City of Chattanooga v. Cinema , Inc., et al.
David Franklin ("Franklin") operates an adult bookstore in Chattanooga known as Cinema 1, Inc. ("Cinema 1"). Numerous undercover visits by Chattanooga Police Department officers discovered a significant amount of sexual activity happening at Cinema 1. This sexual activity violated the Chattanooga city ordinance regulating adult oriented establishments. Based on police reports detailing what the undercover officers observed at Cinema 1, the Mayor of Chattanooga revoked Franklin's adult oriented establishment license, a decision later affirmed by the Chattanooga City Council and then the Trial Court. The primary issues on appeal concern whether the Chattanooga ordinance regulating adult oriented establishments provides the necessary procedural safeguards required by the First Amendment to be considered facially constitutional under the federal Constitution. We conclude the licensing scheme provides the necessary First Amendment procedural safeguards. We further conclude that there was sufficient evidence presented to revoke Franklin's license. The judgment of the Trial Court, therefore, is affirmed. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Julie Jiles, et al. v. State of Tennessee
Julie Jiles ("Plaintiff") and her husband, Bryan Jiles, sued the State of Tennessee ("State") for medical malpractice regarding medical care Plaintiff received at the Sevier County Health Department. The case was tried before the Claims Commission and an Order of Judgment was entered in March of 2003, holding, inter alia, that the standard of care was not breached and dismissing Plaintiff's case. In dicta, the Judgment also suggested that another health care provider was the proximate cause of Plaintiff's damages. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Kenneth W. Mitchell, et al., v. Homer E. Chance, et al.
This appeal involves a dispute between neighbors regarding the use of a county road in rural Humphreys County. After one of the landowners began to use the road to cross the neighboring landowners' property, the neighboring landowners erected barricades in the road and later filed a trespass action in the Chancery Court for Humphreys County. The landowners who desired to use the road counterclaimed to establish their right of way along the road. Following a bench trial, the trial court sided with the landowners desiring to use the road. On this appeal, the landowners who desire to prevent the use of the road take issue with the trial court's refusal to consider parol evidence regarding the meaning of the references to the road in the deeds. We affirm the trial court's decision that the references to the road in the deeds are not ambiguous, as well as its decision to admit extrinsic evidence to determine the location of the road. We have also determined that the evidence fully supports the trial court's decision regarding the location and dimensions of the road. |
Humphreys | Court of Appeals | |
James O. Ward v. Susan Ampferer Ward
Wife appeals trial court’s ruling on remand that former husband did not dissipate substantial marital assets through extramarital relationship, specifically asserting that the trial court failed to properly consider or apply the two-prong test set forth by the appellate court for determining whether dissipation has occurred. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
AT&T Corp. v. Ruth Johnson, et al.
This appeal concerns a challenge to the Commissioner's franchise and excise tax assessment. On cross-motions for summary judgment the chancellor found for the Commissioner. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Steven D. Elliott v. Ginger W. Elliott (Ecton)
This appeal involves a post-divorce dispute regarding stock options that were part of the marital estate. The Circuit Court for Davidson County approved a marital dissolution agreement in which the husband agreed to transfer one-half of his employee stock options to the wife as part of the division of the martial estate. After the husband's employer and the employer's brokerage firm declined to transfer the stock options to the wife, she orally requested the husband to exercise the options on her behalf. The value of the employer's stock fell after the husband did not exercise the options. The wife sought to hold the husband in contempt or to modify the divorce decree. The trial court declined to hold the husband in contempt but found that he had impermissibly impeded the division of the martial estate. Accordingly, the court awarded the wife $59,759.25, the stock options' before-tax value had they been exercised on the day the divorce decree was entered. In addition, the court ordered the husband to immediately sell the options originally awarded to the wife and to pay her the proceeds as a credit against the judgment. The court also ordered the husband to pay the wife's attorney's fees, as well as prejudgment interest. The husband has appealed. We have determined that the trial court properly concluded that the husband unreasonably impeded the wife's acquisition of the value of the stock options. However, we have determined that the trial court erred by valuing the stock options as of the time of the divorce rather than the time the wife and the husband orally agreed to exercise the options and that the court erred by requiring the husband to exercise his options to pay the judgment. We have also determined that the court erred by awarding the wife prejudgment interest but properly awarded the wife her attorney's fees. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Krishnalal J. Patel v. Dileep Patel
This appeal involves a dispute among the members of a general partnership. In 1997, a group of the partners sued one of the partners in the Chancery Court for Davidson County for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court granted a judgment for the defendant partner in 2000. In 2001, the same group of partners filed a similar suit in the Circuit Court for Davidson County. The defendant partner moved to dismiss on the grounds of res judicata. The trial court converted the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment and then granted judgment for the defendant partner on the ground that the 1997 chancery court judgment barred the second state court suit. The plaintiff partners have appealed. We affirm the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Carol Newell D/B/A Solowell v. Exit/In, Inc., et al.
The trial court granted partial summary judgment to plaintiff in this suit to collect on a promissory note. Appellant does not appeal the grant of judgment, but appeals the trial court's certification of that judgment as a final order under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02. We affirm the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Gretta Irion v. Sun Lighting, Inc., et al.
Consumer brought products liability suit under theories of negligence, strict liability in tort, and breach of implied warranty for property damage arising out of a fire caused when the consumer's son placed a pillow on top of a halogen torchiere lamp supplied by defendant Sun Lighting, Inc. and sold by defendant The Home Depot, Inc. The trial court granted summary judgment to both defendants and dismissed the lawsuit. The consumer appeals. Because we find the joint summary judgment motions were properly granted, we affirm the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Helaine Richberger v. The West Clinic, P.C., et al.
Plaintiff filed medical malpractice action against clinic, treating nurse, and supervising physician for injuries suffered as a result of alleged negligent chemotherapy treatment. Trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, finding that registered nurse was not qualified as an expert on the issue of medical causation, and further noting that the deposition testimony of lone expert physician failed to establish that the plaintiff’s injuries were caused by the negligence of the defendants. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Catherine A. Hoback v. Glenn D. Hoback
The issues on appeal in this divorce action are: (1) Whether the trial court erred in awarding alimony in futuro; (2) Whether the trial court was in error in finding wife's IRA of Wal-mart stock was her separate property in its entirety; (3) Whether the trial court erred in failing to make a downward deviation in child support. The trial court awarded to Ms. Hoback as alimony in futuro $500 per month for a ten (10) year period terminating on her death or her remarriage. Wal-mart stock of value of approximately $35,000 was awarded to Ms. Hoback as her separate property. Child support was set at $750 per month upon a finding of ability of the father to earn $60,000 per year, and based upon additional parenting time above 80 days per year granted to the father the Court reduced the month of June child support to $550 and reduced the month of July support to $375 making a downward deviation of $47.92 per month. For reasons stated below, the trial court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Tiffany Reed v. Christopher Kidd
This custody case involves two parents who have never been married and have not been involved in any prior custody determination regarding the child at issue. Father had never seen the child prior to filing this custody action and had not spoken with Mother since the child's birth in 1992. He was served with a paternity action in November 2001 and adjudicated to be the child's father. On June 4, 2002, he filed this custody action. The trial court determined that custody should remain with Mother and adopted a parenting plan offered by Mother. Father appealed. We affirm the trial court's determination. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Brenda J. Sneed v. Thomas G. Stovall, M.D., et al.
Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants alleging that Defendants committed medical malpractice. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendants. Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s limiting Plaintiff’s voir dire concerning his medical expert, denial of Plaintiff’s renewed motion in limine, refusal to include proposed jury instructions, and refusal to strike a third party opinion from the deposition of Plaintiff’s expert. We affirm the decisions of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jennifer Lee Hewson v. Kerry David Hewson
This appeal involves the financial aspects of a divorce decree filed by the Circuit Court for Davidson County. The husband takes issue with the apportionment of the marital debts, the amount of child support, and the award of spousal support. We affirm the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Brenda Lee Chastain v. Ricky Lavon Chastain
This appeal arises from a divorce proceeding involving a state prisoner and his wife. After the wife filed her divorce complaint in the Chancery Court for Cheatham County, the prisoner counterclaimed for divorce and served interrogatories on his wife regarding their separate and marital property. Two motions to compel the wife to answer these interrogatories were unresolved when the trial court conducted a bench trial in the prisoner’s absence and granted the wife a divorce. The prisoner asserts on this appeal that the trial court erred by failing to dispose of his discovery motions prior to trial. We agree and, therefore, vacate the portions of the divorce decree pertaining to the division of the marital estate. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
Tracie Marie Shipwash, et al., v. Meadowood Apartments
This is a premises liability case. Tracie Marie Shipwash and Dennis Marine sued Meadowood Apartments ("Meadowood") to recover for damage done to their respective vehicles when a tree located near a parking area at the apartment complex fell on the vehicles during a severe storm. At the bench trial below, the plaintiffs offered the testimony of a tree expert, who opined that his examination of photographs of the fallen tree revealed signs of deterioration and that the tree should have been removed prior to the storm. The trial court held that the tree removal service hired by Meadowood to make an annual inspection of the apartment property was Meadowood's agent, and that, as a consequence of this fact, Meadowood is liable based upon its imputed constructive notice of the dangerous condition created by the tree's condition. Meadowood appeals. We reverse. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Phil Mitchell v. John Van Zyll, et al.
Phil Mitchell ("Plaintiff") sued his next-door neighbors, John Van Zyll ("Van Zyll") and Ann Furlong ("Furlong"), for malicious prosecution. Plaintiff alleged that Van Zyll and Furlong "caused to be issued against [him] a criminal warrant for his arrest, alleging aggravated assault and reckless endangerment." The criminal charges against Plaintiff were dismissed. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Trial Court granted as to Furlong but denied as to Van Zyll. Plaintiff appeals the Court's ruling in favor of Furlong. We affirm. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
Tinker-Watkins Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Michael W. Parsons
This case involves a claim for payment from Defendant for goods and services provided by Plaintiff to Defendant under an oral contract. Originally, the claim was brought in the General Sessions Court for Decatur County. Defendant first challenged the venue of Decatur County, which was rejected by General Sessions Court. Defendant appealed the judgment of the General Sessions Court to the Circuit Court, which also denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss for improper venue and awarded Plaintiff the amount claimed under the terms of the contract. Defendant appealed to this Court and we affirm. |
Decatur | Court of Appeals | |
Belinda Kullman Rhoads v. Christopher Kullman, Sr. - Dissenting
I respectfully disagree with the court’s conclusion that Ms. Rhoads is not entitled to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(1) relief from the June 26, 2002 order removing her children from her custody. Her lawyer mishandled her case in three significant ways. First, he set the hearing on his motion to withdraw as Ms. Rhoads’s counsel on the same day as the final custody hearing. Second, he told Ms. Rhoads that the case would most likely be continued until August 2002 after his motion was granted. Third, he did not tell Ms. Rhoads that her presence was required at the June 25, 2002 hearing. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
Belinda Kullman Rhoads v. Christopher Kullman
In this custody case, the mother appeals the denial of her Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 Motion for Relief from Judgment and Motion for New Trial. The mother’s trial counsel withdrew on the day of the final hearing and the mother failed to appear at the final hearing. After hearing testimony from the father, the trial court found a significant and material change of circumstances had occurred and that it was in the best interest of the parties’ minor children for custody to be changed to the father. The mother contends that her failure to appear at the custody hearing was due to excusable neglect or inadvertence because her attorney had informed her “that the matter should be continued to allow her to obtain new counsel for further litigation in this matter.” For the reasons set out in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
Evelyn Marie Abercrombie v. Stephen Eugene Abercrombie
Stephen Eugene Abercrombie ("Father"), the custodian of the parties' two minor children, filed a complaint against his former wife, Evelyn Marie Abercrombie ("Mother"), seeking to modify the trial court's January 19, 2000, order awarding him custody. That order had directed that, if Father decided to enroll the children in private school, Mother would pay one-half of the children's tuition and other private school expenses. The same order, however, recited that Mother was not required to pay any general child support to Father. In his post-divorce complaint, Father asked the trial court to set a sum certain to be paid by Mother to Father as general child support under the Child Support Guidelines ("the Guidelines"). The trial court declined to modify its previous order and dismissed Father's complaint "on the ground[] that the guidelines currently do not show any . . . child support due." Father appeals, arguing that Mother should be required to pay a set amount of general child support in addition to her obligation to pay one-half of the children's private school tuition and related expenses. We reverse and remand with instructions. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Kokomo Grain Company, Inc., v. Randy Collins, et al.
This is a dispute between the former tenant of a grain storage facility and the new owners of the premises who acquired the property at a foreclosure sale. The issues in dispute are whether the tenant was a bailor or a holdover tenant following foreclosure and the fair market storage or rental value of the premises. The trial judge ruled that the former tenant was a holdover tenant and that the previous rental rate was the fair market rental value for the holdover period. We affirm. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Cher Lynn Hogue v. Joseph Hogue
Chancellor found father of minor child, who told child he is gay, in contempt for violating restraining order which prohibited father "from taking the child around or otherwise exposing the child to his gay lover(s) and/or his gay lifestyle." Father appeals, asserting the restraining order was overbroad and/or vague, not issued pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 65.03, and had expired prior to the alleged offense. While we find the restraining order was issued properly and not overly broad, we find the father's act of telling child he is gay did not violate the restraining order as written. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
James Wilkerson v. Ifeatu Ekelem
This case involves a dispute between a Williamson County property owner who decided to oversee the construction of his own house and the masonry contractor he hired to do the brick work on the project. The brick mason filed suit in the Williamson County Chancery Court claiming the property owner had breached the parties' oral agreement by failing to pay the balance due under the agreement. The property owner responded by claiming it was the brick mason who had breached the contract, accusing the brick mason of failing to finish the work in a professional manner, and charging the brick mason with slander. The trial court found in favor of the brick mason on his breach of contract claim, rejected the property owner's claims, and entered a $29,268.99 judgment in favor of the brick mason. The property owner appealed. We concur with the trial court's finding that the property owner breached the contract and, therefore, affirm the judgment. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Phillips. v. United Services Automobile Association
Charles C. Phillips, Jr. sued United Services Automobile Association ("USAA") under his homeowners insurance policy. His suit was prompted by USAA's denial of coverage for water damage to the plaintiff's house. The plaintiff claims that the damage was due to water seepage as a direct result of the faulty design or negligent installation of the synthetic stucco system applied to the exterior of his house. The plaintiff amended his complaint, seeking class certification for all other USAA insureds who had sustained similar losses caused by the failure of synthetic stucco material and whose claims had been denied by USAA. Following a bench trial on the issues of coverage and class certification, the trial court determined that the plaintiff's policy provided coverage for the water damage that ensued as a result of water penetrating the stucco exterior. In addition, the trial court ordered that a class of plaintiffs be conditionally certified. USAA appeals the finding of coverage. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals |
