State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services v. RDV
In this action to terminate father's parental rights, the Trial Court refused to appoint counsel for father, despite his claim of indigence. On appeal, we vacate the Judgment and remand for further hearing on the issue of indigency. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Austa La Vista, LLC and Take It Easy, LLC, and Boardwalk Property Owners Association, v. Mariner's Pointe Interval Owners Association, Inc., and Henry Phillips, Individually
In this dispute, plaintiffs sought declaratory judgment as to use of their lake by defendant, payment of fees and injunctive relief. Defendant counter-claimed for a declaratory judgment as to its use of the lake, disputed any obligation to pay fees to the plaintiff, and sought monetary damages and attorney's fees. The Trial Court held that plaintiffs' owned the lake and the master deed provided for maintenance fee and membership fees, that defendant's members were required to pay. But if the defendants' members did not use the lake they would not be required to pay the fees. On appeal, we hold the Court correctly found that the lake was an amenity and that a lake use fee was required to be paid to plaintiffs pursuant to the master deed and exhibits. But the Court erred in holding that defendant owners could choose not to use the lake and not pay the fees. We otherwise affirm the Court's rulings on the issues raised on appeal. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Cavalier Metal Corporation, et al. v. Finch & McBroom, et al.
Appellants, who were represented in a lawsuit by Appellees, appeal the dismissal of their attorney malpractice suit against Appellees on the ground, among other things, that the Appellants did not file suit within the one-year statute of limitations for attorney malpractice actions. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Henderson | Court of Appeals | |
Gregory Fodness v. Newport and Cocke County Economic Development Commission, Inc.
This case involves the interpretation of a portion of the Tennessee Public Records Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-503. The issue presented is whether the statutory exemption set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-503(d)(1) is available to the Appellee which is a nonprofit joint municipal-county economic development commission. The trial court granted the commission’s motion for summary judgment, finding that the exemption was applicable and the commission did not have to provide its records to the Appellant. We hold that the commission is entitled to the statutory exemption, but that there is a genuine question of material fact as to whether the commission is the functional equivalent of a public agency. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Cocke | Court of Appeals | |
Gregory Fodness v. Newport and Cocke County Economic Development Commission, Inc. - Dissenting
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the Commission is not entitled to summary judgment on the record presently before us. I disagree, however, with the majority’s rationale for that conclusion. Specifically, I disagree with the assertion that the public’s access to the Commission’s records depends upon whether, in the words of the majority, “[the Commission] is the functional equivalent of a governmental agency.” I believe this concept of “functional equivalen[cy],” as promulgated by the Supreme Court in Memphis Publ’g Co. v. Cherokee Children & Family Servs., Inc., 87 S.W.3d 67, 79 (Tenn. 2002), is not material to the issue now before us. |
Cocke | Court of Appeals | |
Kim Jones, d/b/a Kim's Kiddie Korner vs. State of Tennessee
Claimant sought reimbursement for child care under the Child Care Certificate Program. The Commissioner granted the State summary judgment on the grounds that the State was not contractually bound to reimburse claimant under the governmental immunity statutory scheme. On appeal, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Patsy Smith, as next of kind and mother of Shawn Smith, v. State of Tennessee
Shawn Smith died of aspiration of gastric contents while a patient at the University of Tennessee Medical Center. Shawn Smith’s mother, Patsy Smith (“Plaintiff”), sued the State of Tennessee (“the State”). The case was transferred to the Claims Commission (“the Commission”). After trial, the Commission entered a judgment for the State holding, inter alia, that there was no breach of the standard of care. Plaintiff appeals claiming that the Commission erred in holding there was no breach of the standard of care, that the Commission erred in making certain factual findings, and that the Commission erred in refusing to find that the integrity of the medical record had been compromised. We affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Ora Aschbacher v. Peggy Ann Woods
Aunt and niece agreed that aunt would convey her residence to niece in exchange for the promise of niece to look after her in her declining years. The years passed, niece provided care and attention for a period of time, but eventually ceased doing so. Aunt sought to rescind the deed for failure of consideration. The trial judge held that while the proof established a contract, the action was barred by the six-year statute of limitations. Reversed on a finding that the contract was a continuing obligation. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Warren E. Heatherly v. Campbell County Board of Education, et al.
The plaintiff in this case was employed as the director of schools for Campbell County, Tennessee, under a contract of employment which was deemed by the defendant Campbell County Board of Education to have terminated after four years. The plaintiff sued the Board for breach of contract asserting that the contract contained a clause which provided that if the Board took no action by April 15 of each year of the contract to either extend or non-renew, the contract was automatically extended one year. The plaintiff contended that, in view of this clause and accompanying non-action by the Board, the contract did not terminate upon the expiration of four years, but rather extended beyond that period of time. The plaintiff alternatively asserted that, pursuant to a prior order of the trial court entered in a matter unrelated to the present case, he was entitled to an annual salary of not less than ten percent below that of the director of schools. The Board filed a motion for summary judgment requesting a ruling that the automatic extension clause of the contract was invalid and that the contract expired according to its terms. The Board's motion also requested that the trial court rule that, upon expiration of the contract, the plaintiff enjoys no rights to salary beyond those of a classroom teacher. The trial court denied the Board's motion with respect to the automatic extension clause, declaring the clause to be valid and enforceable; however, the Board's motion was granted with respect to the matter of the plaintiff's rights to salary granted by the court's prior order. We hold that the automatic extension clause is invalid, but that the plaintiff retains those rights granted him under the prior order of the trial court subject to further review by the trial court. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee Department of Human Services, ex rel. Tracy Ellis v. Malcolm Humes
Appellant seeks relief, ostensibly under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02, from final orders establishing paternity and setting child support obligations. Because Appellant failed to timely file his petition to establish fraud and/or misrepresentation and because the equities in this matter do not support the disestablishment of paternity, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Steven Johnson, v. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company
The issue for jury resolution was whether Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company refused in bad faith to settle a damage suit against Johnson by Moore within his policy limits of $25,000, and exposed him to a final judgment of nearly $200,000.00. Johnson’s defense entirely focused on his asserted non-liability, not withstanding that Moore’s medical expenses exceeded $75,000, and his injuries were serious and permanently disabling, thus reasonably indicating that if Johnson was found to be negligent, the percentage of his fault necessarily would have to be minimal in light of his insurance limits. An unidentified van forced Johnson to crash head-on into Moore, and the jury allocated 50% of Moore’s damages to Johnson and 50% to the van. After this allocation was affirmed on appeal, Johnson sued Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company, claiming that Moore’s claim could have been settled for his policy limits. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company presents a host of issues, beginning with the refusal of the court to direct a verdict, and continuing with complaints of the trial judge commenting on the evidence and refusing corrective jury instructions. The judgment is reversed for the latter two reasons. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Steven Johnson v. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company - Dissenting
I concur with the majority’s decision affirming the trial court’s denial of Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company’s motion for directed verdict, but I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision reversing the jury’s verdict based on the jury charge and comments to the jury. I would affirm the jury verdict in favor of the Plaintiff, Robert Steven Johnson. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In re: J.M., D.O.B. 10/31/1994, Lee T. Myers v. Sandra Brown
This is petition to modify custody. The mother and father of the minor child were never |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: R.D.F. and D.L.F.
The attorney for the petitioner was held in contempt for failing to appear as ordered and failing to advise the Juvenile Court of a Chancery action. We hold the evidence does not support a finding of criminal contempt. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Steven Johnson v. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company - Concurring/Dissenting
I agree with both Judge Inman’s and Judge Lee’s Opinions that Tennessee Farmers |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Alexander Ford-Mercury, Inc. v. City of Franklin, Tennessee Board of Zoning Appeals
This is a zoning case involving a free-standing sign. The plaintiff seeks to replace it with another sign which does not conform to a new sign ordinance. The plaintiff seeks the protection of the grandfather statute. The Chancellor held that the grandfather statute did not apply. We affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Mary Jo Earl Headrick vs. William H. Headrick, Jr.
This appeal arises from a divorce in which the husband appeals the trial court's classification of separate and marital property as well as the division of these assets. The trial court reserved the issue of the wife's request for attorney's fees. Since all issues were not adjudicated by the final decree, the order was not final pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a). Accordingly, we hold that this appeal is premature and dismiss and remand to the trial court. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: A.Y.M. and A.N.W., Jr.
A.N.W., Sr., father, alone appeals the termination of his parental rights as to two children, A.Y.M. and A.N.W., Jr., the youngest of which had been removed from parental custody at birth due to the child's addiction to cocaine. A.N.W., Sr., challenges the trial court's findings that DCS exercised reasonable efforts to provide family services, that A.N.W., Sr., failed to substantially comply with permanency plan goals, that A.N.W., Sr., had abandoned these two children, and that the best interest of the children required termination of parental rights. We affirm the trial court's findings in all respects and remand the case for such other proceedings as may be necessary. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Randy Alan Barnes v. Amy Robertson Barnes
This is a divorce case. In contemplation of a divorce grounded on irreconcilable differences, Husband and Wife entered into a Marital Dissolution Agreement. Subsequently, Husband filed a complaint for divorce, and the complaint, inter alia, disavowed the prior executed Marital Dissolution Agreement. The divorce case proceeded to trial, and the trial court granted the divorce on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct and enforced the Marital Dissolution Agreement, dividing the marital property and debt. Husband appeals. Because Husband-Appellant repudiated the Marital Dissolution Agreement prior to the entry of the trial court’s Final Decree of Divorce, there was no agreement between the parties, and the Marital Dissolution Agreement should not have been enforced. We reverse and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, ex rel., Brandi Shantika Taylor v. Cedrick Cortez Wilson
Appellant challenges trial court’s dismissal of his petition, under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02(4), seeking to rescind his voluntary legitimation of child, modify custody, set aside paternity order and modify child support arrearage, based on results of DNA test that conclusively proves that he is not the father of the child. We reverse. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Sandra Kaye Kemp Parish, et al., v. Jerry Donald Kemp, et al.
This appeal arises out of a complaint filed by Appellants seeking to invalidate certain inter vivos |
Carroll | Court of Appeals | |
In Re F.R.R., III
This appeal involves the termination of a biological father’s rights to his non-marital child. When the child was almost five years old, his mother and her husband filed a petition in the Williamson County Juvenile Court seeking to terminate the biological father’s parental rights and to adopt the child. Following a bench trial, the juvenile court determined that the biological father had abandoned the child by willfully failing to visit him and that terminating the biological father’s parental rights would be in the child’s best interests. Accordingly, the court terminated the biological father’s parental rights and approved the adoption. The biological father has appealed. We have determined that the record contains clear and convincing evidence that the biological father abandoned the child and that terminating the father’s parental rights would be in the child’s best interests. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Bernadette Benson v. Nathan Berryman, et al.
This appeal arises out of an action by Appellant for a claim of negligence. After the close of |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Union County Education Association v. Union County Board of Education and Dr. James Pratt, Superintendent of the Union Cty Schools
We dismiss this appeal from a granting of summary judgment because the appeal was not from a final judgment and the issues are moot. |
Union | Court of Appeals | |
Richard D. Vatt, et al. v. A.L. James d/b/a A.L. James Construction Company
This case involves the alleged breach of a real estate sales contract. The plaintiffs argue that the defendant home builder is in breach of contract because he refused to sell them the house contracted for unless, in addition to the price stated in the contract, they paid him for costs attributed to changes in construction. None of these changes were implemented pursuant to written change orders as required under the contract. The builder countersued arguing that the changes for which he sought payment were agreed to orally after the contract was executed, that the written change order requirement of the contract was waived, and that the plaintiffs breached the contract by refusing to pay him the original contract price, plus the amount attributed to the changes. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the defendant. We affirm in part, reverse in part and remand. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals |
