Donnie E. Johnson v. State of Tennessee
In 1985, the Petitioner, Donnie E. Johnson, was convicted of the first degree murder of his wife, Connie Johnson. See State v. Johnson, 734 S.W.2d 154, 155 (Tenn. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 994, 108 S. Ct. 1303 (1988). The jury imposed and the trial court approved a sentence of death. Id. The conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal by both the Court of Criminal Appeals and the Tennessee Supreme Court. The Petitioner later sought post-conviction relief, which was unsuccessful. See Donnie E. Johnson v. State, No. 02C01-9111-CR-00237, 1997 WL 141887, at * 1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Mar. 27, 1997), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. Sept. 8, 1997); Donnie Edward Johnson v. State, No. 02C01-9111-CR-00237, 1995 WL 603159 (Tenn., Oct. 9, 1995); Donnie Edward Johnson v. State, No. 02C01-9111-CR-00237, 1994 WL 90483, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Mar. 23, 1994); Donnie Edward Johnson v. State, No. 02-S-01-9207-CR- 00041, 1993 WL 61728, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Mar. 8, 1993). On June 9, 2006, Petitioner Johnson filed a petition to compel testing of biological evidence as provided by the Post- Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001. The post-conviction court denied the petition on October 9, 2006. Upon review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Paul Harris Nelson, et al.
This is an action in conversion, fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty instituted by will beneficiaries against the decedent’s sister, who was also the Executrix of his estate. The threshold issue involves subject matter jurisdiction for this appeal. Although a recent amendment to the Tennessee Code would place appellate jurisdiction for this case in the trial court, we hold that a more specific, prior private act conferring appellate jurisdiction on this Court controls. The second, and pivotal, issue in this dispute involves the ownership of four certificates of deposit (CD) that were purchased by Mr. Paul Harris Nelson (Mr. Nelson), the decedent, and that were later claimed and cashed by Ms. Margie Little (Ms. Little), the Defendant/Appellee, just prior to the opening of the estate. The Estate of Mr. Nelson (the Estate) appeals the lower court’s ruling that Ms. Little owned the CDs at the time of Mr. Nelson’s death because the siblings held the CDs jointly with a right of survivorship. Thus, the Estate also appeals the court’s findings of no conversion, fraud, or breach of fiduciary duty by Ms. Little with respect to the CDs. We affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Eric D. Wallace v. Stephen Dotson, Warden
The petitioner, Eric D. Wallace, appeals from the circuit court’s summary dismissal of his second pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review of the parties’ briefs and applicable law, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tommy Lee Henry
The defendant, Tommy Lee Henry, was convicted by a Sullivan County jury of tampering with evidence, a Class C felony, and a third offense of possession of cocaine, a Class E felony. The defendant was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to four years for the tampering conviction and two years for the possession conviction to be served concurrently in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. He claims that the police illegally detained him when they found him inside a parked car with two other individuals in a high-crime area at approximately 3:00 a.m. and that they illegally seized evidence during the detention. We hold that the trial court properly denied the motion, and we affirm its judgments. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Johnny Baxter
The defendant, Johnny Baxter, was convicted by a McMinn County jury of rape of a child, a Class A felony, for which he received a sentence of twenty years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction, that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on child abuse as a lesser included offense, and that the trial court failed to account for mitigating proof in its sentencing determination. We hold that no error exists, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
McMinn | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Heath Baldwin
The defendant, Heath Baldwin, pled guilty to misdemeanor assault and received an agreed eleven month, twenty-nine day sentence with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the court ordered that the defendant serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the defendant challenges the denial of an alternative sentence, specifically the denial of probation. After our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the Shelby County Criminal Court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Adoption of Jordan S. Hayes (D.O.B. 01/10/99)
This is an adoption case involving a child support arrearage. By consent of the biological father, the trial court entered an order terminating the father’s parental rights and permitting the husband of the biological mother to adopt the child. The order further stated that the biological father had satisfied all child support obligations. The State intervened in the action and filed a motion to alter or amend the order to include a provision stating that the father still owed child support. At a hearing, the mother stated that she had no desire to collect any child support arrearages from the father. In light of this, the trial court amended its order to reflect that the biological father owed the State a reduced child support arrearage, but owed nothing to the mother. The State now appeals, arguing that the trial court’s order constituted an impermissible retroactive modification of the original child support order. We modify the order, finding that the trial court’s order was, in fact, a retroactive modification of a valid child support order. |
Weakley | Court of Appeals | |
Cedric L. Coppage v. Veronica Y. Green
This is a petition to set aside an order establishing parentage. The child at issue was born in 1990. In 1997, the juvenile court entered an order establishing the petitioner as the child’s father. Eight years later, the petitioner took an independent DNA test which indicated that he was not the child’s biological father. The petitioner then filed a petition to disestablish his parentage of the child, attaching the results of the independent DNA test to his petition. After a hearing, the juvenile court referee recommended court-approved DNA testing to prove or disprove the petitioner’s parentage. This recommendation was confirmed by the juvenile court judge. The respondent mother filed a motion for a rehearing before the juvenile court judge. The motion was granted. After a rehearing, the juvenile court judge dismissed the petitioner’s petition for court-ordered DNA testing to determine parentage. The petitioner now appeals. We reverse, determining that relief should be granted under these circumstances, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Linus Thornton v. James A. Massey,
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Hardin | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee ex rel., Elizabeth Wray v. Kelly Collins
This appeal involves a series of cases – a paternity action, a dependency and neglect proceeding, and the present case, a petition to establish paternity and set child support. The first paternity suit had been dismissed by the mother after genetic testing had taken place, but before the court entered an order of parentage. During subsequent dependency and neglect proceedings, a grandmother had received temporary custody of the child. Finally, the State of Tennessee filed this case on the grandmother’s behalf to establish paternity and collect child support from the child’s biological father. The father insisted that he had never been properly served in the dependency and neglect proceeding, so the trial court dismissed the State’s petition. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Edgar White, Jr.
The defendant, Edgar White, Jr., was convicted of driving under the influence (first offense) (DUI) and simple possession of marijuana, both Class A misdemeanors, and was sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days in jail for each, suspended to thirty days, to be served concurrently. On appeal, the defendant challenges both the sufficiency of the evidence that formed the basis of his convictions and the length of his sentence. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to sustain both convictions, and we affirm the convictions. We also affirm the sentence imposed by the trial court. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dodrick Losame Houston
The defendant, Dodrick Losame Houston, pled guilty to burglary and violating the motor vehicle habitual offender law, Class D and E felonies respectively. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to two years for the former and one year for the latter, with the sentences to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of three years. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by denying probation. Following our review, we affirm the sentences ordered by the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Arthur Buford
We granted this appeal of the defendant’s perjury conviction to determine whether the prosecutor must prove which of the defendant’s two inconsistent statements was false. We hold that pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16-707 (1997), the prosecutor was not required to prove which of the two statements made by the defendant was false. Therefore, the State was relieved of any election requirement, and no enhanced unanimity instruction was warranted. We also hold that the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s perjury conviction and that the trial court properly allowed the defendant’s trial counsel to testify. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
M. Eileen Lingle v. Fortis Health Insurance Company
The Trial Court granted defendant summary judgment on the ground that the medical bills incurred by plaintiff were excluded from coverage under the health insurance provided by defendant. On appeal, we vacate the summary judgment and remand. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lee Turner - Dissenting
Because I conclude that the trial court committed reversible error in giving its instructions to the jury, I am unable to join the majority’s affirmance of the appellant’s sentence and respectfully dissent. |
Marion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lee Turner
The State charged the appellant, Lee Turner, with misdemeanor assault, and a Marion County Circuit Court jury convicted him of that offense. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the appellant to eleven months, twenty-nine days to be served at seventy-five percent. On appeal, the appellant contends (1) that the trial court erred by giving the jury an improper “dynamite” or Allen charge after the jury announced it was deadlocked; (2) that the trial court erred by refusing to admit the victim’s prior juvenile conviction into evidence for impeachment purposes; and (3) that the trial court relied on unsubstantiated facts in determining the appellant’s sentence. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Marion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Helen L. Bates v. James G. Neeley, Commissioner of The Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development, et al.
A former employee of the Highland Youth Center appeals the denial of her claim for unemployment benefits. The employee was subjected to a severe assault while at work at the youth center. She attempted to return to work after the incident but was unable to remain at work due to the severe psychological trauma associated with the assault at the workplace. She filed a claim for unemployment benefits, which was denied by the Department of Labor, the Appeals Tribunal, and the Board of Review on the ground she did not have “good cause” to terminate her employment. The Chancery Court affirmed the denial of benefits, and this appeal followed. We reverse finding the employee had good cause for terminating her employment at the Highland Youth Center. |
Lewis | Court of Appeals | |
Tracy Brown-Harper v. Nissan North America, Inc.
This worker's compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer Nissan North America, Inc., asserts that the trial court erred by awarding benefits based on a 4% anatomical and 48% vocational disability rating to the lower right extremity to the employee, Tracy Brown-Harper. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Steve Johnson v. Pasminco Zinc, Inc.
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that the employee was entitled to a permanent partial disability award of fifty-five percent (55%) to the left upper extremity for an injury to his left arm and twelve percent (12%) to the body as a whole for loss of hearing and tinnitus. The employer contends that the evidence preponderates against both of these awards. The employee claims that this appeal is frivolous. We affirm the trial court on both awards, but conclude that the appeal is not frivolous. |
Smith | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Fabian Timmons v. Taylor Farms Tennessee, Inc. and Zurich American Insurance Company
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer, Taylor Farms Tennessee, Inc., and Zurich American Insurance Company, have appealed the trial court’s award of 50% whole body impairment to Mr. Timmons. It is the appellant’s contention that expert medical testimony fails to support the trial court’s finding that Mr. Timmons’ hip condition was aggravated or advanced permanently by the work-related injury. After carefully considering the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Rickey Hogan v. Tony Parker, Warden
Petitioner, Rickey Hogan, appeals the order dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, raising two issues: (1) whether his concurrent, forty-year sentences, imposed in 1985 for robbery with a deadly weapon and second degree murder, are void; and (2) whether the Department of Correction has miscalculated the expiration date of his sentences. Following our review, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s order of dismissal. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jerome Sawyer v. State of Tennessee
Following a jury trial, Petitioner, Jerome Sawyer, was convicted of aggravated sexual battery and sentenced to eighteen years in the Department of Correction as a Range II, multiple offender. This Court affirmed his conviction. Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief. After appointing counsel and conducting several hearings, the trial court denied his petition for post-conviction relief. In his appeal, Petitioner argues that he is entitled to post-conviction relief because (1) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel, and (2) the post-conviction court improperly allowed trial counsel to be examined outside of Petitioner’s presence. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael J. Hart v. State of Tennessee
The Appellant, Michael J. Hart, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Madison County Circuit Court. Hart pled guilty to first degree felony murder, aggravated robbery, and felony evading arrest, and received an effective sentence of life without parole. On appeal, Hart contends that his pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered due to trial counsel’s ineffectiveness during the pre-plea proceedings. Following review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jerral D. Parris v. State of Tennessee
The Defendant, Jerral D. Parris, was indicted on two counts of extortion. A Warren County jury convicted the Defendant of two counts of attempted extortion. On appeal, the Defendant alleges the following: (1) attempted extortion is not a crime in Tennessee; (2) there was insufficient evidence to convict the Defendant of attempted extortion; (3) the trial court improperly denied a motion for a change of venue; (4) the trial court erred in refusing to allow the Defendant to test and inspect audio tape evidence; (5) the trial court erred in not declaring a mistrial after the Defendant was compared to a notorious murderer; (6) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury as to the affirmative defense to extortion; and (7) the trial court erred in sentencing the Defendant. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we determine that attempted extortion is a crime in Tennessee and that there was sufficient evidence to convict the Defendant of this crime. His conviction, however, must be reversed because the trial court improperly refused to allow a jury instruction on an applicable affirmative defense. Thus, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Edgar Lewis Ries
A Marshall County jury convicted the Defendant, Edgar Lewis Ries, of attempted first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder. The Defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of twenty years for his convictions. On appeal, he alleges there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions and that the trial court erred when it sentenced him. Finding no error exists, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals |