Judy Plunk, who sues as Administratrix of the Estate of Jerry L. Plunk v. Illinois Railroad a Corporation - Concurring
Judy Plunk (“plaintiff”) as administratrix of her husband’s estate, filed suit in the Circuit Court of Shelby County pursuant to the Federal Employer’s Liability Act, (FELA) against the Illinois Central Railroad (“defendant” or “railroad”) seeking damages stemming from the death of her husband, Jerry Plunk (“decedent”), who was the engineer of a train owned and operated by defendant that was involved in a head-on collision with another train. The case was tried by a jury. At the conclusion of plaintiff’s proof and again at the conclusion of all the proof, defendant made a motion for a directed verdict which was overruled each time by the trial court. The case was submitted to the jury, who found plaintiff’s decedent 70% negligent and defendant 30% negligent in causing the collision, and awarded plaintiff $285,000.00 as damages. On appeal defendant has raised five issues for our consideration: whether the trial court erred in (1) failing to grant defendant’s motion for directed verdict on the ground that decedent was the sole cause of the accident; (2) admitting into evidence testimony of plaintiff’s expert, Dennis Runcie; (3) allowing other railroad employees to testify as “experts” regarding “good railroad practice”; (4) admitting into evidence testimony of plaintiff’s economist expert, Fred Johnson; and (5) failing to order plaintiff’s counsel to dismiss with prejudice allegations of defendant’s vicarious liability in two collateral cases pending in Mississippi and to cease representation of certain plaintiffs in the Mississippi litigation. For the reasons hereinafter stated, we reverse in part and remand this case to the trial court for a new trial in keeping with the provisions of this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Betty J. Collins, v. David Collins
Plaintiffs Betty J. Collins, Panther Park Missionary Baptist Church, and six Church trustees appeal the trial court’s final judgment which established the boundary line between the parties’ respective properties. We affirm the trial court’s judgment based on our conclusion that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that an existing fence row represents the boundary line between the properties. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Willie D. Graham - Concurring
Indicted for first degree murder, the defendant, Willie D. Graham, was convicted of voluntary manslaughter in the death of his brother-in-law, Ray Anthony Shervington. The trial court imposed a Range I sentence of six years. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Bill McMurry v. Hancock County Election Commission, John Knox Walkup, Attorney General of Tennessee, et al. - Concurring
The appellant, a nonlawyer, was elected to the office of General Sessions Judge of Hancock County in the August 1990 general election. |
Hancock | Court of Appeals | |
Lunn Real Estate Investments, v. Boiler Supply Company, Incorporated
This case involves a contractual dispute between the lessor and lessee of certain commercial property. The appellant, Lunn Real Estate Investments, Inc. (Lunn), leased the subject premises to the appellee, Boiler Supply Company, pursuant to an agreement executed by the parties on January 1, 1989. On August 31, 1995, Lunn served Boiler Supply with written notice that it was requiring the latter to vacate the premises by October 1, 1995.1 On October 5, 1995, Lunn filed a detainer action in the general sessions court seeking possession of the property. By order entered April 19, 1996, the court found the claim for possession moot due to Boiler Supply’s vacating of the premises on November 30, 1995, but awarded Lunn a judgment for two months holdover rent plus attorney’s fees.2 Lunn appealed the decision to circuit court where, after a hearing, a judgment was entered for Lunn for $17,790. Lunn now appeals from that decision to this Court requesting additional compensatory damages, due to Boiler Supply’s alleged failure to maintain the premises in accordance with the contract, and attorney’s fees. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Carver Plumbing Company, Inc., v. Martha Cone Beck
The appellee has filed a petition for rehearing in this cause which, after due consideration, is denied. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Batson East-Land Co, Inc., v Ronnie D. Boyd
Ronnie D. Boyd, the Assessor of Property of Montgomery County, Tennessee, appeals the trial court’s judgment which ruled that eighty-nine percent (89%) of a parcel of real property owned by Petitioner/Appellee Batson East-Land Company, Inc., was entitled to “Greenbelt” status for the tax year 1991. We conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s ruling and, thus, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Robert C. Daniels, v. Charles Traughber, Chairman, Tennessee Board of Paroles, et al.
The plaintiff, a prisoner in the custody of the Department of Correction, filed in the Trial Court a petition for the writ of certiorari from the action of the Board of Paroles on April 18, 1996, rescinding its order of April 9, 1994, granting the prisoner a parole. At the time of the rescission, the prisoner had not been released from custody. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Contour Medical Technology, Inc., v. Flexcon Company, Inc.
The plaintiff, ContourMedical Technology, Inc., has appealed from a partial summary judgment dismissing that part of plaintiff’s claim against the defendant, Flexcon Company, Inc., which seeks consequential damages resulting from defects in material purchased by plaintiff from defendant. The Trial Judge directed entry of final judgment as provided by TRCP Rule 54.02. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Eli Mike, an individual, James A. Schrampfer, an individual, and Jane B. Forbes, as Trustee in bankruptcy for the estate of David L. Osborn, et al. v. Po Group, Inc., et. al.
The captioned plaintiffs’ have appealed from a summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs’ actions against the corporate defendant for the value of their stock as dissenting minority shareholders and their action against the individual defendants for breach of fiduciary duty as corporate directors. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Car Connection, Inc. v. Auto Buyers, Inc.
This suit was filed in General Sessions Court to collect a dishonored check, but was appealed to the Circuit Court where a complaint was filed stating more details of transactions involving the transfer of ownership of two automobiles, a Honda and a Chevrolet. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In re: The Estate of Harold L. Jenkins, Deceased, Hugh C. Carden and Donald W. Garis as Co-Executors of the Harold L. Jenkins Estate, v. Joni L. Jenkins and Kathy L. Jenkins
This is yet another chapter in the administration of the estate of Harold L. Jenkins, a popular entertainer whose stage name was “Conway Twitty.” The executors initiated the present proceeding to resolve disputed rights of three devises in respect to the collection from them of certain charges appearing on the records of the deceased. The Probate Court resolved the issues in favor of the executors, and two of the devises appealed. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Barbara Ann Hall and David A. Hall, v. St. Thomas Hospital\, Rachel Kaiser, M.D., and Daniel L. Starnes, M.D.
This is a medical malpractice suit in which the plaintiffs have appealed from a summary |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Robert C. Daniels v. Charles Traughber, Chairman, Tennessee Board of Paroles, et al. - Concurring
I concur with the decision to affirm the trial court’s order. In my view, it is simply a case of statutory application. In the “Open Parole Hearings Act” of 1993 the legislature provided that the Parole Board shall receive and consider victim impact statements, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-504(a); that notice be given to the victim or the victim’s representative and to the trial judge and district attorney involved in the original criminal prosecution, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-505(b)(1), (2) and (4); and that on a failure to provide the required notices, the Board may schedule a new hearing if the Board receives a written victim impact statement within fifteen days of the time the parole decision is finalized, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-505(d)(2). |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Robert C. Daniels, v. Charles Traughber, Tennessee Board of Paroles, et al. - Concurring
I concur with the decision to affirm the trial court’s order. In my view, it is simply a case of statutory application. In the “Open Parole Hearings Act” of 1993 the legislature provided that the Parole Board shall receive and consider victim impact statements, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-504(a); that notice be given to the victim or the victim’s representative and to the trial judge and district attorney involved in the original criminal prosecution, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-505(b)(1), (2) and (4); and that on a failure to provide the required notices, the Board may schedule a new hearing if the Board receives a written victim impact statement within fifteen days of the time the parole decision is finalized, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-505(d)(2). |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Joe Erwin and Susan Erwin, as surviving parents of and next of kin of Bethany Suzanne Erwin, et. ux. v. James M. Rose, Wade Matheny, in his capacity as Sheriff of Maury County, Tennessee, and Tracy Joe Lovell
The appellants have filed a petition to rehear based on the Western Section’s opinion in Sims v. Stewart, No. 02A01-9706-CV-00123 (Jackson, Jan. 21, 1998). In Sims the court relied on an earlier case of Dwight v. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 701 S.W.2d 621 (Tenn. App. 1985), and decided that the policy in question “provides that reduction for worker’s compensation benefits applies to damages and in no way affects the coverage available.” We think that Dwight stated the opposite; it stated that coverage was reduced by any worker’s compensation benefits paid or payable. We respectfully overrule the petition to rehear. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, v. Gary Lewis Thompson
The appellant, Gary Lewis Thompson, was indicted by a Monroe County Grand Jury for the offense of vehicular homicide, driving under the influence, third offense, and driving on a revoked license. On July 22, 1996, the appellant pled guilty to DUI, third offense, with the sentence to be determined by the trial court. Prior to the guilty plea hearing, the State moved to nolle pros the vehicular homicide charge, which was granted. Additionally, the trial court, upon appellant’s motion, dismissed the charge of driving on a revoked license. Immediately following entry of the guilty plea, the State, for the first time, requested seizure and forfeiture of the appellant’s John Deere tractor, which he was operating at the time the DUI offense occurred. Following a sentencing hearing on September 6, 1996, the trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months twenty-nine days in the county jail and assessed a fine of $7,500 for the DUI, third offense conviction. The appellant’s release percentage was fixed at 75%. The trial court also ordered that the farm tractor be “confiscated” from the appellant’s possession and forfeited to the State. On November 8, 1996, the written order to seize and forfeit the tractor was entered. The appellant appeals from the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2)(ii), raising the following two issues: I. Whether the period of confinement in the jail is excessive; and II. Whether § 55-10-403(k)(1) properly authorizes forfeiture of his tractor. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
Jeff Hubrig v. Lockheed-Martin Energy Systems, Inc., Linc Hall, Individually; Larry Pierce, Individually, and Jim Kolling, Individually
The plaintiff describes himself as a whistle blower, as that term has come to be used, and seeks damages for his termination from employment because he allegedly refused to participate in and keep silent about certain allegedly illegal corporate activities. The allegations were denied by the defendants whose motion for summary judgment was granted. The plaintiff appeals and presents for review the issues of (1) whether he was terminated for time card abuse and sexual harassment or whether these reasons were pretextual, (2) whether a common law cause of action for retaliatory discharge remains viable in this jurisdiction, and (3) whether his termination constituted outrageous conduct by the defendants. Our review of the findings of fact made by the trial Court is denovo upon the record of the trial Court, accompanied by a presumption of thecorrectness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. TENN. R. APP. P., RULE 13(d). See, Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208 (Tenn. 1993). We will refer to the plaintiff as Hubrig, or as the appellant, or as the plaintiff. This record is unusually prolix; prima facie, it appeared to reflect a trial by affidavit, an impermissible use of RULE 56, see: Womack v. Blue Cross- Blue Shield, 593 S.W.2d 294 (Tenn. 1980), but an in-depth analysis reveals that the trial court correctly held that the totality of the evidence demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of fact or law. We therefore affirm the judgment. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Ronnie Erwin v. Moon Products
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Marshall | Court of Appeals | |
Jerry Cunningham vs. Baker, et al
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Court of Appeals | ||
Regan vs. Malone
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Court of Appeals | ||
McClellan vs. Stanley
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Court of Appeals | ||
DHS vs. Epps
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Court of Appeals | ||
Miller vs. Hembree
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Court of Appeals | ||
Foulke vs. City of Greeneville
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Greene | Court of Appeals |
