Virginia Dell Person v. James R. Wilson, et al., and Coffee County, Tennessee, et al.
This appeal arises from a two-car accident at the intersection of two county roads in Coffee County. The sixteen year-old driver of one of the two vehicles and his parents and sister, who were passengers in his vehicle, filed suit against the County for injuries they sustained in the accident, contending the County was at fault for failing to properly maintain the stop sign and vegetation at the intersection. The trial court attributed 50% of the fault to the County and 50% of the fault to the sixteen year-old driver. Because he was 50% at fault, the sixteen year-old driver was not awarded damages against the County; however, his parents and sister were awarded judgments against the County for 50% of their damages. On appeal, the County contends the parents are barred from recovering against it due to their negligence and negligent entrustment. The County also contends his sister was negligent for riding in the vehicle. We affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Donna Funk v Target National Bank/Target Visa
In this suit on a credit card debt, the Trial Court granted plaintiff summary judgment on the amount claimed. On appeal, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Matthew Flory and Christi Flory v. John Arnold Fitzgerald
Plaintiffs purchased property from defendant by Warranty Deed which stated the property contained 15 acres. Plaintiffs subsequently learned in litigation with a neighbor over the boundary line, that the parcel only contained 10.66 acres. Plaintiffs then filed this action against defendant to recover damages and the Trial Court held that plaintiffs were entitled to damages under the warranties in the Deed in the amount of $6,660.00 for the shortage of acreage plus costs and the judgment they incurred in the boundary line dispute with their neighbor. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Rhea | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Smith, Executor of the Estate of Ethel Rogers Smith v. Jerry Smith
The issue in this case is whether the trial court erred in denying the plaintiff’s Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion for relief from judgment. Following a bench trial and judgment in favor of the defendant, a third party provided additional materials pursuant to an agreed discovery order, which were not previously disclosed to the parties before trial. The plaintiff filed a motion pursuant to Rule 60.02, requesting that the judgment be set aside based on this newly discovered evidence. The plaintiff also argued that the doctrines of equitable estoppel and judicial estoppel should be applied to grant relief from the judgment. The trial court denied the motion, and the plaintiff appealed. After careful review, we find that the trial court incorrectly applied the law in deciding on the plaintiff’s Rule 60.02 motion. Therefore, we vacate and remand. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Diana B. Hannahan v. Terry Q. Hannahan
The trial court held Husband in contempt because he failed to comply with the terms of a postdivorce agreed order which modified the terms of the divorce decree regarding the disposition of the marital residence. On appeal, Husband argues that the agreed order was void because the trial court was without jurisdiction to modify the divorce decree after it became final. We hold that the agreed order, which was a modification of the divorce decree by the parties, was valid and enforceable. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in enforcing the terms of the agreed order by holding Husband in contempt of court for noncompliance with the order. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
John Wayne Webb v. Brandon O.Canada, et al - Concurring
The majority holds that the Judgment denominated “Final Judgment” reducing the previous Judgment from $723,426.27 to $598,426.27 was a “juristic act” of acceptance of the remittitur under protest. I do not agree. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
John Wayne Webb v. Brandon O.Canada, et al
John Wayne Webb was injured in a car wreck and filed suit against two other drivers. A jury found defendant Brandon O. Canada to be solely at fault and awarded Mr. Webb $723,426.27 in compensatory damages against Mr. Canada. An order was entered awarding Mr. Webb judgment against Mr. Canada in the amount of $723,426.27 and dismissing the case as to the other driver, Douglas D. Townsend. Mr. Canada filed a motion seeking a new trial or in the alternative, a remittitur. Following a hearing, the trial court suggested a remittitur in the amount of $125,000. Final judgment was entered on July 24, 2006, referencing the remittitur and reducing the amount of the judgment to $598,426.27. On appeal, Mr. Canada argues that he is entitled to a new trial because Mr. Webb never accepted the remittitur, the verdict was excessive, and the remittitur was inadequate. After review, we find no error and affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
William Harrison Nix, III v. Richard Terry Sutton
The appellant contends that the circuit court erred in dismissing his appeal from general sessions court when he failed to appear on the date of the hearing. He claimed that he had gone to the wrong courthouse on the hearing date. We affirm. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
C.S.C., et al. v. Knox County Board of Education, et al.
In this class action lawsuit filed against the Knox County Board of Education and its superintendent, the trial court awarded the Plaintiffs a portion of their attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The Defendants argue on appeal that the trial court erred in finding the Plaintiffs to be “prevailing parties” in the litigation and that the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees was unwarranted and erroneous. We hold that although the Plaintiffs were not successful on all of their claims, they achieved enough success in their lawsuit to be “prevailing parties.” We find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in awarding Plaintiffs $45,000 in attorney’s fees, and consequently affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Rudolph Powers v. Tennessee Board of Probation and Paroles
This appeal involves a prisoner seeking parole. The petitioner was convicted in 1981 and is serving a life sentence. In 2004, he was denied parole based on the severity of his offense. He filed the instant petition for a common-law writ of certiorari, claiming violations of his constitutional right to equal protection and due process, and a violation of the ex post facto clause of the Constitution. The trial court dismissed the petition on its face, finding that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The petitioner filed this appeal. We affirm, concluding that the petition does not state a claim for relief. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Allen Shawn Dye v. Amanda Layne Fowler
The primary residential parent of the parties' eleven-year-old child requested permission to relocate to Georgia because her husband accepted employment that provided a significant increase in pay and better opportunities for advancement. The father opposed the relocation. The trial court, which made no findings of fact, denied the request based upon the conclusion the relocation did not have a reasonable purpose. We have determined the evidence preponderates in favor of the finding that the mother had a reasonable purpose for relocating to Georgia. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand with instructions to grant the requested relocation to Georgia. |
Lewis | Court of Appeals | |
Patrick McGee v. Tommy Jacobs, Jacobs, Cohen & McCormick, PLLC CPAS
Appellant asserts the circuit court erred by dismissing this action as untimely under the savings statute. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Brenda J. Woodward v. Michael v. Woodward - Dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s Opinion affirming the Trial Court’s division of the marital property. I take no issue with the Trial Court and the majority concerning what was marital property and what was separate property. However, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s Opinion as I believe that it, as did the Trial Court, largely ignores the fact that this is a short term marriage, a very short term marriage, and what is the court’s goal in such a situation. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Brenda J. Woodward v. Michael v. Woodward
In this divorce case, Husband argues that the trial court erred in its classification, valuation, and division of the marital estate, including the award to Wife of $1,000 to “equalize the marital property division.” Upon our determination that the evidence did not support an award of $1,000 to Wife to equalize the marital property division, the trial court’s judgment is vacated in that regard. In all other respects, Husband failed to show that the evidence preponderated against the trial court’s decision, and the judgment is affirmed. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Vacated in Part and Affirmed in Part; Cause Remanded |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Herman Charles Heikkenen v. Janice Lee Heikkenen
On this appeal, the sole issue is whether the trial court erred in awarding $1,500.00 per month as alimony in futuro to the wife. Finding no basis for determining the trial court abused its discretion in awarding alimony in this amount, we affirm. |
White | Court of Appeals | |
Marks, Shell & Maness, et al. v. Cynthia T. Mann, et al.
A judgment lienholder appeals from a trial court’s determination that a purchase money mortgage lien on real property has priority over a previously recorded judgment lien. Based upon this court’s holding in Guffey v. Creutzinger, 948 S.W.2d 219 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998), we affirm the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Ronald K. Pendergraph, v. J. Hilton Conger
In this action for legal malpractice against defendant attorney, the Trial Court granted defendant summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff, as a condition precedent to maintaining the malpractice action, had to obtain post-judgment relief from his criminal conviction, which plaintiff had failed to do after bringing his post-judgment action. On appeal, we affirm.
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Van Buren | Court of Appeals | |
Wendy L. Clark v. Randal Lee Arthur
This appeal involves petitions for contempt and to modify a custody order. Both the mother and the father filed petitions seeking to have the initial custody order modified, and both asked that the other parent be held in contempt for failing to comply with the parenting plan. They presented various arguments about why custody should be changed in their favor, but neither alleged that any circumstances had changed since the initial order was entered. The trial court dismissed both petitions after finding that both parties had failed to prove a material change in circumstances to justify a modification of the custody order. The court also dismissed both petitions for contempt. For the following reasons, we affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Cummins Station, LLC v. Allison Batey
This case arises from a default judgment entered against Appellant for failure to comply with an Order to Compel. Appellant appeals. We affirm and remand for determination of damages for frivolous appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Amanda Dawn Alderidge v. Lynn Vernon Alderidge, Jr.
In this divorce proceeding, the appellant contends the trial court erred by granting the divorce to his wife and designating her as the primary residential parent of their minor child. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals | |
John Anthony Melton v. Jennifer Shannon Profitt (Melton) Johnson
At the time the parties were divorced, they essentially agreed to a joint custodial arrangement for their two children. Subsequently, the father filed a Petition alleging change of circumstances and for primary custody of the children. The wife filed a Counter-petition for primary custody. The Trial Court heard evidence and awarded primary custody to the father. The mother has appealed. We affirm. |
Humphreys | Court of Appeals | |
Maggie Lee Banks v. Jack C. Sanford, M.D., et al.
After receiving a routine hormone injection, the plaintiff patient experienced pain, facial swelling, numbness, and blindness. The plaintiff filed a complaint against the clinic, its employee physician, and the employer of the nurse who had administered the injection, alleging medical malpractice. The defendant clinic and physician filed a motion for summary judgment, and attached the expert affidavit of the defendant physician in which he stated that all of the defendants had treated the plaintiff in accordance with the relevant standard of care and according to their best medical judgment. After the physician’s deposition was taken, the plaintiff filed a motion for a determination by the trial court that his previously filed affidavit had been filed in bad faith, citing alleged inconsistencies with his deposition testimony and discovery admissions. The nurse’s employer filed a motion for summary judgment that relied upon the physician’s deposition testimony that the nurse had acted in accordance with the relevant standard of care and that the actions of the nurse had not caused the plaintiff’s injuries. A hearing was held at which the trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion to find that the physician’s affidavit had been made in bad faith, and the trial court allowed the plaintiff additional time in which to produce expert proof of causation. After the plaintiff was unable to obtain expert proof, the trial court ultimately granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment. The plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Eric Todd Jackson v. State of Tennessee
Appellant, who was the defendant in a previous criminal proceeding, filed a Writ of Mandamus seeking to obtain a refund of the bond he posted in the criminal case. The trial court dismissed the petition. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of W. Garnett Ladd, Sr., W. Garnett Ladd, III, et al. v. Robert C. Marks
The matters at issue pertain to the fee awarded a Co-Executor of an estate. The Co-Executor appeals contending he was entitled to a contractual fee equal to five percent of the gross estate based on an oral agreement with the ninety-four year old widow of the testator who served as his co-executor. The Special Master and Chancellor made concurrent findings that the appellant had failed to properly administer the estate. They also found that his claimed excuse, that he was acting according to the wishes of his ninety-four year old Co-Executrix, did not relieve him of his affirmative fiduciary duties as a personal representative. The Chancellor awarded him a fee of $25,000 for his services as Co-Executor. We have concluded he is entitled to no fee for his services. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Linda Bush v. Adworks Advertising Outdoor, LLC
This is a property case involving a restrictive covenant. The homeowners in a subdivision entered into a restrictive covenant agreement with the original developer of a tract of land directly across the highway from the residential subdivision. The restrictive covenant prohibits the use of the developer’s property for “billboards . . . not in place on December 1, 1995.” On December 1, 1995, three billboard structures existed on the burdened property. Years later, the defendant billboard company purchased easements in the three billboard sites and the existing billboard structures were removed. The defendant billboard company then erected three new billboard structures. Subsequently, the plaintiff homeowner in the subdivision filed the instant lawsuit for injunctive and declaratory relief, alleging that the defendant billboard company’s placement of new billboard structures on the burdened property constituted a violation of the restrictive covenant. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant billboard company, and the plaintiff homeowner now appeals. We affirm, finding that the language of the restrictive covenant is unambiguous, and that it restricts only the use of the burdened property, limiting the use to the number of billboards on the property as of December 1, 1995. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |
