Steven R. Ouzts v. Michael L. Womack, Victoria A. Raub, Frank Donato, Remax-Elite, Steven Boysen, Crye-Leike, Inc., and McAnally Inspection Svc., Inc.
This case involves alleged fraud in the sale of real estate. The sellers completed a residential disclosure statement indicating that the subject property had no flooding problems. The sellers then bargained to include language in the deed disavowing any previous representations concerning the property’s condition. The buyer accepted these terms. After the buyer took possession, the property flooded. The buyer filed suit against the sellers, alleging fraudulent concealment and misrepresentation. The sellers filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted. We affirm, holding that the buyers are bound by the unambiguous terms of the contract for sale and the deed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Monte Panitz, et al., v. F. Perman & Company, Inc., et al.
Shareholders seek to inspect certain records of corporation of which they are shareholders, as well as records of two other corporations (“the subsidiaries”): a second corporation which is the wholly-owned subsidiary of the corporation in which Plaintiffs hold shares, and another that is the wholly owned-subsidiary of the second corporation. Defendants maintain that plaintiffs do not have any right to inspect the records of corporations in which they are not shareholders, but agreed to allow inspection of limited records of two subsidiaries as a courtesy, contingent upon plaintiffs signing a confidentiality agreement. Plaintiffs maintain that they have an unqualified right to inspect records of all three corporations under T.C.A. 48-26-102. The trial court found that the confidentiality agreement was reasonable and entered an order requiring defendants to produce certain records, dating back to 1991, for inspection and copying. It further held that, in light of defendants’ agreement to allow limited inspection of records of subsidiaries, it need not rule on issue of whether plaintiffs were entitled to inspect records of subsidiaries. We affirm as modified herein. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Kenneth Morgan Johnson v. Dorothy Lynn Johnson (Holt)
Kenneth Morgan Johnson (“Father”) and Dorothy Lynn Johnson (“Mother”) were divorced in 1998. The parties have two minor children and initially agreed to equal co-parenting time and that neither party would seek child support from the other. A house owned by Father was severely damaged if not destroyed by fire, and the proceeds from a fire insurance policy were deposited with the Trial Court in a separate lawsuit. After Father was sentenced to be incarcerated for seven years for federal drug violations, Mother filed a petition claiming entitlement to the insurance funds being held by the Trial Court because the minor children were in need of support. The Trial Court concluded Mother should be paid $1,034 per month out of the fire insurance proceeds as child support for the parties’ two minor children. Father appeals claiming the Trial Court erred in determining the amount of child support he should be required to pay each month out of the fire insurance proceeds. We affirm the decision of the Trial Court. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Kenneth Morgan Johnson v. Dorothy Lynn Johnson (Holt) - Concurring
I agree completely with the majority opinion. I write separately to express my opinion that the statement in State ex rel. Vaughn v. Kaatrude, 21 S.W.3d 244 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) that “[s]etting child support is a discretionary matter,” id. at 248, should not be broadly read. For example, it is clear to me that a trial court has “limited discretion” to deviate from the amount of child support determined by applying the rules set forth in Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs., ch. 1240-2-4- .03. See Jones v. Jones, 930 S.W.2d 541, 544-45 (Tenn. 1996). However, I agree with the majority that the Kaatrude principle set forth above applies to the facts of this case. Finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s judgment, I concur. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
David L. Buck and Christopher L. Buck v. James W. Avent and Wife, Bernadine Avent, and Timmy Avent
This is an action to establish an easement. The plaintiffs’ property adjoins the northern boundary of the defendants’ property. The plaintiffs’ property is landlocked. To access the property, the plaintiffs historically used an old logging road on the northeastern corner of the defendants’ property. In 1998, the defendants made improvements that effectively blocked the plaintiffs’ passage over the old logging road. The plaintiffs filed this lawsuit to establish an easement over the old logging road and to enjoin the defendants from further impeding their use of the easement. After a bench trial, the trial court determined that the plaintiffs had established prescriptive easement and an implied easement over the defendants’ property. The trial court directed the plaintiffs’ expert, a surveyor, to establish the exact property lines between the parties’ properties, and ordered the defendants to restore the plaintiffs’ property to its original state according to those boundaries. From that order, the defendants now appeal. We affirm the trial court’s conclusion that the plaintiffs established a prescriptive easement and an implied easement, and reverse in part and remand for the trial court to allow the parties an opportunity to submit further evidence on the exact boundary line between their properties. |
Hardeman | Court of Appeals | |
Prime Company and Jerry Salemi v. Wilkinson & Snowden, Inc. and Eugene Woods
This case involves a claim for procurement of breach of contract. The plaintiff real estate firm sued the defendant real estate firm for procurement of breach of a real estate listing contract. A bench trial was conducted. At the close of the plaintiffs’ proof, the defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims. The trial court noted that, in order to prove procurement of breach of contract, the plaintiffs were required to prove that the defendants acted with “malice.” In order to prove “malice,” the trial court held that the plaintiffs were required to prove that the defendants were “motivated by ill will, hatred or spite.” The trial court found that the plaintiffs had not submitted evidence that the defendants were motivated by ill will, hatred or spite, and therefore held that the plaintiffs could not prove that element of their claim. The plaintiffs’ claim for procurement of breach was dismissed. The plaintiffs now appeal. We reverse, finding that in order to prove malice in this context, the plaintiffs were not required to prove ill will, hatred or spite. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Barsha Ella Royston
Appellant has appealed before final judgment was entered. We dismiss the appeal. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Ron Searcy, D/B/A Restoration Contractors v. John Herold
This appeal involves a dispute between a homeowner and a contractor over the validity of an arbitration award. After the arbitrator awarded the contractor $52,725, the contractor filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Sumner County to confirm the award and to recover the costs of the arbitration. The homeowner challenged the award on the ground that he had not been afforded a hearing. The contractor filed a motion for summary judgment, a motion to dismiss the homeowner's counterclaim, and a motion for attorney's fees under the arbitration agreement. The trial court, granting the contractor's motions, confirmed the $52,725 arbitration decision and awarded the contractor $500 in arbitration expenses and $2,205 in attorney's fees. The homeowner has appealed. We have determined that the arbitration award must be vacated because of the arbitrator's failure to provide the parties a hearing before rendering his decision. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
In RE: Zaylen R.
This appeal involves a dispute over the custody of a non-marital child. The child's father requested the Wilson County Juvenile Court to designate him as the child's primary residential parent because of the mother's history of substance abuse. Following a bench trial, the juvenile court designated the mother as the child's primary residential parent and established a visitation schedule for the father. The court also ordered the father to pay child support and to maintain insurance for the child. The father asserts on this appeal (1) that the juvenile court's findings of fact were insufficient, (2) that the evidence does not support designating the mother as the child's primary residential parent, and (3) that the court based its decision on the outmoded tender years doctrine. We affirm the juvenile court's order. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Shirley Patricia Gilliam, Mother and next of kin of LaShun Hall, Decedent v. Michael G. Derrick, Administrator Ad Litem for the Estate of Santres A. Johnson, Decedent
This is a wrongful death action. The plaintiff’s decedent was riding as a passenger in a car driven by the defendant’s decedent. The car collided at a high rate of speed into the guard rail of a bridge. Both the driver and the passenger died in the accident. It was later determined that the driver was intoxicated, but that the passenger had not been drinking. The plaintiff, the mother of the passenger, filed this wrongful death action against the estate of the driver, alleging that the driver’s negligent conduct caused the death of her son. After a jury trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant. The jury concluded that the passenger was 50% at fault for his demise, because the passenger knew or should have known that the driver was intoxicated when he got into the car. The plaintiff now appeals. We reverse, finding no material evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that the passenger knew or should have known that the driver was intoxicated. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
John E. Allen v. Quenton T. White, et al.
This appeal concerns the dismissal of a common law writ of certiorari by the Circuit Court of Lake County. Appellant, an inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction, filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Certiorari to challenge the results of a prison disciplinary proceeding instituted against him. The trial court granted Appellee’s motion to dismiss the petition as untimely filed in violation of the applicable statute of limitations. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Lake | Court of Appeals | |
Shari Parker Morrow, et al. v. Fay A. Jones
Plaintiff/Buyer brought a cause of action alleging breach of a real estate contract and seeking specific performance. The trial court entered judgment for Defendant/Seller. We affirm in part, modify in part, and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Charles W. Ayrhart v. Dewel B. Scruggs, et al.
This is an interlocutory appeal of the trial court's refusal to grant a summary judgment to the defendants in a negligence case. We find that the defendants have not affirmatively negated an element of this negligence claim and that reasonable minds could differ on the allocation of fault between the parties. Consequently, the defendant is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We therefore agree with the trial court and affirm the denial of summary judgment. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Carl Shockley v. Joseph F. Crosby, et al.
