Jerry D. Carney v. State of Tennessee
This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to dismiss or in the alternative to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner has appealed the trial court’s order dismissing his petition for writ of error coram nobis in which the petitioner alleged that newly-discovered evidence mandated a new trial. Upon a review of the record in this case, we are persuaded that the trial court was correct in dismissing the petition for coram nobis relief after a hearing and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Don Murfree McClaran, et al. v. Judith Ann Beardsley, et al.
In this case, the unsuccessful Plaintiff appeals the grant of summary judgment in favor of a will offered for probate by the defendants, Judith Ann Beardsley as executrix and Cavalry Bank Trust Department as Administrator ad litem for the estate of Olalee McClaran. Plaintiff challenges the will as a product of fraud in the inducement and undue influence. The proponents filed a Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment. From the summary judgment grant against him, Mr. McClaran now appeals. We affirm the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Ricky Butler v. State of Tennessee
The appellant, Ricky Butler, filed a petition to rehear in accordance with Rule 39 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure on June 29, 2006, following the release of the opinion of this Court on June 27, 2006. The opinion of this Court dismissed the petitioner’s appeal because the appellant’s notice of appeal was filed outside the thirty day time limit. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jesse Williams, Sr., et al. v. Linkscorp Tennessee Six, L.L.C., d/b/a Nashboro Golf Club - Dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the majority. As stated in the majority opinion, in order for an owner or operator of premises to be held liable for negligence in allowing a dangerous or defective condition to exist on the premises, the plaintiff must prove, in addition to the elements of negligence, that the condition was caused or created by the owner or, if the condition was created by someone other than the owner, that the owner had actual or constructive notice that the condition existed prior to the accident. Blair v. West Town Mall, 130 S.W.3d 761, 764 (Tenn. 2004). It is alleged in the Plaintiffs’ complaint that Mr. Williams was walking down a set of steps on the golf course that were made of railroad crossties and that he fell due to the slippery surface of the step. Mr. Williams testified in his deposition that he evidently hit some mud and moss1 on the stairs, which caused him to fall. He testified that it was “raining real, real hard at that time.” However, Mr. Williams recanted this testimony in a subsequent affidavit wherein he stated, “it may have been sprinkling, but it was not raining hard.” In response to the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the Plaintiffs filed affidavits of Arthur Overall and Larry Rees, both of whom were golfing with Mr. Williams. Mr. Overall stated that it had been raining heavily early that morning, but at the time we were playing golf, |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jesse Williams, Sr., and wife Janet Williams v. Linkscorp Tennessee Six, L.L.C., d/b/a Nashboro Golf Club
This is a premises liability action. While playing golf in the rain, the plaintiff slipped and fell on stairs on the golf course made of railroad cross ties. The plaintiff claimed that the stairs were covered with mud and some variety of moss or algae, making them dangerously slippery. The plaintiff sued the golf course for negligence. The defendant golf course filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted, finding that the plaintiff failed to proffer evidence of notice, either actual or constructive. The trial court also found that the plaintiff’s evidence of a dangerous condition was speculative. We reverse, finding sufficient evidence to create a factual issue on whether a dangerous condition existed and whether the defendant golf course had constructive notice. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Richard Barrom
Following a jury trial, the defendant, RichardBarrom,was convicted of assault by causing extremely offensive or provocative physical contact, a Class B misdemeanor. The trial court deferred sentencing, placed the defendant on diversion for eleven months, twenty-nine days, and ordered him to perform thirty hours of community service work and complete an anger management program. On appeal, he argues that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred in overruling his objection to hearsay testimony; (3) the trial court improperly removed a juror based on race; and (4) his conviction was barred by prior jeopardy. Additionally, the State argues that the trial court erred by granting judicial diversion. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Memphis Health Center, Inc. et al. v. Gregory Grant, et al.
This is a derivative action. The board chairman of a nonprofit health care center was found guilty of submitting false claims in violation of federal law. Thereafter, the health care center’s chief executive officer and two of its board members filed a derivative action on behalf of the health care |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Gerald Jump v. C & M Disposal
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation |
Bradley | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Mary E. Moffitt v. U.S. Xpress Enterprises, et al.
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation |
Hamilton | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Henry Kent Sudberry v. Royal & Sun Alliance, et al.
Trial court granted motion to dismiss tort claims as barred by statute of limitations where the injury alleged was loss of employment. To the extent the employee alleged he had a contract for continued employment, his complaint was not subject to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) dismissal because the three year statute of limitations applies to cases involving loss of property, including contractual rights. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gary Lee Marise
We granted permission to appeal in this case pursuant to Rule 11, Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, to determine whether lay testimony of olfactory observations alone may support a conviction for possession of anhydrous ammonia with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine, a violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-433(a). We conclude that the burden of proving the nature and composition of anhydrous ammonia as it is defined in Tennessee Code Annotated section 43-11-303(a) cannot be met by adducing lay testimony of olfactory observations only. Because the evidence adduced in the case under submission did not include any evidence of the chemical composition of the substance, we conclude that it is insufficient to sustain the conviction for unlawful possession of anhydrous ammonia and reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals insofar as it affirmed this conviction. Accordingly, we dismiss the defendant’s conviction for possession of anhydrous ammonia with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine. |
Carroll | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Bobby Ray Johnson
In the latter half of 2001, the defendant, Bobby Ray Johnson, who was living in Coffee County, convinced his girlfriend to engage in fellatio on two occasions with the minor victim, while the defendant watched and videotaped the encounters. The defendant was indicted for two counts of rape of a child. The defendant was convicted on both counts by a Coffee County jury. The trial court sentenced the defendant to two consecutive sentences of twenty years each to be served at 100% as a child rapist. The defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction and that the trial court erred in ordering his sentences to be served consecutively. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Coffee | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Terry Jamar Norris v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Terry Jamar Norris, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert J. Wrigglesworth, Jr.
The defendant, Robert J. Wrigglesworth, Jr., previously convicted in Texas for the offense of indecency with a child by contact, was indicted for violating Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-39-211(c) because of his residing at an address where a minor child also resided. He offered to stipulate that he was a sex offender as covered by this statute. The trial court concluded that the State was required to accept this stipulation and thus barred from proving that the defendant was a convicted sex offender or why it was unlawful for him to live in the same residence as a minor. The State filed a Rule 9 appeal. Following our review, we reverse the order of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Earl Cherry
Williamson County- The defendant, William Earl Cherry, was indicted for three counts of aggravated assault and three counts of reckless endangerment. He filed an application for pretrial diversion, and the State denied his request. He then filed a petition for writ of certiorari, and the trial court ordered that the State enter into a memorandum of understanding. The State filed a Rule 9 appeal. Following our review, we reverse the order of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bobby Gene Walker, Jr.
The defendant, Bobby Gene Walker, Jr., appeals a certified question of law regarding a police officer’s stop of him which resulted in his arrest for driving under the influence and violating the implied consent law. Because we agree with the Circuit Court for Blount County that reasonable suspicion supported by specific and articulable facts existed for the stop, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, ex rel., Jonathan Hulon Brown v. Jackie Lynn Ross
Jonathan Hulon Brown (“Father”) appeals the trial court’s refusal to change the surname of his minor child, born out of wedlock, from that of the minor child’s mother Jackie Lynn Ross (“Mother”) to that of Father. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jermaine Scruggs
The defendant, Jermaine Scruggs, pled guilty to driving under the influence, first offense, a Class A misdemeanor; reckless driving, a Class B misdemeanor; and driving without a license, a Class C misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 55-10-401, -403, -205, 50-351 (2003). The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days and a $350.00 fine for driving under the influence, first offense; six months and a $100.00 fine for reckless driving; and thirty days and a $50.00 fine for driving without a license, each at a seventy-five percent service rate. The sentences were ordered to be served consecutively to an earlier five-year sentence for tampering with evidence. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred by ordering his sentences for the three misdemeanor convictions to be served consecutively to his prior felony sentence. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In the Matter of E.J.M. d.o.b. 10/31/1994, Lee T. Myers v. Sandra Brown
This is a child custody case which originated in juvenile court. On March 24, 2005, the court entered an order which, inter alia, awarded joint custody to the parties, with the mother being the primary custodian. Relying on Local Rule 15 of the Shelby County Juvenile Court, father timely appealed to the Circuit Court of Shelby County. By order entered October 11, 2005, the circuit court dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On October 28, 2005, father filed a notice of appeal in the circuit court, appealing the final judgment of dismissal in the circuit court and the final judgment of the juvenile court entered on March 24, 2005. We vacate the order of the circuit court dismissing the case and remand the case to the trial court with directions to enter an order transferring this appeal to the Court of Appeals. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Phillips & Associates v. George D. Blackburn, et al.
Defendants/Appellants appeal the order of the circuit court dismissing their appeal from general sessions court based upon their failure to appear for trial in the circuit court. We affirm. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
Nancy Lee Barlow Long v. Bobby Ray Long
In this post-divorce action, the Trial Court entered Judgment against the defendant for previously awarded obligations, and held him in contempt. On appeal, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Markus K. Hartley
The appellant, Markus K. Hartley, was indicted by the Williamson County Grand Jury for driving under the influence, fourth offense. The appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that the police did not have probable cause to stop his vehicle. The trial court denied the motion to suppress the evidence. Subsequently, the appellant pled guilty to driving under the influence, second offense, but reserved a certified question of law to determine whether the trial court properly ruled on the motion to suppress. Because the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Sumner County Board of Education v. Carden Company, Inc.
In this action, the Trial Court stayed defendant’s planned arbitration and defendant has appealed. We affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Deborah Bowers Smith v. Riley Dean Smith
This is a divorce case. In a post-trial proceeding after remand by the Court of Appeals, Husband appeals the order of the trial court which effectively awarded certain stock to Wife. The appeal is dismissed for failure to file a timely notice of appeal. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
Marshall Burks, et al. v. Elevation Outdoor Advertising, LLC f/k/a Delta Outdoor Advertising, LLC
The Appellee is a billboard advertising business engaged in selling advertising space on the billboards it maintains. The Appellants contracted with the principal owner of the business to sell the business in exchange for a commission. One of the Appellants had partial ownership interest in three of the billboards serviced by the business. After closing the sale, the Appellee paid the Appellants a significantly smaller commission than the parties had agreed upon. The Appellants brought suit for breach of contract seeking to recover the remainder of the commission allegedly owed. The Appellee subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that, pursuant to the Tennessee Real Estate Broker License Act of 1973 codified at section 62-13-101 et seq. of the Tennessee Code, the Appellants could not recover a commission as a matter of law. The Appellee also sought to invoke the Act’s provisions to recover the commission already paid to the Appellants. Finding it undisputed that the Appellants did not have a real estate broker’s license when negotiating the sale of the business and that real estate comprised a significant portion of the Appellee’s assets, the trial court granted the Appellee’s motion for summary judgment. Further, the trial court ordered the Appellants to return the commission already paid by the Appellee. The Appellants have appealed the trial court’s decision to this Court. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |