. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
William H. Fleming v. Tejinder Saini, M.D. and Healthquest Clinic
This is an appeal from the denial of a post-judgment motion. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s lawsuit. At the hearing on the motion, the plaintiff agreed to dismissal of his lawsuit. The trial court entered an order dismissing the lawsuit and assessing court costs against the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed a timely motion to alter or amend, asking the trial court to reconsider the award of court costs; this was denied. The plaintiff filed a second motion to alter or amend, again seeking reconsideration of the award of court costs; this request for reconsideration was denied as well. The plaintiff now appeals the trial court’s order on the second post-judgment motion. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In The Matter of: Shayla H.
Mother and Father were divorced and Mother was designated as the primary residential parent of their child in 2003. Father filed a petition several years later seeking to have the designation of primary residential parent changed from Mother to himself. The trial court granted Father’s petition after determining Father had proved a material change in circumstances and it was in the child’s best interest for Father to become the primary residential parent. Mother appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Deborah Evans Wilhoit v. Gary Dennis Wilhoit
Husband filed a petition to terminate his alimony obligation, asserting that he sold his dental practice following the entry of the final divorce decree for health reasons,as a result of which he was unable to pay alimony because his only income was social security benefits. The trial court found that husband’s retirement constituted a material and substantial change of circumstances, but declined to modify his obligation. Husband appeals the denial of his petition and wife appeals the denial of her request for attorney fees. We affirm the decision in part, reverse in part and remand for further consideration. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Aaron Bissinger, Et Al v. New Country Buffett, Et Al.
A man who suffered a blood infection after eating raw summer oysters at a Nashville restaurant filed suit against the restaurant, claiming that the oysters were contaminated because they were kept at an improper temperature. The restaurant owner answered, and among other things he named three companies in the supply chain that furnished the oysters to the defendant restaurant as possibly liable under the doctrine of comparative fault. The plaintiff subsequently died, and his executor was substituted as plaintiff. The executor filed an amended complaint that added the suppliers as defendants, and included claims against all the defendants of negligence, negligence per se, product liability, and breach of warranty. All the parties filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court denied the defendant restaurant’s motion for summary judgment, but it granted summary judgment to the defendant suppliers on all issues except failure to warn. After studying the voluminous record in this case, we affirm all the trial court’s rulings on the summary motions against the restaurant. We affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the suppliers, and reverse the denial of summary judgment to them for failure to warn. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
The Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority D/B/A Erlanger Health System v. United Healthcare Plan of The River Valley, Inc. D/B/A Americhoice and Tennessee Attorney General
Hospital filed an action against TennCare managed care organization (“MCO”) for breach of contract and unjust enrichment when MCO refused to pay Hospital’s standard charges for emergencyservices and follow-up care. Hospital was notpart of MCO’s “provider network” under the TennCare regulations and therefore was “non-contract” provider. MCO alleged Hospital was required to accept as payment the rate TennCare specified in its regulations. MCO filed motion for summary judgment, and the trial court dismissed the portion of the complaint to which the TennCare regulations may apply due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court determined the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (“UAPA”) divested it of jurisdiction because Hospital did not first seek a declaratory order from the Bureau of TennCare regarding the applicability of its regulations to Hospital’s dispute with MCO. Hospital appealed the dismissal of its claims, and we reverse. Because Hospital is not challenging applicabilityor validityof TennCare regulations,UAPA does not divest trial court of jurisdiction. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
William Barry Wood v. Karla Davis, Commissioner of Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development, et al.
The Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development hired plaintiff in 2007 as an executive service appointment. The Department terminated his employment in 2011. In August 2012, Plaintiff filed a complaint based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a violation of his due process rights. The trial court found that the statute of limitations for § 1983 actions had expired. Plaintiff appealed. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |
