Donald E. Smith v. Fleeman's Transport, Inc. and Tennessee Second Injury Fund
This case is before the Court upon the entire record, including the order of referral to the Special Workers’ Compensation Panel, in compliance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Donald E. Smith had suffered a number of injuries prior to and after his employment with Fleeman’s Transport, Inc., but none of these incidents resulted in a disability impairment rating or job restrictions. On November 9, 2000, Mr. Smith suffered a work-related accident which caused him to be permanently and totally disabled. The trial court determined that Mr. Smith reached maximum medical improvement from his injuries on October 23, 2003, and based on the court’s assessments of prior work injuries, apportioned the award of workers’ compensation for the November 9, 2000 injury to both the employer and the State Second Injury Fund. Fleeman’s appeal contends that the trial court erred in assigning the date of maximum medical improvement past the date of the employee’s actual maximum recovery. The Second Injury Fund appeal contends that the trial court erred in assigning it any liability because the employer failed to establish actual knowledge of a prior disability. We find that the proof fails to preponderate against the judgment of the trial court on the date of maximum medical improvement and affirm this portion of the trial court’s decision. We also find that Fleeman’s Transport, Inc. did not establish actual knowledge of disability required for assigning liability to the Second Injury Fund. Consequently, we reverse the trial court’s apportionment of liability for this work-related injury and modify that determination and assign all responsibility and liability for this work-related injury to Fleeman’s Transport, Inc. |
Smith | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Terry Brown v. Ace Property and Casualty Insurance Company and William Bonnell Company, Inc.
This case is before the Court upon the entire record, including the order of referral to the Special Workers’ Compensation Panel, in compliance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Terry Brown sustained a work-related left knee injury on November 4, 2000, when he slipped on a plastic bag and fell on a concrete floor, landing primarily on his left knee. This incident occurred within the scope and course of his employment and was observed by his supervisor. Mr. Brown reported his injury and sought medical care from Dr. Bowdoin Smith with the approval of his employer. Dr. Smith administered nonsurgical treatment for pain and recommended that Mr. Brown receive an MRI scan and returned him to work. The treating physician’s recommendation of an MRI was not carried out and he made no impairment rating. Thereafter, a doctor preforming an independent medical evaluation assigned a 5% impairment to Mr. Brown’s left lower extremity. A second independent medical evaluation assigned a 1% impairment to the left lower extremity for this same injury. Unfortunately for Mr. Brown, on June 7, 2001, he sustained work-related injuries to both of his arms. Mr. Brown filed a complaint for workers’ compensation benefits on June 18, 2001 for all these injuries which was ultimately amended and later settled his claims related to both arm injuries. This settlement order retained as the only issue for ultimate decision, Mr. Brown’s claim for left lower extremity injury. The trial court, after considering the medical and lay evidence, awarded Mr. Brown 45% permanent partial disability to his left lower extremity and the benefits associated therewith. The employer has appealed this decision asserting that this award is excessive and takes into account subsequent injuries to the arms. Therefore, this appeal is limited to whether the trial court’s award was excessive. After carefully considering the record, we find that although the award of the trial court is generous, we affirm the trial court’s determination. |
Macon | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Brenda and Stanley Morrison v. Citizen State Bank
This is the third action between Stanley Morrison and Citizen State Bank concerning a series of promissory notes and security agreements. In the first action, Citizen State Bank filed a civil warrant in General Sessions Court against Stanley Morrison to recover a deficiency judgment and repossess a truck that was collateral on a series of loans. The bank obtained a default judgment against Morrison and repossessed the truck when Morrison failed to appear in court. Morrison failed to timely appeal the default judgment. Thereafter, Morrison and his wife filed this action challenging the validity of the default judgment and seeking damages for fraud, misrepresentation, and conversion of property, contending four of six promissory notes and security agreements that the judgment was based upon were forgeries. The trial court held this action was barred by res judicata and dismissed it on summary judgment. We affirm the dismissal of this action on the basis of collateral estoppel. |
Marion | Court of Appeals | |
The Travelers Indemnity Company of America, et al. v. Moore & Associates, Inc.
The insurer of a general construction contractor brought an action for a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify the contractor against the claims raised against the contractor in a demand for arbitration. The Chancery Court for Sumner County, Tennessee, Judge Tom E. Gray, granted summary judgment to the contractor, holding that the insurer, as a matter of law, had a duty to defend the contractor in the arbitration. The court reserved ruling on whether the insurer had a duty to indemnify the contractor for damages paid as a result of the arbitration settlement until after the arbitration proceeding. This Court affirms the trial court’s judgment in all respects. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brandon Raymond Bartee
On appeal, the defendant challenges the length and consecutive nature of his sentences on three counts of sexual battery. Upon review, we conclude that: (1) the enhanced sentences were justified based upon the defendant's prior criminal behavior; (2) the mitigating factors, even if applied, would not have lessened the enhanced sentence; and (3) the defendant's consecutive sentence was proper based upon the predatory nature of his conduct and the residual psychological effects incurred by the minor victim. Therefore, we affirm the sentences imposed by the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Edward M. Patterson
The defendant, Edward M. Patterson, pled nolo contendere to possession of drug paraphernalia and criminal trespass and received respective sentences of sixty and thirty days, both suspended. As a condition of his plea, the defendant reserved a certified question of law as to whether there was adequate reasonable suspicion to support a seizure of his person. Because we find the certified question is not dispositive of the charges, we dismiss the appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Denny Finney
The Defendant, Denny Finney, pled guilty to misdemeanor simple possession of a schedule VI substance, and the State agreed to dismiss the other counts against him. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days suspended, except for six months to serve in jail. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it sentenced him. After thoroughly reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the Defendant's sentence. |
Franklin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Melvin Perry v. Bruce Westbrooks, Warden, and The West Tennessee State Penitentiary Disciplinary Board
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari filed by a prison inmate. The petitioner prisoner was found guilty on the charge of “failure to participate” in work as instructed by a prison official. He lost his prison job and was sentenced to a brief period of segregation and a $5.00 fine. After exhausting his administrative appeals, he filed an application for a writ of certiorari in the trial court, naming as respondents the warden and the disciplinary board. The trial court granted the respondents’ motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The petitioner now appeals. We reverse and remand to the trial court for issuance of the writ. |
Lauderdale | Court of Appeals | |
Juan Alfonzo Hill v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he contends that: (1) he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel, and (2) the post-conviction court and the district attorney general erred in failing to comply with the Post Conviction Procedure Act, which caused him prejudice. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction relief. |
Washington | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dickey L. Cotton v. David Mills, Warden - Dissenting
I agree that if the allegations and assertions contained in the petition are correct, the Defendant’s sentences appear to be in direct contravention to Tennessee’s sentencing act and are therefore illegal and void. However, because the Defendant’s habeas corpus petition was summarily dismissed without a hearing, I would remand the case to the habeas court for a determination of whether the sentences are indeed void. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dickey L. Cotton v. David Mills, Warden
The petitioner, Dickey L. Cotton, appeals the circuit court’s summary dismissal of his Pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we reverse the circuit court’s dismissal of the habeas corpus petition and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Donnie Glenn Thompson
The Defendant, Donnie Glenn Thompson, was indicted for one count of stalking his former wife, Kimberly McClinsey. The Defendant subsequently submitted an application for pretrial diversion on this charge, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-15-105. The district attorney general denied the Defendant’s request for pretrial diversion. The Defendant sought review by the trial court, and the trial court found no abuse of discretion by the district attorney general. The Defendant now appeals from the trial court’s ruling. Finding that the district attorney general abused his discretion in analyzing the Defendant’s application for pretrial diversion, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this matter to the district attorney general for further consideration. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v.Jeffery Scott Sherrill
The defendant, Jeffery Scott Sherrill, pleaded guilty to second degree murder. After conducting a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant to serve a 25-year sentence as a Range I violent offender. Aggrieved of his sentence, the defendant brings the instant appeal challenging his sentence as excessive. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the lower court. |
Rhea | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John R. Benson v. State of Tennessee
This matter is before the Court upon the State's motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner has appealed the trial court's order summarily dismissing the petition for the writ of habeas corpus. In that petition, the petitioner alleges that the trial court erred by failing to appoint counsel and that the trial court erred by charging the jury with reckless endangerment as a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault. Upon a review of the record in this case we are persuaded that the trial court was correct in summarily dismissing the habeas corpus petition and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Wayne | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Stanley Arthur Lawson v. Vonda Lea (Lawson) Mattox
The mother has filed a Tenn. R. App. P. 10 application for an extraordinary appeal from an ex parte Emergency Temporary Parenting Plan Order entered by the Chancery Court for Lawrence County on September 6, 2005. The mother asserts the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the order because it had transferred the case to the Chancery Court for Rutherford County in 2001. The father now agrees that the trial court lacks jurisdiction. We grant the application for an extraordinary appeal and vacate the Emergency Temporary Parenting Plan Order. |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals | |
Xavier S. Todd v. State of Tennessee, County of Shelby and District Atty. General Paul Summers
The Petitioner, Xavier S. Todd, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. After review, we conclude that the Petitioner is statutorily prohibited from seeking state habeas corpus relief as he is in federal custody and is being restrained under an order of a federal court. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Aaron T. Burton v. Virginia Lewis, Warden
The petitioner, Aaron T. Burton, appeals from the trial court's order dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner has failed to establish that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Bledsoe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Raymond T. Schmidt, Jr. v. Barbara J. Schmidt
This is a petition to modify alimony. The divorce decree required that the husband pay the wife alimony of $1,500 per month for ten years or until she remarries. The husband filed this petition to terminate his alimony obligation, asserting that there had been a material change in circumstances. The wife maintained that the alimony award was alimony in solido and, therefore, not subject to modification. The husband filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue of whether the alimony award was modifiable. The trial court held that the alimony award was alimony in solido, not subject to modification. From that order, husband now appeals. We reverse, concluding that the award was alimony in futuro and, therefore, subject to modification. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Darnell Lavelle Welch
The defendant, Darnell Lavelle Welch, was indicted for premeditated first degree murder. A jury convicted the defendant as charged, and he was sentenced to life in prison. The defendant now appeals his conviction, alleging that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction in two |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jerry Dale Tigner, Jr.
The defendant, Jerry Dale Tigner, Jr., was indicted for second degree murder, a Class A felony, and was convicted by a jury as charged and sentenced as a Range I, violent offender to seventeen years in confinement. The defendant appeals his conviction and sentence, claiming that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction; (2) the sequential jury instructions on second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter are unconstitutional; (3) the trial court erred in sentencing by failing to consider all mitigating factors; and (4) the State committed Brady violations with regard to a witness. Upon review, we find no reversible error and affirm the conviction and sentence. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Darrell Toomes
Following a jury trial, Defendant, Darrell Toomes, was convicted of delivery of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine. He was sentenced to seven years in the Department of Correction as a Range II, multiple offender. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion for new trial. On appeal, Defendant argues that |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bobby Shane Hurley
Convicted by a jury of possession of cocaine with intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver, a Class B felony, and sentenced to a Department of Correction term of ten years as a Range I offender, the defendant, Bobby Shane Hurley, appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the severity of his sentence, and the failure of the trial court to grant a sentencing alternative to incarceration. We affirm the judgment of the trial court |
Hardin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Eric Rice
The defendant, Eric Rice, pled guilty to one count of statutory rape, a Class E felony, and applied for judicial diversion pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-313. The trial court denied the application for judicial diversion and sentenced the defendant as a standard offender. On |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Thomas Sallee v. Tyler Barrett
This appeal arises from a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The defendant, a police officer, accidently discharged his gun while standing behind the plaintiff, startling the plaintiff. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, concluding that the defendant was immune from suit pursuant to the Governmental Tort Liability Act, Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-20-310(b) (2000). The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that section 29-20-205(2), which retained immunity for governmental entities for the "infliction of mental anguish" caused by its employee applied to both negligent, as well as intentional infliction of mental anguish. We reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court's order granting the motion to dismiss in favor of the defendant. |
Montgomery | Supreme Court | |
Troy A. Clark v. Jennifer Dawn Clark
This is an appeal from a divorce action in which the husband argues that the trial court failed to make an equitable division of the marital estate. Specifically, the husband challenges the trial court’s treatment of certain real property as the wife’s separate property, and he challenges the valuation placed on their vehicles. Finding the appeal meritorious, we reverse and remand for a new division of the marital estate. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |