Neal Lovlace and Norma Jean Lovlace v. Timothy Kevin Copley and Beth Copley
This is a modification of child visitation case, involving grandparent visitation. The Appellant grandparents appeal the trial court’s order, denying their request for more visitation with the minor child, as well as the failure of the trial court to find the Appellee Mother guilty of all alleged incidents of civil contempt. In the posture of Appellees, the mother and her husband (the child’s adoptive father) argue that the Appellants are not entitled to any visitation. We conclude that in modification of grandparent visitation cases, if the parent is the movant, his or her burden is to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that there has been a material change in circumstance affecting the child’s best interest. However, where the movant is the non-parent, we hold that the grandparent visitation statute provides that the burden is on the non-parent to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that there has been a material change in circumstance that would present a substantial risk of harm to the child if modification is denied. Because the trial court incorrectly applied the best interest standard, we vacate its order modifying the visitation arrangement. We also conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the mother in civil contempt on five counts; however, we conclude that the award of attorney’s fees for that contempt is not clear as to what portion, if any, of those fees was expended for prosecution of the contempts, and what portion, if any, was expended in pursuit of the Appellees’ attempt to modify the visitation order. Therefore, we also vacate the award of attorney’s fees and remand for an award of those fees associated only with the prosecution of the contempts. Vacated in part, affirmed in part, and remanded. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Neal Lovlace and Norma Jean Lovlace v. Timothy Kevin Copley and Beth Copley - Concur and Partial Dissent
I concur with the result reached in this case, but I disagree with some of the reasoning and therefore write separately. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Neal Lovlace and Norma Jean Lovlace v. Timothy Kevin Copley and Beth Copley - Concur and Partial Dissent
I agree with much of the majority’s well reasoned analysis in this case. However, in some respects, I would use different reasoning to reach the same result, and so must file this separate concurrence. In some other respects, I disagree with the result reached by the majority and so must partially dissent. These are discussed below. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Gary Paul v. Dennis Watson and Darlene Watson d/b/a Double D Lawn Care and Landscaping
This case involves an alleged oral contract for landscaping work. The homeowner paid a |
Benton | Court of Appeals | |
Eagles Landing Development, LLC v. Eagles Landing Apartments, LP, et al.
This is a breach of contract case. Following a bench trial, the trial court awarded Appellee Developer the remaining balance due under a Development Agreement that was entered by and between Appellee and the Appellants, a partnership and its limited liability partners, for construction of an apartment complex. Appellants contend that Appellee was not entitled to final payment because the general partner, who is not a party to this appeal, had not funded the development fees that were contemplated under a Partnership Agreement, to which Appellee was not a party. Specifically, Appellants argue that the payment under the Development Agreement is contingent upon satisfaction of the funding requirements specified in the Partnership Agreement. We conclude that the conditions precedent under the Development Agreement were met, and that the Appellee was, therefore, entitled to its full fee under the Development Agreement. The trial court assessed judgment against the limited liability partners and the partnership. Under the Tennessee Revised Uniform Partnership Act, Appellants’ status as limited partners protects them from liability for the debts of the partnership. Appellee contends that it is a third-party beneficiary under the Partnership Agreement and may, therefore, have judgment against the limited partners who were parties to that agreement. We conclude that the third-party beneficiary issue is waived and that the trial court erred in entering judgment against the limited partners. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Brian Douglas Spivey v. David N. King et al.
The plaintiff Brian Douglas Spivey (“the Plaintiff”) alleges that the defendants, his former business partners, David N. King and Anthony G. Brown (collectively “the Defendants’), engaged in a conspiracy, and, pursuant to that conspiracy, took actions that include forcing him into bankruptcy and harassing him in the bankruptcy case, expelling him from a business entity, defaming him, and initiating unwarranted criminal charges that were dismissed. The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss asserting that this was simply an attempt to relitigate issues that had been determined in the Plaintiff’s bankruptcy and in a chancery court case the Defendants had pursued. They also filed a motion for sanctions. It turns out that the bankruptcy court did not issue its opinion until after the complaint in this case was filed and that the chancery court action was stayed as to the Plaintiff as a result of his bankruptcy filing. The trial court dismissed the complaint in an order that states that the dismissal was for “failure to state a claim.” The trial court also awarded sanctions against the Plaintiff and his attorney. The Plaintiff appeals. We affirm that part of the judgment dismissing the claims related to forcing the Plaintiff into bankruptcy and harassing him in bankruptcy as well as the claims related to expelling him from the business entity. We vacate that part of the judgment dismissing claims related to defamation and the allegedly unwarranted criminal prosecution. We also vacate that part of the judgment sanctioning the Plaintiff and his attorney. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Shree Krishna, LLC d/b/a Quizno's Classic Subs v. Broadmoor Investment Corp.
This case involves the breach of a commercial lease. The plaintiff leased property from the defendant for a franchise restaurant. The lease granted the plaintiff options to renew for two additional lease periods. The parties’ agreement with the franchisor provided that the lease and the options were assignable, and that the landlord’s consent to the assignment could not be unreasonably withheld. The plaintiff sought to assign the lease and the renewal options to a third party. The defendant landlord refused to consent to the assignment and attempted to negotiate a new lease with the prospective assignee on different terms. After the assignee withdrew its offer to purchase the plaintiff’s franchise, the plaintiff agreed to sell it to the assignee for a reduced price. The plaintiff then filed this lawsuit against the defendant landlord for breach of contract, alleging that it unreasonably withheld consent to the original proposed assignment. After a bench trial, the trial court held in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant landlord now appeals. We affirm, finding that the evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that the defendant landlord unreasonably withheld consent in order to extract an economic concession or improve the landlord’s economic position. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Katie J. Rountree v. Joshua Rountree
This is a divorce case involving issues related to the permanent parenting plan and the divisionofmarital property. The trial court adoptedMother’s proposedpermanent parenting plan, which provided that the child would attend preschool, against Father’s wishes, even though prior to trial Father had been the primary caregiver of the child while Mother worked. The trial court also adopted Mother’s proposed division of marital property. We conclude that the trial court erred in finding that Father’s desire to care for the child during the day was based on a self-serving motive. Accordingly, we vacate the parenting plan and remand for the establishment of a new permanent parenting plan. We further conclude that Mother was improperly assigned her attorney fees as a marital debt, and we reverse that award. In addition, we reverse portions of the trial court’s findings regarding the marital property, but affirm the overall division as equitable. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Jennifer Pitts Bradford v. David Wilson Pitts
This is the second appeal of this post-divorce case in which David Wilson Pitts (“Father”) petitioned for suspension or termination of his child support obligation owed to Jennifer Pitts Bradford (“Mother”). The trial court denied Father’s request, holding that Father failed to prove that a substantial variance in his income was present. Father appealed, and this court directed the trial court to consider Father’s tax return in determining whether a substantial variance existed. On remand, the trial court found that a substantial variance existed between Father’s income at the time of the divorce as reflected in the tax return and his income at the time of the request for suspension or termination. The trial court modified Father’s support obligation and imposed court’s imposition of sanctions against Mother but affirm the decision of the trial court in all other respects. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Haven T.
Haven T. is the daughter of Clint T. (“Father”) and Jennifer G. (“Mother”). The parties were never married. Father initiated the present litigation by filing a petition for custody after Mother notified him she would be moving from Chattanooga to Johnson City to attend college. At the hearing that followed, the parties stipulated that this was the “initial” custody determination for Haven although the juvenile court had entered an order in 2003 adopting a “parenting plan” that, by agreement, gave the parties equal time with Haven. The court awarded custody to Father. Mother appeals. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Adelaida Fielding et al. v. The Metropolitan Government of Lynchburg, Moore County, Tennessee et al.
The plaintiffs filed this declaratory judgment action seeking to invalidate a re-zoning ordinance on the grounds that it constitutes illegal “spot zoning,” and that the re-zoned area was improperly classified in violation of the local general zoning ordinance. The trial court upheld the re-zoning ordinance, finding it was enacted in furtherance of public safety goals and that the re-zoning classification was reasonable and rational. We affirm. |
Moore | Court of Appeals | |
Mary Lee Martin v. S. Dale Copeland
In this boundary line dispute, plaintiff sued defendant, the adjoining property owner, and defendant countersued. Each of the parties employed their own surveyors who testified at the trial, and the Trial Court ultimately established a boundary line between the parties. Defendant appealed to this Court. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Roger Lee Neal v. Kelli Jean Hayes
This case arises from a long-running legal dispute between Roger Lee Neal (“Neal”) and Kelli Jean Hayes (“Hayes”) concerning their minor child (“the Child”). Neal and Hayes disputed, among other things, custody matters relating to the Child. In March 2011, the Circuit Court for Knox County, Fourth Circuit (“the Trial Court”), entered an order confirming findings of the Special Master, Sarah Higgins (“the Special Master”) and resolving numerous contested issues. In the same order, the trial judge, Judge Swann, stated, in effect, that he no longer could be neutral towards Neal because of Neal’s villainous statements about the Special Master and Neal’s “admitted perjury” and recused himself from any further participation in these cases. Husband appeals, arguing, in part, that Judge Swann could not simultaneously rule on the Special Master’s findings and recuse himself because of lack of neutrality. We hold that as both the Special Master and Judge Swann expressed an understandable lack of neutrality in their findings and order, respectively, the Trial Court’s March 2011 order is vacated, and we remand for further proceedings to be held before a neutral court. We vacate the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Rebecca Webb v. Mark Thomas Webb
Father in divorce action appeals trial court’s designation of Mother as primary residential parent and division of marital property. Because the order appealed does not resolve all claims, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
Christopher J. Etheridge, Selena A. v. YMCA and West Tennessee, et al
A minor was injured in June 2008 when a sink, installed in November 2004, shattered. Suit was initially filed in June 2009, and Defendants were added in September 2009 and April 2010. The trial court granted summary judgment to Defendants based upon the construction statute of repose, Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-3-202, et seq., and we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Barbara Jean Hooper Flynn v. Robert Dean Flynn
The trial court denied Husband’s petition to modify alimony upon finding he was voluntarily underemployed, and found him to be in civil contempt. We vacate the finding of voluntary underemployment, affirm the finding of contempt, and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Scholastic Book Clubs, Inc. v. Reagan Farr, Commissioner of Revenue, State of Tennessee
The trial court determined that the Commissioner of Revenue’s assessment of sales and use taxes against out-of-state Plaintiff for sales to customers in Tennessee was not permitted under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, and entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff. The Commissioner of Revenue appeals. We reverse and remand. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Todd Marsh, et al. v. Larry A. Storie, et al.
