Lee Pittman v. Williamson County
This appeal comes from the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s governmental tort liability claim |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Timothy DeWayne Gardner v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Timothy Dewayne Gardner, was convicted by a jury in the Robertson County Circuit Court of possessing over 300 grams of cocaine with intent to sell. The petitioner received a sentence of seventeen years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, the petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner now appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Robertson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Samuel Eugene Webster
Defendant, Samuel Eugene Webster, was charged with aggravated kidnapping and aggravated rape. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, he pled guilty to simple rape, a Class B felony, with a sentence of eight years and the manner of service to be decided by the trial court following a sentencing hearing. The charge of aggravated kidnapping was dismissed. Following a sentencing hearing, he was sentenced to serve eight years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his request for alternative sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Colby M. Reynaud v. John Koehler, et al.
This case arises out of a dispute between adjacent landowners regarding whether an easement can be obstructed by a locked gate. The plaintiff placed a locked gate across the easement and asserts that it is necessary for the protection of her person and property. The defendants disagree and argue that the locked gate unreasonably interferes with ingress and egress to their property. The trial court found in favor of the plaintiff. We find that the plaintiff has failed to present sufficient evidence that her person or property is at risk and that she has unsuccessfully attempted alternate means of protecting same and, therefore, it is our determination that plaintiff has failed to prove that the locked gate is necessary. We further find that the locked gate unreasonably interferes with the defendants' use of the easement. Based upon these findings, we reverse the judgment of the trial court in part, affirm in part, and remand. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Laveley Brown v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Lavely Brown, was convicted of first degree murder, armed robbery, and aggravated kidnapping, and the trial court sentenced him, as a Range II offender, to life imprisonment for the murder conviction, and two concurrent sentences of forty years for the armed robbery and aggravated kidnapping convictions. On appeal, this Court affirmed the Petitioner's convictions and sentences. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition because: (1) the State withheld exculpatory information from him; (2) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct in its closing arguments; (3) the trial court conducted an improper ex parte conference with an appellate court judge; (4) the trial court improperly instructed the jury; and (5) he received ineffective assistance counsel. After thoroughly reviewing the record and the applicable law, we conclude that there exists no reversible error in the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kenneth Edward Winn vs. Hallie Jones Winn
This is a divorce case. The husband filed a petition for divorce after five years of marriage. Following a trial, the trial court entered a final decree detailing the equitable distribution of the parties' property. The wife filed a motion to alter or amend the decree, arguing, among other things, that some of the property awarded to the husband was not marital property. The trial court denied that motion. The wife now appeals. We affirm, noting that, in the absence of a transcript or a statement of the evidence, we must presume that the evidence supported the trial court's rulings related to the equitable distribution of the parties' property. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Austin
The defendant appeals his conviction for second degree murder on the grounds of (1) insufficient evidence to support the verdict and (2) the sentence, pursuant to Blakely issues. After review, we find sufficient evidence to support the verdict. The Tennessee sentencing structure is not impacted by Blakely, therefore, the sentence is affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Conservatorship of LaJuana Yvette Brown Delisa Provost v. Alton Brown And Ron Nance, Conservators
This appeal arises out of a petition filed by the conservators requesting the imposition of a constructive trust on assets received by the appellant after the decedent’s death. After issuing a temporary restraining order, testimony was taken and the trial court determined that the decedent intended for all funds received by the appellant upon decedent’s death to be held in trust for decedent’s daughter, the ward. The trial court imposed a constructive trust on these assets, ordered that the assets be paid over to the conservator of the ward’s estate, and determined that the appellant was an unsuitable trustee for the funds. The trial court further ordered that the appellant would bear the costs of the proceedings but the conservators were responsible for their attorney’s fees. This appeal followed. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Gary W. Baker v. Joseph Smith & Deborah Smith, In the Matter of: T.M.S., A Child Under 18 Years of Age
In this appeal we are called upon to evaluate a juvenile court’s decision regarding a petition to |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kenna Jean Parrott
Following a jury trial, Defendant, Kenna Jean Parrott, was found guilty of theft of property over $60,000, a Class B felony, and forgery of books and records valued at over $60,000, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to eight years for each offense and ordered Defendant's sentences to run concurrently. The trial court ordered six months of the effective eight-year sentence to be served in jail, and the remainder of the effective sentence in Community Corrections. Defendant does not challenge the length or manner of service of her sentence. In her appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Edmund R. Briley, et al. v. Gary W. Chapman, et al.
This appeal involves the question of the statute of limitation for an action for libel of title. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, holding that the proper statute of limitation was found at T.C.A. § 28-3-105. Without reaching a decision on the merits, an examination of the record indicates that the notice of appeal was not timely. Therefore, this Court does not have jurisdiction, and the appeal must be dismissed. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Clayton Wilburn Eslick
The appellant, Clayton Wilburn Eslick, was convicted by a jury in the Marshall County Circuit Court of six counts of passing worthless checks. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of six years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. Upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Harold L. Cassell - Dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion insofar as it places the defendant on judicial diversion. As set forth in the majority opinion, a trial court is obliged to consider a multitude of factors in determining whether to grant a request for judicial diversion. See State v. Cutshaw, 967 S.W.2d 332, 343-44 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997); State v. Bonestel, 871 S.W.2d 163, 168 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993), overruled on other grounds by State v. Hooper, 29 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Tenn. 2000). A trial court is further required to state on the record the weighing process it uses in balancing all of the factors and the calculus relied upon in reaching the ultimate conclusion. See State v. Electroplating, Inc., 990 S.W.2d 211, 229 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). When the trial court follows this procedure and provides a comprehensive record of its decision-making process, then this Court should affirm the trial court’s ruling so long as there is any substantial evidence to support it. See Cutshaw, 967 S.W.2d at 344. However, it is only when the trial court satisfies its obligations in reviewing a request for judicial diversion that this Court is given the opportunity for meaningful appellate review. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Harold L. Cassell
The defendant, Harold L. Cassell, entered an agreed plea to domestic assault, a Class A misdemeanor, and applied for judicial diversion, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-313. The trial court imposed a sentence of 11 months and 29 days to be served on probation and denied the application for judicial diversion. On appeal, the defendant challenges the denial of judicial diversion. Upon review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and grant judicial diversion. The cause is remanded for the imposition of conditions of the probationary term. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Carey Ray Faught
Following a jury trial, Defendant, Carey Ray Faught, was found guilty of carjacking, a Class B felony. At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to nine years. The trial court ordered Defendant's sentence for the current offense to be served consecutively to the sentence he was currently serving in case No. 71405. On appeal, Defendant argues (1) that the trial court erred in not granting his motion to suppress the victim's pre-trial identification; (2) that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for carjacking; (3) that the trial court erred in sentencing Defendant above the minimum of the range for a Range I, standard offender, convicted of a Class B felony; and (4) that the trial court erred in ordering Defendant to serve his sentence for the current offense consecutively to his sentence in case No. 71405. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Wanda Joyce Drake
The appellant, Wanda Joyce Drake, pled guilty in the Cannon County Circuit Court to conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine, possession of a weapon during a felony, and possession of methamphetamine. The appellant received a total effective sentence of two years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying probation. Upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Cannon | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In the Matter of B.L.R., D.O.B. 10/14/02, a Child Under 18 Years of Age
This appeal involves the termination of the parental rights of a biological father to his infant daughter. The day after the daughter was born, the Department of Children’s Services became involved with the family and learned that both the mother and father were using methamphetamine. Shortly after the department became involved in this case, the mother took very little interest in her infant daughter. The department implemented several permanency plans calling for father to demonstrate that he remained drug free and was attending counseling to resolve his addiction. When the father failed to attend counseling on a regular basis and continually tested positive for methamphetamine, the department filed a petition to terminate his parental rights. Following a hearing on the petition, the trial court held that the department had proven, by clear and convincing evidence, all the grounds for termination alleged in the petition. The trial court also held that terminating father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Father appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the grounds for termination, however, we vacate the order and remand this case to the trial court for further action consistent with this opinion. |
Weakley | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lacey Jones
The defendant, Lacey Jones, was convicted of four counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated burglary, and two counts of aggravated robbery. The trial court merged the aggravated robbery convictions into the convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping and ordered a concurrent sentence of thirty-five years for each of the four counts. The trial court ordered the aggravated burglary sentence of seven years to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of forty-two years. In this appeal of right, the defendant argues that his convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery violate principles of due process; that the trial court erred by merging the aggravated robbery convictions into the especially aggravated kidnapping convictions; and that the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentencing. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jimmy Ray Rogers
The appellant, Jimmy Ray Rogers, was convicted by a jury of introducing contraband into a penal institution, possession of marijuana, and driving on a revoked license. He received a total effective sentence of nine years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for introduction of contraband into a penal institution and the length of the sentence imposed for that conviction. Upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we conclude that the appellant's conviction and sentence for introducing contraband into a penal institution should be affirmed; the appellant's conviction for possession of marijuana should merge into his conviction for introducing contraband into a penal institution; a corrected judgment should be entered reflecting that the appellant was found not guilty of possession of drug paraphernalia; and the appellant's conviction for driving on a revoked license should be reinstated. Therefore, this case is remanded to the trial court for sentencing on the appellant's conviction for driving on a revoked license and for correction of the judgments. |
Franklin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Gwendolyn Flowers v. Timothy Flowers
Husband in this divorce action appeals from the judgment entered in the trial court. Absent a transcript or statement of the evidence, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In The Matter Of: C.M.C., C.L.C., and D.A.M.
The trial court terminated Mother's parental rights based on abandonment, substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan, persistence of conditions, and a finding that termination was in the best interests of the children. Mother appeals. We reverse. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brenda Bowers
The appellant, Brenda Bowers, was convicted by a jury of theft of property worth less than $500 dollars. The trial court sentenced the appellant to eleven (11) months and twenty-nine (29) days and ordered the appellant to serve six (6) months of the sentence in incarceration and the remainder of the sentence on probation. After the denial of a motion for new trial, the appellant appealed, presenting the following issues: (1) whether the State improperly introduced evidence of a prior bad act of the appellant; (2) whether the appellant received ineffective assistance of counsel; and (3) whether the trial court correctly sentenced the appellant. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Becca Jo Maroney v. Brandon Lee Maroney
Becca Jo Maroney ("Mother") and Brandon Lee Maroney ("Father") were divorced in September of 2002. The parties agreed at that time for Mother to be the primary residential parent for the parties' son. In July of 2003, Father filed a petition for change of custody claiming there had been a material change in circumstances and that it was in the best interest of the minor child for custody to be transferred to Father. After a trial, the Trial Court concluded that there had been a material change in circumstances and that designating Father as the primary residential parent was in the best interest of the minor child. Mother appeals. We hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court's findings, and the judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Chris Edward Smith
Defendant, Chris Edward Smith, was convicted of the sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony, and was sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to ten years imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant argues (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) that the trial court erred in overruling Defendant's objection to the prosecutor's peremptory challenge of the only African-American prospective juror in the venire; and (3) that the trial court erred when it mistakenly informed the jury that Defendant was also charged with possession of drug paraphernalia. Defendant does not challenge his sentence on appeal. Following a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
McMinn | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
City of Jackson, Tennessee v. Walker-Hall, Inc., et al.
This is an action to recover for damage done to personal property. During the course of a road improvement project, the city placed some heavy equipment and debris alongside the roadway being repaired. An employee of the corporate owner of the land abutting the roadway noticed the debris and an excavator parked adjacent to the roadway during a route inspection of the property. Believing the debris and excavator to be on his employer’s land, the employee had the excavator towed. Apparently, the towing company selected by the landowner’s property manager severely damaged the excavator during the course of removing it. The city subsequently filed suit against the landowner and several other defendants claiming they had negligently harmed the city’s personal property. The trial court held that the landowner was negligent and committed a trespass against the city. The landowner appealed, and we reverse the decision of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Appeals |