State of Tennessee v. Karl Daniel Forss - Dissenting
I agree with the majority, for the reasons outlined in its opinion, that it was error for the trial court to apply T.C.A. § 40-35-114(10) (2006) to enhance the defendant’s sentence in this case. However, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court did not consider the mitigating factors proposed by the defendant. In my view, the sentencing hearing transcript establishes that the trial court not only considered the mitigating factors urged by the defendant, it also applied them. The record also establishes that the defendant had a record of illegal drug use, four DUI convictions, and a theft conviction. Thus, the trial court’s conclusion, after weighing the enhancing and mitigating factors, that the enhancement factors greatly outweighed the mitigating factors was supported by the record. |
Cocke | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Barbara Mitchell v. Milan Seating Systems, Assumed Name For Intier Automotive Seating of America, Inc. and James Farmer, Director, Division of Workers' Compensation, Department of Labor, Second Injury Fund - Dissenting
Respectfully, I would find that the preponderance of the evidence does not support a causal relationship between Employment and the Employee's gradual injury which did not manifest itself until fifty-one weeks after she left work for the Employer. |
Gibson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Barbara Mitchell v. Milan Seating Systems, Assumed Name For Intier Automotive Seating of America, Inc. et al.
In this case, the employer appeals the judgment of the trial court, which awarded a twelve percent permanent partial disability to the employee’s left arm and found that the employee provided timely notice of her injury pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-201(b)(1). At trial, the employee contended that she sustained a gradually occurring injury from her work with the employer over a fifteen-year period, causing ulnar nerve neuropathy in her left elbow. The employer argues on appeal that the employee failed to carry her burden of proof as to causation and did not provide timely notice of the injury to the employer. After careful consideration of the record in this case, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Gibson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Martha Smith, et al. v. Greg Brooks, et al.
In 2005, Martha Smith and her husband, Brian D. Smith, filed suit (“the First Lawsuit”) in the trial court against four individuals and the Polk County Board of Education (“PCBE”). Each of the four counts in the complaint includes an allegation that defendants Greg Brooks, Tracy McAbee, and Grady Samples “were acting in their official capacity while engaging in their illegal and tortious activity and . . . these defendants . . . are duly elected members of PCBE.” An order of voluntary nonsuit without prejudice was entered in the First Lawsuit as to PCBE and all of the individual defendants except a non-board member, Shane Wooten. In 2006, the plaintiffs again filed suit (“the Second Lawsuit”). The “illegal and tortious activity” alleged in the Second Lawsuit is identical to that alleged in the First Lawsuit. The Second Lawsuit names Brooks, McAbee, and Samples (“the defendants”) as the sole defendants. They are sued as individuals and not as members of PCBE. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss – citing Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) – asserting that the Second Lawsuit had been filed outside the period of the applicable statute of limitations. The trial court agreed and dismissed the Second Lawsuit. The plaintiffs appeal, relying upon Tenn. Code Ann. §28-1-105(a) (2000), a part of the so-called Tennessee saving statute. We hold that, under the facts of this case, the saving statute is not available to the plaintiffs to preserve their causes of action against the defendants in their individual capacities. Accordingly, we affirm. |
Polk | Court of Appeals | |
Anthony Darrell Hines v. State of Tennessee
A Cheatham County jury convicted the Petitioner, Anthony Darrell Hines, of first-degree felony murder and sentenced him to death. After a remand to reconsider sentencing, the Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed a second sentence of death, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in 1997, which was denied by the trial court and ultimately affirmed by this Court in 2004. The Petitioner filed this petition for post-conviction relief requesting permission and funds to test seven pieces of evidence for DNA. The trial court denied the petition, and, upon a thorough consideration of the facts and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Cheatham | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Adoption of D.R.T., d/o/b 12/25/93 Kevin Dean Turnage v. Misty Renee Mitchell Carr
This is a case involving the chancery court’s decision not to terminate a mother’s parental rights. The father and his wife petitioned the court to terminate the mother’s rights and allow the wife to adopt the minor child. The court held a termination hearing to determine if the other’s rights should be terminated. In the order dismissing the petition for termination and adoption, the court found that the mother had not abandoned the child by failure to visit because her attempts to maintain contact and visit the child were thwarted by the father and his wife. As to the father and wife’s contention that the mother abandoned the child by her failure to pay child support, the court found that the mother had no reason why she did not pay child support, but then found that her failure to pay did not constitute abandonment. On this appeal, we do not have a transcript of the trial proceedings. The father filed a statement of the evidence, and the mother filed an objection to the father’s proposed statement of the evidence. In the mother’s filed objection, she stated that the parties stipulated at trial that her failure to pay child support “was not sufficient in itself to terminate [her] parental rights.” The chancery court certified its own statement of evidence, concurring with the mother’s filed objection and stating that the mother’s failure to pay child support was not willful |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bobby Glenn Scott
Defendant, Bobby Glenn Scott, entered a plea of guilty to possession of methamphetamine, a Schedule II drug, a Class B felony; possession of unlawful drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor; and unlawful possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, a Class E felony. The transcript of the guilty plea submission hearing is not in the record. The judgments of conviction reflect that the trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to twelve years for possession of cocaine, two years for his weapons conviction, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for his misdemeanor conviction. The trial court ordered Defendant to serve his sentences concurrently for an effective sentence of twelve years. Defendant attempted to reserve a certified question of law under Rule 37(b)(2)(I) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress the evidence seized after execution of a search warrant. After review, we conclude that this Court does not have jurisdiction to address the certified question because the certification did not meet the requirements of State v. Preston, 759 S.W.2d 647 (Tenn. 1988). The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. |
Henderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Emmett Crutcher v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Emmett Crutcher, pled guilty in 2005 to attempted aggravated arson and was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to twelve years in the Department of Correction. In 2006, the petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied his petition, and we affirm that judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Vern Braswell
Defendant, Vern Braswell, was indicted for first degree premeditated murder. Following a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of the lesser included offense of second degree murder. After a sentencing hearing, Defendant was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender, to twenty-four years. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred in certain evidentiary rulings; and (3) his sentence is excessive. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dearice Cates, Alias
The defendant was convicted by a Knox County jury of three counts of especially aggravated kidnapping and one count each of aggravated robbery, attempted aggravated robbery, assault, and aggravated burglary, and received an effective sentence of twenty-four years. The trial court subsequently granted the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal as to the three especially aggravated kidnapping convictions, holding that the defendant could not be convicted of both kidnapping and robbery because the movement or confinement supporting each kidnapping conviction was essentially incidental to the commission of the robbery, decisions which the State appealed. The defendant likewise appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for aggravated robbery. We affirm the defendant’s conviction for aggravated robbery and the trial court’s dismissal of one count of especially aggravated kidnapping. We reverse the trial court’s dismissal of the remaining two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping and remand for reinstatement of those convictions. In all other respects, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lillie Walker vs. Collegetown Mobile Estates, Inc.
Plaintiff who fell in a mobile home sued the lessor owner for damages for injuries. The Trial Court granted summary judgment to defendant. On appeal, we vacate the summary judgment and remand. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
J. O. House v. Estate of J. K. Edmondson - Dissenting
I agree with the majority that the trial court did not err by approving the special litigation committee’s report. For a variety of reasons, however, I must respectfully dissent with regard to the holding that a minority shareholder suing on behalf of a for-profit corporation can never recover attorney fees under the common fund doctrine. First, I do not believe that failure of the General Assembly to include the common fund doctrine in the Tennessee Business Corporation Act (“TBCA”) abrogates our holding in Grant v. Lookout Mountain Co., 28 S.W. 90 (Tenn. 1894). Secondly, the common fund doctrine is not analogous to Tennessee Code Annotated section 48-17-401(d), which authorizes an award of attorney fees against the opposing party. Finally, from a policy standpoint, the application of the common fund doctrine to shareholder derivative suits is desirable to promote corporate accountability. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
J. O. House v. Estate of J. K. Edmondson
A minority shareholder in a closely held Tennessee corporation filed a derivative suit claiming that the company’s majority shareholder, who also served as the corporation’s president and chairman of its board of directors, misappropriated corporate funds. The minority shareholder also filed an individual claim against the majority shareholder alleging that he breached a pre-incorporation agreement in which the majority shareholder agreed to offer available stock to the corporation and other shareholders before purchasing the stock himself. A litigation committee appointed by the corporation to investigate the allegations against the majority shareholder found merit to the charges. The litigation committee recommended to the corporation that the company either settle the derivative claim or proceed with the litigation if the majority shareholder was unwilling to resolve the lawsuit in accordance with terms proposed by the committee. The trial court found that the litigation committee’s findings and recommendations were in the corporation’s best interests and that, once a settlement was reached, the derivative suit would be dismissed. The trial court also granted summary judgment to the majority shareholder on the individual breach of contract claim and denied the minority shareholder’s request for attorney’s fees. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s acceptance of the litigation committee’s report and the denial of attorney’s fees to the minority shareholder, but reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the majority shareholder on the breach of contract claim. We accepted review to determine: (1) whether a plaintiff in a shareholder’s derivative suit brought on behalf of a for-profit corporation may recover attorney’s fees; and (2) whether the trial court was correct in adopting the findings of the litigation committee’s report. We hold that Tennessee law does not authorize an award of attorney’s fees to a plaintiff in a shareholder’s derivative suit brought on behalf of a for-profit corporation. We also hold that the trial court did not err in approving the sufficiently independent, thoroughly researched report of the litigation committee. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals as to those issues is affirmed. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Darryl J. Roberts vs. The Baylor School
Plaintiff sued recipient of an inter vivos gift to recover the gift on the grounds defendant violated a fiduciary duty owed to plaintiff, and the failure of defendant to comply with conditions of the gift. The Trial Court ruled in favor of defendant. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Verdis Chambers v. Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole, et al.
An inmate appeals the dismissal of his lawsuit under Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-807(b) for failure to make partial payment of the filing fee and argues the trial court abused its discretion in failing to specify the amount of the partial payment due. The trial court gave the inmate an opportunity to make the filing fee payment prior to dismissal and was not required to specify the amount due since the statute provided the formula to determine the amount of the partial payment due. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Eric Magness et al. v. Terrell W. Couser et al.
This case involves a property dispute between neighbors. Property owner and her son who resides on her property brought an action to quiet title and for ejectment against a neighboring property owner. The trial court imposed sanctions against the defendant under Rule 37 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure for failing to comply with its order compelling discovery responses. The court subsequently granted the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment and, after a hearing on damages, issued a permanent injunction against the defendant and her son and a judgment for damages and costs against the defendants. The defendants have appealed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in part, reverse in part and remand. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Wells Fargo Financial Leasing, Inc. v. Mountain Rentals of Gatlinburg, Inc.
Wells Fargo Financial Leasing, Inc., brought this action against Mountain Rentals of Gatlinburg, Inc., to collect rent under an equipment lease. The trial court granted summary judgment to Wells Fargo, and Mountain Rentals appealed. After careful review, we hold that the rental agreement is an enforceable finance lease and that Mountain Rentals’s obligation to pay rent was irrevocable and independent. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Paul Hayes v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Paul Hayes, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in denying his petition for relief but provides no proof of ineffective assistance of counsel. Therefore, the judgment from the post-conviction court is affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kevin E. Glasgow
The defendant, Kevin E. Glasgow, was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI), fourth offense, a class E felony, and received a sentence of one year, suspended after 150 days. He was acquitted of driving on a revoked license. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence is not sufficient to support his conviction and that the jury rendered an inconsistent verdict by finding him guilty of DUI and not guilty of driving on a revoked license. We conclude that no error exists, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Stewart | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Metropolitan Government of Nashville Davidson County, Tennesse v. Printer's Alley Theater, LLC d/b/a Brass Stables and Metropolitan Government of Nashville Davidson County v. C&A Entertainment, Inc. d/b/a/ Club Platinum
These consolidated appeals involve punishment for criminal contempt. The two defendants are businesses that were providing sexually oriented entertainment, as defined by the Nashville Metropolitan Code of Laws, without licenses. The businesses continued to provide sexually oriented entertainment in violation of injunctions forbidding such activity and later injunctions ordering the businesses to be closed. The businesses were held in contempt of court, and an individual who was a corporate officer or part owner of each business was sentenced to five days in jail in each case, to be served concurrently. The individual appeals, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that he should be punished for contempt. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Mario Merritt v. State of Tennessee
A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Mario Merritt, of especially aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years in prison. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief claiming he was not afforded the effective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition, finding the Petitioner failed to prove that trial counsel was deficient and that any alleged errors caused prejudice. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Keith T. Perry v. Glen Turner, Warden
The Petitioner, Keith T. Perry, pled guilty to second degree murder in 2000, with an agreed sentence of thirty years to be served at one hundred percent. He subsequently filed a petition for habeas corpus relief claiming the following: (1) the thirty-year sentence violated Blakely v. Washington and its progeny; (2) the thirty-year sentence violated the Tennessee Code’s requirement that Range I offenders not be sentenced to more than twenty-five years; and (3) the Tennessee Code sections applicable are ambiguous. The habeas court denied the petition, and, upon a thorough consideration of the facts and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Seletta McKinnis
The Defendant, Seletta McKinnis, was arrested and pled guilty to failing to appear in court. She received a sentence of “time served.” The Defendant was subsequently indicted on separate offenses and applied for pretrial diversion. The prosecutor denied her application, explaining that she had previously served a sentence of confinement. She appealed to the Circuit Court, which also denied her application, and now she appeals, arguing that her “time served” sentence should not preclude her from pretrial diversion. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Edward Wright
The defendant, William Edward Wright, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of one count of conspiracy to sell over twenty-six grams of cocaine, a Class B felony; two counts of facilitation of the sale of over twenty-six grams of cocaine, a Class C felony; and one count of possession with intent to deliver over twenty-six grams of cocaine, a Class B felony. He was sentenced by the trial court as a Range II offender to twenty years for the conspiracy conviction, ten years for each of the facilitation convictions, and twenty years for the possession with intent to deliver conviction. Finding the defendant to be a professional criminal, that he had an extensive history of criminal activity, and that the offenses were committed while he was on probation, the trial court ordered that the twenty-year sentences be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of forty years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conspiracy and facilitation convictions, the trial court erred in denying his motions to suppress his statement and the evidence seized during the search of his residence, and his sentence was excessive. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we remand for the entry of a corrected judgment in Count 3 to reflect the correct conviction offense of facilitation of the sale of over twenty-six grams of cocaine. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Richard Wayne Hampton
The defendant was convicted by jury of possession of .5 grams or more of a schedule II substance (cocaine) with intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony. For his conviction, he was sentenced to ten years imprisonment. In this appeal, the defendant presents four issues for review: (1) whether the trial court improperly admitted evidence of a prior un-indicted drug sale at the defendant’s residence in violation of Rule 404(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence ; (2) whether the trial court erred in failing to include the defendant’s special instruction in the jury charge; (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction; and (4) whether the defendant was denied his right to a fair and impartial jury verdict due to improper extraneous influences on the jury’s deliberation. Finding no errors requiring reversal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Carroll | Court of Criminal Appeals |