This appeal arises from a claim filed in Van Buren County Circuit Court alleging breach of contract, outrageous conduct, and assault. At the close of the plaintiff's proof, the trial court granted the defendants' motion for a directed verdict on the outrageous conduct claim. At the close of all the proof, the trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict on the breach of contract claim, and the parties then stipulated that the assault had occurred. The case went to the jury for consideration of the damages resulting from the breach and the assault. The jury returned a verdict of $57,500 for the breach of contract and specifically found that the assault did not cause injury to Carl Shockley for which compensatory damages should be awarded. Nonetheless the jury did find that Joseph Crosby acted in such a way that punitive damages should be awarded. The trial court refused to submit the punitive damages issue to the jury and granted a remittitur of $7,500 on the contract claim. Both parties appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Van Buren | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, ex rel. Paul G. Summers and Milton H. Hamilton, Jr. v. B&H Investments, Inc., Charles R. Smith and Alvin G. Pierce
The Trial Court held purchaser of land responsible for prior owner’s violations of the Tennessee |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Michaela Babb v. Hamilton County Board of Education
This is a suit brought by a school teacher against the Hamilton County Board of Education under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act wherein the teacher alleges negligence on the part of the Board of Education as a result of an assault on her by a student who was re-enrolled in school and re-placed in her classroom despite the fact the student had assaulted her the previous month and been suspended from school. The trial court granted the Board of Education's motion for summary judgment. We hold that the decision to place the student back in the teacher's classroom, despite the previous assault, was a discretionary action for which the Board of Education was immune from liability. Accordingly, we affirm and remand to the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Frank Soard
This case involves a dispute between a widow and the personal representative of her husband’s estate. The parties differ as to the correct interpretation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 31-4-101 (2001), the statute setting forth the criteria pursuant to which a surviving spouse’s elective share is computed. The trial court adopted the estate’s construction of the statute and subtracted the widow’s exempt property, homestead allowance, and year’s support allowance from the value of her percentage share of the net estate in arriving at the elective-share amount to which she is entitled. We disagree with the trial court’s interpretation of the statute. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of that court. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Sylvester Young v. Bank One, N.A.
The Trial Court awarded possession to purchaser of property at foreclosure sale and dismissed possessor's action to rescind foreclosure. On appeal, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Deborah Lynn (Katz) Smith v. Steven White Smith
Wife appeals the trial court's distribution of marital property as inequitable in of her contribution to the acquisition of the only significant asset, the marital home. The trial court clearly recognized that without Wife's contribution from her separate property, the parties would have been unable to buy the house. We modify the trial court's award of the equity in the house and affirm as modified. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: T.A.R. and D.F.R.
The trial court terminated the parental rights of both Mother and Father, and both appealed. Because statutory grounds were proved by clear and convincing evidence and it was also shown by clear and convincing evidence that termination of parental rights was in the best interest of the children, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Holli Thacker Haney, et al. v. Bradley County Board of Education, et al.
Holli Thacker Haney ("Plaintiff") had two children who attended Michigan Avenue Elementary School (the "School") in Bradley County. Plaintiff's husband, Tracy Thacker ("Thacker"), was not the biological father of the oldest child, but he was the biological father of the youngest child. Thacker filed for divorce, and he and Plaintiff were in sharp disagreement over custody matters. Apparently believing he was going to lose on the custody issues, on the morning of December 12, 2000, Thacker went to the School and signed out both children. The School required Thacker to provide a written explanation as to why the children were being signed out. Thacker wrote "Keeping Promise by Mother" and "Pay Back" as his reasons for signing out the children. School employees did not read what Thacker had written prior to allowing him to leave the premises with the children. Tragically, Thacker then murdered both young children. Plaintiff sued the Bradley County Board of Education asserting claims of negligence and negligence per se based on the School's allowing Thacker to sign out the children and leave the School with them on December 12. The Trial Court granted the Board of Education's motion for summary judgment. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Teresa Lynn (Hurst) Fugate v. William Kendred Fugate, III
In this divorce case, Teresa Lynn (Hurst) Fugate ("Wife") appeals the trial court's decision to set aside the parties' marital dissolution agreement (MDA) and a quitclaim deed to the marital residence executed by the Husband shortly after the parties separated. The trial court found the residence to be marital property and equally divided the equity in the property between the parties. Wife argues that the trial court should have found the residence to be a gift from husband, and thus separate property, and that the trial court erred by not enforcing the quitclaim deed. Wife also appeals the trial court's award of $187.00 in attorney fees to Husband. We affirm the trial court's judgment in all respects. |
Rhea | Court of Appeals | |
Kathyrn Morris Brown and Swann Brown Jaffurs v. Juan F. Gutierrez, William E. Kessler, Donald J. Vernine individually and D/B/A GKV Leasing
In this Declaratory Judgment action, the Trial Court established the purchase price of property pursuant to a right of first refusal, awarded interest and denied a request for attorney's fees. On appeal by Seller, we Affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: The Estate of Dillard Phillips, Deceased, Leroy Phillips v. Cora Chitwood
In this action to contest a Will, the Trial Court granted proponent summary judgment. On appeal, we vacate and remand. |
Scott | Court of Appeals | |
Rosetta Willis v. Mike Settle, et al.
This is an appeal from a judgment entered on a jury verdict for Plaintiff/Appellee. Plaintiff/Appellee was taken hostage by a prisoner who escaped from the control and custody of Defendant/Appellant, a private corporation contracting with the State of Tennessee to provide prison security. Defendant/Appellant asserts that it is entitled to immunity under the Public Duty Doctrine, that there was no material evidence on which the jury could have based its verdict, that the award of compensatory damages was excessive and not supported by the evidence, that Defendant/Appellant cannot be held responsible for the actions of its employees under the doctrine of respondeat superior, and that the trial court erred in not granting a mistrial. We affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals |
