State of Tennessee v. Artis Reese
The appellant, Artis Reese, was indicted on four counts of aggravated robbery, one count of possession of marijuana, and one count of aggravated criminal trespass. After a jury trial, the appellant was convicted of four counts of aggravated robbery and one count of aggravated criminal trespass. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged two of the aggravated robbery convictions into the other two aggravated robbery convictions and imposed consecutive eight-year sentences on the resulting two convictions for aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced the appellant to a concurrent sentence of six months for aggravated criminal trespass, resulting in an effective sentence of sixteen years. After the denial of a motion for new trial, this appeal followed in which the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. Because the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles A. Green
The defendant, Charles A. Green, was convicted on his guilty pleas of three counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The defendant, a Range I offender, received four-year sentences, with two counts to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of eight years. The effective sentence involved split confinement of one year in jail and seven years on probation. The trial court later found that the defendant had violated his probation by committing a new offense and revoked his probation. The defendant appeals, arguing that substantial evidence does not support that determination. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Perry | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Chico McCracken v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Chico McCracken, was convicted of one count of murder in the perpetration of a felony and one count of aggravated robbery. He petitioned for post-conviction relief claiming that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The post-conviction court dismissed the post-conviction petition, and we affirm that judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jimmy D. Pickett
A Franklin County Circuit Court jury convicted the appellant, Jimmy Dale Pickett, of first degree premeditated murder and especially aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of life and twenty years, respectively. On appeal, the appellant claims (1) that he is entitled to a retrial because the State violated the rule of sequestration; (2) that the trial court erred by denying his motions to suppress his confessions; (3) that the trial court erred by allowing the jury to use a transcript, which had not been introduced into evidence, during deliberations; (4) that the trial court erred by refusing to give the jury a corpus delicti instruction; and (5) that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments. Finding no errors requiring reversal, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Franklin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Pierre Andre Brown A/K/A Anthony Anderson v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Pierre Andre Brown, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner fails to assert a cognizable claim for which habeas corpus relief may be granted. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Barry Brown
The defendant, Barry Brown, was convicted of three counts of aggravated robbery, Class B felonies.Two of the counts of aggravated robbery were merged, and the trial court imposed a thirty-year sentence on each conviction, to be served consecutively to each other for an effective sixty-year sentence in the Department of Correction as a persistent offender. The defendant appeals claiming that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict; (2) the trial court erred in failing to suppress pretrial statements made by the defendant; and (3) the trial court erred by granting the State’s motion to consolidate. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Andre Neely v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Andre Neely, appeals the lower court’s denial of his petition for postconviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. After a review of the pleadings, the lower court’s order and the applicable law, this Court concludes that the lower court properly determined that the Petitioner’s claims were waived and properly dismissed the petition. Accordingly, we affirm the court’s dismissal. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Eric Carter v. Glen Turner, Warden and State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Eric Carter, appeals the trial court's order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's judgment pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition fails to establish a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dudley W. Taylor, D/B/A The Taylow Law Firm v. James Dalle, Katherine Dalle, Moshe Shloush, Clarence L. Hendrix and Robert Hickman
In this action for a judgment for fees for legal services rendered, the Trial Court entered Judgment for plaintiff and defendants appealed. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee Department of Children's Services v. F.R.G.
The trial court terminated the parental rights of F.R.G. (“Mother”) and R.K.B. (“Father”) with respect to their minor child, C.G.B. (“the child”) (DOB: December 31, 2003), upon finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that grounds for terminating their parental rights existed and that termination was in the best interest of the child. Mother appeals, arguing procedural defects in the trial court’s termination of her parental rights. We affirm. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Dwayne Edwards v. State of Tennessee - Order
Pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, the State of Tennessee, through the Attorney General, requested rehearing of the opinion filed in this case on January 17, 2007, which reversed the trial court’s summary dismissal of the petition for writ of habeas corpus and remanded the case for the appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing related to the allegation that the petitioner’s sentence was illegal due to an improper offender classification. |
Hickman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony Bonds
The Appellant, Anthony Bonds , was convicted by 1 a Shelby County jury of attempted especially aggravated robbery and sentenced to ten years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Bonds raises the single issue of sufficiency of the evidence. Following review of the record, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of conviction. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Robert Gill v. Saturn Corporation
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court our findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer, Saturn Corporation (Saturn), asserts that the forty-five percent permanent, partial disability to the body as a whole, awarded the employee, Robert Gill, by the trial court, was excessive. We conclude that the evidence presented does not preponderate against the findings of the trial court and affirm. |
Maury | Workers Compensation Panel | |
William Stevie Holton v. Marshall County and Sue Ann Head, Administrator for the Division of Workers' Compensation, Tennessee Department of Labor Second Injury Fund.
This is a workers' compensation appeal referred to and heard by the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 50-6-225 (e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The defendant contends that the court erred in finding a 13% anatomical impairment rating to be the appropriate anatomical impairment suffered by plaintiff and that a concomitant 90% vocational disability award for a back injury was excessive. The Tennessee Department of Labor, Second Injury Fund, adopts defendant's arguments and urges reversal of the trial court's decision. For the reasons set forth below we disagree and therefore, affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Marshall | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Donnie Thompson
The appellant, Donnie Glenn Thompson, was indicted on one count of stalking his ex-wife. The appellant applied for pretrial diversion, and this request was denied by the district attorney general. The trial court denied the appellant’s petition for writ of certiorari, holding that the district attorney general had not abused his discretion by denying pretrial diversion. This Court accepted the appellant’s application for interlocutory appeal and issued a judgment in which we reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded the issue for further consideration by the district attorney general. The district attorney general denied the appellant’s application for pretrial diversion a second time. The appellant filed a second petition for writ of certiorari, which the trial court again denied. We have accepted the appellant’s second application for interlocutory appeal. Because the district attorney general considered the proper criteria when evaluating the appellant’s application for pretrial diversion, including evidence favorable to the defendant and because he articulated sufficient grounds for denying the appellant’s request for pretrial diversion, we affirm the trial court’s conclusion that the district attorney general did not abuse his discretion |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Harvey Phillip Hester v. State of Tennessee
The State appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s granting the petitioner’s request for postconviction relief from his convictions for two counts of second degree murder and one count of attempted second degree murder and effective sixty-two-year sentence. In this appeal, the State claims that the trial court erred by concluding (1) that the petitioner received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel and (2) that the petitioner did not voluntarily and knowingly waive his right to a twelve-member jury verdict. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the trial court erred by granting the petitioner’s request for post-conviction relief and reverse the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
BFS Retail and Commercial Operations, LLC v. Charles Smith - Concurring
I concur with the court’s opinion. However, I have prepared this separate opinion to point specifically to the provisions of Mr. Smith’s employment agreement that undermine the summary judgment in this case. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Cletus Lee Harvey v. Stone & Webster Construction, Inc., et al.
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. On this appeal, the employer, Stone & Webster Construction, Inc. (Stone & Webster), alleges the trial court erred by failing to cap the recovery of the employee, Cletus Lee Harvey, Jr., at 2.5 times the medical impairment as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(1) and in awarding Mr. Harvey a vocational disability of fifty percent of the body as a whole. Finding the evidence does not preponderate against the findings of the trial court, we affirm. |
Sequatchie | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Janette Phelps v. Mark IV Automotive
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court our findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer asserts that the trial court erred in failing to apply the two-and-one-half times impairment cap set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(1) and that the forty-two percent permanent, partial disability to the body as a whole, awarded by the trial court, was excessive. We conclude that the evidence presented does not preponderate against the findings of the trial judge and affirm the trial court. |
Decatur | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Herbert Wayne Ralston v. The Aerostructures Corporation and Zurich American Insurance Company
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee contends that the trial court erred by applying the 2.5 multiplier cap to the employee’s vocational disability award pursuant to Tenn. Code. Ann.§ 50-6-241(a)(1). The employer contends that it should not be required to pay post-judgment interest on the award and that the employee’s appeal is frivolous. We affirm the trial court’s application of the cap. We further find that the employee is entitled to statutory postjudgment interest on the award. Finally, we conclude that the appeal is not frivolous. |
Rutherford | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Sandra J. Simpson v. Calsonic Kansei North America
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated §50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer contends that the trial court erred by (1) finding that the Plaintiff suffered a compensable work-related injury and (2) finding that the Plaintiff was entitled to an award of 23% vocational disability apportioned to her two feet. We affirm the trial court in all respects. Finally, we conclude that the appeal is not frivolous |
Rutherford | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Holly J. Young v. Cumberland County Medical Center, et al.
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 5-6-225(e) (3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. On this appeal, the sole issue presented is whether the trial court erred by failing to cap the recovery of the employee, Holly Young, at 2.5 times the medical impairment as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 5-6-241(a)(1). In this case, Ms. Young sustained a shoulder injury to her right shoulder resulting in surgery. Following the first surgery, Ms. Young was returned to work performing light duty for her employer, Cumberland County Medical Center (CCMC). She resigned that employment due to progressively intense pain. Thereafter, Ms. Young underwent a second surgery. She was not offered employment by CCMC following her second surgery or after she had reached maximum medical improvement. The trial court determined Ms. Young's anatomical impairment to be fifteen percent to the body as a whole, held the statutory cap of benefits contained in Tennessee Code Annotated section 5-6- 241(a)(1) did not apply, and awarded benefits based upon a fifty percent disability to the body as a whole. We affirm. |
White | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Jamie Roskom
The Appellant, Jamie Roskom, was convicted by a Bedford County jury of violating the Sexual Offender Registration, Verification, and Tracking Act of 2004, a Class E felony. On appeal, Roskom argues that he was indicted for failing to “register” as a sexual offender, which is a violation of section 208 of the Act; however, he was convicted of failing to “report,” which is a violation of section 204. See T.C.A. § 40-39-208(1), -204(c) (Supp. 2004). As such, Roskom asserts that he was not given notice of the crime for which he was convicted, and there is “no proof that [he] [committed] the offense for which he was indicted.” After review of the record, we agree and conclude that the indicted offense of failing to “register” impermissibly varied from the proof at trial, which established the separate offense of failing to “report.” Accordingly, Roskom’s conviction for violation of the “sex offender registration act” is reversed and dismissed. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Steve Wherry and Mary Hopkins, Co-Executors of the Estate of Margaret Archer, Deceased v. Union Planters Bank, N.A.
This case involves the alleged negligent administration of a trust. In 1964, the plaintiffs’ decedent established a $1.7 million trust and named herself as the sole beneficiary. The defendant bank was named as the trustee and was given sole discretion to manage the trust investments. From 1964 until the decedent’s death in 1999, the bank managed the trust fund and sent the decedent monthly statements describing the trust activities. When the trust terminated, it was worth approximately $880,000. The plaintiffs, co-executors of the decedent’s estate, brought this action on behalf of the estate for negligent administration of the trust, arguing that the bank negligently failed to maximize the rate of return on the trust assets. The bank filed a motion for summary judgment based on, inter alia, the doctrine of ratification, asserting that the decedent had ratified the bank’s management of the trust assets by failing to object to its decisions over the thirty-five-year life of the trust. The plaintiffs argued that the decedent was not sufficiently sophisticated in financial matters to ratify the bank’s actions. The trial court granted the bank’s motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs now appeal. We affirm, concluding that, in light of the undisputed facts that the decedent was legally competent and was fully informed of the bank’s actions in managing the trust investments, the decedent’s level of sophistication in financial matters is immaterial. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mark A. Schiefelbein
A Williamson County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Mark A. Schiefelbein, of seven counts of aggravated sexual battery and one count of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. The trial court imposed a 12-year sentence for each conviction and ordered consecutive service, thereby yielding an effective sentence of 96 years. Aggrieved of the convictions and sentences, the defendant appeals and raises the following issues: (1) the trial court erred by failing to require the State to furnish discovery materials to the defendant; (2) the trial court committed reversible error by configuring courtroom seating to shield the public from viewing certain exhibits; (3) the trial court improperly instructed the jury, sua sponte, to disregard certain truthful testimony of the defendant; (4) the trial court’s repeated questioning of State’s witnesses created an appearance of judicial bias and improperly bolstered the State’s case; (5) the trial court committed reversible error in excluding defense-proffered medical testimony that a physical examination of the victim rebutted the occurrence of sexual penetration, contact, or injury; (6) the trial court permitted the introduction of inadmissible and highly prejudicial hearsay and opinion testimony; (7) the trial court erroneously permitted the State to examine the defendant about his knowledge that a “voice stress analysis” could detect stress in an individual’s voice; (8) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that the defendant could be guilty of aggravated sexual battery if he acted intentionally, knowingly, or “recklessly”; (9) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that the State could prove the mental state for aggravated sexual battery in the disjunctive by showing that the defendant acted intentionally, knowingly, “or” recklessly; (10) the trial judge should be disqualified from further involvement in the case; and (11) the defendant’s effective sentence is excessive, illegal, and unconstitutional. As an adjunct to the issues raised on direct appeal, the defendant also pursues Appellate Procedure Rule 10 interlocutory review to bar future prosecution of three related child rape charges that were severed, over his objection, from trial of the aggravated sexual battery and especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor offenses. After thorough review of the record and careful consideration of the parties briefs, their oral arguments, and the applicable law, we hold that none of the errors require reversal of the defendant’s convictions for aggravated sexual battery or for aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. However, we hold that the incarcerative 96-years’ sentence is inconsistent with the purposes and principles of sentencing and does not provide a fair sense of predictability of the criminal law and its sanctions; therefore, we modify the defendant’s effective sentence from 96 years to 36 years. We order that the trial judge who presided at trial is disqualified from conducting any further proceedings in this cause. Finally, we dismiss the child rape offenses, as improperly severed, and hold that further prosecution on such charges is barred by |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals |