State of Tennessee v. William Larry Littles
This is a direct appeal from a conviction on a jury verdict of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), fourth or subsequent offense. The Defendant, William LarryLittles, filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a warrantless seizure, alleging the police did not have reasonable suspicion to conduct the investigatory stop that led to the seizure. The Defendant’s motion to suppress was denied. Following his conviction he was sentenced to eighteen months in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC). This sentence was suspended, and he was ordered to serve 180 days in jail followed by supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant raises a single issue: that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rafael Antonio Bush v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Rafael Antonio Bush, was convicted of especially aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and aggravated assault and received an effective twenty-two year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he had not received the effective assistance of counsel at trial. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition after a hearing, and this appeal ensued. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request that the jury be instructed about accomplice testimony. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dawn Nepp, et al. v. Margaret Hart, et al.
This is an appeal of a judgment on a jury verdict. Plaintiffs- homeowners contracted with a construction company, a corporation wholly owned by a single stockholder, to construct their residence. Because of alleged breach of contract and negligent construction, the homeowners filed suit against the corporation and also the sole stockholder and his wife, a director, alleging that they were in fact the alter egos of the corporation. Prior to trial, the corporation was voluntarily dismissed by the homeowners, and the case was tried against the individual defendants on the alter ego theory. The jury found that owner-defendants were liable under the alter ego theory for negligent construction and breach of contract. Judgment was entered on the jury verdict. Plaintiffshomeowners appealed stating that the trial court erred in dismissing some of the other causes of action, but a review of the record reveals that no motion for a new trial was filed by plaintiffs homeowners as required by Tenn. R. App. P. 3 (e), and thus those issues are waived. The individual defendants asserted affirmative issues for review as cross appellants. Although the individual defendants filed a motion for a new trial, many of the issues raised were not specifically stated therein and are consequently considered waived on appeal by virtue of Tenn. R. App. P. 3 (e). Finding that there is material evidence to support the jury verdict, we affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Barney Newcomb v. Kohler Company
In April 2003, the plaintiff’s employer terminated his employment. The employer, citing the company’s respectful workplace policy, fired the employee for allegedly cursing a fellow employee. The employee subsequently filed suit against the employer for retaliatory discharge. The employee alleged that his prior workers’ compensation claims were the real reason that his employer terminated his employment. In his complaint, the employee sought compensatory and punitive damages, but did not set forth the amount requested. After the jury trial got underway, the trial court allowed the employee to amend his complaint to request a specific amount of damages for back pay and front pay, but ultimately dismissed the claim for punitive damages. At the conclusion of the employee’s case-in-chief, the employer moved for a directed verdict, which the trial court denied. At the close of the employer’s proof, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the employee finding that his workers’ compensation benefits were a substantial factor in the employer’s decision to terminate his employment. At the end of trial, the trial court conducted a hearing on the issue of whether to |
Obion | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mark Edward Ellis
The defendant, Mark Edward Ellis, pled guilty to felony escape, a Class E felony. In exchange for his guilty plea, the defendant was sentenced to one year as a standard offender, which was to run consecutive to his prior sentences. On appeal, the defendant argues that the circuit court erred by denying his request for suspension of this sentence. Following our review of the parties’ briefs and applicable law, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Vicki Lynn Fox v. Terry Wayne Fox - Concurring
I concur in the results reached by the majority and agree with most of the reasoning. However, I do not fully agree with the analysis used to determine whether the Carol Lane Property and the Buffalo Valley Road Property were marital or separate. The analysis used by the majority starts with the presumption that property acquired during the marriage is marital, relying on the definition of marital property in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(A). While the opinion acknowledges in a footnote the definition of separate property that includes property acquired in exchange for pre-marital separately owned property, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(2)(B), the analysis fails to take that definition into account.1 Logically, that definition should also create a “rebuttable presumption” that is equal in weight to the one used as the basis for the analysis herein. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Vicki Lynn Fox v. Terry Wayne Fox
This appeal involves the financial aspects of the dissolution of a marriage that lasted approximately ten years. Both parties sought a divorce in the Chancery Court for Putnam County. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the wife a divorce and approved a permanent parenting plan designating her as primary residential parent for the parties’ two children. In addition, the trial court classified the parties’ assets, divided the marital estate, reduced the husband’s alimony arrearage to a judgment for alimony in solido, and ordered the husband to pay the wife $350 per month in longterm alimony. The husband takes issue on this appeal with the manner in which the trial court classified the parties’ assets and divided the marital estate and with the trial court’s decision to require him to pay long-term alimony. We have determined that the trial court erred in its classification of the parties’ property. However, we find that the evidence fully supports the manner in which the trial court divided the parties’ marital estate, as well as the trial court’s decision to award the wife long-term alimony. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Roseann Huffaker v. St. Mary's Health System, Inc.
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated §50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer contends the trial court erred in (a) finding employee’s claim for latex allergy to be compensable, (b) failing to impose liability on a subsequent employer, and (c) awarding 50 percent vocational disability. We affirm. |
Knox | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Auto Credit of Nashville v. Melissa Wimmer - Dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that Auto Credit failed to give Ms. Wimmer reasonable notice of the scheduled sale of the collateral. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Auto Credit of Nashville v. Melissa Wimmer
A woman bought a used automobile, financing the purchase with a loan from the plaintiff credit company. The loan was secured through a UCC Article 9 security interest in the vehicle. When the buyer fell behind in her payments, the creditor repossessed the car and sent her notice by certified mail that it intended to sell the car and that she would face a deficiency judgment if the sale price was less than the amount she still owed. She did not receive the notice, and the certified letter was returned unclaimed to the creditor the day after the sale. The creditor sued for a deficiency of over $3,400, and the circuit court granted it judgment for the amount claimed. The buyer sought statutory damages under Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-9-625 arguing that the attempted notice was inadequate, and the trial court dismissed her counterclaim. The buyer appeals this dismissal. We reverse the trial court because we find Auto Credit did not act reasonably in proceeding to sell the car without affirming that the notice had in fact been delivered. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Leonard Frazier v. Donal Campbell, et al.
This appeal involves a petition for writ of certiorari filed by a state prisoner. After drugs were discovered in the inmate’s incoming mail, he was sentenced to punitive segregation. He sought review of his conviction in the Shelby County Chancery Court, which later dismissed his case without prejudice for lack of prosecution. The inmate filed a notice of appeal which we have determined was untimely and therefore a nullity. As a result, we must dismiss this appeal without considering the issues presented by the Petitioner. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Judge Brooks - Concurring and Dissenting
I concur in the reasoning and result reached in the majority opinion save in one area. I respectfully disagree with its conclusion that the defendant’s right to confrontation was forfeited by virtue of his wrongfully killing the victim. The majority opinion essentially holds that wrongfully causing the victim’s unavailability to testify at the defendant’s trial for murdering the victim forfeits the defendant’s right to confrontation, which allows all relevant statements by the victim to be admitted into evidence. I believe the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine should require that the defendant procure the absence of the declarant with the intent that the declarant not be a witness. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Judge Brooks
A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, Judge Brooks, of first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment. In this appeal, the appellant claims (1) that the trial court improperly admitted the victim’s prior statements into evidence under the hearsay rule’s forfeiture by wrongdoing exception, Tennessee Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), and in violation of the Confrontation Clause; (2) that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of the appellant’s prior assault on the victim pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b); and (3) that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. While we conclude that the trial court improperly admitted hearsay into evidence, we conclude that the error was harmless and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Leslie A. Pryor
The defendant, Leslie A. Pryor, was convicted of two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, one count of theft over $10,000, one count of attempted voluntary manslaughter, one count of felony evading arrest, one count of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, three counts of reckless endangerment, and one count of criminal impersonation. The trial court merged the reckless endangerment and attempted voluntary manslaughter convictions with the greater charge of aggravated assault, and the defendant was given an effective sentence of forty-two years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for aggravated assault. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Pickett | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Alvin King v. Shelby County Government Civil Service Merit Board
Employment of a ShelbyCountyDeputy Sheriff was terminated and the decision was upheld by the Shelby County Civil Service Merit Board. The employee filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court of Shelby County. The administrative record was duly filed in the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Louise Spann et al. v. American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc. et al.
This appeal involves a dispute between a credit and charge card issuer and two cardholders regarding allegedly unauthorized charges to their accounts by entities affiliated with the issuer. The cardholders filed a class action complaint in the Circuit Court for Williamson County asserting that the practice of charging them for goods and services they did not agree to purchase constituted an unfair and deceptive trade practice prohibited by various state consumer protection laws and gave rise to causes of action for negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation, conversion, and unjust enrichment. The issuer and its affiliates filed a motion to compel separate arbitrations against each cardholder in accordance with the class arbitration waiver clause of the arbitration provision in the cardmember agreements. The cardholders conceded that they were required to arbitrate their claims but asked the trial court to strike the class arbitration waiver clause as unconscionable. Siding with the cardholders, the trial court struck the class arbitration waiver clause and granted the motion to compel arbitration. The issuer and its affiliates appealed. We have concluded that the trial court did not err by granting the motion to compel arbitration. However, we have also concluded that the trial court erred by finding the class arbitration waiver clause unconscionable under Utah law. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: The Estate of Marjorie Louise Brevard, Decedent, W. Terry Barlowe, Proponent-Appellant, v. Dorothy Brevard and The Estate of John Brevard, Contestants-Appellees
The Trial Court granted contestants of a Will summary judgment, voiding the Will. On appeal, we vacate the summary judgment. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Jerry Wayne Lynch v. City of Jellico, et al. AND David A. Lozano v. Lincoln Memorial University, et. al.
In these consolidated workers’ compensation appeals, we are asked to decide the constitutionality of various provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Reform Act of 2004. Specifically at issue is whether the benefit review conference requirement embodied in Tennessee Code Annotated sections 50-6-203(a) (2005), 50-6-225(a)(1) (2005), and 50-6-239(b) (2005), violates the due process protections of the Tennessee or United States Constitutions, the separation of powers doctrine in article II, sections 1 and 2 of Tennessee’s Constitution, or the open courts doctrine found in article I, section 17, of the Tennessee Constitution. Additionally, we are asked to decide whether the method used to determine permanent partial disability benefits, namely the multiplier provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(A) (2005) used in conjunction with the American Medical Association Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (“AMA Guides”), violates equal protection; due process; the Tennessee Human Rights Act, Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-21-101 (2005); and the Tennessee Handicap Act, Tennessee Code Annotated section 8-50-103(a) (2002). The trial judge determined that each of these provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Reform Act of 2004–the benefit review conference, the multiplier, and use of the AMA Guides–is unconstitutional. After carefully considering the record and relevant authority, we conclude that the trial judge erred. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgments are reversed. |
Campbell | Supreme Court | |
William Eric Brewer v. The Hartford
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation |
Carroll | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Phillip Brow v. Penske Logistics, Inc., et al
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation |
Shelby | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Carol Pipkin v. Tennessee Electroplating, Inc.
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer insists the evidence preponderates against the trial court's findings as to causation and extent of permanent partial disability. The employer further insists the claim should have been dismissed by the trial court because the injured worker failed to give timely written notice. We conclude the trial court’s judgment should be affirmed. |
Lauderdale | Workers Compensation Panel | |
James W. McDonnell, Jr., et al. v. Conseco Life Insurance Company, et al.
Plaintiffs James W. McDonnell, Jr., Faith McDonnell Campbell, Anne McDonnell Durell, and James W. McDonnell, III, appeal the trial court’s grant of summary judgment holding that their causes of action are barred by applicable statutes of limitation. Because we find that the trial court failed to execute a final order disposing of all of Plaintiffs’ asserted causes of action, we dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 3(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Antonio Young v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Antonio Young, appeals from the order dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner has failed to establish that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Niccole A. Naifeh, et al. v. Valley Forge Life Insurance Company, et al.
We granted this appeal to determine (1) whether a life insurance policy purchased by the insured as part of a divorce decree had been terminated before the insured’s death; and (2) whether the insurer or the insurance agent was negligent in failing to prevent the policy from lapsing after the insured issued an oral stop payment order and failed to pay a monthly premium. The Chancery Court concluded that the policy had not been terminated, that the insurer and insurance agent were negligent, and that the proceeds of the policy were to be paid to the beneficiary. The Court of Appeals, reversing the Chancellor’s judgment, concluded that the policy had been backdated by agreement of the parties and had been terminated by the insured before his death. The Court of Appeals also concluded that the insurer and the insurance agent were not negligent because their actions were not a proximate cause of the damages. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we conclude that the life insurance policy remained valid at the time of the insured’s death and that the beneficiary was entitled to the proceeds under the policy. However, we agree with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the insurer and the insurance agent were not negligent because there was no evidence that their acts were a proximate cause of the damages. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals’ judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part for the reasons stated herein. |
Tipton | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Earnest Banks
The defendant, Earnest Banks, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated burglary and sentenced to nine years in the Department of Correction as a Range II multiple offender. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals |