City of Elizabethton, Tennessee, v. North American Fibers, Inc. et al.
This appeal arises out of a cause of action filed by a municipality against a corporate landowner for breach of a sewer easement which the municipality purchased as a path for its underground sewer line. The municipality alleged that after construction of the sewer line, the landowner's long- standing practice of depositing fly ash and cinders over the area of the easement rendered the line inaccessible and necessitated the construction of an alternate sewage system for which the municipality requested compensation. The municipality also sought to hold the landowner's president and chief executive officer liable as the alter ego of the landowner. The trial court decreed that the landowner had unreasonably burdened the easement, awarded the municipality compensatory damages, and decreed that although the landowner's president was an alter ego of the landowner, he was not personally liable. On appeal the landowner argues that the municipality's cause of action was barred under the statute of limitations and equitable doctrines of estoppel and laches, that under the rule of practical construction the easement allowed the landowner to dump material over the sewer line, that the trial court erred in its award of damages, and that the court erred in refusing to strike findings with respect to the landowner's president. We affirm the judgment of the trial court as rendered and remand. |
Carter | Court of Appeals | |
Randel P. Carlton, et al. v. Mark L. Williams, et al.
Randel P. Carlton, and Julie S. Carlton ("Plaintiffs") purchased a house from Mark L. Williams and Sandra Kay Williams ("Defendants"). Plaintiffs later sued Defendants claiming, among other things, that Defendants knew and failed to disclose that the swimming pool was not in good working order and that the swimming pool encroached onto a sewer easement and neighboring property. Plaintiffs also claimed that Defendants had warranted that all fixtures, including the swimming pool, were free of liens and encumbrances and had breached this warranty. The case was tried on the issue of whether Defendants had warranted that all fixtures, including the pool, were free of liens and encumbrances. The Trial Court found and held, inter alia, that the paragraph of the sales contract relied upon by Plaintiffs contained no warranty and that the owner's affidavit also contained no warranty because it merged into the deed at closing. The Trial Court dismissed the case against Defendants. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm, in part, reverse, in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Tareco Properties, Inc. v. Steve Morriss
The assignee of a judgment rendered by a federal district court in Texas attempted to enforce that judgment in Tennessee. The trial court entered an order granting summary judgment to the plaintiff and enforcing the judgment. The defendant subsequently filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60 motion for relief, arguing that the judgment of the federal court was void. The trial court agreed and set aside its previous order. After the Texas federal court that had rendered the original judgment reached the opposite conclusion, the plaintiff filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60 motion asking the trial court to set aside its earlier order setting aside the summary judgment enforcing the Texas judgment. The trial court denied this motion. By final order, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff's action to enforce the Texas judgment. We reverse the trial court on this issue and also vacate the order of expungement granted to Mr. Morriss related to a holding of criminal contempt. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State ex rel. Karl F. Dean v. John Aaron Nelson, et al.
This extraordinary appeal involves the efforts of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County to close an adult business where acts of prostitution and lewdness were allegedly occurring. At the City’s request, the Criminal Court for Davidson County issued an ex parte temporary restraining order immediately padlocking the business. Following a hearing one week later, the trial court entered a second order stating that the temporary restraining order would “remain binding and in effect pending a trial.” The owner of the adult business filed a Tenn. R. App. P. 10 application with this court. We have concluded that the trial court departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings in two respects. First, the court violated Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-3-106(a) (2000) by issuing the temporary restraining order without five days written notice. Second, the trial court violated Tenn. R. Civ. P. 65.03(5) by allowing the temporary restraining order to remain in effect pending the trial. Accordingly, we grant the owner’s Tenn. R. App. P. 10 application and vacate the order padlocking the premises.1 |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Christina K. Yeubanks v. Methodist Healthcare Memphis Hospitals, et al.
Appellant, the mother of a nine year old girl who died after being seriously injured in an |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services v. Tammy Robbins
This is a termination of parental rights case. Tammy Robbins (“Ms. Robbins”) appeals from the order of the Juvenile Court of Weakley County terminating her parental rights. Specifically, Robbins asserts that the trial court erred the following five respects: in admitting the testimony of a certain expert witness; in disregarding the testimony of another expert witness; in disregarding the testimony of Robbins’s fact witnesses; in refusing to observe Robbins with her children; and in considering, in the termination proceeding, evidence of the State’s earlier removals of the children from Robbins’s custody. Because we find appellant’s assertions to be without merit, we affirm. |
Weakley | Court of Appeals | |
Crye-Leike. v. Estate of Kenneth Earp, et al.
This case involves a dispute over whether a real estate listing contract was canceled by oral agreement prior to receipt of a full-priced offer from a buyer. Plaintiff real estate agents claim the contract was still in effect at the time of the offer entitling them to their sales commission when Defendant sellers refused to sell their property. The trial court found that the contract was canceled by oral agreement prior to receipt of the offer and dismissed Plaintiffs' complaint. Defendants counterclaimed for violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act and the Tennessee Real Estate Broker's Licensing Act. Defendants counterclaims were also dismissed. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Ronald Hugh Parchman v. Brenda Parchman
This case involves the validity of a final divorce decree entered by the trial court which incorporated an agreement reached by the parties regarding alimony and property division. The wife subsequently filed a motion for a new trial, or in the alternative to alter and amend the judgment, alleging that the final divorce decree was invalid. The wife alleged that, at the time she entered into the agreement with her husband, she was not mentally competent. The trial court denied the wife’s motion. On appeal, the wife alleges that the trial court erred in denying her post-trial motion, as well as in its division of marital property and award of alimony in the final decree. For the reasons contained herein, we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Conlee Engine Rebuilders, Inc. v. City of Memphis
This appeal arises out of an inverse condemnation action brought by Appellant against Appellee. Appellee filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, contending that Appellant’s claim was time barred by the applicable statute of limitation. The trial court granted Appellee’s motion, and Appellant now seeks review by this Court. For the following reasons, we reverse. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Mary Allene Story v. Malcolm Eugene Lanier
This case primarily involves a dispute over the proper characterization of property held by the parties during a thirty year relationship. The parties lived together during their relationship, but never married. Mary Story filed suit against Malcolm Lanier, alleging that a marriage by estoppel existed between the parties, or in the alternative, that an implied partnership was created, justifying the equal division of all bank accounts, personal property, and real property owned by the parties. The chancellor granted Mr. Lanier’s Motion to Dismiss Ms. Story’s marriage by estoppel claim but allowed her to proceed on an implied partnership theory. Following a bench trial, the chancellor found that an implied business partnership existed in a restaurant purchased by Mr. Lanier in 1974 but not in any real property or bank accounts. Both parties have appealed the chancellor’s rulings regarding the division of the parties’ assets. Ms. Story also appeals the chancellor’s denial of prejudgment interest, the finding that no resulting or constructive trusts existed as to the real property and bank accounts, and a ruling regarding Mr. Lanier’s pleadings. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the decisions of the chancery court. |
Lake | Court of Appeals | |
Max Deberry v. Ed Gore, et al.
This case involves an inmate’s petition for a writ of mandamus filed against the Tennessee Department of Correction following an increase in his release eligibility date. The inmate filed the petition asking the trial court to order the department to enforce the sentencing range set forth in the judgment entered as a result of his plea agreement. The department filed a motion to dismiss which the trial court granted. We affirm. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
R&J of Tennessee, Inc., v. Blankenship-Melton Real Estate, Inc., and Walden Blankenship, Individually
This case involves a lawsuit filed by a secured party against a guarantor seeking a deficiency judgment following a foreclosure sale. The guarantor argued that the secured party was not entitled to a deficiency because he was given inadequate notice and the salewas conducted in a commercially unreasonable manner. Following a hearing, the trial court awarded the secured party a deficiency judgment. We reverse and remand to the trial court for further action consistent with this opinion. |
Henderson | Court of Appeals | |
Lee Ann Braswell v. Leslie Graves, et al.
Plaintiff/Appellant appeals from the trial court’s grant of Defendants/Appellees’ Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12 Motion to Dismiss for failure to secure service of process. Finding that Defendant/Appellees’ evidence clearly and convincingly rebuts the process server’s testimony, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Monica White Mueller v. David Edmond Mueller
This appeal concerns the trial court’s findings regarding child custody and rehabilitative alimony in a divorce action. Following a bench trial, the chancery court ruled that the mother would be the minor child’s primary residential parent. The father was awarded standard visitation pursuant to the Permanent Parenting Plan. The chancellor also awarded the mother rehabilitative alimony for a period of three years. The father has appealed the rulings of the chancery court to this Court. For the following reasons, we affirm. |
Lauderdale | Court of Appeals | |
Linda Kurts (Parrish) v. Gregory Parrish
This case involves the trial court’s denial of an upward deviation in child support. The chancery court issued a final decree of divorce which incorporated the Permanent Parenting Plan approved by the parties. Pursuant to the plan, the mother was designated the primary residential parent and the father was given overnight visitation. The plan also ordered the father to pay the mother child support pursuant to the Tennessee Child Support Guidelines. When the father failed to make child support payments and exercise his visitation rights under the plan, the mother filed a petition for contempt. She also asked the trial court for an upward deviation in child support due to the father’s failure to exercise his rights to overnight visitation. The mother also asked the chancellor to award her litigation costs associated with bringing the petition. The father filed a counter-petition, asking the court for a downward deviation in his child support obligation due to his recent loss of income. The trial court originally granted a downward deviation to the father finding that a significant variance existed, but subsequently reinstated the original child support award. The mother filed this appeal, alleging the chancellor erred in refusing to grant her an upward deviation in child support and in not awarding her litigation expenses. For the reasons contained herein, we reverse in part and affirm in part the decision of the chancery court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee Department of Children's Services v. B.B.M.
This appeal involves the Juvenile Court's termination of the parental rights of B.B.M. ("Mother") to her four children. After a trial, the Juvenile Court held there was clear and convincing evidence that DCS had made a reasonable effort to assist Mother to reunite with her children. The Juvenile Court also concluded that DCS had proven by clear and convincing evidence that Mother's parental rights should be terminated on three separate grounds. Finally, the Juvenile Court held there was clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the children's best interest. The record on appeal is lacking in many respects and does not contain even the permanency plans developed by DCS to assist Mother in the unsuccessful attempt to reunite her with her children. We conclude the record, such as it is, does not contain sufficient evidence to support the Juvenile Court's conclusion that there was clear and convincing evidence that DCS had made a reasonable effort to assist Mother to reunite with her children. The judgment of the Juvenile Court is, therefore, reversed. |
Hancock | Court of Appeals | |
Estate of Jason Jenkins
This is a suit for personal injuries brought by the mother of a mentally challenged 17 year old boy occurring when his teacher attempted to transfer him from one chair to another and tripped over a nearby rocker. Neither his teacher nor the Defendant Nurse who immediately attended to him after the accident detected the fractured leg. Young Jason Jenkins died from causes unrelated to the accident, and his suit was revived against Defendants, Metropolitan Government of Nashville, Davidson County, Mary Ann Armbrister, and Lisa Morrow. The case was voluntarily dismissed as to Defendant teacher Ms. Armbrister, and a settlement was reached between Plaintiff and Metropolitan Government of Davidson County. The trial court sustained a Motion for Summary Judgment on behalf of Ms. Morrow from which Plaintiff appeals. We affirm the action of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of the Estate of Lizzie Tomlin Daughrity, Deceased
This case involves a claim filed by the Tennessee Bureau of TennCare against the estate of an elderly decedent to recover certain benefits paid to the decedent to cover nursing home expenses during her lifetime. The executor filed an exception to the claim arguing that it was filed outside the four (4) month limitations period found in sections 30-2-306(c) and 30-2-307(a) of the Tennessee Code. The chancery court issued an order barring the bureau's claim on the grounds that is was untimely filed. For the reasons stated herein, we reverse. |
Marshall | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee ex rel. Margaret Estelle Mitchell v. Ray Allen Lea State of Tennessee ex rel. Katherine A. Yarbrough v. William R. Johnson
This is a consolidated appeal involving two Title IV-D child support cases. In each case, the mother had custody of the children, and the father was subject to a court order requiring monthly child support payments. The mother in each case received State assistance, and consequently the father was required to make the child support payments through the State’s central collection and disbursement unit. Years later, after significant child support arrearages had accrued, the father in each case filed a motion to modify the child support order and requested that the court terminate his child support obligation. Each mother joined in the father’s request, confirming that she no longer wanted the State to enforce the father’s child support obligation. In each case, the State objected, asserting that the mother had assigned to the State her right to the child support payments when she accepted public assistance benefits. The trial court dismissed each case and forgave each father’s outstanding child support arrearage. The State now appeals. We reverse, in both cases, concluding that the trial court erred in retroactively modifying its child support orders and in terminating the cases before the State had been reimbursed for public assistance benefits received by the mothers. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Rose Construction Company, Inc. v. Raintree Development Company, L.L.C.
This is the second appeal of this case. In June 1999, an arbitration panel determined Rose Construction was entitled to damages under the parties’ contract. The trial court vacated the arbitration award. On appeal, this Court reversed and confirmed the arbitration award in its entirety. The Tennessee SupremeCourt denied Raintree Development’s application for permission to appeal, issued a mandate, and remanded the case to the trial court for entry of judgment. The trial court entered judgment for Rose Construction as ordered by this Court. Raintree Development again appeals. We affirm. We also hold this appeal frivolous and award Rose Construction damages for a frivolous appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jo Ann Harris v. Billy Harris
This is a petition to modify alimony. The parties were married for over forty-one years. In 1998, the wife filed a petition for legal separation. In October 1998, the trial court entered a final decree of legal separation, incorporating the terms of the parties’ property settlement agreement. In that agreement, the husband agreed to pay the wife alimony in futuro of $1,300 per month. In October 2001, the husband filed a petition to modify his alimony payments, based on the deterioration in his health, which hindered his ability to pay, as well as the wife’s receipt of social security benefits and income from investments that diminished her need for alimony. The trial court concluded that, since the 1998 decree, there had been no substantial or material change in circumstances that was not foreseeable when the decree was entered. Consequently, the husband’s petition to modify alimony was dismissed. The husband now appeals. We affirm. |
Hardeman | Court of Appeals | |
Crye Leike, Inc. et al., v. Richard Scott Over
This case arises out of the sale of real estate located in Madison County, Tennessee. Appellants filed this action to recover a real estate commission under a theory of unjust enrichment. The trial court below granted Appellee’s motion for summary judgment, and Appellants now seek review by this Court. For the following reasons, we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Woodrow Jerry Hawkins v. Mary Burton, et al.
Following an unlawful detainer action in general sessions court, Appellant was lawfully evicted pursuant to a writ of possession. Appellant did not appeal the judgment. Appellant filed a subsequent action in general sessions court alleging wrongful eviction. The general sessions court dismissed the action. Plaintiff appealed to circuit court, which affirmed dismissal based on the doctrine of res judicata. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
City of Cookeville, Tennessee v. Tennessee Water Quality Control Board, et al.
This appeal concerns the rule-making authority of the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation under the Tennessee Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. The City of Cookeville, seeking to expand its treatment works facility, obtained a permit from the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation which placed nitrogen limits on the City's effluent emissions into Pigeon Roost Creek in Putnam County, Tennessee. The city filed a declaratory judgment action with the Chancery Court of Davidson County asking the court to find as follows: (1) the section 303(d) list created by the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation, which listed Pigeon Roost Creek as organically enriched, amounted to an improperly promulgated rule in violation of the Tennessee Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, and (2) the organic enrichment criteria contained in the section 303(d) list amounted to an improperly promulgated Water Quality Standard, which in turn constitutes an improperly promulgated rule, that the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation used to impose restrictions on the city's permit. The parties each filed motions for summary judgment with the chancery court. The chancellor granted the city's motion, finding that the section 303(d) list containing the organic enrichment criteria amounted to improperly promulgated rules as a matter of law. The state appealed the chancellor's ruling to this Court and, for the reasons contained herein, we dismiss this case as non-justiciable. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Dwayne S. Byrd, Julie Dichtel Byrd, J. Wilson Roop, Jr. - Getwell West Residents Assoc. v. City of Memphis, et al.
This case involves a dismissal for failure to prosecute. In January 1988, the plaintiff residents filed this lawsuit against the defendant municipal officials for allegedly enacting an unconstitutional and unreasonable annexation ordinance. In 2003, after the case had been on the trial court’s docket for fifteen years with little activity, the trial court clerk filed a motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution. In June 2003, the trial court granted the clerk’s motion and dismissed the case. The plaintiff residents now appeal. We affirm, finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the case. The caption of the case lists 17 Plaintiffs. However, the first 1 two named Plaintiffs, Dwayne and Julie Byrd (“the Byrds”), are now counsel to the Plaintiffs and are not real parties in interest. The suit was originally filed when the Byrds were law students and residents of Getwell West. Subsequently, the Byrds moved out of Getwell West, but entered appearances on behalf of the other Plaintiffs after they became licensed to practice law. 2On November 14, 1995, the trial court entered an order dismissing the case for lack of prosecution. Apparently, however, that order was inadvertently entered, and two weeks later the trial court set that order aside. -2- Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court is Affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |
