State of Tennessee v. Derrick L. Dillard
Defendant, Derrick L. Dillard, argues in this appeal that the trial court erred by imposing an illegal sentence following a hearing in which the trial court found that Defendant had violated the terms and conditions of his Community Corrections sentence. The State agrees that the trial court erred. After a full review of the record, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for entry of an order consistent with this opinion. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Harry David Johnson v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Harry David Johnson, was convicted in the Sullivan County Criminal Court of the first degree murder of his wife, Katherine Trotter Johnson, and he received a sentence of life imprisonment. Subsequently, the petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, alleging that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel during his trial. The post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing, ultimately determining that the petitioner had failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that trial counsel was ineffective. The petitioner timely appealed this ruling. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for a new trial. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gregory Skinner
The defendant, Gregory Skinner, was convicted of two counts of sale of a Schedule II controlled substance, a Class C felony, and one count of sale of a counterfeit controlled substance, a Class E felony, and sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to ten years for each of the two counts of sale of a Schedule II controlled substance, to be served concurrently, and to three years for the sale of a counterfeit controlled substance, to be served consecutively, for a total sentence of thirteen years. This sentence was ordered to be served consecutively to a previous sentence. The defendant appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred in applying a nonstatutory factor in setting his sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of corrected judgments in Counts 2 and 3. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dexter Jones v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Dexter P. Jones, appeals from the Wilson County Criminal Court's denial of post-conviction relief from his four convictions for assault, a Class A misdemeanor, and resulting consecutive eleven-month, twenty-nine-day sentences. He contends that his guilty pleas were not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made because the trial court did not advise him that he was waiving a double jeopardy claim. We affirm the trial court's denial of the petition. |
Wilson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Glen Holt
A Morgan County jury found the Defendant, Glen Holt, guilty of first degree felony murder and aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to nine years in prison for the aggravated robbery charge, to be served concurrently with a life sentence for the murder conviction. The Defendant appeals, contending: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) that the trial court erred when it allowed a photograph, offered by the prosecution, to be admitted into evidence without a proper foundation; (3) that the jury did not follow the trial court’s instructions with regard to felony murder; and (4) that he did not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waive his constitutional right to testify in his own defense. Although we conclude that issues (1), (2) and (3) are without merit, the record is insufficient for us to determine whether the Defendant personally and knowingly waived his right to testify. Therefore, we remand the case to the trial court for a hearing to determine whether the Defendant’s right to testify was violated, and if so, whether the violation of the Defendant’s right to testify was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. |
Morgan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Glen Holt - Concurring and Dissenting
I concur in most of the conclusions and reasoning in the majority opinion, but I dissent from the remand in this case. I believe that the record sufficiently shows that the defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to testify. The failure to follow the specific Momon requirements should not disturb the judgment in this case. Counsel told the trial court, in open court with the defendant present, that he had advised the defendant of his rights to testify and not to testify and that he thought the defendant understood those rights. When the record states that the “Defendant indicates affirmatively” in response to the trial court’s asking him if he understood his rights and was not going to testify, I have no problem in concluding that the defendant intentionally relinquished his right to testify. Moreover, given the fact that counsel at the motion for new trial hearing indicated that the defendant had consulted with him and had made a decision not to testify further justifies my conclusion. To require a Momon hearing under the circumstances in this case would be putting form above substance. I would affirm the trial court.
|
Morgan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Holly Fant
The appellant, Holly Fant,1 pled guilty to aggravated assault by use of a deadly weapon |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Holly Fant - Concurring
I agree that the defendant’s sentence should be affirmed. In my view, however, it was error for the trial court to apply enhancement factor (6), that the defendant treated the victim with exceptional cruelty. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114(6). Application of this factor requires a finding of cruelty over and above that inherently attendant to the crime for which the defendant is convicted. State v. Embry, 915 S.W.2d 451, 456 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). In other words, such evidence must “denote[ ] the infliction of pain or suffering for its own sake or from the gratification derived therefrom, and not merely pain or suffering inflicted as the means of accomplishing the crime charged.” State v. Kelly Haynes, No. W1999-01485-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Mar. 14, 2000). Enhancement factor (6) has typically been applied insituations where the victim was tortured or abused. See State v. Davis, 825 S.W.2d 109, 113 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). This court has upheld the application of this factor based on proof of extensive physical abuse or torture, see State v. Williams, 920 S.W.2d 247, 259 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995), as well as proof of psychological abuse or torture, see State v. Thomas Lebron Mills and Carl Franklin Mills, No. 936 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Dec. 19, 1985) (holding that acts of mental cruelty, by themselves, can be as vicious and scarring as acts of physical cruelty). Here, there is no evidence that the defendant tortured or abused the victim or that she inflicted pain and suffering greater than that necessary to complete the offense. Rather, after shooting the victim, the defendant dialed 911 and waited with him until emergency assistance arrived. Nevertheless, I concur with the majority that the four-year sentence, one year above the minimum, was warranted. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dwight Miller
The appellant, Dwight Miller, was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life in prison in 1996. On December 29, 1998, this Court reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case to the Haywood County Circuit Court for a new trial. See State v. Dwight Miller, No. 02C01-9708-CC-00300, 1998 WL 902592 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, Dec. 29, 1998). At the conclusion of the second trial, appellant was convicted again by a jury of first degree murder and sentenced to life in prison. The issues presented for our review include: (1) whether the trial court erred in permitting the prior recorded testimony of a witness to be read into the record; (2) whether the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial after a bomb threat occurred during the course of the trial; and (3) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction for first degree murder. Appellate review is available for the sufficiency of the evidence despite the appellant's failure to file a timely motion for new trial under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(b). The review of the issues, however, is also dependent upon either a timely filed notice of appeal, or in the interest of justice, a waiver of the timely filing of a notice of appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a). Because the appellant filed an untimely motion for a new trial, his notice of appeal is likewise tardy. Additionally, the appellant has not sought a waiver of the timely filing of the notice of appeal. Under these circumstances we conclude that the appellant has waived review of these issues on appeal. Nevertheless, we have in the interest of justice, reviewed the primary issue of the sufficiency of the evidence. The evidence is more than sufficient to support the verdict of the jury. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Haywood | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Walter Eugene Ingram v. State of Tennessee
The defendant, Walter Eugene Ingram, filed a “Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence” in the Shelby |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Barry Graham
The defendant, Barry Graham, was convicted by a Rutherford County Circuit Court jury of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and theft of property under $500, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced by the trial court as a Range III, persistent offender to concurrent sentences of thirteen years for the aggravated burglary conviction, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the theft conviction, to be served consecutively to a sentence in a previous case. The sole issue the defendant raises on appeal is whether the circumstantial evidence at trial was sufficient to establish his guilt of the offenses. We conclude the evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find him guilty of aggravated burglary and theft under $500 beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
MacArthur English v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his guilty pleas to two counts of felony reckless endangerment, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Hawkins | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Richard Eugene Thompson
The defendant, Richard Eugene Thompson, appeals the lower court’s failure to grant alternative sentencing following his guilty plea to vehicular assault. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marcillo Anderson
The appellant, Marcillo Anderson, was convicted by a jury of second degree murder and sentenced to twenty years as a Range One, Standard Offender. His release eligibility was classified as violent, requiring him to serve one hundred percent (100%) of his sentence. In this direct appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court’s denial of a jury instruction on self-defense. We hold that none of the issues raised by the appellant warrant a reversal and affirm the conviction. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles Vantilburg, III
The defendant was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to twenty years in the |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Terry Proffitt v. State of Tennessee
Terry Proffitt appeals the Sevier County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Proffitt claims that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel during the proceedings in which he was convicted of first degree murder for the death of his ex-wife and that improper jury instructions were given during those proceedings. Because the lower court properly found that the petitioner failed to carry his burden of proving these claims by clear and convincing evidence, we affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Gary Maurice Sexton, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Gary Maurice Sexton, Jr., appeals the Knox County trial court's denial of his pro se motion requesting "credit for time at liberty." On appeal, the petitioner asserts: (1) the trial court erred in denying the motion; (2) the trial court erred in requiring him to proceed pro se at the hearing; and (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel prior to the pro se hearing. Upon review of the record and the applicable law, we dismiss the appeal. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Shawn Rafael Bough
The appellant, Shawn Rafael Bough, was convicted by a jury of felony murder and especially aggravated robbery. A co-defendant was tried separately. The trial court immediately sentenced the appellant to life in prison for the felony murder conviction. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the appellant to a sentence of twenty-one years at 100% for the especially aggravated robbery conviction, to be served concurrently with the life sentence. The trial court denied the appellant's motion for new trial, amended motion for new trial, and second amended motion for new trial, and he appeals. Because the first motion for new trial was not timely filed in regards to the felony murder conviction and an untimely notice of appeal resulted, we determine that the appellant has waived all issues except for sufficiency of the evidence in regards to the felony murder conviction, which we choose to address in the interests of justice. Because the amended motion for new trial and second amended motion for new trial were likewise untimely, we hold that the only other issues properly before this Court are those raised in the initial motion for new trial that relate to the conviction for especially aggravated robbery. Those issues include: (1) whether the trial court erred in allowing the State to comment on the appellant's failure to produce a witness; (2) whether the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction for especially aggravated robbery; and (3) whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury regarding the corroboration of accomplice testimony and out-of-court confessions. After a thorough review of the record, we find the evidence sufficient to sustain the convictions and affirm the judgment of the trial court. As to the remaining issues, we find no reversible error and, therefore, affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jimmy Buck
An Anderson County grand jury indicted the defendant and two co-defendants on a single count of aggravated robbery. While one co-defendant pled guilty to a reduced offense, the defendant and remaining co-defendant elected a jury trial. Following the close of proof, the trial court jury found these two individuals guilty as charged. For this offense the lower court sentenced the defendant to ten years as a standard offender. Thereafter the defendant unsuccessfully pursued a new trial motion. In this appeal the defendant continues to assert that his conviction cannot be upheld because it is based on the uncorroborated testimony of a co-defendant. |
Anderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Wheatley Jamar Graham, III, v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Wheatley Graham, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief alleging that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The judgment of the post-conviction |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Howard Coleman
The defendant appeals his convictions for first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery on the grounds of the insufficiency of the evidence to support the convictions. We conclude that the evidence abundantly supported the convictions and affirm the same. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Renee Lee
Following a bench trial, the defendant, Michael Renee Lee, was convicted of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and theft over $1000, a Class D felony, and was sentenced as a career offender to fifteen years and twelve years, respectively. The sentences were ordered to be served consecutively for an effective sentence of twenty-seven years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a continuance. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Carl E. Ross, Pro Se v. State of Tennessee
This matter is before the Court upon the State's motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by order pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner is appealing the lower court's denial of coram nobis relief. After review of the record, we conclude that the State's motion is well-taken and the trial court's order denying Petitioner coram nobis relief is affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
David William Smith v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, David William Smith, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his five convictions for attempted second degree murder and resulting effective thirty-two-year sentence as a Range II, multiple offender. He contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney failed to (1) cross-examine state witnesses on testimony conflicting with their prior testimony, (2) advise him that he could receive consecutive sentences, and (3) call the necessary witnesses. We affirm the trial court's denial of the petition. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kendrick D. Rivers
The defendant, Kendrick D. Rivers, was convicted of possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell and/or deliver, evading arrest, resisting arrest, and criminal trespass. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of twelve years’ incarceration. In this appeal, the defendant asserts (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for possession of cocaine; (2) that one of the jurors had a bias against him; and (3) that the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by knowingly using false testimony.1 Finding no error in the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals |
