Gregory L. Anderson v. State of Tennessee
Aggrieved of his driving under the influence (DUI), fifth offense, conviction, the petitioner, Gregory L. Anderson, sought post-conviction relief, which was denied by the Criminal Court for Davidson County after an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, the petitioner pursues his claim of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. We affirm the denial of post-conviction relief. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Angie Sorhagen v. Williamson County Animal Shelter, a Division of the Williamson County Government
The plaintiff filed this action against Williamson County alleging the County failed and/or refused to return her dog and cat for which she sought monetary damages. The County filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion to dismiss, contending the negligence claim asserted pertained to a discretionary function for which the County was immune from suit under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Debra Jane Grey v. Bobbie Lee Brooks
Bobby Lee Brooks has appealed, seeking dismissal of an Order of Protection entered by the Trial Court. No record of the evidence has been filed. We affirm the Trial Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Patterson
James Patterson, the defendant, appeals from his jury convictions of especially aggravated robbery (Class A felony), criminal attempt of second degree murder (Class B felony), and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping (Class A felonies). The defendant presents two issues by contending that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions and that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. After review, we affirm the convictions and the sentence imposed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Smith
The Appellant, Robert Smith, was convicted by a Madison County jury of the misdemeanor offenses of possession of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia. As a result of these convictions, Smith received two sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days in confinement. The trial court further ordered that the two sentences be served concurrently but consecutively to two previously imposed suspended misdemeanor sentences, which Smith was currently serving on probation. On appeal, Smith raises two issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions; and (2) whether the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. After review of the record, we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lawrence Warren Pierce v. State of Tennessee
Aggrieved of his kidnapping and sexual battery convictions, the petitioner, Lawrence Warren Pierce, sought post-conviction relief, which was denied by the Davidson County Criminal Court after an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, the petitioner presents several issues of the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the denial of post-conviction relief. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Adoption of A.M.H.
This case concerns the termination of parental rights. The appellants, who are the parents, seek reversal of the termination of their parental rights to the care and custody of their daughter, A.M.H. The trial court predicated the termination on the ground that the parents abandoned A.M.H. by willfully failing to visit her for four months. First, we hold that the statute of repose under section 36-1-113(q) of the Tennessee Code Annotated does not deprive this Court of jurisdiction to review the termination of parental rights. Second, because the undisputed evidence shows that there was animosity between the parties and that the parents were actively pursuing custody of A.M.H. through legal proceedings during the four-month period immediately preceding the filing of the petition for termination of parental rights, we hold that the trial court erred in finding a willful failure to visit. Finally, we conclude that the parents’ consent to transfer custody and guardianship of A.M.H. to the appellees was not made with knowledge of the consequences of the transfer. Therefore, according the parents those superior rights to the custody of their child that constitutional law mandates, only a showing of substantial harm that threatens the child’s welfare may deprive the parents of the care and custody of A.M.H. Although A.M.H. has now been with the appellees for more than seven years, six of those years elapsed after the parents’ first unsuccessful legal filing to regain custody. Evidence that A.M.H. will be harmed from a change in custody because she has lived and bonded with the Bakers during the pendency of the litigation does not constitute the substantial harm required to prevent the parents from regaining custody. For the reasons discussed below, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and this case is remanded to the chancery court to be expeditiously transferred to the Juvenile Court of Shelby County for the entry of an order that implements a plan to reunite A.M.H. with her natural parents. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Lyn S. Summers v. Christopher J. Ryan
In this interlocutory appeal, the issue we address is which trial court – the Rhea County Family |
Rhea | Court of Appeals | |
Phillip Crow v. Batesville Casket Company, Inc. and Travelers Insurance Co.
