Rebecca Paige Mulkey (Hurd) v. Bradley Warren Mulkey
Rebecca Paige Mulkey (“Mother”) and Bradley Warren Mulkey (“Father”) were divorced in 1996. The parties agreed that Mother would be the primary residential parent of their two minor daughters with Father having reasonable visitation rights. Several years later and after Mother had remarried, Father filed a Petition for Change of Custody claiming the older child had been physically abused by her step-father. The Trial Court temporarily transferred custody of the children to Father and indicated this arrangement would be reviewed periodically. After the older child recanted her allegations of physical abuse, the Trial Court ordered that she be examined by a psychiatrist. An examination was undertaken and the psychiatrist concluded there was no evidence of abuse “of any kind.” The Trial Court later entered a judgment and held that its previous temporary decision to designate Father as the primary residential parent was to be the final determination. Mother appeals claiming the Trial Court erred when it transferred custody of the children to Father because Father failed to prove there had been a material change in circumstance. We agree and reverse the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
Rebecca Paige Mulkey (Hurd) v. Bradley Warren Mulkey - Concurring
The majority Opinion notes that the Trial Court talked to the minor children in camera in the presence of the parties’ attorneys, but no court reporter was present, and a record of that proceeding is not before us. We directed in Rutherford v. Rutherford, 971 S.W.2d 955 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997), p. 956: The Trial Judge has discretion to interview children apart from the courtroom setting if he considers it is in the best interest of the child. However, if he elects to follow this procedure, he must examine the child “in the presence of attorneys for each side and in the presence of the court reporter.” Newburger v. Newburger, 10 Tenn. App. 555, 566 (1930), and in order to have a complete record on appeal, a transcript of such evidence must be filed. This procedure was not followed in this case and the failure to follow this procedure is grounds, standing alone, to vacate and/or reverse the Judgment of the Trial Court, as we noted in Rutherford. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
Roy Hugh Rushing, II v. Jill Marianne Rushing
This is a post-divorce child custody case. The parties were divorced by a final decree which incorporated the parties’ marital dissolution agreement (“MDA”). The MDA provided, among other things, that the parties would have joint custody of their two minor children, and that the mother would be the primary residential parent. The MDA also stated that the father would provide life insurance on the children’s lives, and that the maternal grandmother would arbitrate the parties’ disputes. Approximately two years later, the mother filed a motion for contempt, claiming that the father had failed to provide the required life insurance on the children’s lives. In response, the father filed a motion to increase his residential time with the children and also sought court approval to provide term-life insurance as opposed to whole-life insurance on the children’s lives. In addition, the father asked the court to strike the MDA provision stating that the maternal grandmother would be the final arbiter of the parties’ child rearing disputes. The trial court denied the mother’s motion for contempt and granted the father’s motion for modification of the MDA. The mother now appeals. We affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of James A. Champion, Deceased
This appeal challenges the chancery court’s subject matter jurisdiction to hear a will contest. The petitioner daughter filed a petition to probate the last will and testament of her father. Other siblings filed an objection to probate, alleging that their father did not have the requisite testamentary capacity to execute the will. After a hearing, the chancery court rejected the siblings’ claims and admitted the will to probate. Later, the siblings filed another petition contesting the will, again challenging testamentary capacity and, in addition, alleging undue influence. The chancery court certified the will contest to the circuit court. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the petitioner, finding that the issues raised by the siblings had been addressed in the former proceedings and were res judicata. The siblings then filed a Rule 60 motion in chancery court to set aside the order probating the will. The motion was denied. The siblings now appeal, arguing that the chancery court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the will contest. We affirm, finding that the chancery court had concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit court to adjudicate a will contest. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
Bill Fox et al. v. State of Tennessee
In this premises liability action,Debby Fox (“the plaintiff”)1 and her husband, Bill Fox, filed a claim against the State of Tennessee (“the State”) for damages sustained by the Foxes when the plaintiff was injured as a result of a fall from a stage during a play rehearsal on the campus of the University of Tennessee at Knoxville (“UT”). The claims commission found in favor of the State, holding (1) that the plaintiff failed to prove her claim of negligence and (2) that she was guilty of 100% of the fault in the accident. The plaintiff and her husband appeal, arguing, inter alia, that the evidence preponderates against the claims commission’s determinations. We affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Seiller & Handmaker, L.L.P. and Glen Cohen v. Kelly Finnell
This is an action to enroll a foreign judgment. A Tennessee resident was represented by a Kentucky lawyer in a Kentucky lawsuit. When the Kentucky lawyer pursued collection of his fees, the Tennessee client filed a bar complaint against him in Kentucky. The bar complaint was dismissed, and the Kentucky lawyer filed a malicious prosecution lawsuit in Kentucky against the client, and obtained a judgment. In this action, the Kentucky lawyer seeks to enroll the Kentucky judgment against the Tennessee client. The client asserts that the judgment should not be enrolled in Tennessee because it falls under the public policy exception to the full faith and credit clause of United States Constitution. The client bases this argument on Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 27.1, which prohibits any lawsuit based on a bar complaint, asserting that the enrollment of a foreign judgment based on this cause of action would violate Tennessee public policy. The trial court held that the Kentucky judgment was entitled to full faith and credit and domesticated the judgment. We affirm the decision of the trial court, finding that the enrollment of the foreign judgment does not violate Tennessee public policy. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, ex rel., Donna Cottingham v. William B. Cottingham
This appeal concerns an order of the Williamson County Chancery Court finding William B. Cottingham in criminal contempt of court for failure to pay court-ordered child support and alimony. Mr. Cottingham appeals the order of the chancery court sentencing him to 170 days in jail for failure to comply with court orders concerning child support and alimony. We affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Jean Ann Trudeau, et al. v. Department of Labor and Workforce Development for the State of Tennessee, et al.
This is an age discrimination case. In October 2001, a thirty-seven year old woman interviewed for a job position at the defendant’s Career Center. She was recommended for hire for the job. Subsequently, the defendant Career Center began accepting applications for a second job position, similar to the first. The forty-five year old aunt of the first applicant submitted an application for the second job position. The second job position was never filled. The forty-five year old job applicant filed a lawsuit, alleging that she was not hired due to age discrimination. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Career Center. We affirm, finding that the forty-five year old applicant failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination. |
Henry | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tracy Lynn Franks
The appellant, Tracy Lynn Franks, pled guilty to aggravated assault, felony reckless endangerment, and felony evading arrest. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the appellant was sentenced to six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction for the aggravated assault conviction and four years each for the reckless endangerment and evading arrest convictions, with the sentences to be served concurrently. Additionally, the trial court imposed a $500.00 fine for the evading arrest conviction. On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying him probation. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hardin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Charles Mullins v. State of Tennessee
The Appellant, Charles Mullins, proceeding pro se, appeals the Maury County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. On appeal, Mullins argues that his effective thirty-two-year sentence for two counts of aggravated sexual battery is illegal because (1) the judgment forms provide for an improper release eligibility date and (2) the trial court failed to award pretrial jail credits on the judgment forms. Finding merit to the Appellant’s contentions, we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jeremy Wayne Humphrey v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Jeremy Wayne Humphrey, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for post conviction relief or in the alternative for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner filed his petition outside the statute of limitations for post-conviction purposes. Further, the petitioner does not state any cognizable habeas corpus claims. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Steve A. White
Defendant, Steve A. White, appeals the trial court’s order amending Defendant’s judgment to grant restitution to the victim in his case. Because the trial court did not have jurisdiction to amend Defendant’s judgment, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for reinstatement of the judgment of conviction as originally entered. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Eric Matthews
The defendant, Eric Matthews, was charged by the Shelby County Grand Jury in two separate indictments with especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony, aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony, and two counts of aggravated rape, a Class B felony, based on events involving the victim, V.T.,1 that occurred on August 14, 1999, in the Whitehaven area of Memphis. Following his 2003 trial,2 he was acquitted of the rape counts and convicted in both the especially aggravated and aggravated kidnapping counts of the lesser-included charge of kidnapping, a Class C felony. Applying four enhancement and no mitigating factors, the trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent terms of five years in the county workhouse. In a timely appeal to this court, the defendant challenges both the sufficiency of the evidence and the sentencing imposed. Based on our review of the record and applicable law, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the convictions but that the trial court erred by failing to merge the kidnapping convictions into a single judgment of conviction. We further conclude that three of the four enhancement factors were applied in error under the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), which was released after the sentencing was imposed in this case. Accordingly, we affirm the convictions, but order that they be merged into a single conviction and modify the sentence imposed from five to four years, to be served in the county workhouse. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Clarence Mumford v. Board of Education of The City Of Memphis
Board of Education of the City of Memphis suspended tenured teacher and assistant principal without pay pending an investigation of child abuse by the Department of Children’s Services. After teacher was reinstated, he sought to recover lost wages under T.C.A. §49-5-511. Trial court found that teacher was entitled to recover but that such recovery should be offset by wages earned during the period of suspension. We affirm as modified herein. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
James A. Bledsoe and Nannie Bledsoe v. Randall Buttry and Grange Insurance Company
James A. Bledsoe and wife, Nannie, sued Randall Buttry and Grange Insurance Company (uninsured motorist carrier) for damages sustained in a motor vehicle crash. The Bledsoe's claim the jury verdict was insufficient and that the trial court erred in certain evidentiary rulings. We affirm. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
Tony Hopkins v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Tony Hopkins, appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, contending that, following his guilty plea, he was wrongfully sentenced to a fifteen-year sentence as a Range I offender on a Class B felony. After careful review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition. |
Morgan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Timothy Davis
The defendant, Timothy Wade Davis, was convicted by a jury of four counts of rape of a child and one count of aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. Sentences of twenty-two years were imposed for each child rape conviction and ten years for aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. Three of the child rape convictions and the especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor were ordered to run consecutively for an effective sentence of seventy-six years at 100%. The defendant appeals his convictions and sentencing and alleges that the trial court erred in the following respects: (1) in failing to suppress the search warrant and the defendant’s statements; (2) by denying the defendant the right to represent himself; (3) by refusing to instruct the jury on insanity; (4) in finding the defendant competent to stand trial; and (5) in regard to sentencing. After review of the issues presented and the record as a whole, we conclude that no reversible error was present and affirm the convictions and sentencing. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Timothy Davis - Concurring
I concur in the results and most of the analysis in the majority opinion. However, I believe the differences reflected in the search warrant affidavits in the record would justify suppression of the items seized pursuant to Rule 41(c), Tenn. R. Crim. P. Such a result, though, is not needed, because the record does not reflect that the copies of the affidavits in the record are thoserequired by Rule 41(c) to be identical. On the other hand, even if suppression were required, I believe many of the defendant’s statements against interest could be admissible. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Charles Smith, Executor of the Estate of Ethel Rogers Smith v. Jerry Smith
The Trial Court held that the confidential relationship between defendant and deceased voids the transaction because deceased did not have independent advice. On appeal, we reverse. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Pete Wayne Duncan v. State of Tennessee Parole Board
This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner is appealing the trial court's denial of habeas corpus relief. A review of the record reveals that the Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Corey Cartwright v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Corey Cartwright, appeals as of right from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Davidson County Criminal Court. He seeks relief from his Class C felony conviction for possession of less than one-half gram of cocaine with intent to sell and resulting sentence of ten years in confinement. He contends that the post-conviction court erred in summarily dismissing his petition without appointing counsel, that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, and that the trial court erred in sentencing. We affirm the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Garner Dwight Padgett
The defendant, Garner Dwight Padgett, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder. The trial court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment. In this appeal of right, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to grant a mistrial after two jurors observed him in custody, by failing to instruct on the lesser included offenses of aggravated assault and assault, and by failing to suppress his confession. He also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and argues that there was prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Bowdoin Grayson Smith v. Ginger Lee Marenchin Smith
Bowdoin Grayson Smith (“Father”) and Ginger Lee Marenchin Smith (“Mother”) were divorced in 1996. Mother was granted sole custody of the parties’ four minor children, and Father was granted visitation and ordered to pay child support. Two years later, Father filed a petition for joint custody and later a petition to modify child support. After a hearing, the Trial Court found that Father had failed to prove a material change in circumstances and denied the petition for joint custody; modified the visitation schedule; granted Father telephone and e-mail contact with the children at specified times; found that Mother had proved monthly expenses of $7,500 were reasonably necessary to provide for the support and needs of the children, but that Father would be responsible for paying only $5,000 in monthly child support with Mother responsible for the remainder; and granted Mother attorney’s fees. Mother appeals claiming the Trial Court erred in finding that only $7,500 per month was reasonably necessary for the support of the children and in holding that Father would be responsible for only $5,000 of these expenses. Father raises additional issues claiming the Trial Court erred in dismissing the petition for joint custody and in awarding Mother attorney’s fees. We affirm, in part; modify, in part; vacate, in part; and remand solely for the collection of the costs below. |
Smith | Court of Appeals | |
Anthony and Melinda K. Colston v. Citizens Tri-County Bank
Following Appellees’ default on promissory note secured by a deed of trust, Appellant Bank placed a hold on Appellees’ accounts and instigated foreclosure proceedings. Despite the fact that Appellees cured the default, Appellant Bank continued its hold on accounts and failed to stop publication of foreclosure notice. Although Appellees failed to prove damages, trial court found Bank negligent and awarded nominal damages to Appellees. We reverse. |
Marion | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Johnson
The defendant, James Johnson, originally charged with first degree murder, was convicted of second degree murder. The trial court imposed a sentence of twenty-three years. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion for a preliminary hearing; (3) the trial court erred by permitting evidence of a California police chase involving the defendant; (4) the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury; (5) the cumulative effect of the errors at trial require reversal; and (6) the sentence is excessive. Because the trial court misapplied certain of the enhancement factors, the sentence is modified to twenty-one years. Otherwise, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals |