Herbal Integrity, LLC, et al. v. Scott Huntley, Jr., et al.
The parties agreed to submit the valuation of Defendants’ membership in Plaintiff LLC to arbitration. Following arbitration, Defendants moved to vacate the arbitrator’s award. The trial court denied the motion and entered final judgment in the matter. Defendants appeal. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Annia J.
The trial court modified a previous custody order and named father the primary residential parent. We conclude that the trial court erred in finding a material change in circumstances. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s decision. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Elizabeth Ann (Stickney) Compton v. Neil Scott Stickney
This is a post-divorce dispute over father’s obligation to help pay for the parties’ child’s college education. We conclude that, pursuant to the parties’ permanent parenting plan, father is contractually obligated to continue paying support in the amount of $790 a month until the child reaches the age of 21 as long as the child is in college. We affirm the trial court’s decision as modified. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Chadwick David Dorman Moyer v. Nashville Midnight Oil, LLC, d/b/a Cadillac Ranch
Plaintiff sued to recover for injuries sustained while riding a mechanical bull in a bar owned byDefendant. Defendantappeals the trial court’s determination that it was 100% at fault and resulting judgmentfor plaintiff. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Landon H.
The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights on the ground that Father abandoned the child by engaging in conduct exhibiting a wanton disregard for the child’s welfare. Father appeals, contending that the pleadings did not allege abandonment by wanton disregard as a ground upon which termination was sought; Father also asserts that the trial court erred in denying his counter-petition for custody. Because we have concluded that the petitioners failed to plead abandonment by wanton disregard as a ground for termination, we vacate the termination of Father’s parental rights on that ground and remand for consideration of whether Father’s parental rights should be terminated based on a ground alleged in the petition or supplemental petition; we affirm the trial court’s denial of Father’s counterpetition for custody. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
David Scott Blackwell v. Bill Haslam, Governor of the State of Tennessee, et al.
This is a declaratory judgment action filed pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-14102.The petitioner, who was convicted of three felony drug offenses in Georgia, was granted a full pardon by the State of Georgia that expressly restored his right to possess a firearm, now resides in Tennessee and desires to purchase and possess firearms. Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-17-1307(b)(1)(B) makes it a Class E felony offense for a person, who has been “convicted of a felony involving the use or attempted use of force, violence or a deadly weapon” or who has been “convicted of a felony drug offense,” to possess a firearm in Tennessee. Therefore, Petitioner filed this action seeking a declaration that he would not be in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-17-1307(b)(1)(B) by purchasing or possessing a firearm in Tennessee. The State of Tennessee responded to the petition by filing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and a motion to dismiss pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Due Process Clause of the Second and Fourteenth Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, the Second Amendment, and article I, section 26 of the Tennessee Constitution.The chancery court ruled that it had subject matter jurisdiction and denied the State’s Rule 12.02(1); however, the chancery court granted the State’s Rule 12.02(6) motion finding that the petitioner failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. On appeal, the petitioner challenges Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-17-1307(b)(1)(B) as applied to him under the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution; article I, section 26 of the Tennessee Constitution,the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Full Faith and Credit Clause. The State raises one issue on appeal, asserting that the chancery court did not have subject matter jurisdiction and the appeal should be dismissed for that reason. We affirm the chancery court’s finding that it has subject matter jurisdiction. As for the decision to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6), we have determined that the complaint for declaratory relief states facts sufficient to demonstrate the existence of an actual controversy concerning the matter at issue; therefore, the chancery court erred by granting the State’s motion pursuant to Rule 12.02(6) instead of rendering a declaratory judgment as the facts and law require. Accordingly, the complaint for declaratory relief is reinstated and this case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Joshua N. Lee v. Lyons Construction Company, Inc.
Plaintiff and others sustained injuries in a single car accident and sued defendant construction company and the Tennessee Department of Transportation, alleging that defendant construction company had recently completed work on that section of the highway where the accident occurred, and that a low point in the pavement caused plaintiff to lose control of his vehicle and wreck. Defendant answered, stating that they had completed the required construction on that section of the highway, and the State had accepted its work pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §12-4-501 et seq. which provides upon proper completion of the work the contractor "is discharged from all liability to any party". Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment which the Trial Court granted and plaintiff appealed. We hold that summary judgment for the defendant in this case was proper, and affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Rebecca L. Inman v. James A. Inman, et al.
A show cause order was entered in this case on November 21, 2011, directing the pro se appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed as premature. The appellant has responded to the show cause order within the time specified, but the argument presented in the response does not appear to present good cause for maintaining this case in this court. The review of the record reveals that the judgment to which the notice of appeal is directed is not “a final judgment adjudicating all the claims, rights, and liabilities of all parties” from which an appeal as of right would lie. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a). Specifically, the order of dismissal does not address the counterclaims filed by the appellees below or finally resolve the award of attorneys’ fees to the appellees. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal as premature. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
CK Development, LLC v. Town of Nolensville, et al.
The Developer of a Planned Unit Development in Nolensville sought final approval from the planning commission of phase 7 of the development. The planning commission conditioned its approval of the plan on the developer’s agreement to construct the roads in phase 7 in accordance with more recent road standards that were adopted in 2007. The developer filed a petition for writ of certiorari claiming it had vested rights in the earlier road standards and that complying with the more rigorous standards would require it to spend more money than it had originally planned. The trial court agreed with the developer and concluded that it had vested rights in the earlier road standards. The town appealed. We reverse the trial court’s decision because the developer did not rely on any final governmental approval, the application of the improved road standards was not a zoning change, and the developer has neither engaged in substantial construction of phase 7 nor incurred substantial liabilities with respect to phase 7. We also reject the developer’s argument that the planning commission exceeded its jurisdiction by acting in a legislative rather than an administrative capacity when it determined the developer was required to comply with the 2007 road standards. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Frederica April Dawn Bell v. Dennis Lynn Bell
This is an appeal from an order returning temporary custody of the parties’ child to the father pending a further hearing. Because the order appealed does not resolve all the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment. |
Humphreys | Court of Appeals | |
2850 Parkway General Partnership v. C. Dan Scott, et al
Plaintiff brought an action for declaratory judgment, asking the Court to declare that while plaintiff's sublease required it to pay the property taxes, the master lease required the lessor to pay the property taxes, and asked the Court to declare the lessor liable for the property taxes. Following trial, the Trial Court declared that the sublessee was liable for the property taxes, as it agreed to pay under the sublease. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court on the grounds that under the fact of this case, plaintiff is equitably estopped to avoid paying property taxes, as agreed to in the sublease. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, ex rel Alexandria Price v. Christopher Childers
The State brought this action against the defendant to establish paternity and require support for the dependent child. A default judgment was taken against defendant, which determined that he was the father of the child and he was ordered to pay child support, and it was ordered that the child support be withheld from his paycheck. During these proceedings the defendant was a member of the United States military, and he subsequently filed a pro se motion for DNA testing. The DNA test established that he was not the biological father of the child, and the support withheld from his paycheck was ordered reimbursed to defendant. The State appealed, and we hold that the Juvenile Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to require the State to reimburse defendant for the child support withheld from his paycheck. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Benjamin M. Bates and Estate of Pearl Bates
This appeal arises from a claim filed against two decedents’ estates to recover the value of improvements made to real estate since 2000. The claimant is one of nine children of the decedents, husband and wife, who died in 1959 and 1962, respectively. The court granted the appellee’s claim for the value of improvements made since 2000 to the decedents’ former home place. Because the decedents died intestate, their real property immediately vested in their heirs in 1962. Therefore, the real estate the claimant improved beginning in 2000 was not owned by either decedent at that time or thereafter; thus, the award of a claim against the estates of these two decedents is a nullity. Accordingly, the judgment is vacated and the case is remanded. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
Kimberly Anne Chavez v. James Albert Chavez, Jr.
Wife sought a divorce and Husband counterclaimed for a divorce. The trial court granted the divorce to both parties. Wife was designated the primary residential parent and was awarded transitional alimony and alimony in solido. Husband appeals. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
William N. Nusbaum v. Lucile E. Nusbaum
In this divorce appeal, wife challenges the distribution of husband’s federal retirement benefits, the award of transitional alimony, and the court’s failure to award her attorneyfees. Because of an error in the percentage of husband’s FERS classified as marital assets, we reverse the trial court’s decision. As to transitional alimony, we affirm the award of $500 per month but extend the award until the time of husband’s retirement. We affirm the trial court’s decision regarding attorney fees. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Rheaetta F. Wilson, et al. v. Americare Systems, Inc., et al.
Decedent’s next of kin filed this wrongful death action against an assisted living facility, two nurses, and the facility’s management company for failure to provide proper care and treatment. This appeal concerns only the jury verdict and judgment finding the management company directly liable for failure to provide adequate staff at the assisted living facility. We find no material evidence to support a conclusion that any staffing deficiency proximately caused the decedent’s death. We therefore reverse the judgment finding direct liability on the part of the management company. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
Jacqueline L. Shultz v. Kirby Fuller
Upon the divorce of the parties, the permanent parenting plan designated the mother as the primary residential parent of the couple’s daughter. Both parties eventually filed petitions to modify the permanent parenting plan. The trial court concluded that there had been a material change of circumstance and that it was in the best interest of the daughter that her parenting be shared equally between the parties. Mother appeals the trial court’s modification decision. We reverse the order of the trial court and remand for further proceedings regarding the best interest of the child. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Mark Steven Devore v. Rhonda M. Devore
This is a post-divorce case in which Mark Steven Devore (“Husband”) petitioned for modification of child support. Rhonda M. Devore (“Wife”) counter-petitioned for contempt. The trial court held that Husband was no longer liable for child support because the children had reached the age of majority but that the amount of overpayment was offset by obligations provided for in the marital dissolution agreement (“MDA”). The court also held that Husband was liable for future college expenses. Following Wife’s motion to reconsider, the court held that Husband owed $11,230.43 for past due college expenses. Husband appeals. We hold that the court erred because it did not use a child support worksheet to calculate the amount of support owed. We vacate and remand for the court to utilize a worksheet. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, et al. v. Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development and Workers' Compensation Division
This action was filed pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, Tennessee Code Annotated § 4-5-322, for contested cases. The petitioner challenges a penalty assessed by the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development, Division of Workers’ Compensation.The stated reason for the penaltywas the failure to file Form C-20,Tennessee Employer’s First Report of Work Injury, regarding eighteen injuries that occurred in January and February 2003 which were medical only injuries, meaning no disability benefits were owing. The trial court affirmed the penalty. We find the petitioner was not afforded proper notice of the Department’s basis for issuing the penalty in violation of the petitioner’s due process rights under the UAPA, Tennessee Code Annotated § 4-5-307. We also find that the Department exceeded its authority by changing its “interpretation” of Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0800-2-1-.06, a rule that was unambiguous and, thus, not subject to interpretation. The trial court’s holding is reversed, and this matter is remanded with instructions to vacate the penalty assessed against the petitioner. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Billy D. H.
Mother’s parental rights to her son were terminated on grounds that she was mentally incompetent to provide for the child and that the conditions which led to the child’s removal from Mother’s custody persisted. She appeals, contending that the grounds are not supported by the evidence and that termination of her rights was not in the best interest of the child. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Fentress | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Conservatorship of John Daniel Tate
This is the second appeal arising from a disputed “temporary” conservatorship. Three issues are presented: whether the evidence clearly and convincingly established that the respondent was a disabled person in need of the protection and supervision of the court; which party is responsible for the costs of the proceedings under Tennessee Code Annotated § 34-1-114(a); and which party is responsible for discretionary costs under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.04(2). The petitioner was appointed “Temporary Conservator” and served in this fiduciary capacity for thirty-one months until June of 2010, at which time the trial court terminated the conservatorship upon the finding that the respondent was no longer a “disabled person” as that term is defined in Tennessee Code Annotated § 34-1-101(7). Over the objection of the ward, the trial court assessed the costs of the conservatorship against the respondent pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 34-1-114(a) because a “fiduciary” was appointed, and discretionary costs pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.04(2) upon the finding that the petitioner was the “prevailing party.” The respondent contends this was error because the conservator was merely appointed the “temporary conservator” and the petition to create the conservatorship was ultimately dismissed. We find the evidence presented to the trial court on November 14, 2007, clearly and convincingly established that the respondent was a disabled person in need of a conservator of his person and property; we find no error with the trial court’s conclusion that the petitioner was entitled to recover the costs of the proceedings pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 34-1-114(a) because a conservator was appointed; and we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in assessing discretionary costs against the respondent under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.04(2). Thus, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Geoffrey Todd Krasner v. John Arnold
This appeal involves claims of defamation. After words were exchanged in the course of a parenting dispute, the plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the defendant father of the plaintiff’s girlfriend’s daughter. A bench trial was held in which both parties were self-represented. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Chandra Pearson v. Victor Ross
This appeal involves a nuisance claim. The parties own adjoining homes in a neighborhood of zero-lot line homes. The defendant’s air conditioning condenser unit is outside his home, between the parties’ homes. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the defendant, alleging that the noise of the defendant’s air conditioning unit constituted a nuisance, and seeking abatement of the nuisance, money damages, and injunctive relief. After a bench trial, the trial court held in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff now appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Grand Valley Lakes Property Owners Association, Inc. v. Dennis Burrow
Appellant, the owner of several lots in a subdivision managed and maintained by the Appellee home owners association, appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee on the question of whether Appellant owed an increase in dues and fees on his lots, and the denial of his counter-claims for fraud, violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, outrageous conduct, and invalidity of the restrictive covenants on grounds that these causes of action were barred by the applicable statutes of limitation or the doctrine of laches. We conclude that the Appellee followed the correct procedure in amending its restrictive covenants to increase the amount of dues. However, because the trial court did not make findings, as required by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.04, concerning the grounds for its application of laches, we cannot review the question of whether Appellant’s counter-claims were properly dismissed. Vacated and remanded. |
Hardeman | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Thomas Grady Chastain
We granted the application of June Chastain Patterson (“the Proponent”), which sought permission to appeal an order of the trial court holding, as a matter of law, that the “will” of Thomas Grady Chastain (“the Deceased”) was not executed in compliance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 32-1-104 (2007). The Deceased signed the affidavit of attesting witnesses on September 4, 2004, which affidavit was attached to the purported will of the same date; he also initialed the bottom of the first page of the “will,” but did not sign the second page of the two-page “will.” The Proponent appeals. We reverse. |
Polk | Court of Appeals |