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing, findings of fact, and conclusions of law. The trial court awarded the employee benefits based on 17.5 percent permanent partial disability to the whole body for an |
Franklin | Workers Compensation Panel | |
In Re. Mikayla Grace Clark, Samuel Kent Clark v. Leah Joy Cerden
This is a child custody dispute. The biological parents of the child involved in this action met in Georgia, where the child was born in December 2002. The parties lived together with the child, but never married. Initially, the parties moved several times with the child, following job opportunities for the father. When the child was about nine months old, the parties moved to Jackson, Tennessee. Not long after that, the mother and the child returned to Georgia to live with the mother’s parents in Georgia, in order for the mother to seek professional help for depression. About nine months later, after an altercation between the mother and the child’s maternal grandmother, the mother told the father that she could not care for the child and asked him to assume custody. Accordingly, the father took the child to live with him in Jackson. About two months later, the father filed the instant petition for legitimation of the child and to seek custody. The mother opposed the father’s petition and filed a counter-petition for custody. After a hearing, the trial court determined that the father was comparatively more fit than the mother and designated him as the primary residential parent. The mother now appeals. We affirm, finding that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s determination. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Patti Zakour v. Ut Medical Group, Inc., & Scott Craig, M.D.
The issue we review in this case is whether the defendants exercised peremptory challenges during jury selection based on race and/or gender in a discriminatory manner contrary to the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Batson v. Kentucky. The Defendants used six of their seven peremptory challenges to strike women from the jury panel, including the only African-Americans who were seated in the jury box. In response to the Plaintiff’s race-based Batson challenge, the Defendants responded that one of the African-American women was dismissed because she had difficulty remembering the verdict in a previous civil jury case in which she had served as a juror and because she had a family history of cancer. As to the Plaintiff’s gender-based Batson objection, the Defendants responded that the women were excused based on “experience and body mechanics.” The trial court overruled the Plaintiff’s objections and the trial proceeded. Following a defense verdict, the Plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. After careful review of the record and applicable authorities, we hold that the Defendants’ stated reasons for exercising peremptory challenges to strike the African-Americans and women from the jury panel were insufficient to satisfy the requirements of Batson v. Kentucky. Because the trial court erred in overruling the Plaintiff’s Batson objections, we reverse and remand this case to the trial court for a new trial. |
Tipton | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Octavia Cartwright
The Defendant, Octavia Cartwright, was convicted of evading arrest in a motor vehicle with risk of death or injury, attempted first degree murder, two counts of especially aggravated robbery, especially aggravated burglary, and four counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. The Defendant was sentenced to an effective sentence of ninety-one years in prison as a Range I offender. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) there was insufficient evidence to sustain the convictions for attempted murder and especially aggravated kidnapping; (2) the trial court improperly sentenced the Defendant; (3) the trial court erred when it determined the Defendant was competent; and (4) her constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. After throughly reviewing the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions and sentences. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kelly Michael Pickett
We granted the appeal in each of these cases to determine the constitutionality of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1003 (2003), which prohibits the possession of child pornography. Initially, the statute is neither unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad. Secondly, we hold that because the charges against Pickett were multiplicitous, only one conviction is permissible under the circumstances of that case. In consequence, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals in each case is affirmed. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
John Whatley v. State of Tennessee
The Appellant, John Whatley, appeals the judgment of the Maury County Circuit Court denying post-conviction relief. Whatley is currently serving an eleven-year sentence in the Department of Correction as a result of his conviction for aggravated sexual battery. On appeal, Whatley argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel, specifically arguing that trial counsel was ineffective in: (1) “failing to adequately consult with and prepare [Whatley] for trial”; (2) failing to present a potential defense witness at trial; (3) opening the door for the introduction of prejudicial testimony; and (4) failing to properly preserve a conflict of interest issue for appeal. After review, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jermeil Ralph Tarter
The Defendant, Jermeil Ralph Tarter, was indicted by a Sullivan County grand jury for evading arrest, a Class A misdemeanor. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of the indicted offense. In this direct appeal, the Defendant alleges that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction beyond a reasonable doubt and (2) the trial court erred in requiring the Defendant to serve this sentence consecutively to his prior sentences. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Reginald E. Bost
The Defendant, Reginald E. Bost, appeals the decision of the Knox County Criminal Court revoking his alternative sentence. In July 2004, the Defendant pled guilty to possession with intent to sell .5 grams or more of cocaine and received an eight-year sentence. This sentence was suspended, and he was placed in the Community Alternative to Prison Program. On April 13, 2005, a warrant was issued, wherein it was alleged that the Defendant violated the conditions of the program. The warrant was later amended to include additional violations. After a hearing, the trial court concluded that the Defendant violated the conditions of his sentence and ordered that his original eight-year sentence to the Department of Correction be reinstated. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence does not support full revocation of his alternative sentence. After a review of the record, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Donald Wayne Joiner
The Defendant, Donald Wayne Joiner, was convicted by a Sullivan County jury of one count of escape, a Class E felony. He was sentenced as a career offender to six years in the Department of Correction. He filed a timely motion for a new trial, which was denied. In this appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for escape beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dale Anthony Scott, et al. v. Marion Yarbro, et al.
This is the second appeal of a property case involving the ownership of three parcels of real property held by tenants-in-common. We dismissed the first appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the trial court's order did not constitute a final judgment. On remand, the trial court entered a supplemental decree. After reviewing the record and the supplemental decree, we find that there is still not a final appealable judgment. We must, therefore, dismiss this second appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Decatur | Court of Appeals | |
Cargo Master, Inc. v. Ace USA Insurance Company, Steven W. Hines, D/B/A S & A Trucking, and S & A Transportation, Inc. D/B/A S & A Trucking
This is an insurance case. The plaintiff cargo company entered into a carrier agreement with an independent trucking company to transport freight, in which the trucking company agreed to indemnify the plaintiff for any loss or damage to the freight transported. The trucking company obtained a motor truck cargo liability insurance policy, which insured property while in due course of transit. In the process of transporting a shipment of tires for the plaintiff, the driver for the trucking company parked the trailer portion of the tractor-trailer behind a shopping center and left it overnight. During the night, the cargo was stolen. The trucking company submitted a claim against its cargo insurance policy and the claim was denied. The plaintiff sued the trucking company and the cargo insurance company for breach of contract, seeking to recover the value of the stolen cargo. The plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment against the defendant cargo insurance company and, in response, the defendant insurance company filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the cargo insurance company, finding that the shipment of tires was not “in transit” when it was stolen and that, consequently, there was no coverage under the policy. The plaintiff cargo company appeals. We reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Steven Quincy Manchester v. Bridgestone Firestone, Inc., et al.
This worker's compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court awarded the employee, Steven Quincy Manchester (Manchester), an eighteen percent permanent partial disability award based upon a twelve percent impairment rating. The trial court also determined the employer, Bridgestone Firestone, Inc. (Bridgestone) was not entitled to a credit for a portion of the temporary total benefits it paid to the employee. Bridgestone has appealed, contending the trial court erred in that the impairment rating was not supported by the medical evidence and in not allowing the credit it claimed. We modify the trial court's judgment by reducing the impairment rating to ten percent to conform to the evidence presented, and remand the case to the trial court for determination of permanent partial disability. We affirm the trial court's judgment disallowing a set off for the temporary total benefits paid by Bridgestone. |
Warren | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Lona Swindle v. Unipres U.S.A. and Tennessee Department of Labor as Custodian for the Second Injury Fund of the State of Tennessee
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer asserts that the trial court erred in finding the employee's back injury compensable, in finding the employee to be permanently and totally disabled, and in apportioning the permanent total disability award between the employer and the Second Injury Fund. The Second Injury Fund also asserts the trial court erred in finding employee to be permanently and totally disabled and in calculating the award. The employee asserts the trial court erred in allocating a setoff for disability insurance payments. We reverse in part and modify in part. Tenn. Code. Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right, Judgment of the Macon County Circuit Court is reversed in part and modified in part. HOWELL N. PEOPLES, SP. J., in which WILLIAM M. BARKER, CHIEF JUSTICE, and JEFFREY S. BIVINS, SP. J. joined. M. Clark Spoden, Julie A. Schreiner-Oldham, Brian Neal, Frost Brown Todd, LLC, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant, Unipres, U.S.A., Inc. Paul G. Summers, Attorney General, Lauren S. Lamberth, Assistant Attorney General, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant Second Injury Fund. William Joseph Butler, E. Guy Holliman, Farrar, Holliman & Butler, Lafayette, Tennessee, for Appellee, Lona Swindle. 1 MEMORANDUM OPINION Facts Lona Swindle filed her complaint against Unipres U.S.A., Inc. ("Unipres") for workers' compensation benefits on April 1, 22 alleging that she sustained "cumulative injuries to both of her hands, elbows and arms." She also alleged that she had received court awarded vocational disability for previous work injuries for which the Second Injury Fund would be responsible. The complaint did not mention any claim that she had sustained a work-related injury to her back. On January 14, 23, Ms. Swindle amended her complaint to add the assertion that she was permanently and totally disabled as a result of a "combination of the Plaintiff's pre-existing non-work-related injuries and/or conditions and the subject work-related injuries . . ." The amended complaint also did not mention any claim of a work-related back injury. In January 22, Ms. Swindle was diagnosed with bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. She was treated by Dr. Roy Terry, who performed surgeries on both wrists. He released her to return to work without restrictions on June 27, 22. Ms. Swindle returned to work at Unipres with activities that were less repetitive, but involved heavier lifting and more bending than the job that caused the carpal tunnel syndrome. On September 13, 22, Ms. Swindle saw Jennifer Dittes, a certified physician's assistant with complaints of back pain. Ms. Swindle testified that she stopped working at Unipres on October 21, 22 because of back pain. She did not report a back injury to her employer as being work related. On April 8, 23, Ms. Swindle filed an application for long-term disability benefits for the back injury and represented her injuries were not work related. Decision Below The trial court found that the Ms. Swindle's bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome was work- related, that the back injury resulted from the carpal tunnel syndrome, and that the combination of the injuries and her pre-existing condition caused her to be permanently and totally disabled. The trial court apportioned 7 percent of the award to Unipres and 3 percent to the Second Injury Fund. The trial court also granted Unipres an offset for payments to Ms. Swindle made by a disability insurance policy for long-term disability due to her back injury. Standard of Review The standard of review in a workers' compensation case is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2); Houser v. BiLo, Inc., 36 S.W.3d 68, 7-71 (Tenn. 21). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court in workers' compensation cases to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies. |
Macon | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Rosalind Pruitt, Individually and as Mother and Next of Kin of Domonique Pruitt, a Minor v. City of Memphis
This is a negligence case brought under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act. The plaintiff’s minor daughter slipped and fell at a public swimming facility and broke her arm. The plaintiff filed suit against the defendant swimming facility, alleging that her minor daughter slipped |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Vivian Earl McDaniel v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Vivian Earl McDaniel, filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The habeas court denied relief, and the Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the convicting court lacked jurisdiction over him because he was improperly shuttled between state and federal custody in violation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court. |
Fayette | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Allstar Consulting Group, a/k/a Allstar Consulting Group, LLC v. Trinity Church & Christian Center and Trustmark National Bank
This is a breach of contract case. The plaintiff finance broker and the defendant church entered into an agreement under which the plaintiff broker was to assist the church in obtaining a loan, and the church would pay the plaintiff a 3% broker’s fee for this service. The plaintiff broker negotiated a financing arrangement as requested by the church. Independent of the plaintiff, the church obtained financing from a different lender. The plaintiff then claimed a right to its broker’s fee under the parties’ agreement, claiming that it had an exclusive arrangement with the church. The church refused to pay the fee, denying that it had an exclusive arrangement with the plaintiff broker. The plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit against the church to recover its broker’s fee. The trial court held in favor of the plaintiff, concluding that the parties’ agreement was exclusive. The church now appeals. We affirm, finding that the issue turns on the credibility of the witnesses. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony Dewayne Cotton
The Defendant, Anthony Dewayne Cotton, pled guilty to possession of a schedule II controlled substance with intent to deliver .5 grams or more, unlawful possession of a weapon by a convicted felon, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Pursuant to Rule of Criminal Procedure 37, the Defendant reserved as a certified question of law the issue of whether the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals |