State of Tennessee v. Leonard J. Young
Defendant, Leonard J. Young, was convicted by a jury of first degree premeditated murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, and theft over $1,000 but less than $10,000. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-202(a)(1) (Supp. 1999), 39-13-305(a)(1) (1997), 39-14-103 (1997). The jury subsequently sentenced Defendant to death for the murder, applying three aggravating circumstances: (a) Defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies, other than the present charge, the statutory elements of which involve the use of violence to the person; (b) the offense was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of Defendant or another; and (c) the murder was knowingly committed, solicited, directed, or aided by Defendant, while Defendant had a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit, or was fleeing after having a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit, theft. See id. § 39-13- 204(i)(2), (6), (7) (Supp. 1999). The trial court sentenced Defendant as a career offender to sixty years for the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction and as a career offender to twelve years for the theft conviction. The trial court ordered all sentences to be served consecutively. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions and the death sentence. After the case was docketed in this Court, we entered an order identifying several issues for oral argument.1 We now hold as follows: (1) the evidence was sufficient to establish venue in Shelby County; (2) the death in the immediate family of the original trial judge constituted an “other disability” under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 25(a) such that appointment of a substitute judge was proper; (3) the trial court committed harmless error in allowing into evidence several photographs of the victim as a child; (4) the evidence is sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction of first degree premeditated murder; (5) the trial court committed harmless error in admitting certain victim impact evidence; (6) the trial court committed harmless error in instructing the jury that Defendant’s 1999 Mississippi conviction of kidnapping was an offense, the statutory elements of which involve the use of violence to the person; and (7) the death sentence is valid under this Court’s mandatory review pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(c)(1) (2003). We agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals’ conclusions with respect to the remaining issues and attach as an appendix to this opinion the relevant portions of that court’s decision. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Jerry Jerome Primm
A Davidson County jury convicted the defendant, Jerry Jerome Primm, of second degree murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, and felony murder, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus twenty years. Aggrieved that his convictions were unsupported by sufficient evidence and that his sentences were erroneous, he now brings the instant appeal. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Brian N. Knight, M. Chance Dudley, Kristy Dudley, and D. Chad Dudley v. Flanary & Sons Trucking, Inc., Patrick Ray Strum, J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc. and Sean M. Hansen
This is an automobile accident case. The plaintiffs were traveling on the interstate in a pickup truck pulling a U-Haul trailer. The individual defendants were each driving a commercial eighteen-wheeler truck and were following the plaintiffs, one behind the other. The plaintiffs came upon road construction and slowed to a stop. The defendant driving the truck immediately behind the plaintiffs could not stop; he swerved to the right and hit the plaintiffs’ U-Haul. The defendant driving the second truck behind the plaintiffs was also unable to stop. He struck both the U-Haul and the pickup truck, causing both vehicles to catch fire and resulting in serious personal injuries to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs sued the drivers of both of the eighteen-wheeler trucks and their employers for damages resulting from the accident. The plaintiffs’ claim against the driver of the second truck and his employer was settled. The plaintiffs then proceeded to trial against the driver of the first truck and his employer. After a jury trial, the jury returned a verdict finding in favor of the plaintiffs, concluding that the defendant driving the first truck was 25% at fault for the accident. The defendants appeal, arguing that no material evidence supports the jury’s finding that their negligence caused the plaintiffs’ damages. We affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Bancorpsouth Bank, Inc. v. Billy J. Hatchel
In this appeal, we are asked to review the trial court’s decision regarding the damages incurred by the plaintiff in a breach of contract action. The plaintiff, a bank, attempted to sell a parcel of distressed real estate containing residential dwelling units at a foreclosure sale. The defendant placed the highest bid for the property, but he subsequently refused to consummate the transaction. After the sale, a dispute arose over who would be responsible for certain repairs, and the defendant, who did not inspect the property prior to placing a bid, apparently felt that the property was not worth the amount he bid for it. The bank brought suit for breach of contract, but it failed to present any evidence of the property’s fair market value on the date of breach. After a bench trial in the matter, but before the trial court entered its final judgment, the bank sought to introduce additional evidence in the form of a second foreclosure sale conducted post-trial. The bank asserted that the amount it received at the second foreclosure sale represented the fair market value of the property. After considering this additional evidence, the trial court entered a judgment finding that the bank failed to present evidence of the property’s fair market value on the date of the breach. Accordingly, the trial court concluded that the bank was not entitled to the damages it sought as a result of the breach. The bank appealed that decision to this Court. We affirm. |
Weakley | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jessica Trotter And Andrew Sheriff
Through forgery and credit card fraud, defendants, Trotter and Sheriff, stole approximately half a million dollars from Trotter’s employer. After both defendants had pleaded guilty to theft of property over sixty thousand dollars, a Class B felony, the trial court imposed an eight-year sentence upon each defendant. The defendants applied for alternative sentencing; the trial court denied the application on the grounds of general deterrence and depreciation of the seriousness of the offense. On appeal, the intermediate court reversed the trial court’s judgment and imposed alternative sentences of twelve months incarceration, with the balance to be served on probation. We accepted the State’s petition for review of this cause under Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure in order to determine whether the intermediate court erred in reversing the trial court’s sentences of confinement and substituting alternative sentences. We conclude that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in modifying the defendants’ sentences. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and the judgment of the trial court is reinstated. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Gilbert Waters, et al. v. Wesley Coker, M.D.
Plaintiff in medical malpractice action appeals jury verdict alleging that the “dynamite charge” which supplemented the original instruction after the jury was apparently deadlocked violated Kersey v. State and its progeny. We agree and, because we find the instruction affected the result, we reverse. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Castile
The appellant, James Castile, was indicted with charges of manufacturing methamphetamine, possession of methamphetamine with intent to sell, possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver and criminal impersonation. Prior to trial, the trial court denied a motion to suppress the evidence which alleged that the evidence seized as a result of a search of his person and a search of his hotel room was unconstitutional. After a jury trial, the appellant was found guilty of manufacturing methamphetamine, possession of methamphetamine with the intent to deliver, simple possession of methamphetamine and criminal impersonation. At a sentencing hearing, the trial court disregarded the simple possession conviction as a lesser-included offense of the manufacturing and possession counts and sentenced the appellant as a Range II offender to an eight-year sentence for manufacturing methamphetamine, an eight-year sentence for possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver and a six-month probationary sentence for criminal impersonation. The trial court ordered the sentences to run concurrently to each other, but consecutively to a previously imposed sentence for which the appellant was on probation from the State of Kentucky. After the denial of a motion for new trial, the appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, the appellant argues that: (1) the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict; (3) the trial court erred by sentencing the appellant as a Range II offender and; (4) the trial court erred by ordering the sentence to be served consecutively to the Kentucky sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Nancy Woodall Hunt v. Gary Franklin Hunt
Husband appeals the action of the trial court asserting that the trial court erred in denying his pro se motion for a continuance after allowing his attorney to withdraw. He further asserts that the trial court erred in the disposition of marital property. The action of the trial court in denying a continuance and granting a divorce to Wife is affirmed. The action of the trial court on all other issues is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Reese L. Smith, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
The Defendant, Reese L. Smith Jr., was convicted of two counts of impersonating a licensed professional, and the trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of two years for each count to be served on probation. On appeal, the Defendant seemingly contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. Finding that there exists no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Robertson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, ex rel. Donnie Diane Little v. James Gearin
This appeal involves a retroactive modification of a child support order. The legal custodian of the child at issue received state benefits on behalf of the child. The State, on behalf of the custodian, filed a petition against the father to set child support. In August 2000, the trial court granted the petition, set child support, and entered an order establishing that the father owed a child support arrearage of $14,000 as of the date of the order. This order was not appealed. Years later, the father filed a petition for custody of the child. After a hearing, the trial court granted him custody of the child and terminated his future child support obligation. The trial court’s order also gave the father a $2,962 “credit” toward the arrearage established in the August 2000 order. The State filed a motion to alter or amend, arguing that the trial court was not permitted to retroactively modify the arrearage established in the earlier order. This motion was denied. The State now appeals. We reverse, finding that the trial court erred in retroactively modifying the arrearage amount set out in the original order. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
Herman Phillips v. Tennessee Department of Correction
This is a petition for a common law writ of certiorari arising out of prison disciplinary proceedings. The prison disciplinary board charged the petitioner with money laundering, a state offense. After a hearing, he was found guilty of the charge and sentenced to punitive and administrative segregation. He filed this petition for a common law writ of certiorari, challenging the board’s disciplinary decision. The writ was granted, and the record of the disciplinary proceedings was sent to the trial court for review. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment. The respondent filed a notice that it did not intend to respond to the motion, because the record had already been sent to the trial court for review. The trial court dismissed the petition on the merits without first addressing the petitioner’s motion for summary judgment. The petitioner now appeals, arguing that the trial court was required to decide his motion for summary judgment before addressing the merits of his petition. We affirm, concluding that, under the circumstances, the trial court was under no obligation to address the petitioner’s motion for summary judgment prior to dismissing the action. |
Lauderdale | Court of Appeals | |
Robin Davis v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Robin Davis, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, he asserts that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Donald Eugene Fowlkes
The Defendant, Donald Eugene Fowlkes, appeals from the order of the trial court revoking his probation and ordering that his eight-year sentence be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and ordering that his sentence be served in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Millard E. Smith
Millard E. Smith, the defendant, was indicted and stood trial on one count of aggravated rape. A jury convicted the defendant on the lesser included offense of rape (Class B felony). The defendant was sentenced as a repeat, violent offender to life without parole. He now appeals his conviction, asserting that the evidence was insufficient to convict. After review, we conclude the evidence was overwhelming and affirm the judgment of conviction. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mark J. Metz v. State of Tennessee
In December of 2004, the petitioner pled guilty to attempted especially aggravated robbery and aggravated robbery. On May 25, 2005, the petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief. By order on June 13, 2005, the post-conviction court denied the petition without appointing counsel or holding an evidentiary hearing. The petitioner appeals arguing that the post-conviction court should have held a hearing. The State concedes that the petitioner is correct. We agree as well. We reverse the decision of the post-conviction court and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Betty G. Brown v. Gary A. Hugo
Betty Brown (“Plaintiff”) was involved in an automobile accident where her car was struck in the rear by the vehicle driven by Gary Hugo (“Defendant”). Plaintiff subsequently filed suit against Defendant in order to recover medical expenses for injuries Plaintiff claims to have incurred as a result of the accident along with other damages. At trial, the jury found that Plaintiff was not entitled to recover from Defendant. Plaintiff appeals arguing that the jury’s verdict was unsupported by competent and credible material evidence. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Ricky Butler v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner pled guilty to two counts of aggravated sexual battery. He later filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court held a hearing on May 8, 2003. The court then entered an order on May 9, 2003 denying the petition. The petitioner filed a pro se notice of appeal over a year and a month later on June 17, 2004. We now dismiss the petitioner’s appeal because the notice of appeal was filed outside of the thirty days required under Rule 4 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Paul Dennis Reid, Jr. v. State of Tennessee - Concurring and Dissenting
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Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Paul Dennis Reid, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
We granted interlocutory review in this post-conviction capital case to clarify the procedure for determining competency to proceed in a post-conviction action. For the reasons explained herein, we hold that the civil standard for mental incompetence adopted in State v. Nix, 40 S.W.3d 459 (Tenn. 2001), applies to a competency determination during post-conviction proceedings. To trigger a hearing on competency, a petitioner must make a prima facie showing of incompetence by submission of affidavits, depositions, medical reports, or other credible evidence. A petitioner bears the burden of proving that he or she is incompetent by clear and convincing evidence. A finding of incompetence requires neither a stay of the post-conviction proceedings nor abeyance of individual issues. A trial court should appoint, if necessary, a “next friend” or guardian ad litem to pursue the action on behalf of the petitioner. Accordingly, the decision of the trial court is affirmed as modified, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Ennix Hariston, et al. v. Lillian B. Newsom
This appeal stems from a negligence action resulting from an automobile accident. A husband and wife filed suit against the defendant alleging personal injury and property damage resulting from the defendant’s alleged negligence that caused the automobile accident involving the wife and the defendant. In addition to the wife’s claims, the husband brought claims against the defendant for loss of consortium and loss of services. Additionally, the wife’s uninsured motorist insurance carrier was served but unnamed. Both Newsom and the uninsured motorist insurance carrier filed Motions to Exclude All Medical Proof of Plaintiff and Motion for Summary Judgment. The circuit court granted the defendant’s and the unnamed but served uninsured motorist insurance carrier’s Motions to Exclude All Medical Proof of Plaintiff and Motion for Summary Judgment. The order adjudicated the wife’s personal injury claims only. On appeal, the plaintiffs assert that the circuit court erred when it granted the defendant’s and the unnamed but served uninsured motorist insurance carrier’s Motions to Exclude All Medical Proof of Plaintiff and Motion for Summary Judgment. However, because we find that the circuit court failed to execute a final order disposing of all of the plaintiffs’ causes of action, we dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to rule 3(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Tracye Jenae Simpson (Brogden), et al. v. Ralph Edward Simpson - Concurring and Dissenting
I concur in much of the judgment and rationale of the majority opinion. I agree with the majority’s statement “that the five payments made directly to the child totaling $2,740 were gratuitous or otherwise should not be considered as a credit against Father’s child support obligation.” I also agree with the majority’s treatment of Father’s issues pertaining to (1) the trial court’s refusal to permit Father to testify regarding child support payments made by him “when he had no documentary evidence supporting the amount of those payments,” and (2) the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees. However, I disagree with the majority’s judgment that Father should be granted credit against his general $60 per week child support obligation to Mother for payments made by him “at the direction of [Mother].” |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Tracye Jenae Simpson (Brogden), et al. v. Ralph Edward Simpson
This appeal involves child support arrearages incurred by Ralph Edward Simpson (“Father”) over the course of many years. Following a trial, the Trial Court concluded that certain payments made directly to the child were gratuitous and should not count as a credit against Father’s child support obligation. The Trial Court also concluded that various payments made by Father to third parties for expenses incurred on the child’s behalf and which were made as expressly directed by Tracye Jenae Simpson (“Mother”) also should not count as credits against Father’s child support obligation. We affirm the Trial Court’s conclusion with respect to the money sent directly to the child. However, we conclude that the Trial Court erred in its conclusion that Father should not be given a credit for payments made to third parties for expenses related to the child and which were made by Father in accordance with the express directives of Mother. The judgment of the Trial Court is, therefore, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Suntrust Bank v. Sheep Inc., and Marilyn Powell
The Trial Court dismissed the case on the grounds the process issued more than one year after the issuance of the previous process was invalid. On appeal, we vacate. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Sedley Alley v. State of Tennessee
In 1985, the Petitioner, Sedley Alley, was convicted of aggravated rape, kidnapping, and first degree murder. For the capital crime of first degree murder, the jury imposed the sentence of death. Petitioner Alley’s execution was scheduled for May 17, 2006; however, on May 16, 2006, the |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kenneth Lyle Davis
The defendant, Kenneth Lyle Davis, appeals from the trial court’s order revoking his probation and reinstating his original sentence of two years. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals |