Helen L. Bates v. James G. Neeley, Commissioner of The Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development, et al.
A former employee of the Highland Youth Center appeals the denial of her claim for unemployment benefits. The employee was subjected to a severe assault while at work at the youth center. She attempted to return to work after the incident but was unable to remain at work due to the severe psychological trauma associated with the assault at the workplace. She filed a claim for unemployment benefits, which was denied by the Department of Labor, the Appeals Tribunal, and the Board of Review on the ground she did not have “good cause” to terminate her employment. The Chancery Court affirmed the denial of benefits, and this appeal followed. We reverse finding the employee had good cause for terminating her employment at the Highland Youth Center. |
Lewis | Court of Appeals | |
Frank H. McNiel v. Susan R. Cooper
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Ronald Ray Stoner v. Tiffany Denise Stoner Morgan
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Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
City of Memphis v. The Civil Service Commission, et al.
This administrative appeal arises out of the termination of Officer Lenora Armstead’s (Officer Armstead) employment with the Memphis Police Department (the Department). The City took this action as a result of a public altercation between Officer Armstead and another off-duty police |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Martin Moreno v. Jose Servando Ruiz, et al.
A small contractor entered into an oral agreement to install brick facades on new houses in a Mt. Juliet subdivision. He did brickwork on eleven houses pursuant to the agreement, and was paid in cash for the work on an irregular basis. Because he believed the other party to the agreement did not pay him in full, he walked off the job and brought suit for breach of contract. A bench trial in Circuit Court ultimately resulted in a net judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of $397.50. He argued on appeal that the evidence showed that he was entitled to receive over $10,000 on his claim. We affirm the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Victoria Hinkle v. The Estate of Jack Lyle Hartman, et al
At the time the deceased and plaintiff divorced, the deceased agreed to maintain the plaintiff as beneficiary of his life insurance policy with his employer. He subsequently left the employer, but returned to the employer and was issued another policy of life insurance on being re-employed, but made his then wife and his two children beneficiaries of that policy. Upon his death, plaintiff sued to enforce the terms of the Marital Dissolution Agreement, but the Trial Court refused and dismissed plaintiff’s action. On appeal, we hold that plaintiff is entitled to benefits under the second policy to the extent of the benefits agreed to under the terms of the first policy. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Frank Shipp v. Ditch Witch Equipment of Tennessee, Inc.
This is a breach of contract case. The defendant equipment company sells and leases underground construction equipment. The plaintiff worked for the defendant company as an outside salesman with a sales territory. The plaintiff salesman operated under a verbal employment agreement and was paid a minimum weekly salary plus commissions. During his employment, the plaintiff actively marketed equipment to a customer in his sales territory, and the customer ultimately signed a lease for several pieces of equipment. Soon after the lease was executed, the plaintiff quit working for the defendant. Subsequently, he sought his commissions due on the lease. The defendant equipment company refused to pay the commissions, claiming that the plaintiff salesman was not due any commissions on the lease because he quit work before the customer made any payments on the lease. The plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit for the commissions. After a bench trial, the trial court held that the plaintiff was entitled to commissions on the lease, but only with respect to one of the pieces of leased equipment. The plaintiff now appeals, arguing that he is entitled to commissions on two other pieces of equipment. We reverse, finding that the evidence preponderates in favor of a finding that the plaintiff was entitled to commissions for all three pieces of equipment. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Mary Kay Thompson v. Clayton Thompson, Jr.
This is a post-divorce proceeding wherein Appellee sought to enforce the provisions of a marital dissolution agreement and Appellant sought to modify alimony and child support provisions because of an alleged change of circumstances. The trial court ruled that Appellant was intentionally underemployed and attributed income that was comparable to his income at the time of divorce. Finding that the evidence in the record does not support a finding of willful underemployment, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Linda Riggan Wood, et al. v. Terry Riggan Lowery, et al. - Concurring
I concur fully in the majority opinion in this case, with the exception of the majority’s discussion of one issue. The majority notes that the executrix, Ms. Wood, was bound “to the exercise of that degree of diligence, prudence, and caution which a reasonably prudent, diligent, and To the extent that the majority’s opinion can be read to find that the trial court correctly found that Ms. Wood acted in a reasonably prudent manner, I must disagree. Certainly she acted in good faith, and it appears that her investment decisions were similar to those made by her father prior to his death. But her investment decisions were nevertheless unwise and imprudent. The fact that the Decedent invested heavily in Revelation and Lowery Riggan Company does not authorize the executrix to continue such unwise investments with the estate assets entrusted to her care.
