State of Tennessee v. Anthony Dwayne Brown
The defendant, Anthony Dwayne Brown, was convicted by jury of one count of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of felony murder, one count of especially aggravated robbery, two counts of especially aggravated burglary, and theft of property valued at less than $500. The trial court merged the two felony murder counts into the first degree premeditated murder count and merged the theft offense into the count of especially aggravated robbery. The trial court also merged the two counts of especially aggravated burglary. The defendant was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for the first degree premeditated murder. The defendant was sentenced to sixty years for especially aggravated robbery and to thirty years for especially aggravated burglary. The trial court ordered all sentences to run concurrent with the sentence of life without the possibility of parole. The defendant raises two issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions; and (2) whether the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of a defense witness. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Obion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Regina Helderman and husband, Troy Helderman v. Matthew R. Smolin, M.D., et al.
This appeal involves a claim for medical malpractice. The plaintiff’s cardiologist initially diagnosed her as having a heart condition which required surgery to repair. The plaintiff’s cardiologist referred the plaintiff to a cardiothoracic surgeon for surgical repair of the condition. The plaintiff subsequently sought a second opinion, and the second cardiologist determined that the plaintiff did not need surgery. Thereafter, the plaintiff’s original cardiologist apparently changed his diagnosis of the plaintiff’s condition. After some time passed, the cardiothoracic surgeon performed surgery on the plaintiff, which was ultimately determined to be unnecessary. The plaintiff sued her original cardiologist and the cardiothoracic surgeon for medical malpractice. Through discovery, it was determined that the cardiothoracic surgeon did not review the plaintiff’s entire medical records prior to performing the surgery. The cardiologist filed a motion for summary judgment arguing the cardiothoracic surgeon was the sole proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. In response, the plaintiff submitted an affidavit from her expert witness stating that the cardiologist had a duty under the applicable standard of care to directly communicate his changed diagnosis to the cardiothoracic surgeon, and his actions were a “significant contributing factor” to the plaintiff’s injuries. The cardiologist filed a motion to strike the affidavit of the plaintiff’s expert as contradictory to his deposition testimony. The trial court partially granted the cardiologist’s motion. After doing so, the trial court granted the cardiologist’s motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff appealed to this Court, and we reverse. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John Fitzgerald Belew
A Henderson County jury convicted the defendant, John Fitzgerald Belew, of possession of cocaine, a Class A misdemeanor; and possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to deliver, a Class B felony. The trial court merged the two convictions and sentenced the defendant to twelve years as a Range I standard offender. On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. Upon our close review of the evidence, we are constrained to hold that the evidence was insufficient to prove the defendant’s intent to deliver beyond a reasonable doubt. However, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to prove simple possession of cocaine. Therefore, we reverse the defendant’s conviction of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to deliver, and reduce it to simple possession of cocaine. We remand the case to the trial court for sentencing consistent with this opinion. |
Henderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Leonard Hartman vs. John T. Milburn Rogers, Jerry W.Laughlin, William S. Nunnally and Rogers, Laughlin, Nunnally, Hood & Crum, P.C.
In this legal malpractice action against attorneys, the trial court granted all defendants summary judgment. On appeal, we affirm on grounds that the statute of limitations ran before the suit was filed. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Roy C. Smith v. James A. Bowlen, Warden and State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Roy C. Smith, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his 1996 guilty plea for rape of a child. After a hearing, the trial court granted the petition, determining that the judgment was not void, but that the petitioner’s sentence was illegal. The State appeals. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court granting the writ of habeas corpus. |
Bledsoe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Edwin Gomez & Jonathan S. Londono - Concurring and Dissenting
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Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Edwin Gomez & Jonathan S. Londono
We granted this appeal to determine whether the defendants are entitled to relief on their claim that admission of testimony about a co-defendant’s oral statement violated their Sixth Amendment right to confrontation and whether the defendants’ sentences were imposed in violation of their Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. We conclude that admission of testimony about a co-defendant’s oral statement violated the defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to confrontation because the defendants had no prior opportunity to cross-examine the co-defendant. See Crawford v. Washington, __ U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004). Nevertheless, we conclude that Gomez is not entitled to relief on this claim because he has failed to preserve it for review and has failed to establish the prerequisites for obtaining relief via plain error review. Although Londono preserved the issue for plenary appellate review, we conclude that he is not entitled to relief because the constitutional error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, we conclude that the defendants’ sentences were not imposed in violation of their Sixth Amendment right to jury trial. See United States v. Booker, __ U.S. __, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, __ U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). Thus, the defendants are not entitled to relief on this claim. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
GSB Contractors, Inc. v. Harry F. Hess, Jr. and Connie Hess
Following a hail storm which severely damaged the Appellees’ home, the Appellee contracted with the Appellant, a construction contractor, to repair the damage. The Appellees’ insurance policy covered the damage done to the home by the hail storm, but the Appellees entered into a collateral agreement with the Appellant to do additional work to the home. The insurance company paid for all work done by the Appellant in repairing the damage from the storm, but the Appellees refused to pay the balance due on work completed under the collateral agreement citing poor workmanship by the Appellant’s subcontractors. The Appellant subsequently filed suit against the Appellees in general sessions court seeking to recover the balance owed. Following a judgment in favor of the |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mary Margaret Boyd
The defendant was involved in an automobile accident. When officers arrived, she maintained that she had been the driver of the vehicle. However, the actual driver was later apprehended. When an officer attempted to place the defendant under arrest, she physically resisted handcuffing. The Davidson County Grand Jury indicted the defendant for making a false report and resisting arrest. She was found guilty of both charges in a bench trial. The trial court sentenced the defendant to an effective sentence of eighteen (18) months with periodic confinement on weekends for twenty (20) days and the remainder on probation. On appeal, the defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support her convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Unte Henderson v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Unte Henderson, appeals from the Rutherford County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his guilty pleas to second degree murder and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery and effective nineteen-year sentence. He contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney coerced him into pleading guilty. We affirm the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James Mario Starnes v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, James Mario Starnes, appeals the Bedford County Circuit Court's dismissal of his pro se petition for post-conviction relief without holding an evidentiary hearing. In his petition, the petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and entered an involuntary plea. The trial court concluded that the factual allegations of the petition were insufficient and that the issues were waived for failure to present them on direct appeal. We disagree and remand the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Elijah Hammond
Following a bench trial before the Bradley County Criminal Court, the defendant, Elijah Hammond, was found guilty of aggravated child abuse by use of a deadly weapon and of aggravated assault involving his minor daughter, ST. 1 The court merged the convictions and sentenced the defendant to serve 12 years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his aggravated child abuse conviction and that he was improperly classified and sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender. After an extensive review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and applicable law, we conclude that the evidence supports his aggravated child abuse conviction and that, pursuant to an amended judgment of conviction, the defendant was properly sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to serve an incarcerative, 12-year sentence. |
Bradley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Lynn Stanton
The defendant, Michael Lynn Stanton, was convicted of first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, and two counts of aggravated burglary. The jury returned a verdict of life without parole for the murder conviction. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204. The trial court imposed sentences of sixty years for the attempted murder conviction and fifteen years for each of the aggravated burglary convictions. The trial court ordered consecutive service, but with the aggravated burglary sentences to be served concurrently to one another, for an effective sentence of life without parole plus seventy-five years. In this appeal of right, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred by (1) permitting evidence of prior bad acts; (2) denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on the first degree murder charges; (3) admitting an audiotape recording of a hospital interview with the victim; (4) limiting impeachment of a state witness; (5) failing to declare a mistrial after the state attempted to call a bailiff as a witness; and (6) failing to grant a judgment of acquittal on the aggravated burglary charge contained in count 5 of the indictment or, in the alternative, failing to merge the two aggravated burglary convictions. Because the defendant was entitled to a judgment of acquittal on the aggravated burglary charge of count 5, that conviction is reversed and the charge is dismissed. Otherwise, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David Arnold Humphrey
The defendant, David Arnold Humphrey, entered a plea of guilt to attempt to possess more than .5 grams of cocaine for resale. As a part of the plea agreement, a Range II sentence of six years was imposed and a certified question of law was reserved for appeal. See Tenn R. Crim. P. 37 (b)(2)(i). The question, as originally approved before the filing of the notice of appeal, is "[w]hether the initial contact and subsequent seizure of the defendant were . . . proper, with said seizure resulting in the seizure of a Crown Royal bag containing cocaine." The state, with the approval of the trial court, conceded that the issue was dispositive of the case. The judgment is affirmed. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Russell Allen v. State of Tennessee
In 2000, the Petitioner, Russell Allen, was convicted of aggravated sexual battery, and was sentenced to serve eight years. Subsequently, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, and the post-conviction court dismissed the petition, concluding that his petition was not filed within the statute of limitations. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his post-conviction petition. After thoroughly reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court's judgment. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Cory D. Holland v. Packard's Service Center, LLC.
Plaintiff claims that his 1990 Nissan with over 200,000 miles was rendered inoperable due to Defendant’s installation of a faulty alternator. He seeks damages for the diminution in the value of the vehicle, wages he allegedly lost while the vehicle was inoperable, and damages under Tennessee’s Consumer Protection Act. Plaintiff’s claims under Tennessee’s Consumer Protection Act were dismissed upon summary judgment. During the trial, the court granted competing motions excluding both parties’ expert witnesses. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant on the remaining claims. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
George Haskel Stewart v. Demple L. Sewell, et al.
Plaintiff, stepson of Clara Stewart, contends that attorneys-in-fact of Mrs. Stewart acted in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. 34-6-108(c)(6) and their confidential relationship with Mrs. Stewart, which deprived him of inheriting real property formerly owned by his father under the will of Mrs. Stewart. The attorneys-in-fact (Fiduciaries) are the daughter and son of Mrs. Stewart. They sold the property while their mother was mentally and physically incapacitated, living in a nursing home. The property was sold for substantially less than the appraised value to a daughter and son-in-law of one of the Fiduciaries and two of their friends. Mrs. Stewart, who inherited the property from Plaintiff's father, was the sole owner of the property at the time of the sale. The Fiduciaries, however, invested the proceeds in certificates of deposit with themselves identified as co-owners with Mrs. Stewart with right of survivorship. The Fiduciaries became sole owners of the entire sales proceeds upon the death of Mrs. Stewart. During the administration of Mrs. Stewart's estate, the Fiduciaries, now executors, advised Plaintiff that his devise adeemed by extinction. Plaintiff brought this action to recover the real property or the fair market value thereof from the Fiduciaries and/or the buyers. The trial court dismissed the complaint without making findings, stating only that it was not sustained by the proof. Plaintiff appealed. We reverse finding that the Fiduciaries acted in contravention of the power of attorney and Tenn. Code Ann. 34-6-108(c)(6) and breached their fiduciary duties to Mrs. Stewart, and award Plaintiff a judgment against the Fiduciaries for the net proceeds resulting from the sale of the devised property plus pre-judgment interest from the date of sale. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
In Re M.J.M., Jr., L.P.M., & C.A.O.M. - Concurring
I continue to disagree with the standard of review employed by the Court in this case for reasons discussed at length in In Re Z.J.S. No. 2002-02235-COA-R3-JV, 2003 WL 21266854 at *18-22 (Tenn.Ct.App.June 3, 2003) (no Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 11 application filed) and Estate of Acuff v. O’Linger, 56 S.W.3d 527, 533-37 (Tenn.Ct.App.2001). A preponderance of the evidence standard is inconsistent and irreconcilable with a clear and convincing evidence standard either in the trial court or on appeal. |
White | Court of Appeals | |
In Re M.J.M., Jr., L.P.M., & C.A.O.M. - Concurring
I agree fully with the majority’s resolution of this case and the issues raised therein. I write separately, however, to express my concern with the apparent inconsistency in the grounds alleged by the Department. Specifically, while the parents’ failure to make reasonable efforts to provide a suitable home for the first four months after removal of the child from the home is a definition of abandonment, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A), it is questionable to me whether the Department can rely on that ground when it has entered into a permanency plan that gives a parent one year to find stable and suitable housing. The majority found that ground unavailable because the Department did not use reasonable efforts, making it unnecessary to address my concern. I agree with that conclusion, but want to make it clear that some question about reliance on that ground may exist regardless of the Department’s efforts. |
White | Court of Appeals | |
In Re M.J.M., Jr., L.P.M., & C.A.O.M.
This appeal involves a mother’s efforts to prevent the termination of her parental rights to her three children while she completes her treatment for methamphetamine addiction. After the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services took custody of the children, it devised a permanency plan obligating the mother to address her drug addiction and to complete other remedial tasks within twelve months. However, after six months of the mother’s failed attempts to restore order to her life, the Department filed a petition in the White County Juvenile Court to terminate the mother’s parental rights. Between the filing of the Department’s petition and the hearing, the mother made significant steps toward completing the tasks in the permanency plan. Despite the mother’s progress, the juvenile court terminated her parental rights on the grounds of abandonment, failure to comply with the permanency plan, and failure to remedy the conditions that had required the children’s removal. The mother has appealed. We have determined that the Department has failed to present clear and convincing evidence of one or more grounds for terminating the mother’s parental rights. |
White | Court of Appeals | |
Alfio Orlando Lewis v. Ricky Bell, Warden
The Petitioner, Alfio Orlando Lewis, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that the Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We find the State's motion has merit. Accordingly, the motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In The Matter of: M.J.J.
In this termination of parental rights case, the juvenile court terminated the parental rights of the mother and father, and the mother appeals. We affirm. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Brewster, Jr. v. Fayette County Board of County Commissioners, et al.
The Fayette County Board of Commissioners denied Plaintiff/Appellant’s application for a change in zoning. The Chancery Court for Fayette County affirmed. We affirm. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
Dickey Cotton v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief and asserts in two issues that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary due to (1) trial counsel’s ineffective representation, and (2) violations of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. We affirm the denial of post-conviction relief. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Austin - Dissenting
The majority concludes that modification of the defendant’s sentence is required in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ______, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). I must respectfully dissent. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals |