Daniel Anthony Norfleet v. Audra Ann Norfleet
This is an appeal from a finding of contempt. When the parents of a six year old girl divorced, they agreed to name the father as the child’s primary residential parent. The mother subsequently acted in a hostile and uncooperative way towards the father, and her parenting time was reduced. Shortly thereafter, the father filed a petition for contempt, alleging that the mother had failed to pay court-ordered child support for four consecutive months. Following a hearing, the trial court held the mother in contempt. She argues on appeal that the trial court erred by trying criminal and civil contempt in the same proceeding. She also argues that the trial court’s order was invalid, because it did not specifically state that her actions were “willful.” We affirm the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Ty-Shawn H.
The Juvenile Court for Johnson City (“the Juvenile Court”) terminated the parental rights of Frank G. (“Father”) to the minor child Ty-Shawn H. (“the Child”) pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6). Father appeals the termination of his parental rights to this Court. We find and hold that clear and convincing evidence existed to terminate Father’s parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6), and that clear and convincing evidence existed that the termination was in the Child’s best interest. We, therefore, affirm the Juvenile Court’s order terminating Father’s parental rights to the Child. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Pepper & Brothers P.L.L.C. v. Brett Jones
A homeowner who was sued by a contractor hired an attorney to defend against the suit. The homeowner and the attorney entered into a contract where by the attorney would charge $225 per hour, calculate the bill in quarter hour increments and bill monthly. The homeowner made his monthly payments as the litigation progressed, but after he became dissatisfied with the service he was getting, he stopped paying . He subsequently discharged the attorney and hired other counsel. The attorney sent the homeowner a final bill for $8,529. The homeowner paid $4,000 and offered to settle the remainder for a lesser amount. The attorney refused and brought suit against the homeowner for the unpaid balance. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the attorney. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Hannah W., et al.
The Juvenile Court terminated the parental rights of Ralph D.M. (“Father”) to the minor twin children Alexis W. and Hannah W. (“the Children”) on the grounds of abandonment by willful failure to visit pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1) and § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i), substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1- 113(g)(2), and persistent conditions pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3). Father appeals the termination of his parental rights asserting that he is neither the biological father nor the legal father of the Children and, therefore, had no parental rights to the Children to be terminated. We find and hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the Juvenile Court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that Father is the Children’s legal father, that grounds existed to terminate Father’s parental rights, and that the termination of Father’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. We affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights to the Children. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
Maury Bronstein, IRA v. Morgan Keegan & Company, Inc.
The trial court vacated an arbitration award in favor of Respondent Morgan Keegan on the ground of evident partiality. Finding Petitioner failed to introduce evidence to support allegations of evident partiality, we reverse and remand to the trial court for confirmation of the arbitration award. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Alissa Owen (Formerly Haas) v. Darin Haas
Wife appeals the trial court’s denial of her Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60 petition to set aside the marital dissolution agreement and permanent parenting plan in their final decree of divorce; she contends she entered into the agreements under duress due to coercion by her husband. The trial court concluded the marital dissolution agreement and permanent parenting plan were not entered into under duress; the court also found that the permanent parenting plan was in the best interests of the children. Finding the trial court applied the correct legal standards and the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, we affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
John Payne as next of kin on behalf of the legal minor heirs of Marcus K. Payne v. Tipton County, Tennessee
This is a negligence case filed against Tipton County for injuries an inmate sustained as a result of a severe hypertensive crisis that occurred while he was confined in the Tipton County jail. The trial court denied the claim, finding that Tipton County did not breach the duty of care. Based on the evidence in the record, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand this matter for consideration of damages. Reversed and remanded. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
Bradford E. Holliday, et al. v. Homer C. Patton, et al.
Bradford E. Holliday, Michael A. Holliday, and Clayton E. Holliday (collectively “Plaintiffs”) sued Homer C. Patton and Jeffrey B. Presley (collectively “Defendants”) for breach of contract and specific performance. Plaintiffs filed motions for summary judgment, which the Trial Court granted after finding and holding, inter alia, that the release provision contained in an amended agreement executed by Defendants “contains broad release language which the Court finds to be adequate to release claims of fraud asserted now by the Defendants in this action.” Defendants appeal to this Court raising issues regarding whether the release was sufficient to waive claims of fraud and whether the Trial Court erred in finding that Defendants could not have reasonably relied upon representations made by Bradford E. Holliday. We find and hold that the release language contained in the amended agreement was insufficient to release claims of fraud and that there are genuine issues of material fact as to the issue of reasonable reliance, and we reverse the grant of summary judgment. We, however, affirm that portion of the Trial Court’s order memorializing Defendants’ voluntary dismissal with prejudice of their counterclaims for fraud against Michael A. Holliday and Clayton E. Holliday. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Stanley Don Runyon v. Melanie Fortner Runyon
This is a Rule 10B appeal of the denial of a petition for recusal. In this divorce case, the trial court bifurcated the issues and conducted a 15-day evidentiary hearing solely on the parties’ parenting arrangement. Months later, the trial court entered an order designating the father as the primary residential parent and giving the mother supervised parenting time. The mother was denied permission for an interlocutory appeal from the parenting order. Several months after that, the mother discovered that, in the course of drafting the parenting order, the trial judge’s office had an ex parte exchange with the guardian ad litem to confirm a minor factual matter. The mother alleged that the trial judge had violated ethical rules against such ex parte communications and filed a motion asking the trial judge to recuse herself. The trial court denied the motion to recuse. The mother filed this accelerated interlocutory appeal of the denial of her recusal motion pursuant to Rule 10B of the Tennessee Supreme Court Rules. We decline to adjudicate whether there was a breach of any ethical rules. As to the trial judge’s denial of the motion for recusal, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Cynthia L. Christian, et al. v. Ayers L.P. d/b/a/ MS. Lassie's Lodge
This is a premises liability case. An attendee at an event fell in the defendant’s parking lot and sustained injuries. The attendee and her husband filed suit against the defendant claiming negligence because the parking area had no lighting on the evening of the fall. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting it: had no notice the outdoor lights were burned out; owed no duty to the attendee; and the attendee was more than fifty percent at fault for her injuries. The trial court determined the record contained insufficient evidence to establish that the defendant had notice the outside lights were not working. The other issues raised were dismissed as moot. The plaintiffs appeal. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Gabriel B. et al
This is a termination of parental rights case, focusing on Gabriel B., Gracie B., and Zachary B., the minor children (“Children”) of Donna B. (“Mother”) and Richard B. (“Father”). The Children were taken into protective custody by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) on June 9, 2011, after they had been found in the care of an inappropriate caregiver while Mother was out of state. On April 19, 2012, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father. Father subsequently surrendered his parental rights to the Children and is not a party to this action. Following a bench trial held on November 9, 2012, and January 4, 2013, the trial court granted the petition upon its finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) Mother had abandoned the Children by failing to provide a suitable home, (2) Mother had failed to substantially comply with the permanency plans, (3) the conditions causing the removal of the Children into protective custody persisted, and (4) Mother’s mental condition was impaired to the point of being unable to provide for the further care and supervision of the Children. The court further found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. Mother has appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
SecurAmerica Business Credit v. Karl Schledwitz, et al.
This is the second appeal involving liability on personal guaranties securing the debt of a transportation company. On remand after our first opinion, the trial court found that the transportation company and the lender, through the actions of its president, entered into a conspiracy to violate the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act and violated the duty of good faith and fair dealing, relieving the guarantors of their liability under the continuing guaranties. The trial court, however, declined to hold that the lender and transportation company committed fraud or that the sale of the transportation company from the guarantors to its current owner was a sham. We affirm the trial court’s rulings with regard to (1) the actions of the lender’s president being imputed to the lender; (2) that the sale of the transportation company was not a sham; (3) that no fraud was committed; and (4) that the guaranties at issue are continuing. We further hold that the trial court was entitled to consider both the underlying credit agreement and the guaranties in determining whether the duty of good faith was breached. However, we vacate the trial court’s judgment with regard to its findings of conspiracy, a violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and breach of the duty of good faith. We further vacate the trial court’s judgment that the guarantors may avoid the obligations under the guaranties. We remand to the trial court for further findings of fact and conclusions of law on these issues. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Charles J. Chambers ex rel. Odis M. Chambers v. Bradley County, et al.
In this medical malpractice case, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint with prejudice on the grounds that plaintiff failed to file, with his complaint, the affidavit of the person who mailed pre-suit notice to the defendants. The trial court, noting that plaintiff complied with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121 (Supp. 2013) in every respect except for filing the affidavit, and that he filed the affidavit shortly after the complaint, denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff had substantially complied with the statute. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Linda F. Coffey et al. v. Tyler N. Hoffman et al.
The issue presented in this appeal is whether the plaintiffs’ uninsured motorist insurance carrier preserved its rights to a jury trial and subrogation interest under Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-1206 (2008). This statute allows an uninsured motorist insurer to “elect to decline binding arbitration and preserve its subrogation rights” under certain prescribed circumstances. Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-1206(k). The trial court held that the uninsured motorist insurance carrier failed to comply with a local circuit court rule that requires a response to a motion to be filed and served on the movant no later than 30 days after the motion is filed. Pursuant to that local rule, the trial court treated the plaintiffs’ motion to compel arbitration as “unopposed.” The trial court further held that the uninsured motorist insurance carrier “did not strictly comply with the requirement of T.C.A. § 56-7-1206 objecting to arbitration” and ordered the parties to submit to binding arbitration. We hold that the uninsured motorist insurance carrier complied with the statute, thereby preserving its rights to a jury trial and subrogation, and that the local rule does not operate to abrogate these rights. The judgment of the trial court is vacated and this case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
Mary Ann Layman v. Thomas Stuart Layman
In this divorce case, the trial court granted Mary Ann Layman (“Wife”) an absolute divorce from Thomas Stuart Layman (“Husband”), thereby ending the parties’ twenty-nine year marriage. Subsequently, the court divided the marital property and awarded Wife alimony in futuro and child support in a lump sum amount. Husband appeals. We reverse the trial court’s award of $63,200 in retroactive child support. The judgment is otherwise affirmed. |
McMinn | Court of Appeals | |
Tonita Reeves v. Pederson-Kronseder, LLC, d/b/a Pederson's Natural Farms, Inc.
Employee and Employer were preparing to arbitrate Employee’s age discrimination claim when parties began discussing settlement. Employer was responsible for arbitration expenses and made an offer to settle Employee’s claim before incurring bulk of expenses. Employee was aware of Employer’s motivation to avoid paying these fees. Employee attempted to accept offer of settlement three days before arbitration was scheduled, which was after Employer was required to pay $9,000 deposit for arbitration and incurred other necessary expenses preparing for hearing. Employer informed Employee its offer had lapsed and was no longer open. Employee sued for breach of contract. Trial court found Employee did not accept Employer’s offer within reasonable period of time and that there was no settlement contract to enforce. Employee appeals trial court’s judgment. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Gabriel B. et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case, focusing on Gabriel B., Gracie B., and Zachary B., the minor children (“Children”) of Donna B. (“Mother”) and Richard B. (“Father”). The Children were taken into protective custody by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) on June 9, 2011, after they had been found in the care of an inappropriate caregiver while Mother was out of state. On April 19, 2012, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father. Father subsequently surrendered his parental rights to the Children and is not a party to this action. Following a bench trial held on November 9, 2012, and January 4, 2013, the trial court granted the petition upon its finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) Mother had abandoned the Children by failing to provide a suitable home, (2) Mother had failed to substantially comply with the permanency plans, (3) the conditions causing the removal of the Children into protective custody persisted, and (4) Mother’s mental condition was impaired to the point of being unable to provide for the further care and supervision of the Children. The court further found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. Mother has appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
Rhonda Potter, et al v. William Dale Perrigan, M.D., et al.
This is a medical malpractice action. Plaintiffs timely filed a complaint after properly sending pre-suit notices to Defendants. After voluntarily dismissing the initial complaint, Plaintiffs filed a second complaint pursuant to the saving statute with an attached certificate of good faith and a copy of the original pre-suit notices. Defendants moved to dismiss the second complaint for failure to comply with the notice requirements set out in Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a). The trial court agreed and dismissed the action. Plaintiffs appeal. We reverse the decision of the trial court. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Jeremy Mitchell Jordan v. Donald Keeble, M.D. et al.
The plaintiff, a former state prison inmate, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his health care liability action against the defendants. The trial court granted the motions to dismiss filed by the defendants who are medical personnel based upon, inter alia, the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the requirements of the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-26-115 to -122 (Supp. 2013). The trial court also granted the motions to dismiss filed by all of the defendants upon finding that the plaintiff’s complaint contained insufficient factual allegations under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and, therefore, failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6). The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no error regarding dismissal with prejudice pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6), we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Guardianship of Minor Children of Lorenzen Wright
This is an appeal from a probate court order in a guardianship case. In a prior action involving the same parties, the circuit court established a trust to hold insurance proceeds due to Minor Children and appointed Mother trustee. Subsequently, the present case was initiated when Grandfather petitioned the probate court to be appointed guardian over separate pension funds due to Minor Children. Mother also sought to be appointed guardian over the pension funds initially, but she later withdrew her request. Despite Mother’s withdrawal, the probate court investigated Mother’s personal finances and became concerned with her management of the previously established trust. The probate court appointed a guardian ad litem to further investigate Mother’s management of the trust. We hold that the probate court acted beyond the scope of its jurisdiction in doing so and therefore vacate the court’s judgment in part and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Eddie R. Gates v. Andrew S. Perry, et al.
This interlocutory appeal concerns the issue of whether the requirement of obtaining new process or recommencing an action in general sessions court is triggered for purposes of Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-710 by the failure to return unserved the prior process within 60 days as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-902. Eddie R. Gates (“Gates”), alleging damages sustained in an automobile accident, sued Andrew S. Perry (“Perry”) in the General Sessions Court for Bradley County (“the General Sessions Court”). Gates’ suit was dismissed. On Gates’ appeal to the Circuit Court for Bradley County (“the Circuit Court”), Perry moved to dismiss, again alleging that the statute of limitations had run during the long gap between issuance and reissuance of process in the General Sessions Court action. The Circuit Court denied Perry’s motion, holding that the time bar did not operate because process was not returned unserved and, therefore, the statute of limitations never ran. We granted permission for this interlocutory appeal. We reverse the Circuit Court. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Joseph H. Johnston v. Davidson County Election Commission, et al.
Write-in candidate for election to the Council of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County appeals the dismissal of his challenge on constitutional grounds to the statute requiring that, fifty days before an election, write-in candidates for offices in the election submit a notice to the county election commission requesting that their votes be counted. Determining that the statute is constitutional as written and as applied, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Helen Stewart v. Cadna Rubber Company
This is an employment discrimination case. The employment of the plaintiff employee was terminated in the course of a reduction in force. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the defendant employer alleging that she was singled out for termination in the reduction in force based on her age and/or race. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer. The trial court reasoned that the evidence submitted by the plaintiff was insufficient to create an issue of fact as to whether the employer singled her out for termination based on her age and/or race, and that the plaintiff’s evidence was insufficient to prove that the legitimate nondiscriminatory reason proffered by the employer for terminating the plaintiff’s employment was pretextual. The plaintiff now appeals. We reverse. The standard for summary judgment applicable in this case is the standard set out in Hannan and Gossett. Under the very high standard in those cases, the employer cannot negate an element of the plaintiff’s prima facie case merely by showing that the plaintiff did not submit sufficient evidence at the summary judgment stage; to obtain summary judgment under that standard, the employer must show that the plaintiff cannot establish this element of her claim at trial. Thus, we hold that the employer failed to meet this standard on any of the plaintiff’s claims of discrimination. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Bradley Wells v. Chattanooga Bakery, Inc., et al
Plaintiff brought suit against defendants alleging the unlawful use of his image and likeness and asserting statutory claims for violation of the Tennessee Personal Rights Protection Act and the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and common law claims for unjust enrichment, accounting, and conversion. Upon defendants’ motion, the trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on complete preemption by the Copyright Act. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Marsha Hicks v. Jennifer Prahl
This negligence action arose from an automobile accident occurring on October 8, 2009, in Knox County. The plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit on September 7, 2010, alleging that the defendant was negligent in the operation of her vehicle, causing the rear-end collision. A jury trial was held November 8-13, 2012, at the conclusion of which the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff filed a motion for new trial and a supplemental motion for new trial. The trial court denied these motions, determining that the evidence preponderated in favor of the jury’s verdict. The plaintiff timely appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals |
