State of Tennessee v. Deanthony M. Davis
The Defendant pled guilty in September 2005 to possession of .5 grams or more of a Schedule II drug with the intent to sell, which is a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to twelve years, and he was released to a community corrections program after serving one year of incarceration. Following a hearing, the trial court found the Defendant had violated his community corrections sentence, and it revoked the Defendant’s community corrections sentence and resentenced the Defendant to sixteen years of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant claims the trial court erred when it revoked his community corrections sentence and re-sentenced him. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James Robert Bell v. First Citizens National Bank, Trustee of the Mary Sue Bell, et al.
This appeal involves the sale of an asset of a testamentary trust. The plaintiff/appellant is a beneficiary of the trust, and the defendant/appellee bank is trustee of the trust. The trust originally had a promissory note as one of its assets. In 1981, the trust sold the note at a discount. In 1987, the bank submitted an accounting and sought approval for the sale of the note. The appellant’s father, also a beneficiary of the trust, challenged the bank’s petition. In 1989, the chancery court issued an order approving the sale of the promissory note. The order was signed by the appellant and was not appealed. In 2006, the appellant beneficiary filed a complaint in the trial court below, challenging the sale of the note. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the bank, finding that the appellant’s claims were barred under the doctrine of res judicata and collateral estoppel, and that they were time-barred as well. In addition, the trial court awarded Rule 11 sanctions against the beneficiary. The beneficiary appeals. We affirm, finding that the beneficiary’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations, and that Rule 11 sanctions are warranted. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
Dwight Barbee, as Administrator of the Estate of Faye Glenn v. Kindred Healthcare Operating, Inc. et al.
This is a nursing home negligence case involving an arbitration agreement. The son of the decedent signed documents admitting his mother to the defendant nursing home. The admission documents included an arbitration agreement. After his mother’s death, the son filed a lawsuit on behalf of her estate against the defendant nursing home, alleging, inter alia, neglect and abuse. The nursing home filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit and compel arbitration under the agreement. The trial court granted the motion, finding that the agreement was not unconscionable and that the son had apparent authority to sign the agreement in view of his mother’s incompetence and the exigent circumstances. The mother’s estate appeals. We find on appeal that the son was not his mother’s agent and did not have apparent authority to sign on her behalf. Applying the Tennessee Health Care Decisions Act, we find further that the son was not his mother’s surrogate, and that he did not have authority to bind her to the arbitration agreement. Therefore, we reverse the order compelling arbitration. |
Lauderdale | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kim McBride Murphy
Following a bench trial in Cumberland County, the defendant, Kim McBride Murphy, was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor, and sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, with thirty days to be served in confinement. The defendant filed a timely motion for new trial, which the trial court orally denied. No written order of the denial is included in the record, however. On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction for DUI. After review of the record, we conclude that we lack jurisdiction in the case because the record contains no written denial of the motion for new trial. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. |
Cumberland | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mohamed Omar Muse
The Appellant, Mohamed Omar Muse, appeals his convictions by a Davidson County jury and the resulting sentences imposed by the Davidson County Criminal Court for the offenses of sale of less than point five (.5) grams of cocaine and possession of point five (.5) grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver. On appeal, Muse argues: (1) that the evidence offered at trial was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury regarding casual exchange; (3) that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized from his person at the time of his arrest; (4) that the trial court erred in denying his motion for recusal based upon alleged racial and religious prejudices of the trial court; and (5) as to sentencing, that the trial court erred in its weighing of mitigating and enhancement factors and in denying a probationary or community corrections sentence. Upon complete review of the record and the arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee vs Phedrek Davis - Concurring
The specific question presented for our review is whether the acquittal-first jury instruction, in the context of the right to a complete charge on the count in the indictment as well as any and all lesser-included offenses supported by the evidence at trial, either is violative of our constitution or should be overruled for policy reasons. See State v. Ely, 48 S.W.3d 710 (Tenn. 2001); State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453 (Tenn. 1999). The majority concludes that the instruction meets constitutional muster, and I am inclined to concur with that assessment; however, an acquittal-first instruction in Tennessee largely qualifies as legal fiction because the trial judge is required under our constitution to instruct on the primary charge and the full panoply of lesser-included offenses in advance of deliberations. That is, the jury, by being provided with the entirety of the instructions as appropriate, necessarily considers any lesser-included offenses before convening for deliberations. It is my belief, therefore, that as a matter of practicality and for sound policy reasons, Tennessee should retreat from acquittal-first and formally adopt an alternative instruction – one which fits within the framework of a criminal jury trial and which best conforms to specific provisions within our state constitution. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee vs Phedrek Davis
We granted the Defendant’s request for permission to appeal to address the propriety of jury instructions requiring the jury to reach a unanimous decision to acquit of a greater offense before considering a lesser-included offense. We hold that such jury instructions are proper and do not violate the Defendant’s right to trial by jury. We also hold that the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences did not violate the Defendant’s federal Sixth Amendment rights. While the Defendant has raised several other issues, we have determined that the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly held that they do not entitle the Defendant to relief. Accordingly, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions and sentences. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Alex Ikbariah AND I & K Enterprises v. Debra F. Williams
This appeal involves tort and breach of contract claims. The plaintiffs are franchisees of a restaurant chain. They filed this lawsuit against an individual employee of the franchise organization as well as other corporate defendants. The complaint set forth many theories of recovery, but asserted only an extortion claim against the individual employee. The trial court dismissed the extortion claim and, consequently, dismissed the employee from the lawsuit. The plaintiffs’ claims against the corporate defendants remained pending. The plaintiffs filed this appeal of the trial court’s order dismissing the claim against the individual employee. The plaintiffs were not given permission to file an interlocutory appeal, and the order from which the plaintiffs appeal was not designated as final under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02. Thus, we find that the order from which the plaintiffs appeal was not a final order, and therefore dismiss the appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Randall McClure
Defendant, Randall McClure, pled guilty to one count of the sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine and one count of the delivery of less than .5 grams of cocaine. The convictions were merged. The manner of service of the agreed upon five year sentence was to be determined by the trial court at a sentencing hearing. Defendant requested alternative sentencing and after conducting the sentencing hearing the trial court denied the request and sentenced Defendant to serve the five-year sentence incarcerated. On appeal, Defendant argues the trial court erroneously denied his request for alternative sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Lincoln | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, ex rel., Bee DeSelm, et al v. Tennessee Peace Officers Standards Commission, Tennessee Attorney General Timothy Hutchison and Knox County Mayor Mike Ragsdale
Plaintiffs brought this action against the Tennessee Peace Officers Standards Commission, the Tennessee Attorney General, Knox County Mayor and Timothy Hutchison seeking declaratory judgment that Hutchison was disqualified to serve as a deputy sheriff of Knox County. Responding to a Motion to Dismiss, the Chancellor dismissed the action and, on appeal, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Cheryl McLemore Hearn, et al. v. Quince Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, LLC, et al.
This appeal concerns the enforceability of an arbitration agreement between a nursing home and one of its patients. The trial court found that the agreement was unenforceable because the nursing home’s agent gave an insufficient explanation of the agreement’s meaning to the patient’s daughter. We do not reach the merits of the trial court’s conclusion. Instead, we find that the patient’s daughter did not have the authority to sign the agreement on her father’s behalf. We, therefore, affirm the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Edward Farrar, Jr.
The defendant, James Edward Farrar, Jr., appeals from his Bedford County Circuit Court jury conviction of bribing a witness. He claims that the verdict is not supported by legally sufficient evidence and that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a compact disc containing recorded telephone calls that the State failed to properly authenticate. Because we disagree, we affirm the judgment of the trial court |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. George Franklin
Following a jury trial Defendant, George Franklin, was convicted of the second degree murder of three-year-old Jessica Borner and the attempted murder of nine other people. Defendant was convicted under the theory of criminal responsibility for the conduct of another. It is undisputed that Defendant did not fire the shot that killed Jessica. Defendant was sentenced to twenty-five years at one-hundred percent for second degree murder and twelve years at thirty percent for each count of attempted murder. The trial court ordered the sentences to be served consecutively for an effective sentence of one-hundred and thirty-three years. On appeal, Defendant challenges: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain convictions of second degree murder and nine counts of attempted second degree murder; (2) whether the trial court properly refused to grant a mistrial when the assistant district attorney general referenced the statement of a co-defendant; (3) whether the trial court properly prohibited the defense attorney from eliciting information about the alleged dangerousness of the house; (4) whether the trial court properly excluded certain prior bad acts of witnesses; (5) whether the trial court properly applied enhancement factors in sentencing; and (6) whether the trial court properly imposed consecutive sentences. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgements of the trial court except the sentencing. Because of the improper use of enhancement factors in sentencing, we modify Defendant’s sentence from twenty-five years to twenty-one years for second degree murder and from twelve years to nine years for each of the nine convictions for attempted second degree murder. Otherwise the judgments are affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Nichlous Maxwell
Following a jury trial, Defendant, Nichlous Maxwell, was convicted of second degree murder. He was sentenced to twenty-five years’ incarceration. On appeal Defendant argues (1) the trial court committed reversible error by permitting the prosecutor to elicit a hearsay statement under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rules, (2) that the trial court erred in its response to jury questions regarding the instruction on criminal responsibility for the conduct of another, and (3) the trial court erred in enhancing Defendant’s sentence based on facts not found by a jury. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court as to the hearsay statements and the jury instruction and modify the judgment as to sentencing from twenty-five to twenty-three years. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dale Anthony Scott, et al. v. Marion Yarbro, et al.
This is the third appeal of this property case involving the ownership of three parcels of real property held by tenants-in-common. We dismissed the first two appeals for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the trial court's order did not constitute a final judgment. Plaintiffs/Appellants claim ownership of the disputed tract by three modes: (1) title by prescription, (2) title by adverse possession, and (3) title by payment of property taxes pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 28-2-109 and 29-2-110. Finding that Plaintiffs/Appellants have failed to meet their burden to prove ownership based upon any of the three theories, we affirm. |
Decatur | Court of Appeals | |
Diane Marie Depietto Guiliano v. Anthony Philip Guiliano
This appeal arises from a divorce action. The trial court found both parties guilty of inappropriate conduct and declared them divorced pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-129. The trial court awarded 55 percent of the marital property to Wife and 45 percent to Husband; ordered the marital residence sold and awarded the equity to Wife; awarded Wife alimony in futuro in the amount of $4,000 per month; ordered Husband to pay for Wife’s COBRA benefits and uninsured medical costs exceeding $45.00 until the benefits expire; and ordered each party to pay their own attorney’s fees. Wife appeals. We modify the trial court’s order with respect to life insurance and alimony as provided herein. The trial court’s order is otherwise affirmed. This matter is remanded for further proceedings, if necessary, and entry of an order consistent with this Opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Melvin Nettles
The defendant, Melvin Nettles, pleaded guilty to one count of sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine and was sentenced as a Range III offender in Davidson County Criminal Court to an effective 12-year term to be served in a community corrections program. On October 5, 2007, the trial court revoked the community corrections sentence and ordered the defendant to serve his sentence in the Department of Correction. From that order, the defendant appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Merry LeShane, as Next of Kin of Winnie Brumley, Deceased v. Quince Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, LLC.
This appeal arises from the trial court’s denial of Defendant/Appellant’s motion to compel arbitration under an arbitration agreement contained in a nursing home admissions agreement. This is a direct appeal pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-5-319(a)(1). We vacate and remand for further proceedings with respect to the issue of authority. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Gilbert Mohr v. Daimlerchrysler Corporation
This appeal is from a jury verdict against an automobile manufacturer for compensatory and punitive damages. The Circuit Court of Shelby County entered judgments against the defendant for $3,450,000 in compensatory and $48,778,000 in punitive damages for the death of the driver, and $1,100,000 in compensatory damages for the death of the front-seat passenger. The manufacturer on appeal asks this Court to reverse the judgment of liability or to grant a new trial on all issues. In the alternative, the defendant argues that the money judgments are excessive. We affirm the findings of liability for compensatory and punitive damages and we affirm the amounts awarded for compensatory damages. We also find that the amount of punitive damages awarded must be reduced to $13,800,000 to comply with the due process requirements of the United States Constitution. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Trezevant Realty Corporation v. John E. Threlkeld, et al.
This appeal involves a dispute over a real estate sales commission and a third party claim for rent due under a commercial lease agreement. The tenant and the owners of the rental property entered into a listing agreement whereby the tenant’s real estate company would broker the sale of the leased property on behalf of the owners. The property in question was two commercial lots. The tenant was able to procure a sale of one of the commercial lots, and upon close of the sale, tenant stopped paying rent to the owners on the remaining commercial lot. Tenant then brought an offer for the sale of the second lot, which the owners rejected and made a counter-offer. No deal was reached, and the owners terminated the tenant’s agency authority. Through another real estate agency, the owners sold the remaining lot. The tenant’s real estate company brought suit, seeking to collect the real estate commission. The owners sought the rent due on the unsold lot for the time remaining under the lease. The trial court found that the tenant was not entitled to a real estate commission, and that the tenant owed the owners rent, but reduced the amount due to the owner’s failure to mitigate damages. We affirm in part and reverse in part. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Timothy A. Summers
Following a bench trial in the Union County Circuit Court, the defendant, Timothy A. Summers, was found guilty of one count of driving on a revoked license, second offense (Class A misdemeanor). The trial court subsequently imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, with forty-five days to be served. On appeal, the defendant raises the single issue of whether the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion to suppress. Specifically, he contends that the statements made by him on a videotape of the police stop, consisting of an admission that he was driving the vehicle, should have been suppressed because they were obtained as result of a custodial interrogation without the benefit of Miranda warnings. Following review, we conclude that the trial court properly denied the motion. |
Union | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Steven Davis
The defendant, Steven Davis, was convicted of one count of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and sentenced to ten years in confinement. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Harry Jacocks And Dorothy Jacocks v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water
This is a negligence action. Appellees filed a complaint against Appellant alleging that its employee negligently drove a company truck into the back of Appellees’ car. Appellant was granted partial summary judgment because a latent mechanical problem caused its truck’s brakes to fail. The trial court then held a bench trial to determine if the employee’s negligent driving was also a cause of the accident. Although it made no findings of fact, the trial court concluded that the employee was negligent, and awarded Appellee, Harry Jacocks $15,350 in damages. Appellant appeals, asserting that the evidence presented does not support the trial court’s judgment. Because we agree that the evidence was insufficient, we reverse the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Leon Flannel
The defendant, Leon Flannel, was convicted by jury of one count of murder in perpetration of a theft and one count of premeditated murder. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for both convictions, which were merged. The defendant now appeals, arguing that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions and his conviction for murder in perpetration of a theft was unconstitutional; (2) the trial court failed to properly exercise its duty as thirteenth juror; (3) the trial court erred in failing to grant the defendant’s motion to suppress his statement to police; (4) the trial court erred in qualifying certain state witnesses as experts; (5) the trial court erred in admitting a letter into evidence without proof of chain of custody and proper authentication; (6) the trial court made improper comments regarding witness qualification and jury instruction; and (7) cumulative error in the trial proceedings requires relief. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: A.R. (DOB 8/13/05) A Child Under Eighteen Years of Age
Mother appeals the juvenile court’s decision to terminate her parental rights. The minor child has been in the custody of the Department of Children’s Services since he was five months old, as the juvenile court found that he was dependent and neglected. Following approximately sixteen months of services and a failed trial home visit, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights. The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights on the ground of “persistence of conditions.” We affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals |