State of Tennessee v. Antonio Ramon Smiles
The appellant, Antonio Ramon Smiles, was convicted of introduction of contraband into a penal institution and possession of more than one-half ounce of marijuana with intent to deliver. He received a total effective sentence of three years of confinement in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s failure to dismiss the indictment for introduction of contraband into a penal institution and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jan Marie Vaughn v. William Daniel Vaughn
In this divorce case filed by the Appellee/Mother, she was granted a divorce on the grounds of inappropriate marital conduct. The trial court divided the marital property and ordered the Appellant/Father to pay alimony in futuro and child support for the parties’ two minor children, the oldest of whom is severely disabled. The trial court ordered the Father to acquire the equipment necessary to take care of the child while visiting in his home and to begin intensive training in the use of equipment. Both parties were to maintain term life insurance in the face amount of $250,000. Additionally, the trial court awarded Mother attorneys’ fees in the amount of $15,000.00 and ordered Father to pay child support arrearages in the amount of $4,756.00. Father appeals the decision of the trial court regarding the award of alimony, the upward deviation of child support, the award of attorneys’ fees, and the award of support arrearages. We reverse in part, affirm in part and remand. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Randy L. May v. Howard W. Carlton
Incident to a conviction for first degree murder, the petitioner was declared infamous, a status which involves the loss of rights of citizenship, including the right to vote. At the time of the offense, homicide was not listed as an infamous crime under the statute. We granted permission to appeal to determine whether the judgment could be corrected through the writ of habeas corpus. Because the illegal disenfranchisement of the petitioner qualifies as a “restraint on liberty,” a threshold requirement under our statute, we grant limited habeas corpus relief but uphold the underlying conviction and the term of incarceration. The opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for modification of the judgment. |
Johnson | Supreme Court | |
Paige Townson Lyles v. Joshua Paul Lyles
The Trial Judge awarded primary residential custody of the parties’ child, d.o.b. 2/14/05, to the father. The mother appealed the award of custody. We affirm the Trial Court’s Judgment. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Susan Marie Gilliam Campbell
We granted review to determine whether the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly determined that the evidence at trial was sufficient to support dual convictions of criminally negligent homicide and facilitating escape. Because the defendant, who was charged with the care of the five-year-old victim, took him swimming at a lake without notifying his parents, drank beer and used marijuana, and dared the victim into the water and then failed to supervise his activities, the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction of criminally negligent homicide. Because the defendant, after discovering the disappearance of the victim, discouraged immediate contact with the authorities so that her son, a fugitive from justice, could avoid the police, the evidence was also sufficient to support the conviction of facilitating escape. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Hawkins | Supreme Court | |
Randy L. May v. Howard W. Carlton - Dissenting
I agree with the Court’s conclusion that the portion of the 1981 judgment declaring Randy L. May infamous is contrary to Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-2712 (1975) (amended 1981).1 However, I cannot concur with the Court’s dramatic expansion of the application of the “great and efficacious” writ of habeas corpus in this case. Until today, it had been well settled that the writ did not apply to collateral consequences of a criminal conviction or to circumstances that did not involve imprisonment or a “restraint of liberty” as that concept had been understood at common law. Rather than recognizing a brand new classification of collateral consequences in order to provide Mr. May relief, this Court should simply leave Mr. May to pursue his other, well-established plain, adequate, and speedy remedies. |
Johnson | Supreme Court | |
Aerostructures Corporation and Zurich American Insurance Company v. David Rader
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee, David Rader, sustained a permanent hearing loss, which he alleged was caused by his work. The only doctor to testify completed a C-32 which stated that the hearing loss was more probably than not related to Mr. Rader’s work, but had no specific knowledge of noise levels at Mr. Rader’s workplace other than Mr. Rader’s subjective statements. The trial court ruled that Mr. Rader failed to sustain his burden of proof, and entered judgment for the employer, Aerostructures Corporation. Mr. Rader has appealed. We reverse the judgment of the trial court, and award 15% permanent partial disability to his binaural hearing. |
Davidson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Aerostructures Corporation v. Harry P. York
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. On appeal, the employee, Harry P. York, contends that the trial court erred in holding that he had a 13%, rather than a 30%, impairment rating to the body as a whole. Because the evidence does not preponderate against this finding, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
William Rainey v. Tennsco Corp.
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee, William Rainey, reported a gradual injury to his arms in August 2000. He received medical treatment for arm and neck symptoms through workers’ compensation and returned to work. Mr. Rainey alleged that he sustained a second injury, to his neck, in May 2002. Tennsco denied that a new injury was reported. Mr. Rainey was examined by two doctors through workers’ compensation. Neither doctor considered him to be a surgical candidate. Mr. Rainey sought additional treatment on his own. Eventually, surgery was performed on his cervical spine. At trial, the employer, Tennsco Corporation (Tennsco) denied that Mr. Rainey had sustained a permanent disability as a result of his work injury. The trial court awarded 50% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. Tennsco has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the award. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Dickson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Katherine Deloriese Olinger, et al. v. University Medical Center, et al.
This medical malpractice action was filed by Katherine Deloriese Olinger and Perry Michael Hale (“Plaintiffs”) after their son was born with brachial plexus palsy. Plaintiffs claim the injury occurred because the defendants failed to take the proper medical steps to resolve a delivery complication known as shoulder dystocia. Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of all of the defendants. Plaintiffs appeal claiming the Trial Court erred when it gave a jury instruction on the sudden emergency doctrine, and further erred by refusing to permit cross-examination of a witness by the use of medical literature which Plaintiffs maintain had been established as a reliable authority pursuant to Tenn. R. Evid. 618. We affirm. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Louis Saine, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
he petitioner, Robert Louis Saine, Jr., appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2006 convictions for aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and being a felon in possession of a weapon, a Class E felony. He received an effective sentence of eight years. He contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were unknowing and involuntary. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State ex rel. John W. Carney, Jr. v. Danny J. Crosby
The plaintiff appeals the decision of the trial court to not issue a writ of ouster against the mayor of Coopertown. The issue on appeal is whether the trial court correctly concluded that the plaintiff had failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the mayor knowingly or willfully committed misconduct that would constitute grounds for removal from office under the ouster statute. The mayor also raises the issue on appeal of whether the trial court erred in denying the mayor’s request for attorney fees. We affirm. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Henry Cooper and Lawrence M. Walker
Co-defendants, Henry Cooper and Lawrence M. Walker, were indicted on one count of attempted first degree premeditated murder and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. Following a jury trial, co-defendants were convicted of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony, and were found not guilty of especially aggravated kidnapping. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant Cooper as a Range I, standard offender, to twelve years, and Defendant Walker, as a Range I, standard offender, to eleven years. On appeal, each Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, and Defendant Cooper challenges the length of his sentence. Defendant Walker does not challenge his sentence on appeal. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
David Richard Huddleston v. Patricia Waggoner Huddleston
The plaintiff loaned the defendant $50,000 which was to be repaid in 15 monthly installments of $800 each with a final balloon payment of $46,600. The parties agreed that the total amount to be repaid was $58,600, but did not specify an interest rate or make any provision for interest on the balance in the event the balloon payment was not timely made. The defendant paid the initial 15 monthly installments, but failed to pay the balloon payment, and instead continued to make monthly payments for approximately 44 more months paying a total of $59,416. The issue presented is what amount of interest, if any, is owed on the balloon payment that the defendant failed to timely pay when the contract failed to make a provision for interest in the event of default. The trial court held that the parties had agreed that the defendant would pay interest at the rate of 14.1 percent per annum, based upon the $8,600 he agreed to pay in excess of principal, and that the plaintiff was entitled to have the balance of the loan outstanding at the time of default paid at such rate. Upon review, we conclude that the parties failed to agree on an interest rate to be paid in the event of default of the balloon payment, and accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is vacated to the extent that it awards the plaintiff interest at the rate of 14.1 percent, and the case is remanded with instructions that the trial court grant the plaintiff an award of prejudgment interest in accord with Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-14-102. The judgment is affirmed in all other respects. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Alan P. Woodruff vs. Fort Sanders Sevier Medical Center
Plaintiff's Declaratory Judgment asks the Court to declare the contract he signed with defendant void because it was not sufficiently definite to be enforced, and it was a contract of adhesion. The Trial Court held that the contract was enforceable and not a contract of adhesion. On appeal, we hold the contract was enforceable, but whether the contract was one of adhesion is not appropriate for declaratory judgment. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Phillip Doyle
The defendant, Phillip Doyle, was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI), second offense, and violating the implied consent law. The trial court imposed a sentence of 11 months and 29 days, with all but 45 days suspended to probation. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his DUI conviction. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Loudon | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mark Grimes v. Tony Parker, Warden, State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Mark Grimes, appeals from the circuit court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. Because we find merit to the petitioner’s claim for habeas corpus relief, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tommy Brown, Jr.
The defendant, Tommy Brown, Jr., was indicted on one count of aggravated rape with a weapon, a Class A felony, and one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, also a Class A felony. The alleged victim in the case failed to appear on two separate dates for trial. The state was unable to proceed and the trial court dismissed the case. On appeal, the state argues that the trial court erred by failing to declare the witness unavailable and admitting the victim’s prior preliminary hearing testimony at trial. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Obion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Vincent D. Steele
The Defendant, Vincent D. Steele, was convicted of possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell, a Class B felony, and sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to thirteen years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, he presents a single issue for our consideration: whether the evidence presented at his trial was sufficient to establish that he had the intent to sell the cocaine that he possessed. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jackie R. Rusell v. Ricky Bell, Warden
The Petitioner, Jackie R. Russell, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner alleges that his sentence was unconstitutionally imposed based on Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). Following a review of the record, we conclude that the Petitioner has failed to allege any ground that would render the judgments of conviction void. The judgment of the Davidson County Criminal Court summarily dismissing the petition is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Roderick Chapman
The defendant, Roderick Chapman, pleaded guilty to counts of burglary and aggravated assault and was sentenced as a Range II offender in Shelby County Criminal Court to an effective five-year term to be served in a community corrections program, with the first year to be served in the Synergy drug treatment program. On January 5, 2007, the court revoked the community corrections sentence and resentenced the defendant as a career offender to serve twelve years in the Department of Correction. From that order, the defendant appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment below as modified. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Carl Douglas Dykes v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Carl Ronald Dykes, appeals from the denial by the Marion County Circuit Court of his petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance and that he should be granted a delayed direct appeal of his convictions. After reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Marion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Martino Wright v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Martino Wright, pled guilty to two counts of especially aggravated robbery and received a total effective sentence of thirteen and one-half years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Thereafter, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his counsel were ineffective and that as a result of a multitude of errors his guilty plea was not a knowing and voluntary choice. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner timely appealed. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Bradley Warner
An Obion County Circuit Court jury convicted the appellant, James Bradley Warner, of facilitation of theft of property valued between $1000 and $10,000, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced him to four years to be served consecutively to an earlier sentence stemming from a parole violation. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction because the State did not prove that he knew the items were stolen at the time he helped sell them. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the jury’s guilty verdict. |
Obion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
William Douglas Zukowski v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, William Douglas Zukowski, was convicted of five counts of rape of a child and sentenced to twenty-five years on each count, to be served consecutively for a total effective sentence of 125 years. He later pled guilty to three additional counts of rape of a child and one count of aggravated rape and accepted a sentence of twenty-five years, to be served concurrently with his prior sentence. On direct appeal, this court affirmed his convictions. In his petition for post-conviction relief, the petitioner contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the judgment from the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals |