David Wayne Moore v. Peddinghaus Modern Technologies, LLC
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that the employee was permanently and totally disabled as a result of a work-related knee injury and awarded permanent and total disability benefits until the employee is, by age, eligible for full benefits in the Old Age Insurance Benefits Program under the Social Security Act. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-207(4)(B)(2003). The employer has appealed the trial court’s award contending that the trial court erred in finding that the employee gave notice of the work-related injury and that the trial court erred in considering a summary of the medical depositions as opposed to having read the medical depositions before rendering a decision. After careful review of the record, we conclude that the trial court should be affirmed. |
Hawkins | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Carolyn S. Chandler v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. and Gallagher Bassett Services
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court awarded the Plaintiff eighty-five percent vocational impairment for each arm for a bilateral carpal tunnel work injury. The employer has appealed contending that the trial court erred in awarding eighty-five percent vocational impairment to each arm in light of the employee’s work history subsequent to the work-related injury. The employer also contends that the trial court erred by inappropriately weighing the testimony of the employee’s vocational expert in assessing the eighty-five percent vocational disability. Finally, the employer asserts that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Rodney Caldwell, PhD. After a careful review of the record, we conclude that the trial court should be affirmed. |
Knox | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Betty Leona Cronan v. Cleveland Chair Company
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court ordered the employer to provide medical treatment pursuant to a court approved settlement for a 1995 injury and awarded attorneys’ fees pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(b)(2). The employer has appealed contending that the trial court erred because the employee’s current condition is caused by age-related degenerative arthritis and not by the 1995 work accident and that the attorney fee award was not proved to be reasonable in amount. After a careful review of the record we conclude that the trial court should be affirmed. |
Bradley | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Hollis G. Williams v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Hollis G. Williams, who is serving a life sentence without possibility of parole for first degree murder, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for postconviction relief and motion to reopen his prior post-conviction proceedings. We hold that we are without jurisdiction to consider the petitioner’s appeal from the trial court’s denial of the motion to reopen. We also hold that we have jurisdiction to consider the trial court’s denial of relief on the petitioner’s other post-conviction claims, and we affirm its judgment on those claims. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Alvin King v. v. Shelby County Government Civil Service Merit Board
This is the second appeal of a case involving the termination of a county employee. The petitioner was a deputy jailor for the County Sheriff’s Department. His employment was terminated because he failed to report an injured inmate. The county’s administrative board upheld the termination. The petitioner then filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the trial court. The trial court denied the writ, and the petitioner appealed. In the first appeal, the trial court’s order was vacated and the cause was remanded for reconsideration under the standard of review set forth in the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, see T.C.A. § 4-5-322. On remand, the trial court entered a revised order, affirming the termination. The petitioner now appeals the revised order. We affirm, finding that the petitioner received a fair hearing before the administrative board and that the board’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Wesley Brian McKeehan v. Ace American Insurance Company
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6- 225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal the employer asserts that the trial court erred in rejecting the opinion of the treating physician in awarding the employee benefits based upon a finding of 32.5 percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. We agree with the findings of the trial court and in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(2), affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Cocke | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Joshua Glenn Trivette
The defendant, Joshua Glenn Trivette, pled guilty to two counts of auto burglary, theft over $1000, five counts of vandalism over $1000, vandalism over $500, felony evading arrest, driving under the influence, driving on a revoked license stemming from one indictment (Case No. S50,046), and to driving on a revoked license second offense, violation of the seat belt law, and failure to provide proof of financial responsibility from a separate indictment (Case No. S50,045), with the trial court to determine the length and manner of service. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days in Case No. S50,045 and an effective six-year sentence in Case No. S50,046, to be served consecutively in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by misapplying enhancement and mitigating factors, ordering consecutive sentences, and denying an alternative sentence. After careful review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Keith D. Williams
The defendant, Keith D. Williams, entered guilty pleas in the Criminal Court of Davidson County to sale of cocaine in an amount less that .5 grams in case number 2005-C-1660 and to sale of cocaine in an amount less than .5 grams in case number 2005-C-2147. He was sentenced to six years as a Range II, multiple offender for each count, to be served consecutively, for a total effective sentence of twelve years. The trial court ordered split confinement with the bulk of the defendant’s sentences to be served in the community corrections program. The defendant served a mere eleven days of his community corrections sentence when he was charged with violating the terms of his community corrections sentence. After a full hearing, the trial court found that the defendant had violated the terms of his community corrections sentence, revoked the sentence and resentenced the defendant to a term of eighteen years as a Range II, multiple offender to be served in the custody of the Department of Corrections. The defendant now appeals the revocation and resentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Caroline White
The appellant, Caroline White,1 pled guilty to aggravated assault and robbery, and she received a total effective sentence of three years intensive probation. Subsequently, the trial court revoked the appellant’s probation and ordered her to serve her sentence in confinement. On appeal, the appellant challenges the revocation and argues that she should have been given another probationary sentence. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Chester | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brandon Mobley
The Defendant, Brandon Mobley, was convicted by a Knox County jury of two counts of first degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, and setting fire to personal property, and the trial court sentenced him to two consecutive life sentences plus twenty-two years. On appeal, he alleges: (1) there is insufficient evidence upon which to convict him on either count of first-degree murder; (2) there is insufficient evidence upon which to convict him of especially aggravated robbery; (3) the trial court erred in initially prohibiting testimony from a defense expert, which caused a violation of his Fifth Amendment rights; and (4) the trial court erred in sentencing him. After reviewing the record and applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions, but we conclude the Defendant was improperly sentenced. Thus, we modify the Defendant’s sentences for his convictions for especially aggravated robbery and setting fire to personal property from twenty to eighteen years and from two years to one year, respectively. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kamiko T. Clark
A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Kamiko T. Clark, of six counts of child abuse, a class A misdemeanor. On appeal, the Defendant alleges that the trial court erred when it: (1) allowed her statement to the police into evidence; (2) refused to merge her three child abuse convictions for each victim into one conviction for each victim; and (3) imposed sentences that were consecutive and involved partial confinement. Following review, the judgments of conviction are affirmed. However, because the trial court failed to make findings of fact with regard to consecutive sentencing, we remand the case to the trial court for a determination of whether consecutive sentencing is warranted in this case. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of G. Wallace Creswell, Oral Ruth Creswell v. James Stewart Creswell
In this Estate, the parties in open court announced the terms of settlement between them of the entire Estate. Appellant sought to set aside the settlement on the grounds of duress, but after an evidentiary hearing the Trial Court refused to set aside the settlement. On appeal, we affirm. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Conservatorship of Gladys R. Burchard, and Public Guardian for the Elderly as Conservator for Gladys R. Burchard v. Ralph O. Burchard
Petitioner intervened in this action, averring that the conservator for her mother had died and asked that she be appointed conservator of her mother. The Trial Court appointed a successor conservator and ruled that petitioner had no standing to contest the conservatorship and to be appointed conservator since she was a non-resident of the State. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joann Craddick
The Defendant, Joann Craddick, pled guilty to two counts of vehicular assault, and the trial court sentenced her to concurrent two year sentences for each conviction, with eight months to be served in jail, followed by supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied her full probation. Concluding that there exists no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hickman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Eric Lumpkins
The defendant, Eric Lumpkins, appeals from his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of first degree murder, attempt to commit first degree murder, and two counts of aggravated assault. He challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, the selection of the trial jury, the admission and exclusion of evidence, prosecutorial remarks made during closing argument, and his aggregate sentence of life plus ten years. We hold, inter alia, that the convicting evidence is legally sufficient and, in so holding, decline to apply the physical facts rule, and we hold that consecutive sentencing may be imposed by the trial judge without the participation of a jury. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tommy L. Holmes
The defendant, Tommy L. Holmes, was convicted of aggravated rape, a Class A felony, and sentenced as a violent offender to twenty-four years in the Department of Correction. He presents six issues on appeal: (1) whether he forfeited his right to counsel; (2) whether the jury was properly instructed on lesser-included offenses; (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to establish the bodily injury element of aggravated rape; (4) whether the trial court erred in answering the jury’s question regarding what constitutes bodily injury; (5) whether there was prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument; and (6) whether the trial court erred by excluding certain evidence the defendant offered. Following our review, we conclude that his claims are without merit. However, we additionally conclude that, before determining that the defendant had forfeited his right to counsel, the trial court should have conducted an evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, we remand to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing as to this claim. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Howard Lee Coleman v. State of Tennessee
The Appellant, Howard Lee Coleman, appeals the judgment of the Shelby County Criminal Court denying post-conviction relief. Coleman was convicted of first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery and was sentenced by the jury to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. He also received a concurrent sentence of twenty years for his especially aggravated robbery conviction. Coleman filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief in 2001, alleging multiple deficiencies underlying his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, including the failure to perfect a direct appeal of his convictions. After the appointment of counsel, the post-conviction court heard evidence on all the allegations and granted a Rule 3 delayed appeal to this court. The remaining post-conviction issues were stayed pending the outcome of the appeal, which was subsequently denied. Following the denial of second tier review, Coleman, proceeding pro se, filed an amended post-conviction petition in 2005. The attorney appointed to represent Coleman in his post-conviction challenge was the same attorney appointed to him in the direct appeal of the case. The postconviction court subsequently denied post-conviction relief. On appeal, Coleman argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel, specifically arguing that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to properly investigate and prepare the case. Following review, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed with regard to all allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. However, plain error review of the record reveals an actual conflict of interest in that counsel appointed to perfect the direct appeal was also appointed to represent the Appellant in the amended portion of the post-conviction proceeding. Because the |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Edmund Zagorski vs. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Edmund George Zagorski, appeals from the dismissal of his post-conviction relief petition. He was previously convicted of two (2) counts of first degree murder and sentenced to death by electrocution. Zagorski contends the trial court erred in dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief and presents to this Court the following issues for review: (1) whether the jury charge on the “heinous, atrocious or cruel” aggravating circumstance was unconstitutional; (2) whether he received effective assistance of counsel regarding the motion to suppress his statements; (3) whether he received effective assistance of counsel due to the failure of counsel to present mitigating evidence at his sentencing hearing; (4) whether the trial court’s denial of certain expert services and the failure of trial counsel to request other expert services violated his constitutional rights; and (5) whether the state withheld exculpatory evidence from trial counsel. Finding that the petition for post-conviction relief was properly dismissed, we AFFIRM the judgment of the trial court. |
Robertson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Rod Mills
In January 2004, a Sevier County grand jury indicted the defendant, Rod Mills, on one count of theft over $10,000, a Class C felony. The defendant waived his right to a jury trial. In May 2006, a bench trial was held and the defendant was found guilty on the sole count of the indictment. The trial court sentenced the defendant to five years in prison as a Range I, standard offender. The defendant appeals, alleging that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. We conclude that the evidence was insufficient to prove that the defendant possessed the requisite mental state and therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the case. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Christy L. Taylor v. Randall Robinson, Jr.
The mother of a twelve year old boy filed a petition to establish the paternity of the child. A DNA test confirmed that the man named in the petition was indeed the biological father, and he agreed to pay temporary child support during the pendency of the case. The mother asked the court to order the father to pay retroactive child support back to the date of the child’s birth, in accordance with the child support guidelines. After a hearing, the trial court decided that a deviation from the guidelines was warranted because of the mother’s failure to inform the father of his possible paternity prior to filing the legitimation petition. The court accordingly ordered that retroactive support be paid only from the date of the filing of the petition. We affirm the trial court, but remand this case so the court can state in its order the “the total amount of retroactive support that would have been paid retroactively to the birth of the child, had a deviation not been made by the court,” as is required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-2-311(a)(11)(F). |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
WATCO, a joint venture comprised of Wayne Todd and Wilson Holdings, LP v. Pickering Environmental Consultants, Inc., a Tennessee Corporation
The plaintiff, a real estate development company, conditionally agreed to purchase real property from a trustee bank if the bank first obtained a satisfactory “Phase I” environmental site assessment of the property. The trustee bank hired the defendant environmental consulting company to perform a Phase I environmental site assessment. After performing an assessment, the defendant prepared a report in which it represented that it had conformed with the applicable professional standard in its assessment, that it had not detected any hazardous materials or environmental concerns at the subject property due to current or past uses of the property, that it had not identified any significant environmental concerns in the surrounding area of the subject property, and that it did not recommend further environmental review of the subject property. The plaintiff purchased the subject property in 1995. During residential development of the subject property in 2004, the plaintiff discovered the remains of a municipal garbage dump which had previously existed adjacent to the subject property, and which extended under a portion of the subject property. The plaintiff had the garbage removed and the land filled, and development was delayed as a result. The plaintiff development company sued the defendant environmental consulting company, alleging professional negligence and negligent misrepresentation. A bench trial was held, and the trial court entered judgment in favor of the defendant. For the following reasons, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Daniel Lynn Owens v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Daniel Lynn Owen, pled guilty to arson (Class A felony) and setting fire to personal property (Class E felony), agreeing to a concurrent sentence of ten years for arson and two years for setting fire to personal property, as a Range II, multiple offender. The original judgment incorrectly listed the conviction for arson as a Class B felony rather than a Class C felony, and the trial court later amended the judgment to correctly indicate the petitioner had been convicted of a Class C felony. The petitioner filed this appeal to contest the amended judgment. We conclude that correcting a clerical mistake does not trigger a Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 appeal as of right. No error exists, and the appeal is dismissed. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Carlos Sommerville v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Carlos Sommerville, was convicted of first degree felony murder, second degree murder, and attempted first degree murder. The murders were merged, and the petitioner is serving an effective life sentence. The petitioner appeals from the trial court’s summary dismissal of his post-conviction petition. He contends his petition contained an allegation of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, which should have protected the petition from summary dismissal. After review, we conclude the post-conviction court improperly summarily dismissed the petition because it did state a basis to support the petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Frank Brzezowski
The defendant, Frank Brzezowski, was convicted of two counts of aggravated assault and three counts of aggravated rape and was sentenced to an effective term of twenty-two years to be served at 100%. On appeal, he argues that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial; and (3) the trial court erred in its sentencing determination. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the defendant’s convictions, but remand for a new sentencing hearing. |
Benton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Janice Burnette - Concurring
David G. Hayes, Judge, separate concurring. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals |