Charles G. Summers v. James Fortner, Warden
The petitioner, Charles G. Summers, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. He contends that his sentence is illegal and that his judgment is, therefore, void. The petitioner has established that his sentence for escape was imposed in direct contravention of a statute, and is, therefore, illegal and void. Because the petitioner has made a threshold showing that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief, the judgment of the habeas corpus court is reversed, and the case is remanded for the appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing to determine the scope of the remedy available to the petitioner. |
Hickman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. R. D. S. - Concurring/Dissenting
I concur in the majority’s analysis of the alleged Miranda violations in Parts I and II (A). I respectfully dissent, however, as to the majority’s conclusions in Part II (B) concerning the motion to suppress the evidence discovered in R.D.S’s truck. |
Williamson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. R. D. S. - Concurring/Dissenting Correction
R.D.S. v. STATE OF TENNESSEE |
Williamson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. R. D. S.
This appeal arises out of a finding of delinquency following a denial of a motion to suppress |
Williamson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. James David Johnson
The defendant, James David Johnson, was convicted of premeditated first degree murder; felony first degree murder; aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; and theft over $10,000, a Class C felony. The felony first degree murder conviction was merged with the premeditated first degree murder, and a life sentence was imposed. The defendant was sentenced to eighteen years as a multiple offender for aggravated robbery and to fifteen years as a career offender for theft over $10,000. The theft offense was set as concurrent to the aggravated robbery, but the two, together, were consecutive to the life sentence. This resulted in an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus eighteen years. On appeal, the defendant submits three issues: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions; (2) the trial court erred in failing to suppress the defendant’s statements; and (3) the trial court erred in admitting hearsay testimony. After review, we affirm the convictions. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Alena Wharton v. Robert Wharton
This interlocutory appeal arises from a petition for contempt to enforce a child support order. Although it is undisputed that neither the parents nor the child who is the subject of the support order in this case resided in Crockett County for at least six months prior to the filing of the current petition, the trial court denied Mother’s request under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-3003 to transfer the matter to Dyer County, where the child resides with Father. We reverse, remand, and order the matter transferred. |
Crockett | Court of Appeals | |
Bobby A. Davis v. Howard Carlton, Warden
The pro se petitioner, Bobby A. Davis, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his aggravated rape and aggravated robbery convictions are void due to various defects in the indictments. Following our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition. |
Johnson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
David Wayne Smart v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, David Wayne Smart, was convicted in 2001 of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life in prison. We affirmed that judgment on direct appeal, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied permission to appeal. The Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied the petition after a hearing. Upon a thorough review of the applicable record and law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Farrell Nesbitt v. Paula Nesbitt
This appeal arises from a dispute regarding the trial court’s award of alimony in futuro to Paula Nesbitt. The trial court granted the parties’ divorce, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-129, and ultimately awarded the divorce to the wife because the husband appeared to be at greater fault on the grounds of inappropriate marital conduct. Farrell Nesbitt challenges the trial court’s alimony in futuro award, arguing rehabilitative alimony was the proper award. We affirm the trial court’s ruling. Costs of this appeal shall be assessed to the appellant, Ferrell Nesbitt. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Christopher Keyln Dearing v. Howard Carlton, Warden - Dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the majority based upon my conclusion that the trial court erred in summarily dismissing the petition for a writ of habeas corpus that, in my view, presents a cognizable claim for relief. The record reflects that the petitioner pled guilty to theft of property valued between $1,000 and $10,000 and evading arrest, and that he received concurrent sentences of two years and one day and one year, respectively. In his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Relief, the petitioner alleges that the judgment for the theft conviction is void because he did not agree to a sentence of two years and one day and that such a sentence “is void, as obtained through misrepresentation and [an] unfulfilled promise [of] a total two (2) year sentence.” Additionally, he alleges that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because he did not agree to the two year and one day sentence. In support of this allegation, the petition further asserts that both the technical record and the transcript of the guilty plea proceedings reflect that the sentence imposed should have been two years. However, neither the technical record nor the transcript of the guilty plea were attached to the petition in the habeas court. Attached to the petition for the habeas court’s consideration is the judgment of conviction reflecting a sentence of two years and one day for the theft conviction. |
Johnson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Christopher Keyln Dearing v. Howard Carlton, Warden
The Appellant, Christopher Keyln Dearing, proceeding pro se, appeals the Johnson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. Dearing is currently an inmate at Northeast Correctional Complex in Johnson County as a result of his convictions for Class under the terms of his plea agreement, he pled guilty to Class D theft in exchange for a sentence of two years; however, the judgment form and Department of Correction records show that the actual length of the sentence he is serving is two years and one day. Dearing argues that, because the State has breached the plea agreement, his sentence of two years and one day is void. After review, we agree with the trial court that Dearing’s petition fails to state a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Johnson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Christopher Keyln Dearing vs. Howard Carlton, Warden - Order
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Johnson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, v. Daryl K. Stark
The Trial Court granted defendant permission to attend traffic school in lieu of a fine. On appeal, we reverse because State and federal law does not permit diversion for a commercially licensed operator. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Paul T. Davis v. State of Tennessee - Order
The State of Tennessee has filed a petition requesting this court to rehear its opinion filed on December 3, 2007. In its petition, the State requests that the court reconsider our holding that Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 59 is not applicable to State habeas corpus proceedings brought by petitioners who are incarcerated as a result of criminal convictions in state courts. The State also takes issue with this Court’s direction that upon remand, the trial court should appoint counsel to represent the petitioner during further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Paul T. Davis v. State of Tennessee - Concurring and Dissenting
I concur in the result that this court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal, but respectfully, I disagree with the holding that the habeas corpus petition was filed in an appropriate court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Paul T. Davis v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Paul Tobias Davis, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. In his petition, the Petitioner asserted that his sentence is illegal because he was denied pretrial jail credits. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition because the petition did not state a sufficient reason for not being filed in the county nearest to the Petitioner. On appeal, the Petitioner raises two issues: (1) whether a motion filed in the habeas corpus court to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 59.04 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure can operate to limit the jurisdiction of this Court; and (2) whether the fact that the convicting court possesses relevant records relating to a petitioner’s sentence and retains the authority to correct an illegal sentence at anytime is a sufficient reason under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-21-105 to file a habeas corpus petition in the convicting court rather than the court closest in point of distance to a petitioner. Following our review, we hold that motions filed pursuant to Rule 59 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure do not affect the jurisdiction of this Court in actions for habeas corpus relief and that the Petitioner presented a sufficient reason for filing his petition in the Davidson County Criminal Court. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the habeas corpus court and remand for the appointment of counsel and further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: The Estate of Charles R. Ray, Tony V. Carruthers, v. Sandra B. Ray
Plaintiff filed a legal malpractice claim against defendant’s Estate. The Trial Court held the claim against the Decedent’s Estate was barred by the statute of limitations. On appeal, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Linda Mae (Edwards) Maloy v. Paul David Maloy
This is a divorce case. The husband is a musician and songwriter; the wife is a medical assistant. During the marriage, the husband became physically incapacitated, and the wife quit her job and took care of him. The parties’ living expenses and costs associated with the husband’s medical care were funded through monies that the wife inherited as well as credit cards. This resulted in significant credit card debt. The husband eventually recovered, but was deemed completely disabled and received social security disability payments during the marriage. The wife then had a health crisis. During the wife’s health crisis, the husband took over the parties’ finances, and both parties signed a document outlining division of the parties’ property in the event of divorce. Over a year later, the wife filed for divorce, based in part on the husband’s failure to care for her during her health crisis. The husband counterclaimed for divorce. After declaring the parties divorced, the trial court held a trial on the issue of property division. After one day of testimony, the husband filed a motion seeking to enforce the document signed by the parties purporting to divide their property in the event of divorce. After the hearing, the trial court refused to enforce the alleged agreement. It divided the marital property, including in the marital estate the social security disability payments that had been received by the husband. The trial court refused, however, to divide the parties’ marital debt. The husband appeals the trial court’s refusal to enforce the alleged agreement and the inclusion of his social security disability benefits in the marital estate. Both parties appeal the trial court’s failure to divide the marital debt. We affirm in part and reverse in part, finding that (1) the social security disability payments were properly included in the marital estate, (2) the document is neither an MDA nor an enforceable postnuptial agreement, and (3) the trial court erred in refusing to divide the parties’ marital debt. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Cedric Terry v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Cedric Terry, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he argues that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. After a thorough review of the record and the parties’ briefs, the judgment of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction relief is affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Barbara Mitchell v. Milan Seating Systems, Assumed Name For Intier Automotive Seating of America, Inc. and James Farmer, Director, Division of Workers' Compensation, Department of Labor, Second Injury Fund - Dissenting
Respectfully, I would find that the preponderance of the evidence does not support a causal relationship between Employment and the Employee's gradual injury which did not manifest itself until fifty-one weeks after she left work for the Employer. |
Gibson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Barbara Mitchell v. Milan Seating Systems, Assumed Name For Intier Automotive Seating of America, Inc. et al.
In this case, the employer appeals the judgment of the trial court, which awarded a twelve percent permanent partial disability to the employee’s left arm and found that the employee provided timely notice of her injury pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-201(b)(1). At trial, the employee contended that she sustained a gradually occurring injury from her work with the employer over a fifteen-year period, causing ulnar nerve neuropathy in her left elbow. The employer argues on appeal that the employee failed to carry her burden of proof as to causation and did not provide timely notice of the injury to the employer. After careful consideration of the record in this case, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Gibson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Karl Daniel Forss - Dissenting
I agree with the majority, for the reasons outlined in its opinion, that it was error for the trial court to apply T.C.A. § 40-35-114(10) (2006) to enhance the defendant’s sentence in this case. However, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court did not consider the mitigating factors proposed by the defendant. In my view, the sentencing hearing transcript establishes that the trial court not only considered the mitigating factors urged by the defendant, it also applied them. The record also establishes that the defendant had a record of illegal drug use, four DUI convictions, and a theft conviction. Thus, the trial court’s conclusion, after weighing the enhancing and mitigating factors, that the enhancement factors greatly outweighed the mitigating factors was supported by the record. |
Cocke | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Karl Daniel Forss
The Appellant, Karl Daniel Forss, appeals the sentencing decision of the Cocke County Circuit Court. Under the terms of a plea agreement, Forss entered “open” pleas of guilty to the offenses of attempted aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, and aggravated criminal trespass. The plea agreement provided that the length and manner of the sentences would be determined by the trial court, that Forss would be sentenced as a Range I, standard offender, that the aggravated assault conviction would merge with the attempted aggravated robbery conviction, and that the misdemeanor sentence for the aggravated criminal trespass conviction would run concurrently with the attempted aggravated robbery conviction. Following the sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of six years in confinement. Forss now appeals the length and manner of his six-year felony sentence. After a thorough review of the record and the arguments of the parties, we modify Forss’ six-year sentence for attempted aggravated robbery to reflect a sentence of four years. We affirm the denial of alternative sentencing. We remand to the trial court for entry of an amended judgment to reflect this sentencing modification. |
Cocke | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Alonzo Eugene Terrell
The defendant, Alonzo Eugene Terrell, was convicted of domestic assault, a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, to be served on probation. He filed a motion for new trial, which was denied, and this appeal followed. On appeal, he raises seven issues. First, he argues the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of domestic assault. He also argues that the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce certain evidence and erred in denying both his motion to dismiss for violation of his right to speedy trial and his motion for acquittal. Additionally, he contends the court erred in refusing to allow two specific lines of questioning to the victim and a police officer during the trial. Our review reveals that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction and that no error exists. The judgment from the trial court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lee Edward Peterson
Lee Edward Peterson, the defendant, was charged in a two-count indictment with possession with intent to sell less than 0.5 grams of cocaine and with possession with intent to deliver less than 0.5 grams of cocaine (Class B felonies). The defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from a warrantless search of his person. After the motion was overruled by the trial court, the defendant, pursuant to a negotiated plea, entered a plea of nolo contendere to simple possession of cocaine (Class A misdemeanor), with an agreed sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days suspended and a fine of $250. The defendant attempted to reserve a certified question of law pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(1) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. After review, we conclude that the defendant has failed to properly reserve the certified question of law by failing to include or incorporate by reference the question in the final judgment. Accordingly, the issue is not properly before this court, and the appeal is dismissed. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals |