In Re: Roni M.H.
The Juvenile Court for Bradley County (“the Juvenile Court”), upon a petition by the State of Tennessee, Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) and following a trial, terminated the parental rights of Debbie D. (“Mother”) to the minor child Roni M.H. (“the Child”) pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 (g)(1) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 (g)(3) (2010). Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. We find and hold that clear and convincing evidence existed to terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 (g)(1) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 (g)(3), and that clear and convincing evidence existed that the termination was in the Child’s best interest. We, therefore, affirm the Juvenile Court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Child. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
LVNV Funding, LLC as Assignee of Sears Gold Mastercard v. Kevin Mastaw
This appeal concerns the collection of credit card debt. The plaintiff, a subsequent purchaser of the debt, filed this collection action against the appellant debtor. On appeal, the appellant debtor argues, inter alia, that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence various documents from a previous owner of the debt, pursuant to the hearsay exception for business records under Tenn. R. Evid. Rule 803(6). We hold that two of the exhibits were not appropriately admitted into evidence under the business records exception. Without those exhibits, we find that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s judgment in favor of the creditor, and reverse. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
H. Jewell Tindell v. Callie A. West, et al.
A dispute over the extent of lawn being mowed and the manner in which it was being mowed |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Donna Bellomy v. AutoZone, Inc.
The plaintiff in this case is Donna Bellomy. The defendant is a prior employer of hers, AutoZone, Inc. In Bellomy v. AutoZone, Inc., No. E2009-00351-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 4059158 (Tenn. Ct. App. E.S., filed Nov. 24, 2009) (“Bellomy I”), we vacated, in part, a summary judgment dismissing the Plaintiff’s entire complaint. We held that the Plaintiff had created genuine issues of material fact with respect to her Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”) claims. On remand, the case progressed through discovery and opening statements, following which the trial court granted a mistrial, holding that the Plaintiff had violated certain rulings made by the court on AutoZone’s motions in limine. The court later granted the defendant partial summary judgment and dismissed the constructive discharge aspect of the Plaintiff’s THRA claims. In the same order, the trial court held the Plaintiff in civil contempt and ruled that the dismissal of the constructive discharge claim was also appropriate as a sanction for violating the court’s rulings entered on AutoZone’s motions. The Plaintiff appeals. We vacate the judgment of dismissal and all other orders of the trial court inconsistent with this opinion and remand for further proceedings. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Paul Vincent Giannini v. Amanda Proffitt
This appeal involves a limitation of liability in an insurance policy. The plaintiff was working in a volunteer capacity for the city. While doing so, the plaintiff sustained injuries in an accident caused by the negligence of the defendant. The plaintiff’s medical expenses were paid through the city’s on-the-job-injury program. The plaintiff had uninsured motorist coverage under his insurance policy with the appellee insurance company. The appellee insurance company denied the plaintiff’s claim based on language in the policy reducing the insurance company’s liability by sums paid under laws similar to workers’ compensation laws. The insurance company asserted that the city’s on-the-job-injury program was similar to workers’ compensation. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit, and the plaintiff and the insurance company filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue of coverage. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurance company, finding that the plaintiff’s benefits under the city’s on-the-job-injury program were similar to workers’ compensation. The plaintiff now appeals. We affirm the grant of summary judgment, for the reason stated by the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Karen Johnson v. Beverly Nunis and Farmer's Insurance Exchange
This appeal involves remittitur of a jury verdict. The defendant driver caused a vehicular accident that resulted in substantial personal injuries to the plaintiff. At trial, several witnesses testified to the amount of the plaintiff’s economic damages as well as the noneconomic impact of her injuries. After a trial, the jury returned a special verdict with awards for various categories of economic and non-economic damages. The trial court denied the defendant insurance company’s motion for a new trial but suggested an overall remittitur as to the total verdict. The plaintiff accepted the remittitur under protest and filed this appeal. We affirm the denial of a new trial, reverse the suggestion of remittitur, and reinstate the original jury verdict. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Marie McPeake v. Edna Dickson and Bridgette Collette Dickson; and Danny Dickson and wife, Vickie Dickson v. Marie McPeake
This appeal arises out of a four-day trial over a boundary line dispute. Numerous surveyors and other witnesses testified at trial, and many maps, aerial photographs, survey plats, deeds, and other documents were entered into evidence. The chancellor personally viewed the property in question as well. Thereafter, the court established the boundary line as set forth in the survey plat prepared by the defendants’ surveyor. The plaintiff contends that this was error. We affirm. |
Henderson | Court of Appeals | |
The Convention of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Tennessee, et al. v. The Rector, Wardens, and Vestrymen of St. Andrew's Parish, a Tennessee Corporation
An Episcopal parish in Nashville asserted its intention to disassociate from The Diocese of Tennessee, causing the Diocese to file a declaratory judgment action to determine whether it or the local congregation owned and controlled the real and personal property where the local congregation worshiped. The trial court determined that The Episcopal Church is hierarchical, and based on the canons and constitutions of the Church and its Diocese, ruled that the local parish held the property in trust for the Diocese. The church appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Maria B.S. and Anna J.S.
Father appeals from an order terminating his parental rights, claiming that the order failed to make sufficient findings regarding grounds for termination. We reverse in part, vacate and remand for the preparation of an order that contains the requisite findings of fact and conclusions of law. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Dakota C.R. (d/o/b 6/11/2004); Jimmy D.R., Jr. (d/o/b 3/5/2006); Nathaniel E.R. (d/o/b 2/23/2007)
This appeal arises out of dependency and neglect proceedings regarding three minor children. The circuit court found all three children dependent and neglected, and it found the youngest child had been severely abused. We affirm the dependency and neglect finding and the severe abuse finding with regard to Mother. However, we reverse the severe abuse finding with regard to Father. |
McNairy | Court of Appeals | |
Stephen Todd Mays v. Melissa Gail Mays
In this divorce action, Husband appeals the trial court’s determination of the amount of his monthly income, grant of alimony in futuro to Wife, amount of child support he was ordered to pay, and denial of the introduction of certain of Husband’s tax records; Husband also contends that the trial court erred in holding him in civil contempt for, inter alia, nonpayment of his spousal and child support obligations. We affirm the court’s determination of the amount of his monthly income and finding that Wife is entitled to alimony. Finding that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that Wife cannot be rehabilitated, we vacate the award of alimony in futuro and remand the case for the court to reconsider the nature and amount of alimony. We also remand the case for the court to reconsider the amount of child support and, as necessary, to make findings required by the child support guidelines. We affirm the holding that Husband was in civil contempt, but vacate the sentence of 180 days imprisonment. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Bobby D. Wall v. Selma Curtis
Homeowner and Contractor entered into an agreement for the construction of a new house. The contract provided that no changes would be made to the terms and specifications of the contract without a writing describing the changes signed byboth parties. The parties ignored this provision and made changes without preparing change orders. Before the house was completed the parties had a dispute, and the homeowner contracted with someone else to complete her house. Homeowner alleged Contractor breached the contract by walking off the job and refusing to complete the house,and Contractor alleged Homeowner fired him and told him not to return to her property. Contractor sued Homeowner for breach of contract and sought to recover his damages, which included expenses he incurred for materials and labor that Homeowner refused to pay. Homeowner counterclaimed for breach of contract and sought to recover as damages the amount she paid other contractors to complete her house. The trial court found Homeowner committed the first breach and entered judgment for Contractor in the amount of $21,120.69. Homeowner appealed, arguing the evidence did not support the trial court’s judgment. Concluding the evidence supports the trial court’s findings of fact, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Brooks Cotton Company, Inc. v. Bradley F. Williams
This interlocutory appeal concerns the question of whether a farmer may be considered a merchant for purposes of the Uniform Commercial Code Statute of Frauds. Appellant farmer allegedly entered into an oral contract to sell his cotton crop to Appellee cotton company. The farmer failed to deliver the cotton and the cotton company sued for specific performance. The farmer defended the suit by arguing that the alleged oral contract was unenforceable due to the Statute of Frauds. The cotton company countered that the farmer was a merchant for purposes of the merchant exception to the Statute of Frauds. The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the cotton company, finding that the farmer was a merchant for purposes of the Statute of Frauds. We hold that a farmer may be considered a merchant for purposes of the Uniform Commercial Code Statute of Frauds, the determination of which is a mixed question of law and fact. However, because the question of whether this particular farmer qualifies as a merchant raises genuine issues regarding the inferences to be drawn from the facts, we reverse the grant of partial summary judgment and remand to the trial court for a trial on the merits. |
Crockett | Court of Appeals | |
Wilma J. Solock Smarsh v. David A. Smarsh
This is a divorce case of a marriage of approximately 34 years. After hearing the evidence, the Trial Judge awarded the divorce to the wife, "equally" divided the parties' marital property, ordered the husband to pay the wife permanent alimony of $500.00 a month, and awarded the wife $10,000.00 in partial payment of her attorney's fees. The husband appealed and contended inter alia that the wife was not entitled to permanent alimony, nor was she entitled to have an award of attorney's fees against him. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Morgan | Court of Appeals | |
Victor Raymond Peterson v. Kathleen Adelle Peterson
Husband appeals the trial court’s division of property and award of alimony in solido to Wife. We remand to the trial court for further findings. |
Morgan | Court of Appeals | |
William Mise, et al. v. Methodist Medical Center of Oak Ridge, et al.
This is an appeal from the grant of summary judgment in a medical malpractice case. Virginia Mise was admitted to Methodist Medical Center of Oak Ridge following complaints of abdominal pain, nausea, and vomiting. She was diagnosed with chronic renal failure. Several days later, she died following a medical procedure. Her sons filed suit, alleging that Virginia Mise’s treating physicians and nurses failed to comply with the requisite standard of care, causing her death. Methodist Medical Center of Oak Ridge and the treating physicians filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motions for summary judgment. We affirm the grant of the motions for summary judgment. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Sherrie L. Durham v. Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development by and through James Neeley in his Official Capacity et al.
This petition was filed pursuant to the Tennessee Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. The petitioner seeks judicial review of an administrative decision by the Tennessee Civil Service Commission to uphold the termination of her employment with the Tennessee Department of Labor. On motion by the petitioner, the entire administrative record was struck from the record in the judicial proceedings. Having no administrative record upon which to review the Department’s decision, the trial court dismissed the petition. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
John Durling Kemper v. Joe C. Baker, individually and in his capacity as City Manager of Berry Hill, Tennessee, et al.
This is a GTLA action against a city and city official following a construction accident in which an exterior wall of a building collapsed,causing serious injuries to one of the plaintiffs and causing the death of the other plaintiff. The building was being demolished and the plaintiffs were employed by a private company that was to disconnect gas utilities on the privately owned building. The plaintiffs claim the collapse was caused, in part, by the failure of the city and the city manager to enforce certain OSHA regulations and provisions of the municipal building code. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims against the city and the city official on the defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on governmental immunity. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Michael H. Gaw, et al. v. The Vanderbilt University, et al.
This is an appeal from a jury verdict in a medical malpractice case. A surgeon performed a procedure on an infant to repair a birth defect at the defendant hospital. The infant sustained permanent injuries after the surgery. The parents filed suit on the infant’s behalf against the hospital for failing to adhere to the expected standard of care. At the conclusion of trial, the hospital moved for a directed verdict on all claims, with only the claims for informed consent and post-operative negligence being denied. The jury entered a judgment in favor of the infant. The hospital has appealed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jennifer Lynn Monroe v. Travis Monroe
Husband appeals an order denying his motion to set aside a default judgment and the final judgment entered in his divorce action. On the facts presented, we hold that the default judgment should have been set aside; accordingly, we reverse the order denying Husband’s motion to set aside, and the case is remanded. |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals | |
Consulting and Financial Services, Inc., et al. v. John H. Friedmann, Sr.
This suit arises as a result of the installation of tile flooring in a home. Homeowners sued the contractor for breach of warranty, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment. The trial court awarded $106,103.92 to homeowners and assessed $4,252.00 in discretionary costs. Contractor appeals asserting that, in finding liability, the trial court failed to apply the standard of performance set forth in the contract and that the court erred in calculating and measuring the damages. We have determined that the trial court applied an implied warranty or workmanship rather than the contractual standard; however we have reviewed the evidence de novo and modify the judgment to hold that the contractor breached the contractual standard. We remand the case for a determination of the appropriate amount of damages. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Gina A.
Mother argues that the divestment of custody of her child from the Department of Children’s Services to a relative in another state constitutes de facto termination of her parental rights. We find no merit to this argument since the parent-child relationship was not terminated by the court’s custody decision. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee ex rel. Amy Trisler v. Scott A. Collins
Defendant Collins challenges his conviction for criminal contempt, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to convict him and that the use of certain evidence violated his constitutional rights. We affirm the conviction. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Estate of Thomas R. Ralston v. Estate of Fred R. Hobbs
The defendant appeals from an Order of Sale of real property, which was sold pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 69.07 to satisfy a money judgment against the defendant. We have concluded that the defendant waived many of the issues raised and, as for its issue challenging the sufficiency of the notice of the sale, the sale may not be set aside on this ground because Rule 69.07(4) expressly provides that bona fide purchasers for value at the sale shall take free of any defects concerning notice. The purchaser here is a bona fide purchaser for value; thus, we affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Vivian Kennard v. Methodist Hospitals of Memphis a/k/a Methodist Healthcare Memphis Hospitals, et al.
Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action against the Anesthesia Defendants, among others. Prior to trial, one of Plaintiff’s experts, Dr. McLaughlin, was excluded for failure to meet the requirements of the locality rule. Plaintiff proceeded to trial, and a jury verdict was rendered in favor of the Anesthesia Defendants. Plaintiff now appeals the expert’s exclusion and the subsequent jury verdict. In light of our previous vacation of the order excluding Dr. McLaughlin in Kennard 2, we remand this case to the trial court for reconsideration of Dr. McLaughlin’s qualifications in light of Shipley. If the trial court determines that Dr. McLaughlin meets the requirements of the locality rule, as set forth in Shipley, it shall then consider whether he, as an OB-GYN, may testify against the Anesthesia Defendants. Finally, if the trial court determines that Dr. McLaughlin is competent to testify, it shall then determine whether his erroneous exclusion warrants a setting aside of the jury verdict rendered in favor of the Anesthesia Defendants. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |
