Sam Thomas Burnett v. Board of Professoinal Responsibility
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Fentress | Supreme Court | |
William Roger Shelton v. ADS Environmental Services, et al
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Rutherford | Supreme Court | |
Charlotte McCall v. National Health
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Rutherford | Supreme Court | |
Bellsouth Advertising and Publishing v. Commissioner of Revenue
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Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Lindsay Taylor et al v. Al Beard et al
We granted review to determine whether Tennessee should adopt a cause of action allowing a child to recover for loss of parental consortium due to an injury to the child's parent. The trial court dismissed the claims for loss of parental consortium after finding that no such cause of action exists. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We hold that this Court should not adopt a common law cause of action for loss of parental consortium in personal injury cases and that the issue of whether to create such a cause of action is a matter of legislative discretion. We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals' judgment. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Anthony McNabb, et al., v. Highways, Inc., et al.
We granted this appeal to determine whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the defendant based on the plaintiff’s failure to join all of the tortfeasors in a single proceeding under Samuelson v. McMurtry, 962 S.W.2d 473 (Tenn. 1998). The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment after concluding that the plaintiff’s settlement with one tortfeasor did not require dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint against a second tortfeasor. After reviewing the record and the applicable authority, we hold that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the defendant based on the plaintiff’s failure to join the tortfeasors in a single proceeding and that Samuelson is not applicable to the facts of this case. We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remand to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Polk | Supreme Court | |
Conner Brothers Excavating Company v. Long
We granted this motion for a full court review of the Special Workers' Compensation Panel decision to determine whether the appellant, Clyde L. Long, proved by a preponderance of the evidence that his injury occurred as a result of a work-related incident as required in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-103(a). After a careful review of the record, we hold that the evidence preponderates against the holding of the trial court and Special Workers' Compensation Panel, and that the appellant's injury did arise out of and within the scope of his employment. The judgment of the trial court and the Special Workers' Compensation Panel is reversed. Because the trial court made no other factual findings, the case is remanded to the trial court with instructions to make factual findings regarding: (1) the compensable medical benefits due to the appellant; (2) the temporary disability benefits to which Mr. Long is entitled, and; (3) the proper permanent disability award to which Mr. Long is entitled. Additionally, in the interest of expediting the payment of Mr. Long's medical expenses and the receipt of disability benefits, we direct the trial court to hold such hearing within sixty days of the date of this Court's order. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
Rick Kyle v. Earl Williams & Michelle Williams
We granted the plaintiff's application for permission to appeal to determine whether the Chancellor erred in holding that a contractor is unlicensed for purposes of Tennessee Code Annotated section 62-6-103(b), and therefore is limited to a recovery of documented expenses proven by clear and convincing evidence, where the contractor possessed a valid contractor's license when the contract was formed but did not maintain a valid license throughout the entire time contracting services were performed under the contract. After carefully considering the relevant statutes, we conclude that the Chancellor properly held that a contractor who does not maintain a valid license throughout the entire contract period is unlicensed for purposes of Tennessee Code Annotated section 62-6-103(b) and limited to a recovery of documented expenses proven by clear and convincing evidence. |
Monroe | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Armstrong
We granted this appeal to determine whether a trial court's entry of an order of correction filed after the entry of the final judgment satisfied the requirements for the defendant to appeal a certified question of law pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that neither the order nor the final judgment met the requirements for appealing a certified question of law set forth in State v. Preston, 759 S.W.2d 647 (Tenn. 1988), and dismissed the appeal. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court's order of correction under Rule 36 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure was entered while the trial court had jurisdiction before the filing of a notice of appeal and therefore complied with the prerequisites for raising a certified question of law on appeal under the circumstances of this case. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remand for the Court of Criminal Appeals to address the merits of the appeal. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Antonio D. Richardson
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Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Jessica Diane Toms v. James Anthony Toms, et al
This case is before the Court on an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure.1 In this extraordinary appeal, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in granting temporary custody of her two children to their paternal grandparents during the pendency of the underlying divorce action. Specifically, she claims that the trial court erred in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing and in considering only the guardian ad litem’s reports in making its custody determination. Having carefully reviewed the issues raised by the parties, we hold that the trial court erred in basing its decision to change custody solely upon the guardian ad litem’s reports. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court awarding custody to the grandparents and |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Gerald Powers
A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Gerald Powers, of first degree felony murder and aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to death for the felony murder charge and to a consecutive thirty-year prison sentence for the aggravated robbery charge. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and death sentence for the felony murder but reduced Powers’ sentence for the aggravated robbery to twenty years. Thereafter, the case was automatically docketed in this Court pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(a)(1) (1997). We entered an order designating the following issues for oral argument:1 1) whether allowing Powers’ wife to testify violated the confidential marital communications privilege in Tennessee Code Annotated section 24-1-201(b) (Supp. 1998); 2) whether the trial court erred in excluding evidence and restricting cross-examination indicating that other persons might have had the motive and opportunity to kill the victim; 3) whether the deposition of Margaret York was admissible; 4) whether the evidence was sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the aggravating circumstance in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-204(i)(6) (Supp. 1996); 5) whether the facts underlying Powers’ prior violent felony convictions were admissible; 6) whether the trial court erred in not allowing the defense to attack the character of the victim at the sentencing hearing; and 7) whether the sentence of death is disproportionate, and all other issues mandated by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(c)(1) (1997). Having carefully reviewed these issues and the issue of identification testimony raised by Powers, we find no merit to his arguments. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Terrance Burnett v. State of Tennessee
Terrance Burnett, appellant, pleaded guilty to two counts of felony murder, two counts of attempted first degree murder, and one count of especially aggravated burglary. He received sentences of life without the possibility of parole, twenty years, and eight years, respectively. One year later, Burnett filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging several constitutional violations that he claimed entitled him to relief from the above judgments. After having appointed counsel, the trial court dismissed the petition without having conducted an evidentiary hearing. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the judgment. On appeal to this Court, Burnett contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition without an evidentiary hearing. For the reasons discussed herein, we are of the opinion that the trial court acted in a manner consistent with the provisions of the Post-Conviction Procedure Act of 1995. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed. |
Lauderdale | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Alan Adler
The appellant, Alan L. Adler, was indicted for aggravated child neglect of a child under six years of age, a Class A felony. Following trial, a Fayette County jury convicted him of the lesser-included offense of reckless endangerment, a Class A misdemeanor. Subsequently, the appellant, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-32-101 (section 40-32-101), petitioned the trial court to expunge all public records pertaining to his indictment, prosecution, and trial for the aggravated child neglect charge. After the appellant's petition was granted by the trial court, the State of Tennessee appealed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c) (Rule 3(c)) and argued that Adler was not entitled to expungement under section 40-32-101 because he was convicted of a lesser-included offense. We granted this appeal to determine if the State is authorized under Rule 3(c) to appeal a trial court's expungement order. After examining the facts and the law pertinent to this issue, we hold that the State is not permitted to appeal a trial court's expungement order as of right pursuant to Rule 3(c). Nevertheless, treating the State's appeal as a writ of certiorari, we also hold that the appellant was entitled in this case to expungement of all public records pertaining to the felony charge of which he was acquitted. |
Fayette | Supreme Court | |
Steve Vinson v. United Parcel Service, et al
The dispositive issue in this workers’ compensation action is whether the Special Chancellor erred in finding the appellant, Steve Vinson, to be 100% permanently partially disabled, as a result of a motor vehicle accident that occurred in the scope of his employment. For the reasons set forth herein, we conclude that no such impairment classification exists in the workers’ compensation statutes and cases of this state. After conducting our own de novo review of the record, we hold that the preponderance of the evidence supports the appellant’s claim that he is 100% permanently and |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Ernest Wilson
This appeal arises from Ernest Edward Wilson's conviction for second degree murder in the Criminal Court of Davidson County. At the close of trial, the trial court instructed the jury on first degree murder, second degree murder, and voluntary manslaughter; it did not instruct the jury on reckless homicide and criminally negligent homicide. The jury convicted Wilson of the lesser-included offense of second degree murder, and the trial court imposed a sentence of twenty-four years in the Department of Correction. On direct appeal, Wilson challenged the trial court's failure to instruct on lesser-included offenses. The Court of Criminal Appeals, in a split decision, affirmed the judgment of the trial court. We granted review and now conclude that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on reckless homicide and criminally negligent homicide. Further, we hold that this error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the case for a new trial in accordance with this opinion. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
James Jones v. Pierce Garrett a/k/a Perry Garrett
This case arises from a proceeding to terminate parental rights. In that proceeding, the prospective adoptive parents sought a determination that the father of the child in their custody had abandoned him. The trial court terminated the father's parental rights, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the termination. We granted permission to appeal to determine whether the trial court erred in terminating parental rights on the basis of Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-13-113(g)(8)(A)(vi) (1996 & Supp. 1999) (failure to file a petition to establish paternity within thirty days after notice of alleged paternity by the child's mother) when the father had been adjudicated the legal parent of the child at the time of the hearing. We hold that Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(8)(A)(vi) applies only to cases in which no legal relationship between the parent and child has been established. |
Hamblen | Supreme Court | |
Sharon Keisling v. Daniel Keisling
This case is before the Court on an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. We granted permission to appeal to determine whether the trial court erred in transferring child custody from one parent to the other when no petition requesting a change of custody had been filed at the time of the ruling. After carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court erred in changing custody when the aggrieved party was not provided with notice that custody would be addressed at the hearing. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's award of custody and remand this case to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Wilson | Supreme Court | |
Joanne Carter v. First Source Furniture Group
In this workers' compensation case, we granted the defendant's motion for review pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e) primarily to determine whether the trial court erred by finding that the two and one-half times cap on the permanent partial disability award set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(1) did not apply, where the plaintiff was fired by the employer for gross misconduct prior to being treated for her injury. We hold that an employer should be permitted to enforce workplace rules without being penalized in a workers' compensation case. Thus, the trial court erred in refusing to apply the two and one-half times cap found in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(1). Furthermore, under our review, where expert medical testimony is by deposition, we may draw our own conclusions about the weight and credibility to be given to the medical testimony. Given the disagreement between the evaluating and treating physicians over the surgical procedure performed on the plaintiff, we are of the opinion that the physician who actually performed the surgery was better situated to understand and rate the resulting impairment. We adopt the medical impairment rating of the treating physician, equating to 6% to the body as a whole and set the plaintiff's permanent partial disability at 15% to the body as a whole. |
Lauderdale | Supreme Court | |
Gloria B. Lane v. W.J. Curry & Sons
We granted review in this case to determine whether a landowner can bring a nuisance action against an adjoining landowner when tree branches and roots from the adjoining landowner's property encroach upon and damage the neighboring landowner's property. The plaintiff asserts that encroaching branches and roots from the defendant's trees constitute a nuisance for which she is entitled to seek damages. The defendant responds that the plaintiff's sole remedy is self-help and, therefore, the plaintiff may not recover for any harm caused by the defendant's trees. The trial court and Court of Appeals agreed with the defendant, and held that an adjoining landowner's only remedy is self-help and that a nuisance action cannot be brought to recover for harm caused by encroaching tree branches and roots. We have determined that self-help is not the sole remedy of an adjoining landowner and that a nuisance action may be brought when tree branches and roots from the adjacent property encroach upon and damage the neighboring landowner's property. Although encroaching trees and plants are not nuisances merely because they cast shade, drop leaves, flowers, or fruit, or just because they encroach upon adjoining property either above or below the ground, they may be regarded as a nuisance when they cause actual harm or pose an imminent danger of actual harm to adjoining property. If so, the owner of the tree or plant may be held responsible for harm caused by it and may also be required to cut back the encroaching branches or roots, assuming the encroaching vegetation constitutes a nuisance. We do not, however, alter existing Tennessee law that the adjoining landowner may, at his own expense, cut away the encroaching vegetation to the property line whether or not the encroaching vegetation constitutes a nuisance or is otherwise causing harm or potential harm to the adjoining property. We further find that the record in this case is sufficient to establish liability for nuisance. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's dismissal of the case is reversed. The case is remanded to the trial court for a determination of damages and other appropriate relief. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
John T. King v. Anne B. Pope
Davidson County -In this case, we must decide whether a pay telephone sale-leaseback program marketed and sold by the plaintiff constitutes an investment contract, and thus a security under the Tennessee Securities Act of 1980. In finding that the program was a security, the trial court applied the definition of "investment contract" adopted by the Court of Criminal Appeals in State v. Brewer, 932 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. Crim. App.), perm. app. denied (Tenn. 1996). Under this test, an investment contract exists where (1) An offeree furnishes initial value to an offeror, and (2) a portion of this initial value is subjected to the risks of the enterprise, and (3) the furnishing of the initial value is induced by the offeror's promises or representations which give rise to a reasonable understanding that a valuable benefit of some kind, over and above the initial value, will accrue to the offeree as a result of the operation of the enterprise, and (4) the offeree does not receive the right to exercise practical and actual control over the managerial decisions of the enterprise. Brewer, 932 S.W.2d at 11 (quoting State v. Hawaii Market, 485 P.2d 105, 109 (Haw. 1971)). The Court of Appeals rejected the Brewer test and instead adopted the federal test for determining whether a particular transaction is an investment contract. See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). Applying this test, the Court of Appeals held that the pay telephone sale-leaseback program at issue in this case is not a security. After careful consideration, we agree with the trial court's finding that the appropriate test for determining the presence of an investment contract is set forth in Brewer. Applying this test, we agree with the trial court that the plaintiff's payphone sale-leaseback program is an investment contract and that the plaintiff was thus marketing and selling unregistered securities in violation of Tennessee law. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Susan Godfrey v. Jesus Ruiz
This case arises out of an action by the plaintiffs to recover damages for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident. The plaintiffs claim their injuries were caused by the negligent operation of a van owned by the defendants and driven by a cousin of one of the defendants. In support of their motion for summary judgment, the defendants offered affidavits and deposition testimony stating that the driver was operating the van without their permission and that the driver was not their employee. Despite the prima facie evidence of an owner-driver agency relationship created by Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-311(a) (1998), the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling. We hold that an owner's offer of testimony negating the issue of agency, standing alone, cannot overcome the prima facie evidence created by Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-311(a). |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Paul Dennis Reid
In this capital case, the defendant, Paul Dennis Reid, Jr., was convicted of two counts of first degree murder and one count of especially aggravated robbery for killing two Captain D’s employees and robbing one of the employees. As to each conviction of first degree murder, the jury found in the sentencing hearing that the State had proven three aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt – (1) that the defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies, other than the present charge, the statutory elements of which involve the use of violence to the person; (2) that the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant or another; and (3) that the murder was knowingly committed, solicited, directed, or aided by the defendant while the defendant had a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit, or was fleeing after having a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit robbery. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(2), (6), and (7) (1997). Finding that these aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury sentenced the defendant to death on each murder conviction. The trial court subsequently imposed a twenty-five-year sentence for the especially aggravated robbery conviction and ordered this sentence to be served consecutively to the two death sentences. On direct appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals, the defendant mounted numerous challenges to both his convictions and sentences. After fully considering the defendant’s claims, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Thereafter, the case was docketed in this Court. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206(a)(1) (1997). After carefully and fully reviewing the record and the relevant authority, the defendant’s convictions and sentences are affirmed. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Paul Dennis Reid - Concurring and Dissenting
I concur with the majority’s opinion affirming the conviction of the defendant. With regard to the imposition of the death sentences in this case, however, I cannot agree. My concerns, as expressed below, pertain to my continued dismay with the comparative proportionality review protocol imposed by the majority. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
John Houghton v. Aramark Educational Resources
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 23, we accepted certification of a question of law from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee concerning regulations issued by the Tennessee Department of Human Services. The certified question from the district court asks us to determine whether the rationale of statutorily imposed vicarious liability under Gleaves v. Checker Cab Transit Corp., 15 S.W.3d 799 (Tenn. 2000), applies to rules governing licensing and operation of day care centers in Tennessee. For the reasons given herein, we answer that our holding in Gleaves is distinguishable from the present case, and the Tennessee regulations governing day care centers do not, absent fault on the part of the licensee, provide for vicarious liability for the injurious acts of an employee occurring outside the scope of employment. |
Supreme Court |
