State of Tennessee v. Floyd "Butch" Webb
The appellant, Floyd “Butch” Webb, was convicted by a Rhea County jury of one count of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony; two counts of sexual battery, Class E felonies; and four counts of child abuse, Class A misdemeanors. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a total effective sentence of twelve years to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the trial court erred by admitting evidence of a fresh complaint by a child victim; (2) the trial court erred by allowing a witness to testify about medical records of which she was not the custodian; and (3) the sentence imposed by the trial court was excessive. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Rhea | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Floyd "Butch" Webb - Concurring
I concur in the results reached and most of the reasoning used in the majority opinion. However, I respectfully disagree with its views regarding Kathy Spada’s testimony resulting from her review of the victim’s purported medical records. I believe that her testimony regarding her review of the records, the basic contents of the records, and her “opinion” based upon her review of the records should have been excluded from the evidence. As the majority opinion notes, the records in question are not part of the record on appeal. The state’s comments at trial and Ms. Spada’s testimony indicate that the records were ostensibly regarding a physical examination of the victim when she was three years old. The parties stipulated that the records were from either a Dayton doctor or hospital with whom Ms. Spada was not affiliated and for whom she was not a proper custodian of the records. |
Rhea | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Timothy P. Wilmoth
The defendant, Timothy P. Wilmoth, pled guilty to possession of less than .5 grams of cocaine and misdemeanor evading arrest. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of six years and eleven months, twenty-nine days, respectively. All but thirty days was suspended. Later, the defendant's probation was revoked and he was ordered to serve the sentence in the Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the defendant concedes a violation of the terms of his probation, but asserts that he should have been returned to probation or placed on community corrections. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lester Arnold Clouse
The Appellant, Lester Arnold Clouse, was convicted by a White County jury of five counts of setting fire to land, two counts of aggravated assault, and one count of resisting arrest. These convictions resulted in an effective sentence of twenty-one years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days. On appeal, Clouse raises three issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to convict him of setting fire to land and aggravated assault; (2) whether the trial court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial after a co-defendant invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege and testified before the jury that he had been threatened; and (3) whether the jury instruction regarding circumstantial evidence was proper. After review of the record, we conclude that the errors resulting from the co-defendant's invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege at trial affected the jury's verdict. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for a new trial. |
White | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
TPC Facility Delivery Group, LLC, v. Dr. James H. Lindsey, Jr., et al.
On May 5, 1999, TPC Facility Delivery Group, LLC entered into a Preliminary Design-Build Agreement with defendant PAMOB, LLC in connection with the construction of a proposed medical office building in Tullahoma, Tennessee. TPC was to provide architectural, engineering, and general contracting services under this agreement. The initial contract provided for an additional agreement to be entered into by the parties if the owner elected to proceed with the project beyond the Preliminary Design-Build services. On December 18, 2001, TPC filed suit in Williamson County Chancery Court claiming it performed additional services to PAMOB beyond those designated in the Preliminary Agreement all of which were allegedly authorized by various defendants. For these additional services, TPC submitted bills to PAMOB which were never paid. In response to the complaint, the defendants filed separate motions to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue. On May 6, 2002, the trial court heard oral arguments from all counsel and found the motion to dismiss should be granted. On July 19, 2002, the trial court entered its Order of Dismissal dismissing TPC's complaint on the grounds of improper venue. Notice of this appeal soon followed. For the reasons set forth below, the order of the trial court dismissing the complaint for improper venue is affirmed. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Douglas Marshall Mathis
The defendant, Douglas Marshall Mathis, was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. In this appeal, he contends: (1) that the evidence is insufficient; (2) that the trial court erred by giving an irrelevant definition of "knowing" as a part of the instructions to the jury; (3) that the prosecutor's comments during closing argument were improper; (4) that he was denied the right to a fair and impartial jury; and (5) that the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence. Because the state's closing argument was improper and the error cannot be classified as harmless, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial |
Houston | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Reginald Garner Brown v. State of Tennessee
A Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Reginald Garner Brown, of one count of first degree felony murder, one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated robbery and one count of aggravated burglary. The trial court sentenced the petitioner as a Range I offender to consecutive terms of life with the possibility of parole for murder, twenty-five years for especially aggravated kidnapping, twelve years for aggravated robbery and six years for aggravated burglary. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the convictions, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied the Defendant's application for permission to appeal. The Petitioner then sought post-conviction relief in the trial court, alleging that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. Finding no error, we affirm the post-conviction court's judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Allen W. Hughes v. Tennessee Board of Paroles
The appellant filed a petition for common law writ of certiorari seeking judicial review of a decision of the Board of Paroles to deny him parole. The trial court dismissed the petition as untimely filed. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Murfreesboro Medical Clinic, P.A., v. David Udom
This case involves the enforcement of a non-compete agreement. Plaintiff filed suit to enjoin Defendant from practicing medicine in violation of a covenant not to compete entered into by the parties. The trial court granted Plaintiff's application for a temporary injunction from which Defendant sought this interlocutory appeal. We reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mike Lafever
The Defendant, Mike Lafever, was indicted on three counts of theft. A jury subsequently convicted him of one count of theft over $10,000, a Class C felony, and one count of theft over $1,000, a Class D felony. The jury assessed fines of $10,000 and $5,000 for these offenses, respectively. The jury acquitted him of the other count. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to five and one-half years for the Class C felony, and to three and one-half years for the Class D felony. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently and to be served on community corrections. In this direct appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to admit a statement he made to the police; erred in refusing to instruct the jury on mistake or ignorance of fact; that the evidence is not sufficient to support his convictions; that his sentences are excessive; and that the trial court should have waived his fines. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Robert Zandi, pro se, v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Robert Zandi, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Concluding that the petition is barred by the one-year statute of limitations, the State's motion is granted and the denial of relief entered by the trial court is affirmed. |
Hardin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Johnny Marvin Henning, pro se v. State of Tennessee
This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner, Johnny Marvin Henning, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. Finding that the Petitioner has failed to assert a ground entitling him to habeas corpus relief, this Court affirms the judgment of the trial court dismissing the petition. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Eddie Williams, Jr. pro se, v. David Mills, Warden
This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by order pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner appeals the trial court’s denial of habeas corpus relief. The Petitioner fails to assert a cognizable ground for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Quinton Sanders
Following his transfer from juvenile court, the appellant, Quinton Sanders, was convicted of first degree felony murder, attempted theft of property over $1,000 but less than $10,000 in value, and theft of property over $10,000 but less than $60,000 in value. He received sentences of life imprisonment, two years, and five years, respectively. All sentences are to be served consecutively. In this appeal, the appellant maintains that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury with respect to any lesser-included offenses of felony murder. The appellant also maintains that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of the Memphis Police Department's policies and procedures regarding high-speed chases. The State maintains that the trial court properly excluded evidence of the high speed chase policies and procedures, but concedes that the trial court erred in declining to instruct the jury with respect to the lesser-included offenses of felony murder. After an exhaustive examination of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the trial court did indeed err in declining to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of felony murder and the error is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We also conclude that the trial court properly excluded evidence of the high speed chase policies and procedures of the Memphis Police Department. Accordingly, the appellant's conviction for first degree felony murder is Reversed and Remanded for a new trial in accordance with this opinion. His remaining convictions for attempted theft and theft as well as the sentences for those offenses are affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ray Saulsberry
The defendant was convicted of robbery and driving while a habitual motor vehicle offender. The defendant contends on appeal that the trial court erred in 1) denying his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel, and 2) conducting the trial in absentia while the defendant was not represented by counsel. We conclude that once elbow counsel has been appointed, and the defendant is absent voluntarily or through removal because of behavior, the trial court should require elbow counsel to represent the absent defendant. Under the facts of this case, the trial court erred in not requiring elbow counsel to proceed to represent the defendant when he was removed from the courtroom. Accordingly, the judgments of conviction are reversed and remanded for a new trial. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Terrance Lewis
The defendant was convicted by a Henderson County Circuit Court jury in consolidated cases of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony. He was sentenced by the trial court as a Range I, standard offender to eight years for the aggravated robbery conviction, and as a violent offender to twenty years for the especially aggravated robbery conviction, with the sentences ordered to be served concurrently, for an effective sentence of twenty years in the Department of Correction. He raises essentially one issue on appeal: whether the trial court erred in denying his pretrial motion to suppress his statement to police. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Henderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Laboratory Corporation of America v. Lacy and Associates, D/B/A Occupational Medicine Works
This dispute arose out of a breach of contract claim in which Plaintiff asserted Defendant owed upwards of $20,000.00 for goods and services provided from March 1996 through August 1997. Defendant raised affirmative defenses and filed a counterclaim for fraud, alleging that Plaintiff intentionally submitted false billings. Plaintiff moved for summary judgment. The Chancery Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the complaint and dismissed Defendant’s counterclaim for fraud. Defendant appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Wellmont Health System v. Tennessee Health Facilities Commission
Administrative Law Judge vacated Certificate of Need, which had been granted by Tennessee Health Facilities Commission, on grounds of conflict of interest of a Commission member and erroneous information set forth in application for Certificate of Need. Chancery Court affirmed. We affirm, holding that the vote of a Commission member with a conflict of interest is void ab initio. Commission member with conflict of interest had an affirmative duty pursuant to Rules of Tennessee Health Facilities Commission 0720-1-.02(1) to not only disclose the conflict but to recuse himself. Adverse party's failure to raise the conflict was not a waiver for there can be no waiver of the public's interest in having all votes of the Commission take place without members who have a conflict. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Kenneth Sutton and wife, Juanita Sutton v. Lisa Baysden
In an action to enforce right to easement, the Trial Court enjoined defendant to remove gate across easement and otherwise not interfere with plaintiffs' use. On appeal, we affirm. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James A. Johnson
The defendant appeals his convictions and sentences on two counts of aggravated sexual battery. The defendant was sentenced to two twelve-year terms, to be served consecutively for an effective sentence of twenty-four years. The defendant asserts three issues for review: (1) insufficiency of the evidence to support the convictions; (2) error in the use of enhancement factors in determining the length of the sentences imposed; and (3) error in ordering the sentences served consecutively. |
Hardin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Eugene Turner v. State of Tennessee
A McNairy County jury convicted the Petitioner, Eugene Turner, of two counts of premeditated first degree murder and the trial court sentenced the Petitioner to two concurrent life sentences with the possibility of parole. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the conviction, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied the Petitioner’s application for permission to appeal. The Petitioner then sought post-conviction relief in the trial court, alleging that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. Finding no error, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
McNairy | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Donald Walton v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Donald Walton, appeals from the trial court's summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. After a review of the record and the briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Wayne | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Edward Pinchon v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as time-barred, arguing that the post-conviction court erred for failing to find that the one-year statute of limitations was tolled due to his mental incompetence, or, in the alternative, for failing to find that his petition was timely because it was filed within one year from the date mandate issued. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Anton McDonald v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Anton McDonald, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from a guilty plea to possession of over .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that the petition was time-barred. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ashad R.A. Muhammad Ali v. State of Tennessee
The Appellant, Ashad R. A. Muhammad Ali, appeals the Lincoln County Circuit Court's summary dismissal of his petition requesting DNA analysis under the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act. On appeal, the Appellant raises two issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court properly dismissed the petition and (2) whether the trial judge erred by not sua sponte recusing himself based upon the fact that the trial judge was "part of the prosecutorial team that prosecuted the original conviction against the Appellant." Due to the sparseness of the record with regard to the question of recusal, we remand the case for a determination of this issue. |
Lincoln | Court of Criminal Appeals |