1“An order or decree rendered on the final settlement of a personal 1 representative is not subject to collateral attack, except where there is fraud, misrepresentation, accident, or mistake, or where the court acted without jurisdiction or the order or decree was wholly void.” 34 C.J.S. Executors and Administrators § 868 (1998) (footnotes omitted). |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Linda Riggan Wood, et al. v. Terry Riggan Lowery, et al.
Appellant challenges the trial court's judgment dismissing Appellant's claims against the Executrix of her father's estate and enforcing the agreement made by the Appellant with her siblings to share equally in the net assets of her father's estate. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jennifer Dunn, Individually and as the natural mother and next of kin to Jeremias Dunn, Deceased v. Amelia Davis
This appeal arises from a wrongful death action tried by a jury. The jury allocated 51% fault to Defendant and assessed total damages in the amount of $1,250,000. The trial court denied Defendant’s motions for new trial, remittitur, and judgment in accordance with motion for directed verdict; entered judgment against Defendant in the amount of $637,500; and awarded Plaintiff discretionary costs. Defendant appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with suggestion of remittitur. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. et al., v. Richard Epperson, et al.
In denying a request for attorneys’ fees in an action involving the enforcement of a declaration of easements and restrictions, the trial court found the phrase “costs and expenses” in that declaration does not include recovery of attorneys’ fees. The trial court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Christin M. Johnson, LPN v. Tennessee Board of Nursing
A formerly licensed practical nurse appeals a default judgment revoking her license by the Board of Nursing and claims, inter alia, that the Board failed to comply with applicable notice requirements. Because the administrative record does not reflect consideration of the rule governing proceedings by default, we reverse. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Anna Lou Williams, Plantation Gardens, D/B/A Tobacco Plantation and Beer Barn D/B/A Jim's Flea Market v. Gerald F. Nicely
This is a declaratory judgment action against the State regarding the use of an easement. The plaintiffs own a parcel of land next to a highway. By deed, the plaintiffs' predecessor in title granted a perpetual easement for “highway purposes” to the State for the Department of Transportation in the strip of land immediately next to the highway. Prior to this litigation, the Department of Transportation asked the plaintiffs to remove advertising signs posted on the land next to the highway because the signs encroached on the State's highway “right-of-way.” In response, the plaintiffs filed a declaratory judgment action against the State, seeking a declaration that the easement for “highway purposes” did not constitute a “highway right-of-way,” and that the State had no authority to require removal of the signs. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, declaring that the deed conveyed to the State only an easement of ingress and egress and did not grant the right to use the land as a “highway right-of-way.” The defendant now appeals. We vacate the trial court's judgment and dismiss the case, finding that the plaintiffs’ declaratory judgment action is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Derek Davis v. Shelby County Sheriff's Department
This appeal involves a writ of certiorari. The plaintiff, a former deputy sheriff for the County, was discharged. After a hearing, the County administrative board upheld the County’s decision to terminate the plaintiff’s employment. The plaintiff then filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the chancery court, seeking judicial review of the board’s decision. The plaintiff then filed a motion to amend the petition to add claims. The trial court never ruled on the motion to amend. After a hearing on the petition, the trial court affirmed the decision of the board. The plaintiff deputy sheriff appeals. We dismiss the appeal, finding that there is not a final judgment over which this Court may exercise appellate jurisdiction. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Parris Roofing & Sheetmetal Co. v. SCR Electric, Inc.
Parris Roofing & Sheetmetal Co. (“Plaintiff”) sued SCR Electric, Inc. (“Defendant”) seeking, in part, payment for work Plaintiff had done pursuant to an alleged agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant. The case was tried without a jury and the Trial Court entered an order finding and holding, inter alia, that Plaintiff and Defendant did not have an enforceable agreement, but that Plaintiff was entitled to recover $3,613.50, from Defendant in quantum meruit. Plaintiff appeals to this Court claiming that the Trial Court erred in finding that the reasonable value of the work performed was only $3,613.50. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Kim Brown v. William Shappley, M.D.
We affirm the trial court’s award of summary judgment to Defendant physician in this medical malpractice action. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Tenn-Fla Partners v. Henry C. Shelton, III, et al.
Client appeals the dismissal of its legal malpractice action against the attorneys who represented it in a bankruptcy proceeding. The trial court determined that the action was barred by the Statute of Limitations and that there were no grounds upon which the trier of fact could find that the loss alleged by the client was caused by any negligent act or omission of the defendants. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Garnett Lynn Goforth, R. Lynn Goforth and wife, Susan D. Goforth v. State of Tennessee
Plaintiffs, parents and son brought suit against the University for injuries to the son sustained while practicing football, charging the coaches were negligent in allowing practice to continue under dangerous conditions. The Commissioner ruled in favor of the University, except as to the dispute over insurance, and awarded plaintiffs $3,600.00 under the contract of insurance with the University. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Sharon Kay Jackson v. Randall D. Jackson
This is a divorce case. The parties had a long-term marriage and their children are now adults. During the marriage, the husband worked in the telecommunications industry and the wife was primarily a homemaker. The parties’ marital estate consisted largely of real property. They had incurred a substantial debt to the Internal Revenue Service. After a three-day hearing, the trial court declared the parties divorced and ordered that the real property be sold to satisfy the debt owed to the IRS. The trial court equally divided the IRS debt and any remaining proceeds from the sale of the properties. The trial court also awarded the wife a lump sum judgment representing temporary support during the pendency of the action, ordered the husband to pay the wife transitional alimony for five years, and denied the wife’s request for attorney’s fees. The wife now appeals the division of the marital estate, the decision to make the alimony award transitional rather than in futuro, and the denial of her request for attorney’s fees. The husband appeals the amount of the alimony award and the judgment for temporary support awarded to the wife. We modify the alimony to award alimony in futuro instead of transitional alimony, and affirm the remainder of the trial court’s decision. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Dudley W. Taylor, D/B/A The Taylow Law Firm v. James Dalle, Katherine Dalle, Moshe Shloush, Clarence L. Hendrix and Robert Hickman
In this action for a judgment for fees for legal services rendered, the Trial Court entered Judgment for plaintiff and defendants appealed. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee Department of Children's Services v. F.R.G.
The trial court terminated the parental rights of F.R.G. (“Mother”) and R.K.B. (“Father”) with respect to their minor child, C.G.B. (“the child”) (DOB: December 31, 2003), upon finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that grounds for terminating their parental rights existed and that termination was in the best interest of the child. Mother appeals, arguing procedural defects in the trial court’s termination of her parental rights. We affirm. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
BFS Retail and Commercial Operations, LLC v. Charles Smith - Concurring
I concur with the court’s opinion. However, I have prepared this separate opinion to point specifically to the provisions of Mr. Smith’s employment agreement that undermine the summary judgment in this case. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Steve Wherry and Mary Hopkins, Co-Executors of the Estate of Margaret Archer, Deceased v. Union Planters Bank, N.A.
This case involves the alleged negligent administration of a trust. In 1964, the plaintiffs’ decedent established a $1.7 million trust and named herself as the sole beneficiary. The defendant bank was named as the trustee and was given sole discretion to manage the trust investments. From 1964 until the decedent’s death in 1999, the bank managed the trust fund and sent the decedent monthly statements describing the trust activities. When the trust terminated, it was worth approximately $880,000. The plaintiffs, co-executors of the decedent’s estate, brought this action on behalf of the estate for negligent administration of the trust, arguing that the bank negligently failed to maximize the rate of return on the trust assets. The bank filed a motion for summary judgment based on, inter alia, the doctrine of ratification, asserting that the decedent had ratified the bank’s management of the trust assets by failing to object to its decisions over the thirty-five-year life of the trust. The plaintiffs argued that the decedent was not sufficiently sophisticated in financial matters to ratify the bank’s actions. The trial court granted the bank’s motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs now appeal. We affirm, concluding that, in light of the undisputed facts that the decedent was legally competent and was fully informed of the bank’s actions in managing the trust investments, the decedent’s level of sophistication in financial matters is immaterial. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Anesthesia Medical Group, P.C. v. Pamela Greer Chandler
The plaintiff medical group loaned money to the defendant nurse for tuition at a school that trained its students to become nurse anesthetists. As part of the arrangement, the student promised to work for the group for three years after graduation. Seven months prior to graduation, the student notified the group that she would not be able to work for it upon completion of her training. She paid the loan back with interest, but the medical group filed suit to enforce a $15,000 liquidated damages clause in the loan contract. The student then filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. The court held that the sum demanded constituted an impermissible penalty rather than a valid provision for liquidated damages and, thus, that it was unenforceable as a matter of law. We reverse the grant of summary judgment to the student and affirm the denial of summary judgment to the medical group because we find that the undisputed facts do not show that either party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |
