Ronald K. Pendergraph, v. J. Hilton Conger
M2005-01595-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Judge Larry B. Stanley, Jr.

In this action for legal malpractice against defendant attorney, the Trial Court granted defendant summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff, as a condition precedent to maintaining the malpractice action, had to obtain post-judgment relief from his criminal conviction, which plaintiff had failed to do after bringing his post-judgment action. On appeal, we affirm.

Wendy L. Clark v. Randal Lee Arthur
M2005-01719-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Tom E. Gray

This appeal involves petitions for contempt and to modify a custody order. Both the mother and the father filed petitions seeking to have the initial custody order modified, and both asked that the other parent be held in contempt for failing to comply with the parenting plan. They presented various arguments about why custody should be changed in their favor, but neither alleged that any circumstances had changed since the initial order was entered. The trial court dismissed both petitions after finding that both parties had failed to prove a material change in circumstances to justify a modification of the custody order. The court also dismissed both petitions for contempt. For the following reasons, we affirm.

Cummins Station, LLC v. Allison Batey
M2005-2508-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Hamilton V. Gayden, Jr.

This case arises from a default judgment entered against Appellant for failure to comply with an Order to Compel. Appellant appeals. We affirm and remand for determination of damages for frivolous appeal.

Patsy D. Ownby v. Marriot Hotel Services, Inc., D/B/A Marriot Business Services, et al.
E2006-01901-WC-R3-WC
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge Jon Kerry Blackwood
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Dale Young

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 5-6- 225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer asserts that the trial court erred in finding that the employee's injury, caused by a fall in the workplace, arose from her employment. We agree with the findings of the trial court and in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 5-6-225(e) (2) affirm the judgment of the trial court. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Trial Court Affirmed JON KERRY BLACKWOOD, SR. J., in which WILLIAM M. BARKER, C.J., and J. S. (STEVE) DANIEL, Sr. J.,joined. Daniel T. Swanson, Knoxville, TN, for the Appellant, Patsy Diane Ownby. John P. Dreiser, Knoxville, TN, for the Appellee, Marriott Hotel Services, Inc., d/b/a Marriott Business Services. MEMORANDUM OPINION I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Patsy D. Ownby [hereinafter "the employee"] was employed as a billing specialist for Marriot Hotel Services [hereinafter "the employer"]. She began her employment with the employer in 2. -1- She had an associate's degree in accounting and was 53 years old at the time of trial. On August 15, 23, the employee was attending a daily "stand-up meeting" within her department. As the meeting was concluding, she testified that she walked down an aisle and "her feet caught on the carpet" causing her to fall. She described the fall as "being shot out of a rocket." She further testified that she was wearing non-skid office type shoes, that she had previously stumbled on the carpet, and that she was aware that other employees had stumbled. As a result of the fall, the employee suffered carpet burns on both hands and knees, broke her glasses and watch, and sustained injuries to her right arm, cervical spine and left knee. After the accident, the employee saw Dr. Basile, who was a physician offered to her as a part of a panel of physicians provided by the employer. Dr. Basile referred the employee to several physicians to treat her for her injuries. She was treated by Dr. Finelli with therapy and medication for her cervical spine injury. Dr. Finelli referred her to Dr. Bellner, a physiatrist. Dr. Koenig performed surgery on employee's left knee. She was also seen by Dr. Killeffer for a cervical spine evaluation and Dr. Burns for an arm evaluation. Dr. William E. Kennedy saw the employee for an independent medical evaluation and agreed with Dr. Finelli's assessment that the employee had suffered a 7% impairment of the cervical spine. In addition, Dr. Kennedy, who testified by deposition, further opined that the employee's left knee had a 2% whole body impairment rating, for a combined rating of 9%. II. RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT The trial court found the injury to be compensable, and awarded 22.5% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. III. STANDARD OF REVIEW The standard of review of issues of fact is de novo upon the record of the trial court accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2); Lollar v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 767 S.W.2d 143, 149 (Tenn. 1989). Where the trial judge has seen and heard the witnesses, especially if issues of credibility and weight to be given oral testimony are involved, considerable deference must be afforded those circumstances on review since the trial court had the opportunity to observe the witness's demeanor and to hear in-court testimony. Long v. Tri-Con Industries, Ltd., 996 S.W.2d 173, 178 (Tenn. 1999). IV. ANALYSIS The only issue raised by the employer is whether the trial court erred in finding that the injury arose out of employee's employment. The employer contends that the employee's injuries were caused by an idiopathic fall, and thus not compensable. -2- ****** Document Outline ****** * Page_1 * Page_2 * Page_3 * Page_4 o 4 o 5 o 6 o 7 o 8

Bobby Chris Couch v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company & Jackson Manufacturing Company
E2006-01253-WC-R3-WC
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge J. S. (Steve) Daniel,
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Jerri Bryant

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court findings of fact and conclusions of law. Bobby Chris Couch was injured within the course and scope of his employment when he fell while unloading a truck. During the fall he caught his right leg between the truck and the loading dock. This resulted in a crushing injury to the right leg and a back sprain. Mr. Couch filed a complaint seeking to recover workers’ compensation benefits for permanent partial disability to his leg and back. The trial court awarded 5% partial disability to the lower extremity. However, the court found no permanent impairment to the back. The court’s final order required the employer to be responsible for future medical benefits for the leg and back injury. The employer has appealed only the award of future medical benefits for the back injury claiming that the trial court erred in making such an award when there was no expert medical proof of either permanent impairment or work limitations for the back injury. After review we affirm the trial’s court findings.

Amanda Dawn Alderidge v. Lynn Vernon Alderidge, Jr.
M2004-02568-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Frank Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert L. Holloway

In this divorce proceeding, the appellant contends the trial court erred by granting the divorce to his wife and designating her as the primary residential parent of their minor child. Finding no error, we affirm.

John Anthony Melton v. Jennifer Shannon Profitt (Melton) Johnson
M2006-01412-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel Pickens Franks
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Leonard W. Martin

At the time the parties were divorced, they essentially agreed to a joint custodial arrangement for their two children. Subsequently, the father filed a Petition alleging change of circumstances and for primary custody of the children. The wife filed a Counter-petition for primary custody. The Trial Court heard evidence and awarded primary custody to the father. The mother has appealed. We affirm.

Cornelius D. Pierce v. Tommy Mills, Warden
W2006-02588-CCA-R3-HC
Authoring Judge: Judge J. C. McLin
Trial Court Judge: Judge R. Lee Moore Jr.

The Petitioner, Cornelius D. Pierce, appeals the lower court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to comply with the procedural requirements for seeking habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's dismissal.

Maggie Lee Banks v. Jack C. Sanford, M.D., et al.
W2006-00703-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Judge Kay S. Robilio

After receiving a routine hormone injection, the plaintiff patient experienced pain, facial swelling, numbness, and blindness. The plaintiff filed a complaint against the clinic, its employee physician, and the employer of the nurse who had administered the injection, alleging medical malpractice. The defendant clinic and physician filed a motion for summary judgment, and attached the expert affidavit of the defendant physician in which he stated that all of the defendants had treated the plaintiff in accordance with the relevant standard of care and according to their best medical judgment. After the physician’s deposition was taken, the plaintiff filed a motion for a determination by the trial court that his previously filed affidavit had been filed in bad faith, citing alleged inconsistencies with his deposition testimony and discovery admissions. The nurse’s employer filed a motion for summary judgment that relied upon the physician’s deposition testimony that the nurse had acted in accordance with the relevant standard of care and that the actions of the nurse had not caused the plaintiff’s injuries. A hearing was held at which the trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion to find that the physician’s affidavit had been made in bad faith, and the trial court allowed the plaintiff additional time in which to produce expert proof of causation. After the plaintiff was unable to obtain expert proof, the trial court ultimately granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment. The plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Johnny Parker v. Stephen Dotson, Warden, And State Of Tennessee
W2006-02238-CCA-R3-HC
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph H. Walker, III

The Petitioner, Johnny Parker, appeals the lower court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to assert a ground that would entitle him to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's dismissal.

State of Tennessee v. Jeffrey A. Sundahl, Alias
E2006-00569-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge Mary Beth Leibowitz

Knox County- The defendant, Jeffrey A. Sundahl, was charged with four counts of unlawfully and knowingly depriving the state of the realization of its lawful revenue by failing to remit sales tax revenue, a Class E felony; one count of unlawfully and knowingly delaying, hampering, impeding, obstructing, and thwarting the state in its collection of its lawful revenue by failing to register with the state under Tennessee Code Annotated section 67-6-601, a Class E felony; and one count of theft over $60,000, a Class B felony. The trial court dismissed all six charges on statute of limitations grounds. The state appeals the dismissals. We affirm the judgments of the trial court as to counts 1 through 5. We conclude, however, that the trial court wrongly applied a three-year statute of limitations to the theft count, count 6, and we reverse the judgment as to that count.

Eric Todd Jackson v. State of Tennessee
M2004-00926-COA-R3-WM
Authoring Judge: Judge Frank Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Ross H. Hicks

Appellant, who was the defendant in a previous criminal proceeding, filed a Writ of Mandamus seeking to obtain a refund of the bond he posted in the criminal case. The trial court dismissed the petition. Finding no error, we affirm.

Keith Alan Jordan v. QW Memphis Corp., Quebecor World Dickson, Inc. and Travelers Indemnity Company of Illinois
M2005-02927-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Special Judge Jeffrey S. Bivins

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that the employee had suffered a work-related back injury and awarded the employee permanent partial disability benefits of 57.5% to the body as a whole. The employer appeals, contending that the employee’s back problems did not arise out of his employment. We affirm the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. William Shane Bright
E2006-01906-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Curtis Smith

The defendant was indicted for three counts of solicitation to commit first degree murder, committed while he was in prison for a previous, unrelated conviction. The defendant pled guilty to the three counts. As part of his plea agreement, he received three sentences of ten years each to be served concurrently. In a separate sentencing hearing, the trial court determined that the three concurrent sentences should be served consecutively to the sentence he was serving at the time the crimes were committed. The defendant appeals, arguing that he should have received concurrent sentences and that he was entitled to pre-trial jail credits for time served between the continuation of a parole hearing and his sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In Re: Estate of W. Garnett Ladd, Sr., W. Garnett Ladd, III, et al. v. Robert C. Marks
M2005-02089-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Michael R. Jones

The matters at issue pertain to the fee awarded a Co-Executor of an estate.  The Co-Executor appeals contending he was entitled to a contractual fee equal to five percent of the gross estate based on an oral agreement with the ninety-four year old widow of the testator who served as his co-executor. The Special Master and Chancellor made concurrent findings that the appellant had failed to properly administer the estate. They also found that his claimed excuse, that he was acting according to the wishes of his ninety-four year old Co-Executrix, did not relieve him of his affirmative fiduciary duties as a personal representative. The Chancellor awarded him a fee of $25,000 for his services as Co-Executor.  We have concluded he is entitled to no fee for his services.

State of Tennessee v. Shad Tankersley
W2005-02901-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge Arthur T. Bennett

The Appellant, Shad Tankersly, was found guilty of violating his probation and ordered to serve his sentence in incarceration. On appeal, he challenges the trial court’s decision to revoke probation, asking this Court to determine whether a warrant is required to initiate a probation revocation proceeding and toll the time limitation within which to revoke probation. We hold that T.C.A. § 40- 35-311 plainly requires the issuance of a warrant to initiate a probation revocation proceeding, and, that in the absence of the issuance of a warrant during the probationary period, as is the case here, there is no tolling of the period. Therefore, we reverse and remand the judgment of the trial court.

Linda Bush v. Adworks Advertising Outdoor, LLC
W2006-00763-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor D. J. Alissandratos

This is a property case involving a restrictive covenant. The homeowners in a subdivision entered into a restrictive covenant agreement with the original developer of a tract of land directly across the highway from the residential subdivision. The restrictive covenant prohibits the use of the developer’s property for “billboards . . . not in place on December 1, 1995.” On December 1, 1995, three billboard structures existed on the burdened property. Years later, the defendant billboard company purchased easements in the three billboard sites and the existing billboard structures were removed. The defendant billboard company then erected three new billboard structures.  Subsequently, the plaintiff homeowner in the subdivision filed the instant lawsuit for injunctive and declaratory relief, alleging that the defendant billboard company’s placement of new billboard structures on the burdened property constituted a violation of the restrictive covenant. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant billboard company, and the plaintiff homeowner now appeals. We affirm, finding that the language of the restrictive covenant is unambiguous, and that it restricts only the use of the burdened property, limiting the use to the number of billboards on the property as of December 1, 1995.

Cumulus Broadcasting, et al. v. Jay W. Shim, et al.
M2003-02593-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Gary R. Wade
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Ellen Hobbs Lyle

The chancery court granted a motion for summary judgment to the Plaintiff on the theory of adverse possession under the common law. The Court of Appeals reversed and dismissed based upon Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-2-110 (2000), holding that there was a failure on the part of the Plaintiff to pay real estate taxes on the land area at issue. We granted permission to appeal in order to determine whether the chancellor erred by failing to address a motion to amend before ruling on the motion for summary judgment and also to consider whether the statutory bar applies in these circumstances. Although the chancellor erred by failing to grant the motion to amend before entering judgment, the error was harmless because the statutory bar to an adverse possession claim does not apply to contiguous tracts where the area of dispute is not substantial and each of the owners have paid taxes on their respective properties.

State of Tennessee v. Raymond Lee Gibson
E2006-00450-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Rebecca J. Stern

The defendant, Raymond Lee Gibson, was convicted by a Hamilton County jury of one count of manufacturing methamphetamine. On appeal, he raises several evidentiary issues for our review and argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. After review of the record, we are not persuaded that the evidentiary issues merit relief, and we hold that the evidence at trial was sufficient to support the manufacturing conviction. The judgment of conviction is, therefore, affirmed.

State of Tennessee v. Shannon Richard Hudson, alias Richard Shannon Hudson
E2005-02859-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judges Stephen M. Bevil and Jon Kerry Blackwood

The defendant, Shannon Richard Hudson, was found guilty by a Hamilton County jury of three counts of aggravated sexual battery and one count of attempted aggravated sexual battery. The three counts of aggravated sexual battery were merged, and the defendant received an effective twenty-seven-year sentence in the Department of Correction. He was sentenced to twenty years for the aggravated sexual battery conviction and to seven years for the attempted aggravated sexual battery conviction, to be served consecutively for a total effective sentence of twenty-seven years. On appeal, he contends that: the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions; the trial court erred in allowing the jury to have access to the indictment during their deliberation; and the trial court should have merged all of his convictions. After careful review, we find no error and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

David Holt, et al. v. Barbara Pyles, et al. - Concurring and Dissenting
M2005-02092-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge Walter C. Kurtz

I concur in the majority’s conclusion that the policy is not ambiguous and does not include excess coverage for injuries caused by uninsured motorists. I disagree, however, with the majority’s resolution of the estoppel claim because I do not agree that the requirements for summary judgment for the insurer on that claim were met. 

To properly support its motion, the moving party must either affirmatively negate an essential element of the non-moving party’s claim or conclusively establish an affirmative defense. If the moving party fails to negate a claimed basis for the suit, the non-moving party’s burden to produce evidence establishing the existence of a genuine issue for trial is not triggered and the motion for summary judgment must fail. If the moving party successfully negates a claimed basis for the action, the non-moving party may not simply rest upon the pleadings, but must offer proof to establish the existence of the essential elements of the claim.

Staples v. CBL & Associates, Inc., 15 S.W.3d 83, 88-89 (Tenn. 2000) (citations omitted). Thus, if, but only if, the moving party presents evidence sufficient to justify grant of the motion if the facts remain uncontested, the nonmoving party is required to come forward with some significant probative evidence which makes it necessary to resolve a factual dispute at trial. Where the moving party satisfactorily challenges the nonmoving party’s ability to prove an essential element of its claim, the nonmoving party has the burden of pointing out, rehabilitating, or providing new evidence to create a factual dispute as to that element. Staples, 15 S.W.3d at 88-89; Rains v. Bend of the
River, 124 S.W.3d 580, 587-88 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). 

A defendant moving for summary judgment must, in its filings supporting the motion, either affirmatively negate an essential element of the non-moving party’s claim or conclusively establish an affirmative defense. Blair v. West Town Mall, 130 S.W.2d 761, 767 (Tenn. 2004); Staples, 105 S.W.3d at 88-89. Only if the moving party presents evidence sufficient to justify grant of the motion if the facts remain uncontested is the nonmoving party required to come forward with some significant probative evidence which makes it necessary to resolve a factual dispute at trial. 

A defendant moving for summary judgment cannot rely solely on omissions in the plaintiff’s proof. McCarley v. West Quality Food Service, 960 S.W.2d 585, 588 (Tenn. 1998) (holding that the plaintiff’s inability to show whether his food poisoning was caused by defendant’s chicken or by food eaten at breakfast did not suffice to affirmatively negate the causation element of his negligence claim). Mere assertions that the non-moving party has produced no evidence do not suffice to entitle the moving party to summary judgment. Blair, 130 S.W.3d at 767-68; Staples, 15 S.W.3d at 88-89; Blanchard v. Kellum, 975 S.W.2d 522, 525 (Tenn. 1998); McCarley, 960 S.W.2d at 588; Arnett v. Domino’s Pizza, 124 S.W.3d 529, 532 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). 

I cannot read the “New Policy Coverage Summary” as putting a reasonable person on notice that the “Optional Excess Protection” provision does not apply to the uninsured motorist coverage.  While the relationship between the excess protection coverage and the uninsured motorist coverage is made clear in the lengthy policy itself, specifically the Optional Excess Liability Coverage endorsement or form, nothing in Mr. Holt’s affidavit indicates he received that form or the entire policy before the accident. His affidavit refers only to the policy summary. Apparently, Encompass did not file an affidavit stating that it had provided the complete policy to Mr. Holt. 

In any event, I believe that Mr. Holt’s affidavit raises sufficient questions about misrepresentation by the agent as to his protection under the excess coverage provision and his reasonable reliance on those representations to preclude summary judgment. 

[A] representation of fact made to a party who relies thereon with the right to so rely may not be denied . . . if such denial would result in injury or damage to the relying party. Negligent silence . . . [or] conduct which . . . in fact mislead will work an estoppel notwithstanding there was no intention to do so. 

Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Avery, 914 F.2d 255, 1990 WL 132245, at *5 (6th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted) (summarizing Tennessee law). 

Questions of reasonable reliance and misrepresentation are fact specific. I believe Mr. Holt has testified to sufficient facts to present a question for the fact finder. Encompass has not negated an essential element of the estoppel claim and, therefore, is not entitled to summary judgment.
 

David Holt, et al. v. Barbara Pyles, et al. and David Holt, et al. v. State of Tennessee
M2005-02092-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Judge Walter C. Kurtz

This case concerns a motor vehicle accident in which serious injuries were sustained. The insured believed that his insurance policy provided excess coverage if he were to be involved in an accident with an uninsured or underinsured motorist. In forming this belief, he relied upon statements by the insurance agent and the summary pages of his policy. Following the accident, the insurance company denied that the insured maintained excess protection under his uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage, citing an exclusionary endorsement in the policy. The insured alleged that the policy was ambiguous. The trial court granted the insurance company’s Motion For Summary Judgment, ruling that the policy was not ambiguous and that the insured’s affidavit was insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to the representations made by the insurance agent. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Elaine M. and Larry J. Larson v. Tommy K. Halliburton
M2004-02435-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Judge Clara W. Byrd

Grandparents filed petition for contempt against Father for willfully denying Grandparents their court-ordered summer visitation and weekend visitation with grandchildren. Grandparents also requested a mental evaluation and counseling for both Father and the minor children. The trial court found Father in criminal contempt and ordered that the eldest child, B.H., undergo counseling. Father appeals arguing that the trial court erred in (1) holding him in criminal contempt of court and entering sanctions against him; and (2) ordering B.H. to undergo counseling. The judgment of the trial court is vacated in part, affirmed in part and remanded.

Girtman & Associates, Inc. v. Stephen St. Amour, et al.
M2005-00936-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Ellen Hobbs Lyle

A commercial dealer in doors and associated hardware sued a former employee for breach of a non-compete agreement. The dealer asked the court to award it either injunctive relief or liquidated damages in the amount of $321,500. After a bench trial the trial court concluded that the non-compete agreement was unenforceable under the circumstances and dismissed the claim for liquidated damages. The court did, however, award the plaintiff nominal damages of $200 on its claim of unfair competition based on use of a proprietary form, as well as punitive damages of $3,000 on the same claim. The dealer appealed. We affirm the trial court.

Joseph C. Curtsinger, Jr. M.D. v. HCA, Inc.
M2006-00590-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Ellen Hobbs Lyle

Davidson County- Surgeon filed action against hospital and other related persons and entities seeking injunctive relief and monetary damages for the allegedly improper revocation of his hospital privileges and the false reporting of such to the State Medical Board and the National Practitioner Data Bank. The trial court granted Defendants partial summary judgment on all monetary claims asserted by surgeon pursuant to the Health Care Quality Improvement Act (HCQIA) and the Tennessee Peer Review Law. Having found that surgeon failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendants did not satisfy the four prong test for immunity provided under HCQIA, we affirm the decision of the trial court in all respects.