Teresa Barger v. Linda McGinnis, et al.
The Trial Court awarded plaintiff Judgment against defendants. On appeal defendants sought to reverse Judgment of the Trial Court. No transcript of evidence was filed. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
James R. Morrissett, Jr. v. Robbie Claire McKee Morrissett
This is a divorce case. The parties were married in 1972. In 2001, the husband filed for divorce based on inappropriate marital conduct and irreconcilable differences, and the wife counterclaimed for divorce on the basis of inappropriate marital conduct. After the March 2002 trial, some of the parties’ main assets were sold in foreclosure. In October 2002, the trial court granted a divorce to the wife on the grounds that the husband had committed adultery. The divorce decree resolved all of the property issues between the parties. The trial court also found implicitly that the wife could not be rehabilitated, based on a letter from the wife’s physician, and awarded alimony in futuro. Two weeks later, the husband filed a motion for reconsideration, based in part on the interim sale of some of the parties’ assets and the husband’s consequent inability to fulfill his obligations under the decree. In April 2003, the trial court denied the husband’s motion to reconsider. From that order, the husband now appeals and challenges many of the trial court’s rulings. We affirm the trial court’s division of the marital property and its allocation of the marital debts. We find, however, that the letter from the physician was inadmissible hearsay, and consequently reverse the trial court’s award of alimony in futuro and remand for an award of rehabilitative alimony and for other proceedings. |
Henderson | Court of Appeals | |
Amelia Swafford v. Bobby M. Johnson
The instant appeal was stayed in 1999 by this Court's order upon suggestion of bankruptcy. The stay has been lifted, and the case proceeds on Amelia Swafford's appeal from the trial court's order in favor of the defendants Bobby and Betty Johnson and Old Hickory Engineering & Machine Co., Inc. ("OHEMCO"). We reverse the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: D.L.L. & R. H. F.
The trial court terminated the parental rights of a mother to her two teenage sons on the grounds of abandonment, failure to comply with the permanency plan, and failure to remedy the conditions that led to the children being removed from her custody. After thoroughly examining the record, we agree with the trial court that all those grounds have been proved by clear and convincing evidence and that it is in the best interest of the children that the mother's parental rights be terminated. We also find that the Department of Children's Services made reasonable efforts to assist the mother, but that her own lack of honest effort rendered that assistance ineffective. We accordingly affirm the trial court. |
Macon | Court of Appeals | |
Ricky D. Watkins, Sr. v. State of Tennessee, Department of Human Services, ex rel, Dorothy M. Prather, et al.
This case involves an order for child support for three children of three different mothers. The Juvenile Court of Hardeman County consolidated the three matters into one cause. The trial court ordered Father to pay the child support amount for three children under the Child Support Guidelines and divided the amount equally into thirds. The State of Tennessee Department of Human Services filed this appeal. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion |
Hardeman | Court of Appeals | |
Ailene Standifer Craft v. Claiborne County
The initial judgment declared that Standifer Lane was a public road for one-tenth mile only. Sixteen (16) months after the judgment was entered, the County filed a Rule 62.02 motion alleging that "one-tenth mile" was a mistake because all concerned had agreed upon two-tenths mile. The judgment was amended to provide that Standifer Lane is a public road for a distance of 950 feet or to an existing driveway. The Rule 62.02 motion is untimely. |
Claiborne | Court of Appeals | |
Sherri Dyer Kendall v. Lane Cook, M.D.
Sherri Dyer Kendall (“Plaintiff”) sought treatment for bipolar disorder from a psychiatrist, Lane Cook, M.D. (“Defendant”). Defendant prescribed Topamax for Plaintiff. Less than one week later, Plaintiff began to experience loss of vision, severe headache, and severe vomiting. Plaintiff was diagnosed with acute angle closure glaucoma and underwent several surgical procedures to control or correct the problem. When Defendant prescribed Topamax to Plaintiff, it was unknown in the medical community that a potential side effect of Topamax was acute angle closure glaucoma. That acute angle closure glaucoma was a potential side effect was discovered later by the medical community, and Plaintiff1 sued Defendant2 for medical malpractice. At the close of Plaintiff’s proof at trial, Defendant moved for a directed verdict, which the Trial Court granted. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Melvin L. Bookout v. Knox County Board of Zoning Appeals, et al.
This is a zoning case. The principal issue is whether a rezoning amendment must explicitly designate the maximum density approved with reference to ancillary documentation. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Linda Ottinger, et al. v. Shelly Evans Ottinger
Linda Ottinger and Marion Ottinger (“Plaintiffs”) are the paternal grandparents of H.O. (“the Child”). The Child’s father died in 2000. Plaintiffs sought visitation with the Child. This visitation was opposed by the Child’s mother, Shelly Evans Ottinger (“Defendant”). Plaintiffs filed a petition to obtain grandparent visitation under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-306. After trial, the Trial Court held, inter alia, that the Child has had a significant existing relationship with the Plaintiffs and the loss of that relationship presents the danger of direct and substantial harm to the Child. The Trial Court granted Plaintiffs visitation. Defendant appeals. We reverse. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Linda Ottinger, et. al v. Shelly Evans Ottinger - Concurring
I concur completely in Judge Swiney’s opinion. I write separately to emphasize what the majority opinion expressly states, i.e., that the Defendant in the instant case did not challenge the constitutionality of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-306 (2001 & Supp. 2003). I continue to have some doubt that the deprivation of a relationship with grandparents can form the basis for the type of substantial harm contemplated by the Supreme Court’s decision in Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn. 1993). See Dugan v. Myers, C/A No. E2001-00281-COA-R3-JV, 2001 WL 1117514, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. E.S., filed September 24, 2001), no perm. app. requested (Susano, J., concurring). However, since that issue is not before us in this case, we do not need to reach it. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Crystal Jill Cunningham v. John W. Gill
Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking a reversion of Defendant's mineral interests in Plaintiff's land, alleging that Defendant had abandoned the interests. The trial court held that the mineral interests had not been abandoned because Defendant had made use of the mineral interests by paying taxes on the mineral interests. We affirm. |
Overton | Court of Appeals | |
J.C. King, et al., v. Gatlinburg Sportsman's Club, Inc.
Lessors, who are descendants of the original lessor, filed suit against the Gatlinburg Sportsman's Club, Inc., to declare that the real estate lease had been breached by the Club due to its failure to build a clubhouse as required by the lease. The Club argued that it built a clubhouse that satisfied the lease for the lease did not contain specifications for the type or size of clubhouse. It further argued that it was not in breach for the lessors had extended the deadline indefinitely to build a more substantial clubhouse. The Club also argued that the lessors' claim was barred by the six-year statute of limitations, equitable estoppel, waiver and laches and that the lessors' violated the Club's right of first refusal to purchase the property by not selling the property as the decedent's will directed and for making transfers of partial interests in the property amongst the beneficiaries and descendants of the original lessor. The trial court ruled that the parties mutually suspended the deadline by which the Club was to build a clubhouse, that the Club failed to build a clubhouse, that the Club was in material breach and, therefore, the lease was terminated. We reverse in part finding that the parties did not mutually suspend the obligation or deadline to build a clubhouse, that the completion date for the clubhouse was June 30, 1990, and that the lessors did not file suit until May 5, 2000; therefore, the lessors are barred by the six-year statute of limitations. We affirm the trial court's ruling that the lessors did not violate the Club's right of first refusal to purchase the property, finding that the inter-family transfers did not violate the Club's right of first refusal. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Barbara D. Lowe v. Ruth F.Chenevert, A/K/A Ruth Robertson
This case arises from an automobile accident in which Ms. Lowe was injured by an uninsured motorist. Ms. Lowe and her husband filed suit against the motorist and were awarded a total of $25,000 in damages, which they sought to have satisfied by Tennessee Farmer's Mutual Insurance Company under the terms of their uninsured motorist insurance policy. Tennessee Farmer's refused to pay the claim, asserting that Ms. Lowe had already signed a complete release in exchange for a settlement in excess of $5,000. In the ensuing litigation, the trial court granted Tennessee Farmer's motion for summary judgment, finding that Ms. Lowe had, indeed, signed a release as part of a settlement with Tennessee Farmer's. For the following reasons, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Patricia Albright v. Lloyd A. Button, et al
This case involves the construction of a will. Lloyd A. Button, a widower (“the Deceased”), executed his last will and testament on April 1, 2002, while hospitalized at Parkwest Hospital in Knoxville. Under the heading “Conditional Bequest to Patricia Albright,” the Deceased left Ms. Albright his Loudon County residence, one of his automobiles, and “all . . . tangible personal property,” except the property mentioned in a specific bequest in the will. The Deceased died one week later, on April 8, 2002, having never left the hospital.1 Ms. Albright sued the personal representatives of the Deceased’s estate (“the Personal Representatives”) seeking to establish her entitlement to the property left to her in the will. On cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment to Ms. Albright. The Personal Representatives, who are the Deceased’s son2 and Shirley Reno, a residuary beneficiary under the will, appeal. We reverse and dismiss Ms. Albright’s complaint. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
Patricia Albright v. Lloyd A. Button, et al. - Concurring
While I concur with the majority to reverse the decision of the Trial Court and to dismiss Ms. Albright’s Complaint, I write separately to express my disagreement with the majority’s decision to take judicial notice of certain facts. I agree completely with the majority’s discussion of what the law is as to summary judgment, interpretation of a will, conditional bequests, and judicial notice. However, I cannot agree with the majority that this Court can take judicial notice that e]ssentially all of the services recited as conditions in the Deceased’s will are services that would be rendered by a hospital such as Parkwest for individuals admitted to the hospital on an inpatient bases.” While I suspect that such is true, I cannot say that such a “fact” is “(1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Tenn. R. Evid. 201(b). This being so, I cannot agree that this is a “fact” which is appropriate for judicial notice. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
Gary West v. East Tennessee Pioneer Oil
Gary L. West and Michell B. Richardson ("Plaintiffs") sued East Tennessee Pioneer Oil Co., d/b/a Exxon Convenience Store ("Defendant") asserting claims based on negligence, negligent entrustment, and negligence per se. Plaintiffs allege that Brian Lee Tarver ("Tarver") was visibly intoxicated when he stopped at Defendant's store to purchase beer and gasoline. Pursuant to company policy, Defendant's employees refused to sell Tarver beer because he was intoxicated, but did sell him $3.00 of gasoline. One or more of Defendant's employee then assisted Tarver with operating the gasoline pump. Shortly after leaving Defendant's store, Tarver was involved in an automobile accident resulting in serious personal injuries to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs offered expert proof that had Tarver not obtained the $3.00 worth of additional gasoline, he would have run out of gas before reaching the accident site. The Trial Court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment on all three of Plaintiffs' claims. We affirm the grant of summary judgment on Plaintiffs' claims for negligent entrustment and negligence per se. We reverse the grant of summary judgment on Plaintiffs' negligence claim. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
The Realty Store, Inc., et al. v. Tarl Partnership, L.P., et al.
The Trial Court awarded plaintiffs commission for lease of real estate pursuant to Agreement between the parties. Defendants appealed - we affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Sherry Pearson As Next of Kin of Addie Pearson, Deceased v. Vencor Nursing Center L.P., et al.
Plaintiff sued defendant nursing home located in Carroll County for damages for the injuries and death of plaintiff’s decedent while a patient in the nursing home. Defendant-nursing home, in its answer, alleged comparative fault on the part of Jackson-Madison County General Hospital, a governmental entity. Plaintiff amended her complaint to allege fault on the part of the hospital. The hospital then filed a motion to dismiss for improper venue which was denied by the trial court. The case is before this Court on a Rule 9 Interlocutory Appeal. We reverse and remand. |
Carroll | Court of Appeals | |
T. Green, et al. v. City of Memphis, et al.
Plaintiffs, police officers along with a number of others, were promoted to sergeant after passing a promotional test. Subsequently, the test was declared invalid by the federal court and the city announced its intention to restore the affected officers to their previous rank pending the administration of a new promotional test. Plaintiffs, along with others, filed suit in chancery court to enjoin this action on the part of the city. The chancery court issued a temporary injunction, enjoining the city from removing plaintiffs from their rank of sergeant or from reducing their pay pending final judgment. The chancellor clarified the injunction by order which provided that the injunction would be in effect only “until such time as promotions are made from the 2001 sergeant promotional process.” Of the fifty-four plaintiffs in the chancery court taking the new promotional test, the seven plaintiffs-appellants did not rank high enough for promotion. On motion of the city, the chancery court dissolved the preliminary injunction previously issued and, by consent order, allowed the plaintiffs full credit of time served as sergeant as a result of the first promotional process. Plaintiffs have appealed. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Delores M. King v. Tennessee Farmers Insurance Company, et al.
This case involves payment of an insurance claim demanded by Appellee from Appellant after Appellee’s belongings were destroyed in a fire. Appellant refused payment on the basis that Appellee failed to notify Appellant of an address change. After a hearing, the trial court awarded Appellee $32,000, representing her claim under the insurance policy, and $8,000 as a 25% bad faith penalty. For the following reasons, we affirm in part and vacate the award representing a bad faith penalty. |
Henderson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: R.C.P.
This appeal involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights with regard to her ten-year-old daughter. The Department of Children’s Services obtained custody of the child after discovering that she had been sexually abused by her mother’s boyfriend. Approximately three months later, the Department and the child’s guardian ad litem filed separate petitions in the Juvenile Court for Coffee County to terminate the mother’s parental rights based on abandonment under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1) (Supp. 2003) and severe child abuse under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4). Following a bench trial, the juvenile court determined that the Department and guardian ad litem had failed to present clear and convincing evidence of abandonment but concluded that the mother had committed severe child abuse by knowingly failing to protect her daughter from her boyfriend. The mother has perfected this appeal. We have determined that the record contains clear and convincing evidence supporting the juvenile court’s conclusion that the mother knowingly failed to protect her child from her boyfriend’s sexual abuse and that terminating the mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interests. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: R.C.P. - Concurring
I concur in the judgment that clear and convincing evidence establishes abundant grounds for the termination of the parental rights of the mother in this case and further establishes that it is in the best interests of the child to terminate her parental rights |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Shirley Hale v. Erwin Ostrow, Rose Ostrow, Max Ostrow
This is a premises liability and nuisance case that arose when Plaintiff fell on a public sidewalk. Plaintiff’s fall occurred on a patch of broken concrete located on the portion of sidewalk abutting Neighbor’s property, which is located immediately to the north of the lot owned by Defendants. Plaintiff filed suit alleging that her fall was caused, in part, by overgrown bushes on Defendants’ property that obstructed passage on the sidewalk. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that, because the fall took place on broken concrete in front of Neighbor’s property, Plaintiff cannot establish duty or causation. The trial court granted Defendants’ motion, and, for the following reasons, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Shirley Hale v. Erwin Ostrow, Rose Ostrow, Max Ostrow - Dissenting
I must respectfully dissent from the majority Opinion in this case. I disagree first with the majority’s characterization of the evidence. The majority states that Ms. Hale “admitted” that the cause of her fall was a crumbled section of sidewalk in front of the Ostrow property. Ms. Hale certainly contended that the crumbled sidewalk contributed to her fall,but at no point did she concede that it was the only cause. She clearly alleged that she was forced to attempt to walk in the street because the overgrown bushes from the Ostrow property blocked the sidewalk: |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Kathryn C. Black v. Stevan L. Black
This is an independent action for fraud and coercion based on a marital dissolution agreement. On September 13, 2000, the parties executed a marital dissolution agreement, and they were divorced by final decree entered in circuit court ninety days later on December 12, 2000. In February 2003, the wife brought this independent action in the chancery court below for damages for fraud, deceit, and coercion. She alleged that the husband had coerced her into signing the marital dissolution agreement by the use of threats, had prevented her from obtaining the benefit of counsel, and had misrepresented the value of his marital assets. The husband filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the wife had failed to state a claim upon which relief could granted. The trial court dismissed the wife’s lawsuit, determining that the complaint was essentially an action to set aside the divorce decree, and that the wife did not set out sufficient facts to support that claim. From that decision, the wife now appeals. We affirm, finding that the allegations in the complaint cannot be the basis for an independent action essentially to set aside the divorce decree. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |
