Trevor Moore, et al. v. Houston County Board of Education, et al.
This matter arises from an assault of a student which occurred at Houston County Middle School. The parents of the victim sued the Houston County Board of Education, two HCMS students who participated in the assault, and the mothers of the students involved in the attack. Following a bench trial, the court granted Plaintiffs a judgment for $50,578.97. The court determined that the school board was 25 percent at fault; the court also found that the school board was immune pursuant to the discretionary function exception of the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act and dismissed the case against the board. The court then granted plaintiffs judgment against the non-governmental defendants jointly and severally for 75 percent of the monetary award. We affirm the trial court’s holding that the Board was negligent, reverse the trial court’s ruling that the school board was immune, and modify the judgmentto hold the defendants jointlyand severallyliable for the entire amount of damages awarded. |
Houston | Court of Appeals | |
Tabitha Layne, et al. v. Tyron Layne Adkins, et al
Tabitha Layne, individually, and as Administratrix of the Estate of Freddie Steven Layne, and as Next Friend of Stephanie Layne and Teddy Layne “Plaintiff”) sued Tyron Layne Adkins, Kenneth Rowe, and a certain tract or parcel of Property Identified as Map #089, Parcel 060.01 (“the Property”) alleging, in part, that Ms. Adkins and Mr. Rowe had committed fraud with regard to deeds of conveyance of the Property. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its judgment finding and holding, inter alia, that four specific deeds with regard to the Property were void; that legal title to the Property is held by the heirs of Ted Layne with the Estate of Freddie Steven Layne holding title to one-third interest, Nancy Bolton Layne holding title to one-third interest, and Tyron Layne Adkins holding title to onethird interest; and awarding Mr. Rowe a judgment against Tyron Layne Adkins of $139,000 as a result of a cross-claim. Mr. Rowe appeals to this Court. We affirm. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
Cathy Vice, et al. v. Elmcroft of Hendersonville, et al.
The daughter of an eighty-seven year old woman was looking for an assisted living facility for her mother, who was suffering from dementia. Elmcroft of Hendersonville assured the daughter that it could care for her mother and admitted her after the daughter informed it of her concern about her mother’s risk for falls. Three weeks following her admission the mother fell, and then fell three more times before the daughter moved her out of Elmcroft. The final fall resulted in a broken clavicle, which caused the mother pain and decreased mobility for the rest of her life. The daughter, as her mother’s representative, sued Elmcroft and its administrator for negligence and negligent admission and retention of her mother. A jury awarded a judgment against the defendants for $250,000. There was evidence the Elmcroft staff did not follow Elmcroft’s fall prevention policies and procedures. Elmcroft argued that all claims filed against it involved matters of medical science or art requiring specialized skills not ordinarily possessed by lay persons, and, therefore, this was a medical malpractice which should have been dismissed since the statutory requirements for such a claim had not been met. We conclude, based on the evidence herein, that the claims were ordinary negligence claims. Elmcroft also argued (1) the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the negligence of the daughter and a physician from another state who indicated the mother may be cared for by an assisted living facility and (2) that the jury award was excessive, contained a punitive component, and was the result of passion, prejudice and caprice. We conclude the court did not err in refusing to charge the jury on the physician’s comparative fault or the daughter’s comparative negligence. We also conclude there was material evidence to support the jury’s award of damages. Consequently, we affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Eddie C. Pratcher, Jr., Surviving Spouse of Sandra Y. Jones Pratcher v. Methodist Healthcare-Memphis Hospitals, et al.
Appellant appealed the trial court's order granting Appellee's “Motion of Methodist Healthcare-Memphis Hospitals to Strike, or in the Alternative, Motion in Limine, or In the Alternative, for Partial Judgment and Memorandum.” We dismiss this appeal for lack of |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In The Matter of: Jada T.L.P. and Joseph D.P.
This is a termination of parental rights case. The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of the mother on the grounds of persistence of conditions, substantial noncompliance with the terms of her permanency plans, severe child abuse, and abandonment. The mother appeals, arguing the Department of Children’s Services did not make reasonable efforts to reunite her with her children following their removal and did not clearly and convincingly prove termination of her parental rights was in the best interests of the children. We affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Baron H.S.M.
This is a termination of parental rights case regarding Baron H.S.M. (“the Child”), the son of Sandra M. (“Mother”). Mother maintained a long-term relationship with Ray C., before and since the Child’s birth. She contends that Ray is the Child’s biological father.1 Mother was incarcerated when the Child was born. She arranged to transfer the Child to the care of Ray’s sister, Peggy V. and her husband, Ronald V. collectively, “the Guardians”). Over two years after they took custody, the Guardians filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights and adopt the Child. After a bench trial, the court terminated Mother’s rights upon finding, by clear and convincing evidence, (1) that Mother had abandoned the Child by willfully failing to visit or support him and (2) that termination is in the Child’s best interest. Mother appeals. We affirm. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
Paul Pittman v. City of Memphis
Petitioner firefighter appeals denial of on-the-job injury benefits by the City of Memphis. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Lee Brown and Guttershutter of Nashville, LLC v. David Styles, et al.
Appeal from a judgment confirming an arbitration award. The principle defense is that the appellant, the party against whom the arbitration award was issued, was never a party to the arbitration agreement at issue and did not participate in the arbitration proceedings. The trial court confirmed the arbitration award and enrolled a judgment against the appellant in the amount of $78,956.80 plus costs. We reverse the confirmation of the award against the appellant upon the finding that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to confirm the award. This is because the statute which confers jurisdiction upon the court to confirm arbitration awards, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-5-302, requires a written arbitration agreement between the parties, and there is no written agreement between the appellant and appellee to arbitrate. Thus, the trial court was without jurisdiction to confirm an arbitration award against the appellant. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Anita J. Cash, City of Knoxville Zoning Coordinator v. Ed Wheeler
The City of Knoxville Board of Zoning Appeals granted defendant a variance and the Knoxville City Council then nullified the variance granted by the Board of Zoning Appeals. Defendant then appealed to the Chancery Court of Knox County contending that the city ordinance which permitted the City Council to review the decisions of the Board of Zoning Appeals was invalid, and the Chancellor agreed. On appeal, we hold that the ordinance at issue is valid under the State's statutory scheme. We reverse the Chancellor and remand for further proceedings. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Noel B.F. The Department of Children's Services v. Veda L.M.
This is a parental termination case. The appellant mother has a history of serious mental illness and persistent difficulties in managing her mental illness, resulting in multiple hospitalizations and incarcerations. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services took custody of the child immediately following her birth. After the guardian ad litem and the Department of Children’s Services filed petitions to terminate the mother’s parental rights, the child’s aunt filed an intervening petition for termination of the mother’s parental rights and for custody. The trial court terminated the mother’s parental rights and did not grant the aunt’s intervening petition for custody. The aunt did not appeal. The mother appeals, arguing that the trial court’s decision to allow the child to remain with the foster parents, instead of placing the child with the aunt was not in the child’s best interest. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Monica Whitmore v. Shelby County Government
The trial court granted the defendant, Shelby County Government, judgment on the pleadings as to multiple causes of action brought by a former county employee. The trial court found, inter alia, the one-year statute of limitations of the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”) barred the plaintiff’s claim. Applying well-settled law, the court concluded the general saving statute does not apply to a claim non-suited and re-filed against a governmental entity under the GTLA. Although the trial court failed to address whether a different conclusion might apply to causes of action arising under the Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”), we hold the saving statute does not “save” a claim non-suited and refiled against a State entity under the THRA. The trial court therefore properly concluded the plaintiff’s suit was time-barred. Because the trial court reviewed matters outside of the pleadings when deciding the defendant’s motion, we grant summary judgment in favor of the defendant. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
William H. Thomas, Jr., d/b/a Thomas Investments, A Tennessee Sole Proprietorship v. Shelby County, Tennessee, et al.
The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendants, finding that Plaintiff’s action was filed beyond the limitations period. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm summary judgment on the basis of standing and ripeness. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In The Matter of Keely A.J.
The appellant contends that the trial court made several serious errors, by inter alia, dismissing her claim for child support arrearages, reducing the father’s child support obligation, and denying her numerous motions to alter the agreed order after its entry, etc. The problem with these allegations is that they are wholly unfounded because the appellant agreed to settle and/or voluntarily dismiss all of her claims following the third day of trial, prior to the end of the trial. As for her claim that the trial court erred in awarding $10,000 in attorney’s fees against her, we find this argument is also frivolous for she was discharged of this specific obligation in bankruptcy. Therefore, we affirm the trial court in all respects. Further, upon the finding this appeal is frivolous, we remand with instructions for the trial court to award the appellee his reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and costs against the appellant. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Sandi D. Jackson v. Mitchell B. Lanphere
The petitioner for an order of protection appeals the trial court’s decision dismissing her petition. While we reject most of the assignments of error identified by the petitioner, we agree that the trial court erred in failing to make findings of fact and conclusions of law as now required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.02. We therefore vacate the trial court’s order and remand. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Vicki L. Hutchings v. Jobe, Hastings & Associates
Plaintiff and defendant entered into a contract of employment for a term of three years, wherein plaintiff would prepare tax returns for defendant tax firm. Defendant terminated plaintiff's employment before the three year term had expired and plaintiff appealed to this Court to reverse the Trial Court's finding of breach of contract and award her damages for the breach. We hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court's finding that the employer had just cause to terminate plaintiff. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
John Ambler Widener v. Stephanie Elizabeth Widener
Defendant Mother appeals the trial court’s judgment naming Plaintiff Father primary residential parent, the award of child support, and assignment of debt. We affirm in part, vacate in part, reverse in part and remand. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Mary Elizabeth Schwartz Brock v. Jeffery Brock
In this divorce case, the husband appeals the trial court’s award of spousal support and attorney’s fees to the wife. The husband claims his inability to pay outweighs the wife’s need for spousal support. After reviewing the record, we find the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s decision to award spousal support and attorney’s fees to the wife. Therefore, we affirm. |
McMinn | Court of Appeals | |
Mike Settle v. Middle Tennessee Mental Health Institute, et al.
The plaintiff, Mike Settle, citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983, filed a complaint on April 22, 2010, in which he sought injunctive relief in the form of a transfer from the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”) to the Middle Tennessee Mental Health Institute (“MTMHI”). The defendants, MTMHI and former Chief Executive Officer, Lynn McDonald, filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The plaintiff appeals, and we affirm the trial court’s order of dismissal. |
Morgan | Court of Appeals | |
Krystal Dawn (Walton) Cantrell v. Patricia Tolley
This case arises from the circuit court’s execution of judgment. Following dismissal of Appellant’s appeal from the general sessions court, the circuit court specifically affirmed the judgment of the general sessions court, issued execution thereon, and denied Appellant’s motion to quash the execution upon its finding that the ten year time period for collection of judgments, under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 28-3-110, ran from the date of the circuit court’s order. Upon review, we conclude that, by affirming the general sessions court’s judgment, the circuit court retained jurisdiction to execute the judgment, and that the ten year time period for collection of the judgment ran from the date of the circuit court’s order and was not expired when levy was made. Affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: A.M.K.
This appeal concerns the changing of a minor child’s surname. Tyler Weseman (“Father”) and Amanda King (“Mother”) are, respectively, the father and mother of the minor child A.M.K.(“the Child”). Father filed a petition to establish parentage and co-parenting time. Father sought to have the Child bear his surname. The Juvenile Court for Knox County (“the Juvenile Court”) changed the Child’s surname from King to King-Weseman. Mother appeals. We hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the Juvenile Court’s finding that changing the Child’s surname to King-Weseman is in the Child’s best interest. We further hold that the Juvenile Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to award attorney’s fees to Mother. The judgment of the Juvenile Court is affirmed. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Glenn Cupp et al. v. Bill Heath et al.
In late 2007, the defendant Bill Heath built a fence on a line running generally east and west, said line having been established by surveyor Bill Parsons in 1990 and then re-staked in 2007 by surveyor Dennis Fultz. The plaintiff Glenn Cupp, an adjoining landowner to the south of Heath, hired surveyor Mark Comparoni to establish his northern line because Cupp believed Heath had built the fence much too far to the south. Marjorie Keck, who joins Heath on her northern boundary and Cupp on her western boundary, also commissioned Comparoni to survey her land. Comparoni’s survey confirmed that Heath’s new fence incorrectly encompassed approximately 35 acres of Cupp’s land and approximately 6 acres of Keck’s land. Cupp and Keck filed this action against Heath in 2008 to establish their northern boundary with Heath and the Cupp/Keck common boundary as surveyed by Comparoni. The trial court found that the Comparoni survey correctly established the boundary lines of all the parties. Heath appeals. We affirm. |
Claiborne | Court of Appeals | |
Billie Seay, Nationwide Insurance v. Betty Walsh et al.
On or about May 28, 2005, Billie Seay was involved in an automobile accident with a vehicle driven by the defendant Thomas E. Walsh (“the Driver”), which vehicle was owned by the defendant Betty Walsh (“the Owner”). Seay’s insurance company, Nationwide Insurance Company, settled her claim and filed this subrogation action in Seay’s name for the use and benefit of Nationwide against the Driver and the Owner. The Driver and the Owner filed separate pro se answers. The Owner appeared at trial, but the Driver did not appear. The trial court entered a judgment against both defendants. Two and a half years later, the Driver filed a motion to set aside the judgment. It was denied. He then filed a series of similar unsuccessful post-judgment motions. The Driver appeals from the last order denying post judgment relief. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Richard Jennings v. City of Smithville, et al.
The Board of Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Smithville suspended and ultimately terminated the chief of police because they were unhappy with his efforts to combat the drug and crime problems in the City. The police chief filed a writ of certiorari and asked the trial court to order the City to reinstate him because he was terminated without cause. The trial court concluded there was sufficient evidence in the record to justify the City’s decision and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The police chief appealed, and we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the petition for writ of certiorari. |
DeKalb | Court of Appeals | |
Roger William Byrd, D.C. v. Tennessee Board of Chiropractic Examiners
This appeal arises out of disciplinary proceedings against a chiropractor before the Tennessee Board of Chiropractic Examiners. The allegations originally involved a single incident of solicitation that occurred in 2000, in which Dr. Byrd telephoned a car accident victim just two days after her accident in violation of the Board’s rule governing telemarketing or solicitation. The notice of charges was later amended to include additional allegations regarding Dr. Byrd’s use of an office in Florida to telemarket Tennessee accident victims in violation of the aforementioned rule. Dr. Byrd admitted that telemarketing was being conducted by the Florida employees. However, he claimed that a corporation was responsible for conducting the telemarketing, rather than himself, and he argued that the corporation was not subject to the Board’s telemarketing rules. The Board found Dr. Byrd guilty of several violations and revoked his chiropractic license. The chancery court affirmed. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
BSG, LLC v. Check Velocity, Inc.
BSG, LLC introduced CheckVelocity to Weight Watchers. In 2005, CheckVelocity and Weight Watchers entered into an agreement whereby CheckVelocity provided check collection services. BSG, in accordance with its agreement with CheckVelocity, was to receive compensation for its introduction of CheckVelocity to Weight Watchers in the form of residual fees during the time of the CheckVelocity - Weight Watchers agreement and any renewal agreements. In 2008, CheckVelocity and Weight Watchers entered into a new agreement in which credit card collection services were added and the check collection services were continued unchanged. CheckVelocitystopped paying the residual fees because it considered the Weight Watchers agreement to be a new agreement, not a renewal of the old one. BSG sued. The trial court considered the 2008 agreement to be a new agreement, not a renewal, and ruled for CheckVelocity. BSG appealed. We reverse. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |
