Robert Carrier vs. Speedway Motorsports E2002-02724-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Thomas R. Frierson, II
This case involves a dispute as to exactly what property was leased to the plaintiff, Robert L. "Larry" Carrier. In January, 1996, the plaintiff and his family sold their 100% stock ownership interest in National Raceways, Inc., to the defendant, Speedway Motorsports, Inc. ("SMI"). National Raceways, Inc., operated the well-known Bristol Motor Speedway ("the Speedway"). In conjunction with the sale, the parties executed a lease agreement, wherein SMI leased back a portion of the Speedway's property to the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed suit against SMI and Bristol Motor Speedway, Inc., the new corporate name of National Raceways, Inc., claiming that the defendants had breached the lease by interfering with the plaintiff's leasehold interest. Specifically, the plaintiff claims that the lease covers a 15.54 acre parcel of land lying adjacent to the grandstand at the racetrack. The defendants answered, denying that they had breached the lease and asserting that the subject matter of the lease is limited to three buildings on the 15.54 acre tract rather than to the entire tract. The defendants also filed a counterclaim for an unpaid debt. Following a bench trial, the court found in favor of the plaintiff, concluding that the lease involves the entire parcel of land rather than just the three buildings. It ultimately awarded the plaintiff damages of $2,401,728. The trial court dismissed the defendants' counterclaim. From this judgment, both sides appeal. We affirm the dismissal of the counterclaim, but reverse the trial court's judgment in favor of the plaintiff on the original complaint. That complaint is dismissed at the plaintiff's costs.
Sullivan
Court of Appeals
Carl A. Lindblad v. Parkridge Health System E2003-00221-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Sr. Judge William H. Inman
Trial Court Judge: W. Neil Thomas, III
The plaintiff resigned his position as Director of the hospital's emergency services. Parkridge Health System, Inc. d/b/a East Ridge Hospital, [hereafter "the hospital" or "Defendant"] accepted his resignation and terminated his staff privileges in accordance with an employment Agreement. The hospital's bylaws required notice and hearing, which were not followed. The plaintiff filed this action asserting that in failing to observe its bylaws the hospital breached its contract with him since the bylaws were an integral part of the contract. The Chancellor granted the hospital's motion for summary judgment, holding that the Agreement, which provided for termination of staff privileges controlled the issue. We affirm.
Hamilton
Court of Appeals
Dept. of Children's Services vs MW E2003-00325-COA-R3-CV
Trial Court Judge: Kindall T. Lawson
The Trial Judge held the minor child was dependent and neglected and that the mother had committed severe child abuse against her child. Custody was awarded to DCS who was relieved of making reasonable efforts to reunify the mother and child. The mother appealed, insisting there is no evidence to support the Trial Court's findings. We affirm the Trial Court.
Hamblen
Court of Appeals
Shawn Vineyard vs. Bill Varner D/B/A Fountain City Auto E2003-00436-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Wheeler A. Rosenbalm
Shawn T. Vineyard ("the plaintiff") purchased a 1991 Nissan automobile from Bill Varner, doing business as Fountain City Auto Sales ("the defendant"). Later, the plaintiff sued the defendant alleging a fraudulent misrepresentation and a violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act ("the TCPA") in connection with the sale. In addition to other relief, the plaintiff sought compensatory damages; in the alternative, he asked for rescission of the sale agreement. After the trial court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment, this matter proceeded to trial before a jury. The jury, in response to interrogatories, found the defendant guilty of violating the TCPA, but found no damages. The jury also found that the defendant had committed a fraudulent misrepresentation in connection with the sale of the automobile and assessed the plaintiff's damages at $2,100. In response to post-trial motions, the trial court decreed rescission and awarded the plaintiff the purchase price of $2,100. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred (1) in denying his motion for summary judgment; (2) in decreeing rescission and otherwise modifying the jury's verdict; and (3) in awarding attorney's fees of $12,000 to the plaintiff. We affirm.
Knox
Court of Appeals
Juanita W. Keylon vs. Robert A. Hill E2003-01054-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Sr. Judge William H. Inman
Trial Court Judge: Russell E. Simmons, Jr.
The plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment, based upon the asserted failure of the defendant to countervail the motion, was denied by the trial judge. The plaintiff argues that the established rule that the denial of a motion for summary judgment, followed by a jury trial and verdict, is not reviewable, has no application in this case because there was no verdict. The rule is that the denial of a motion for summary judgment is not reviewable when the case proceeds to judgment, as distinguished from verdict. The motion of the defendant in this medical malpractice case for a directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence was granted upon a determination that all of the expert testimony established that the three-hour window to administer a blood clot dissolver had expired before the defendant treated the plaintiff. Whether the particular anticoagulant should have been administered in a timely manner was at the core of the claimed negligence. We find the question of negligence to be within the peculiar province of the jury, and remand the case for a new trial.
Roane
Court of Appeals
Kenneth Emert vs. City of Knoxville E2003-01081-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Sr. Judge William H. Inman
Trial Court Judge: Dale C. Workman
The original plaintiff, since deceased, tripped on an uneven brick sidewalk and injured his right knee. He was blind, or nearly so, and used a walking aid. The defendant's negligence is not an issue on appeal. The issue is one of causation in light of the medical proof that the plaintiff suffered knee problems before the accident. The trial judge found that the accident aggravated the plaintiff's pre-existing condition and awarded damages of $100,000.00 with fault apportioned 80 percent to the defendant. We affirm.
Knox
Court of Appeals
Polk Couty Bd of Education vs. Polk County Education Assoc. E2003-01110-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Jerri S. Bryant
The Trial Court ruled the School Board did not have to negotiate with the Teachers Association regarding a dress code policy adopted by the Board. On appeal, we reverse and remand.
Polk
Court of Appeals
Kathy Gardenhire vs. Real Estate Inspection Service E2002-02214-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Frank V. Williams, III
Todd Gardenhire and his wife, Kathy Gardenhire ("the plaintiffs"), own a residence and lot on Signal Mountain. In 1995, they contracted with Real Estate Inspection Service, Inc. and Stephen Eady, doing business as Stephen Eady Company (collectively "the defendants"), for the construction of a sunroom addition, a swimming pool, and other work at their residence. Later that same year, the plaintiffs sued the defendants alleging that the defendants had failed to complete the work and that "much of the work" was not accomplished according to the parties' agreement. The defendants answered and filed a counterclaim seeking money allegedly due them for work performed in connection with the contract. Following a bench trial, the court awarded the plaintiffs $35,000 and dismissed the defendants' counterclaim. The defendants appeal. We affirm the judgment in part and reverse in part and remand for further proceedings.
Hamilton
Court of Appeals
Dayne O 'Bannon vs. Stephanie O'Bannon E2002-02553-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Sr. Judge William H. Inman
Trial Court Judge: John B. Hagler, Jr.
This appeal from the Bradley County Circuit Court questions whether the Trial Court erred in denying the Wife's proposed relocation to South Dakota and in changing custody of the parties' children from Wife to Husband. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.
Bradley
Court of Appeals
Jackie Cline vs. Emily Plemmons E2002-02584-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Jerri S. Bryant
This is a dispute between brother and sister over the handling of the affairs as conservators of their mother. The brother appeals from the Trial Court's rulings as to compensation, attorney's fees and conservatorship. On appeal, we affirm.
McMinn
Court of Appeals
W2002-02534-COA-R3-CV W2002-02534-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: D. J. Alissandratos
Sun Splash Painting v. Homestead Village M2002-00853-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.
This appeal involves a challenge to the trial court's refusal to award attorney's fees pursuant to the Prompt Pay Act, and to the court's denial of prejudgment interest. We affirm the trial court in all respects.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
CH-02-0609-1 CH-02-0609-1
Trial Court Judge: Walter L. Evans
Shelby
Court of Appeals
Ronnie Johnson vs. Mark R. White E2002-02815-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Sr. Judge William H. Inman
Trial Court Judge: Bill Swann
These three cases were consolidated for trial. Each Respondent agreed to an Order of Protection sought by their kinsman, who was married to the daughter of Mark V. White, the sister of Mark R. White and niece of Michael Scott Webb. The throes of the divorce action between the Petitioner and his wife, Jennifer White Johnson, precipitated a purported assault on the Petitioner by the Respondents which resulted in criminal charges in addition to an order of protection. Thereafter, the Petitioner and his wife attended the Fourth Circuit Court for a hearing, and the Respondents upon instructions of their attorney in the criminal case also attended, and followed the Petitioner "about the courthouse" placing him in fear. They were cited for criminal contempt, found guilty, and sentenced to ten days confinement, with five days suspended. Each appeals, complaining that the evidence of criminal contempt is insufficient. We affirm.
Knox
Court of Appeals
Patricia Lyman v. Lawrence James E2002-02859-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: W. Neil Thomas, III
After over thirty years of marriage, Patricia A. Lyman ("Wife") left Lawrence A. James ("Husband") and moved to the state of Washington and began living with her new boyfriend. After Husband learned of Wife's affair, the parties agreed to a divorce based on irreconcilable differences and entered into a marital dissolution agreement ("MDA"). Both parties signed the MDA before a Notary Public, but neither party was administered an oath prior to his or her signing. The MDA provided that Husband would receive the entire amount of his pension. Over six months after the parties were granted a divorce, Wife filed a new lawsuit claiming she gave up any claim to Husband's pension because of Husband's fraud and/or misrepresentations. Wife also claimed the court which granted the divorce lacked personal jurisdiction to enter the final divorce decree because neither Husband nor Wife were administered oaths prior to signing the MDA, which Wife claimed resulted in the MDA not being properly notarized. The Trial Court concluded the failure of the Notary Publics to administer oaths did not render the MDA invalid. The Trial Court also concluded Wife failed to meet her burden of proving fraud and/or misrepresentations on the part of Husband. Wife appeals, and we affirm.
Hamilton
Court of Appeals
J.M. Cox, Jr. v. East Tennessee Natural Gas E2002-02946-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: G. Richard Johnson
In this declaratory judgment action to declare the rights between the dominant and servient estates relating to an easement, the trial court held that the landowner's proposal to add fill dirt over the pipeline easement did not unreasonably interfere with defendant's rights. Defendant has appealed. We reverse.
Washington
Court of Appeals
Combustion Federal Credit Union vs. John Farmer E2003-00107-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Sr. Judge William H. Inman
Trial Court Judge: W. Neil Thomas, III
A judgment was rendered against Mr. Farmer in 1992. It remained unpaid, and the judgment creditor's petition for revival was granted. Mr. Farmer appeals, claiming that he never signed the note which formed the basis of the 1992 action. We affirm.
Hamilton
Court of Appeals
Cordell Taylor vs. Donnie & Vick Williams E2003-00199-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Frank V. Williams, III
In this dispute over the boundary line between the parties' property, the Trial Court established the line and declared an easement. Defendants have appealed. We affirm.
Morgan
Court of Appeals
Frankie Maples vs. Frank Maples E2003-00722-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Sr. Judge William H. Inman
Trial Court Judge: Bill Swann
Husband, for the second time, seeks a reduction in his alimony obligation, claiming that his bona fide retirement coincided with a substantial decrease in income. The trial court modified the obligation by reducing it to $919.50 monthly. Wife receives $752.00 from social security. Her reasonable expenses were found to be $2176.00. Husband appeals, insisting that the reduction is insufficient. Wife presents for review the issue of whether any reduction was justified. We reinstate the initial award, finding that Husband, as in the prior appeal, continued his pattern of conduct in restructuring his assets to award his obligation.
Knox
Court of Appeals
James Jackson vs. Jackson, Johnson & Murphey E2002-02476-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Sr. Judge William H. Inman
Trial Court Judge: W. Neil Thomas, III
This litigation is between a former shareholder of the defendant accounting corporation. These parties entered into an employment contract together with a deferred compensation agreement. After two years, each party claimed the other was in material breach: the Plaintiff asserted a breach because, inter alia, the Defendant refused to treat him as an employee, while the Defendant asserted a breach because the Plaintiff prepared a number of tax returns [66], inter alia, for clients of the firm without recourse to the firm. The trial court found that no mutual material breaches had occurred, and that the Plaintiff was entitled to recover the balance of his deferred compensation which had been terminated by the Defendant owing to the Plaintiff's alleged breaches. The judgment is modified.
