James G. Akers v. McLemore Auction Company, LLC, Et Al.
Plaintiff in action to recover for negligence, professional negligence, breach of duty, constructive fraud, constructive breach of contract, and inducement of failure to perform a lawful contract, appeals dismissal of various parties and claims; plaintiff also appeals a portion of the jury instructions, the jury’s verdict awarding him $474.00, and the denial of his motion for a new trial. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Ashley Purdy v. Matthew C. Smith
This case involves the difficult issue of disestablishment of paternity and its effect on child support arrears. Over a year after the trial court entered an order requiring the respondent to pay child support, he requested Rule 60 relief on the grounds that he was not the biological father of the child. Based upon the statutory prohibition against the retroactive modification of child support and the related caselaw, we must affirm the trial court’s decision denying the respondent Rule 60 relief for any time period prior to the filing of his petition. |
Wayne | Court of Appeals | |
Summer Ann-Michelle MIller v. Richard Anthony McFarland
In this post-divorce modification of alimony case,Husband contends that the trial court erred in concluding that his alimony obligation was not subject to modification. We reverse the trial court’s judgment and conclude that Husband’s alimony obligation constitutes transitional alimony that is subject to modification pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-5-121(g)(2). Reversed and remanded. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
David Allan Fogle, Sr. v. Mardonna Shawn Fogle
In this divorce action, the trial court granted Wife a divorce, divided the marital assets, and awarded Wife alimony of $700 per month for 48 months. Wife appeals. We modify the trial court’s judgment to reflect an award of periodic alimony in the amount of $1,000 per month. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Barbara G. Lovejoy v. Department of Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities
This is an appeal from an order dismissing a petition for judicial review of a decision of the Tennessee Civil Service Commission. Because the appellant did not file her notice of appeal with the trial court clerk within the time permitted by Tenn. R. App. P. 4, we dismiss the appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Kaitlynne D
The circuit court adjudicated the child dependent and neglected on the ground of severe child abuse by her father. The father appeals contending the evidence is insufficient to sustain a finding of severe child abuse. Finding the evidence clear and convincing, we affirm. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Serenity B.
In this termination of parental rights proceeding, both Mother and Father maintain that the trial court erred in finding clear and convincing evidence that they willfully abandoned the child by failure to visit within the four months preceding the filing of the termination petition. Mother additionally claims that the trial court erred in finding clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the child to terminate Mother’s parental rights. We affirm the trial court’s findings that both parents abandoned the child by willfully failing to visit and that the termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Consequently, we affirm the trial court’s decision to terminate the parental rights of both parents. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Daniel H. Jones v. Robert H. Montgomery, Jr., Et Al.
The order from which the pro se incarcerated appellant seeks to appeal was entered on December 13, 2013. The Notice of Appeal was filed more than thirty (30) days from the date of entry of the December 13, 2013 order, even considering the date upon which the appellant placed the Notice of Appeal in the mail for filing with the trial court clerk (February 28, 2014). See Tenn. R. App. P. 20(g). Because the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Jerry Wynn v. Dana Wynn
The order appealed is not a final judgment and therefore, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
Gerald Rogers, Next of Kin of Vicki L. Rogers v. Paul Jackson, M. D., Et Al
Defendants in a health care liability action appeal the denial of their motions to strike the allegations of comparative fault raised in the amended answer of other defendants and their motions to dismiss the amended complaint. Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Arlena Tippie v. Tennessee Department of Revenue, Et Al
Former revenue enforcement officer challenges her termination from the Tennessee Department of Revenue. Because substantial and material evidence supports the Civil Service Commission’s decision, we affirm the chancery court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Scott McIllwain, et al. v. Michael Scott Hoover, et al.
Former revenue enforcement officer challenges her termination from the Tennessee Department of Revenue. Because substantial and material evidence supports the Civil Service Commission’s decision, we affirm the chancery court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Club LeConte v. Caroline Swann
This appeal arises from a dispute concerning the payment for Defendant’s wedding reception. Plaintiff filed suit when Defendant failed to pay for the reception as agreed. At trial, Plaintiff presented theories of breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The jury found for Plaintiff and returned a verdict against Defendant in the amount of $10,787.18. On appeal, Defendant requests reversal of the judgment entered against her because she believes that the jury verdict form erroneously allowed for recovery pursuant to both theories of breach of contract and unjust enrichment. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Elisha Michelle (Cantrell) Dickerson v. Johnathan Bradley Cantrell
This post-divorce appeal concerns the modification of a parenting plan designating Mother as the primary residential parent and awarding Father reasonable visitation. Father filed a petition to modify, claiming that a material change in circumstances necessitated a change in the parenting plan. Following a hearing, the trial court designated Father as the primary residential parent and awarded Mother visitation. Mother appeals. We affirm the trial court’s decision. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Donovyn B. H.
The juvenile court set aside its parental visitation order with respect to a child born to married parents as void for lack of jurisdiction. Mother appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Delores Blackmon, et al. v. Illinois Central Railroad Company, et al.
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit pursuant to the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, alleging that her husband was exposed to toxic substances, including asbestos and other chemicals, during his employment with the defendant railroad and that such exposure led to his death from mesothelioma. The railroad filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the deceased employee had executed a release, when he settled previous litigation with the railroad, which served to bar the current litigation. The trial court granted the railroad’s motion for summary judgment based on the release. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Anna May Diggs, et al. v. Reneese Carter, et al.
The trial court awarded summary judgment to Defendant in this will contest. We affirm. |
Carroll | Court of Appeals | |
Philip H. Morson v. Tennessee Department of Mental Health And Developmental Disabilities, Et Al.
A doctor employed by a state mental health facility lost his job in a reduction in force. He claims this action was the result of complaints he made about the facility. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Because the doctor failed to present evidence to establish an issue of material fact (after the defendants shifted the burden to the doctor), we affirm the trial court’s decision. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Daven S. L.
Father of one child appeals the termination of his parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by wilful failure to support and visit and the finding that termination of his parental rights would be in the child’s best interest. Finding no error we affirm. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
In Re D.W.M., Jr.
This appeal involves termination of parental rights. While she was pregnant, the mother of the child at issue made threats to harm herself and the unborn child. Both of the parents are mentally impaired. The mother has other serious disorders as well, and the father is a registered sex offender. The state took the child into protective custody four days after the child was born. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of both parents on grounds of mental incompetence and persistent conditions. After a trial, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that the Department of Children’s Services had established grounds for termination and that termination of parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
David Ray Hoggatt v. Lori Ann Hoggatt
The divorce in this case brought to an end the thirteen-year marriage of David Ray Hoggatt (“Husband”) and Lori Ann Hoggatt (“Wife”). The trial court classified, valued, and distributed the parties’ property. On this appeal, Husband challenges aspects of the division of marital property. We modify the amount that the trial court ordered Wife to pay Husband in the property division. In all other respects, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
David Ray Hoggatt v. Lori Ann Hoggatt - Dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion affirming the trial court’s division of the marital property as modified by the majority. I believe the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s property division, even as modified by the majority, as being an equitable division of the marital property. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Deborah R. Smith v. John P. Stanley, et al.
Deborah R. Smith (“Plaintiff”) sued John P. Stanley and Dinah Stanley (“Defendants”) with regard to injuries Plaintiff suffered when she fell down stairs while visiting a cabin (“the Cabin”) owned by Defendants. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. After a hearing, the Circuit Court for Sevier County (“the Trial Court”) granted Defendants summary judgment after finding and holding that Defendants owed no duty to Plaintiff. Plaintiff appeals the grant of summary judgment. We find and hold, as did the Trial Court, that there are no genuine disputed issues of material fact, and that Defendants have shown that Plaintiff cannot establish an essential element of her claim, specifically duty. We, therefore, affirm the grant of summary judgment. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Garvin M. et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case, focusing on Garvin M. and Brianna M., the minor children (“the Children”) of Ryan M. (“Father”) and Jennifer M. (“Mother”). In July 2012, the Children were taken into protective custody by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) and placed in foster care. DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father on February 26, 2013. The petition alleged as statutory grounds for termination: (1) severe child abuse, (2) abandonment by the parents’ failure to provide a suitable home, (3) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, (4) persistent conditions, and (5) abandonment by an incarcerated parent who exhibits wanton disregard for the Children’s welfare prior to incarceration. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the petition as to both parents upon finding that DCS had proven all of the grounds alleged by clear and convincing evidence. The court also found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights was in the |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Conservatorship of Jack Wayne Turner
This is a conservatorship modification case. Appellant/Mother sought modification of the trial court’s previous order, naming Appellee/Father as the conservator over the parties’ mentally-disabled, adult son, and mandating that Mother’s visitation with the Ward be supervised. Because Mother had made numerous, unfounded allegations of sexual abuse against the Ward by his older brother, the trial court enjoined Mother from making any future allegations of sexual abuse against the Ward by his older brother, and further enjoined her from discussing, with the Ward, any purported sexual abuse by his older brother. Although the trial court modified its previous order to grant Mother four additional hours of visitation per month, it ordered that her visitation would continue to be supervised. The court further modified the conservatorship by holding that Father, at his discretion, would be allowed to tape record any telephone conversations between the Ward and Mother. On appeal, Mother contends that the injunction constitutes an unconstitutional prior restraint on her free speech. We adopt the “modern rule,” holding that defamatory speech may be enjoined after a determination that the speech is, in fact, false, and upon the condition that the injunction be narrowly tailored to limit the prohibited speech to that which has been determined to be false. We conclude that the injunction in this case satisfies both of these criteria such that it does not constitute a prior restraint on Mother’s free speech. Mother also appeals the trial court’sorder concerning the amount of visitation, the fact that the visitation is to be supervised, and recording of her telephone conversations with the Ward. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Mother eight hours of visitation per month. Furthermore, because of Mother’s behavior during the pendency of this litigation, we further conclude that the imposition of supervised visitation and the recording of her telephone conversation serve two functions. First, these requirements preserve the Ward’s best interest by providing safeguards against future negative impacts from Mother’s actions. Second, because Mother has shown a propensity to disregard the orders of the court, the requirements ensure that the court’s orders will be followed. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, and there is no abuse of the trial court’s discretion, we affirm and remand. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |
