State of Tennessee v. Travis Young
The Defendant, Travis Young, was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery, three counts of aggravated assault, two counts of reckless aggravated assault, and one count of intentionally evading arrest. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sixteen-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it: (1) classified him as a Range II offender; (2) enhanced the Defendant’s sentences; and (3) imposed consecutive sentences. We affirm the judgments of the trial court as modified, and we remand the case for entry of judgments consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tony Galtelli, John B. Gardner, and Vance Plumoff
Appellees, Tony Galtelli, John Gardner and Vance Plumoff, all West Memphis, Arkansas police officers, were indicted for reckless homicide by the Shelby County Grand Jury after a high-speed chase. The chase resulted in the shooting death of Kelly Allen, a passenger in the vehicle involved in the chase. The district attorney general denied pretrial diversion for each officer. Subsequently, Appellees sought relief from the denial of pretrial diversion by filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the trial court. The petition alleged that the district attorney general abused his discretion by denying pretrial diversion. The trial court granted the writ of certiorari, ordering the district attorney general to place Appellees on pretrial diversion. The State sought both an interlocutory appeal and an extraordinary appeal. Both requests were denied. The State subsequently sought and was granted permission to file a late notice of appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure 3. On appeal, the State asserts that the trial court improperly concluded that the district attorney general abused his discretion by denying pretrial diversion and that the trial court erred by ordering the district attorney general to enter a memorandum of understanding to place Appellees on pretrial diversion. After a review of the record, we conclude that even though the trial court properly determined that the district attorney general abused his discretion by denying pretrial diversion, the trial court improperly ordered the district attorney general to place Appellees on pretrial diversion where the district attorney general failed to consider all relevant factors in denying diversion. According to State v. McKim, 215 S.W.3d 781 (Tenn. 2007), the trial court should have reversed the district attorney general’s denial of diversion and ordered the district attorney general to consider all the relevant factors in regard to granting or denying the applications for diversion. Therefore, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bretran R. Thompson
The Defendant, Bretran R. Thompson, was disbarred in 1996. In 2004, the Defendant was indicted in two, two-count indictments each for impersonation of a licensed professional and theft, with a different victim in each indictment. In 2005, the Board of Professional Responsibility filed a petition for contempt against the Defendant alleging he violated his disbarment order from 1996. The Defendant pled guilty to contempt and was sentenced to fifty days in jail. He then moved to dismiss the two indictments in Shelby County Criminal Court. After argument, the trial court dismissed the two charges of impersonation of a licensed professional on double jeopardy grounds but refused to dismiss the two theft charges. The State sought interlocutory appeal under Rule 9 contesting the dismissal of the impersonation of a licensed professional charges, which was joined by the Defendant contesting the non-dismissal of the theft charges. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable law, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgments of the trial court. We affirm the trial court’s judgment denying dismissal of the theft charges, but reverse the judgment of the trial court dismissing the charges of impersonation of a licensed professional. The case is remanded for further proceedings on both sets of charges. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Bill Walker et al. v. Sunrise Pontiac-GMC Truck, Inc.
We granted the defendant’s application for permission to appeal in this case to determine whether a class action may be certified in a claim brought under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), Tennessee Code Annotated sections 47-18-101S125 (2001), or in a claim for common law misrepresentation and fraud. The plaintiff, on his own behalf and on behalf of similarly situated individuals, filed a complaint against Sunrise Pontiac-GMC Truck, Inc., challenging sales transactions in which buyers were charged “dealer incurred costs” as part of the purchase price. The complaint alleged class action claims for, among other things, Tennessee Consumer Protection Act violations and common law misrepresentation and fraud. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment with respect to the class certification of the TCPA, misrepresentation and fraud claims. The court granted the defendant’s motion for a Rule 9 interlocutory appeal and to stay discovery. The Court of Appeals denied the motion for a Rule 9 appeal on the basis that we would soon be addressing the same issues in a different case.1 We granted the defendant’s application for permission to appeal when the issue remained unresolved. Upon thorough review of the record and the legal issues presented, we hold that class certification is unavailable under the TCPA and that class certification was not appropriate in the plaintiff’s claims for common law fraud and misrepresentation due to the individual nature of those claims. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Sarah Elizabeth Ferguson v. Johnny Wayne Ferguson - Dissenting
Because I disagree with the majority’s conclusion as to the classification of some of the personal property at issue in this appeal, I must dissent. It is undisputed that the boat and trailer were Husband’s separate property prior to the marriage. Consequently, we must begin with the presumption that they should be classified as his separate property. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(2). Therefore, the burden of proving that the property had been transmuted into marital property lay with Wife. Based on the record before us, I do not believe that Wife met that burden. |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals | |
Sarah Elizabeth Ferguson v. Johnny Wayne Ferguson
Husband appeals the award of certain items of personal property to Wife in a divorce action. Husband and Wife lived together for many years prior to the marriage and acquired both personal and real property during their cohabitation in addition to the property each owned individually. Husband argues that there was no evidence to support a finding that items awarded Wife, specifically a Corvette, a boat, and a trailer, could be considered marital property or the separate property of Wife. Thus, Husband contends that the trial court erred in its distribution of assets. Finding no error below, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeffrey Lee Fields
The defendant, Jeffrey Lee Fields, appeals the order declaring him a motor vehicle habitual offender (MVHO) by default judgment. He contends, and the State agrees, that the Rules of Civil Procedure were not followed regarding service of process, notice of hearing, notice of default judgment, notice of entry and service of judgment. Further, he contends there were insufficient convictions to support a judgment declaring him a motor vehicle habitual offender. After review, we conclude that a conviction on appeal is a final conviction for the purpose of determining MVHO status; however, because the proper procedures were not followed in obtaining the judgment declaring the defendant a motor vehicle habitual offender, it should be vacated. |
Carroll | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles Vantilburg, III
The defendant, Charles Vantilburg III, was originally convicted of second degree murder in 2002 and sentenced to 20 years’ incarceration. On direct appeal, this court reversed the defendant’s conviction and remanded the case for a new trial on the basis of the trial court’s giving an erroneous definition of the term “knowingly.” See State v. Charles Vantilburg, No. W2002-01480-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, Jan. 13, 2004). After a second trial, the defendant was again convicted of second degree murder, and the trial court imposed a 22-year sentence. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial court erred by admitting into evidence a “memorandum of understanding” signed by the parties, (3) the trial court erred by permitting the state to play a videotape of the recovery of the victim’s body, (4) the trial court erred by instructing the jury on flight, and (5) the sentence is excessive. The sentence is modified to 20 years; otherwise, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Emmanual Small, et al. v. Shelby County Schools, a/k/a Board Of Education, Shelby County Schools
This is a negligence claim brought by a student against a school board pursuant to the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act. The plaintiff, a student at Millington Middle School, began experiencing breathing problems after physical education class. The physical education teacher was unaware of the student’s asthma, or the fact that the student was mentally retarded. The mother came to school and picked up her son, who was later taken to Le Bonheur Children’s Medical Center in Memphis, where he remained for six months. The mother then brought a negligence claim on behalf of her son against the school board. During discovery, the student’s attorney failed to disclose the student’s treating doctor as an expert witness. The school board sought to exclude testimony from the doctor concerning causation of the student’s injuries and the reasonableness and/or necessity of the medical charges. The court allowed the testimony concerning causation and necessity, but excluded testimony related to reasonableness. In its answer, the school board failed to raise the affirmative defense of comparative fault. On the first day of trial, the court granted the school board leave to amend its complaint to include the comparative fault of other individuals, including the student’s mother. After a bench trial, the circuit court entered a judgment in favor of the student in the amount of $3 million dollars, but reduced that award to $130,000 pursuant to the Governmental Tort Liability Act. The student’s attorney then moved for an award of discretionary costs, which the court denied. The school board appeals, alleging that it is immune from suit because its employees were performing a discretionary function. Next, the school board argues that the court erred by allowing the doctor to testify concerning causation and necessity because the student’s attorney failed to disclose the doctor as an expert witness. Finally, the school board argues that the only witness that corroborated the student’s claim was not credible. The student raises the issue of whether the court erred in allowing the school board to amend its answer to include comparative fault, and whether the court erred in refusing to award discretionary costs. For the following reasons, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Danny Jones, et al. v. Shelby County Division of Corrections
The Appellant, Shelby County Division of Corrections (“SCDC”), appeals the judgment of the trial court in favor of Appellee inmates. Appellee inmates filed suit against the SCDC, under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”), for injuries sustained when a metal ventilation system fell from the ceiling while officers were performing a search of the cell block. The SCDC asserts three points of error: (1) that the SCDC is not a governmental entity, as defined by T.C.A.§ 29-20-102(3)(A) of the GTLA so as to be subject to suit thereunder; (2) that expert testimony was required as to the cause of the system’s collapse; and (3) that the trial court erred in not considering the fault of unknown inmates in manipulating the ventilation system. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Robin Lee Stanfill, et al. v. John T. Mountain, et al.
This appeal arises out of a real estate transaction in Maury County, Tennessee, wherein the Plaintiffs/Appellants purchased property from Defendants/Appellees John T. Mountain and Melody Mountain. Defendant/Appellee Carl Brooks served as an independent real estate agent for the transaction. Plaintiffs filed suit against the Defendants alleging fraud, misrepresentation and violation of the Consumer Protection Act. Both Defendants filed motions for summary judgment. By Order dated April 19, 2006, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants. Subsequently, the trial court awarded discretionary costs against the Plaintiffs. For the following reasons we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Aerostructures Corporation v. Dennis F. McGuire
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee, Dennis F. McGuire, alleged that he had sustained a compensable aggravation of a previous work-related back injury. The employer, Aerostructures Corporation (Aeorostructures), took the position that the pre-existing condition had not been advanced or accelerated by the claimed work injury. The trial court found that Mr. McGuire failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he had aggravated or advanced his pre-existing back injury, and granted Aerostructures’s motion for involuntary dismissal at the conclusion of the proof. Mr. McGuire has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the judgment of the trial court. We disagree, and so we affirm. |
Davidson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Trebion Lindsay v. United Parcel Service, Inc. and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee sought workers' compensation benefits for a June 2000 injury to his right shoulder and a November 2000 injury to both shoulders. He had surgery to repair a torn labrum of the right shoulder in November 2003. The trial court dismissed the November 2000 claim based upon the statute of limitations, and found that the labral tear was not caused by the June 2000 injury. Employee has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's decision. We affirm the judgment. |
Davidson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Sharon Prince v. State Street Bank & Trust Co. and American Zurich Insurance Company
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee developed bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome as a result of her employment. The trial court awarded 55% permanent partial disability to the right arm and 35% permanent partial disability to the left arm. Her employer has appealed, contending that the award is excessive. We conclude that the evidence in the record does not preponderate against the trial court’s award, and affirm the judgment. |
Bedford | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Ricky Flamingo Brown v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Ricky Flamingo Brown, was convicted in 1986 of rape of his twelve year old daughter. The trial court sentenced him in abstentia to life in prison after he escaped from jail. After his capture in 1990, he began to serve his sentence. Upon agreement by the State, the Petitioner proceeded with a delayed direct appeal, which this Court dismissed. The Petitioner subsequently filed a number of collateral appeals, all of which were denied by the trial court, with some of those judgments appealed and affirmed in this Court. In 2006, the Petitioner then filed this habeas corpus petition alleging a void sentence. The habeas corpus court denied the petition without a hearing. After a thorough review of the applicable record and law, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Courtney Perry v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Courtney Perry, sought post-conviction relief from his conviction of felony murder and especially aggravated robbery. The Shelby County Criminal Court denied relief after an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, the petitioner argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to raise a proper defense of duress and failed to address why the petitioner was present at the murder scene. We affirm the denial of post-conviction relief. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jerry Freeman, et al. v. Lewisburg Housing Authority
The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant public housing authority, dismissing claims by its former employees for retaliatory discharge in violation of the Tennessee Public Protection Act and for constructive discharge based on a racially hostile work environment in violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Act. Because we find that the employees failed (1) to establish an essential element of a claim for retaliatory discharge or (2) to show that the hostile work environment was racially discriminatory, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in all respects. |
Marshall | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Timothy R. Bouton - Dissenting
The majority, after finding plain error, remands for re-sentencing to conform with the requirements of Blakely v. Washington. I must respectfully dissent. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Timothy R. Bouton
The Defendant, Timothy R. Bouton, appeals from the sentencing decision of the Hamilton County Criminal Court. The Defendant pled guilty to vehicular homicide and reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon. At a subsequent sentencing hearing, the trial court followed the pre-2005-revision sentencing law and imposed an effective ten-year sentence as a Range I, standard offender in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the Defendant argues, for the first time, that the United States Supreme Court’s Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), decision precludes enhancement of his vehicular homicide sentence above the presumptive minimum of eight years. The Defendant also argues that the trial court erred by ordering a sentence of total confinement. After a review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying the Defendant an alternative sentence. However, we must notice as plain error that the trial court improperly enhanced the Defendant’s sentence by applying factors that were not determined by a jury. Because we cannot determine from the record before us the proper sentence to be imposed, this matter is remanded to the trial court for further resentencing in accordance with this opinion. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dorothy Owens, as Conservator of Mary Francis King, an incapcitated person, et al. v. National Health Corporation, et al.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART APPELLEES’ PETITION TO REHEAR The appellees, NHC/OP, L.P., National Health Realty, Inc., NHC, Inc., a/k/a NHC, Inc., Tennessee, and National Health Corporation, have filed a petition to rehear the opinion of this Court filed on November 8, 2007. By order of January 4, 2008, appellant, Dorothy Owens, was ordered to file a response to the petition to rehear. Appellant’s response was filed on January 16, 2008. In their petition, the appellees allege that the Court improperly allowed discovery as to the principal’s competence to sign the power of attorney. Upon due consideration, the Court concludes that appellees’ petition to rehear is well-taken as to this issue and should therefore be granted. The petition to rehear is denied as to the remainder of the issues . It appearing to the Court from appellees’ Petition to Rehear and appellant’s response that footnote 4 of its Opinion filed November 8, 2007, should be modified, IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the attached Opinion be and the same is hereby substituted for that Opinion filed in this cause on November 8, 2007, without change to this Court’s judgment entered contemporaneously with the filing of the original Opinion on November 8, 2007, and without the further taxing of costs. PER CURIAM |
Rutherford | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. William Keith Gillum
Defendant, William Keith Gillum, was charged in count one of the indictment with first degree premeditated murder, and in count two with aggravated assault. Defendant entered a best interest plea of guilty in count one to the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony, and the State dismissed count two of the indictment. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to seven years. The trial court ordered Defendant to serve three months in the county workhouse, with Defendant placed on probation for the balance of his sentence. On appeal, Defendant challenges the length of his sentence, arguing that the trial court erred in the weight assigned to the one enhancement factor and the three mitigating factors. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Paul Graham Manning v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Paul Graham Manning, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his petition for writ of error coram nobis. The trial court dismissed the petition because it was not timely filed and because the petition did not allege newly discovered evidence or make allegations which had not been previously raised or litigated. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
DeKalb | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. R. D. S. - Concurring/Dissenting
I concur in the majority’s analysis of the alleged Miranda violations in Parts I and II (A). I respectfully dissent, however, as to the majority’s conclusions in Part II (B) concerning the motion to suppress the evidence discovered in R.D.S’s truck. |
Williamson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. R. D. S. - Concurring/Dissenting Correction
R.D.S. v. STATE OF TENNESSEE |
Williamson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. R. D. S.
This appeal arises out of a finding of delinquency following a denial of a motion to suppress |
Williamson | Supreme Court |