Todd Marsh and Kari Marsh (“Plaintiffs”) sued Larry A. Storie (“Storie”) and First Tennessee Bank National Association (“First TN Bank”) with regard to, among other things, ownership of real property which had been the subject of both a tax sale and a foreclosure sale. After a hearing, the Trial Court entered an order on January 4, 2011 granting partial summary judgment dismissing First TN Bank from the case, and certifying the judgment as final as to First TN Bank pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02. Plaintiffs appeal the dismissal of their claims against First TN Bank. We affirm. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Ronald L.D.
This is a termination of parental rights case in which the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (the “Department”) removed Ronald L. D. (the “Child”) from the custody of Ronald B. (“Father”). The Child was adjudicated dependent and neglected, and after Father failed to comply with the permanency plan, the Department petitioned to terminate Father’s parental rights. Following a hearing, the court terminated Father’s parental rights, finding that Father failed to substantially comply with two permanency plans, that the conditions which led to removal persisted, and that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the Child. Father appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Sierra D.M., et al
The State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed 1 a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of Susan M.M. (“Mother”) and Mark M. (“Father”)2 to the minor children Sierra D.M. (“Sierra”) and Hunter Z.M. (“Hunter”) (or collectively “the Children”) pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1) and (g)(3). After a trial, the Juvenile Court3 entered its order on August 17, 2011 finding and holding, inter alia, that clear and convincing evidence existed to terminate Mother’s parental rights to the Children under Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1) and (g)(3), and that clear and convincing evidence existed that the termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. Mother appeals to this Court. We affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Robert F. Meredith et al. v. Kenneth L. Weller et al.
The plaintiff, Robert F. Meredith (“the Owner”), appeals a judgment rendered against him in favor of his home builder, Kenneth L. Weller (“the Builder”), on the Builder’s counterclaim for breach of contract and for attorney’s fees incurred in defending the Owner’s claims for, among other things, defective construction, misrepresentation, breach of contract, and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 47-18-101 et seq. (2001)(“the TCPA”). The Builder asks us to award him his attorney’s fees incurred in defending the Owner’s appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects. We also award the Builder his reasonable attorney’s fees incurred on appeal and remand to the trial court for a hearing to determine those fees. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Jonathan Paul Gray v. Casey Renea Jeans
Casey Renea Jeans (“Mother”) and Jonathan Paul Gray (“Father”) are the parents of two minor children, Tyler and Alexia (“the Children”, collectively). Mother and Father never were married. As part of the Permanent Parenting Plan (“the PPP”), Mother and Father shared custody of the Children, with Father designated as the primary residential parent. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Donna Crawford v. Department of Finance and Administration and State of Tennessee Civil Service Commission
Appellant, a civil service employee with the State of Tennessee, appeals the trial court’s judgment affirming the decision of the Civil Service Commission terminating her employment. The Commission had affirmed the initial order by the Administrative Law Judge, who upheld the decision of the Department of Finance and Administration to terminate Appellant’s employment for the good of the service pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 8-30-326. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Oliver J. Higgins v. Mark Gwynn, et al.
Petitioner who sought judicial review of the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation’s denial of his request for disclosure of investigative records pursuant to the Tennessee Public Records Act appeals the trial court’s dismissal of the petition. Finding that the records requested are excepted from disclosure, we affirm the judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
James Fitzpatrick Dendy v. Amy Michelle Dendy
This divorce case covered a span of years in the Trial Court, and the Trial Court ultimately granted the parties a divorce, awarded primary custody of the children to the father, denied alimony to the mother and divided the marital estate between the parties. The mother appealed and has raised numerous issues. Many of the issues raised pertain to matters occurring after the appeal was filed, and we decline to consider these issues. The record establishes the mother did not attend the final hearing wherein the divorce was granted. We vacate that part of the final decree, dividing the marital assets and liabilities, on the ground that the mother established grounds of excusable neglect for failing to attend the trial, and remand to the Trial Court to grant a new trial on this issue. We otherwise affirm the rulings in the Judgment by the Trial Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals |
