Floyd Lee Perry, Jr., v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Floyd Lee Perry, Jr., filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the Obion County Circuit Court. In his petition, the petitioner raised several issues, with his two chief complaints being that the trial court erred by failing to charge the jury on the lesser-included offenses of felony murder and that trial counsel was ineffective. Subsequent to an evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court dismissed the petition and the petitioner timely appealed. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Obion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Diann Parnell v. Victor L. Ivy, Peter J. Dauster, Hardee, Martin, Jaynes & Ivy, P.A., C. Wesley Fowler and Glankler Brown, PLLC
This is a legal malpractice case. The client filed suit in federal court against a municipality for the |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Atta Najjar
The defendant was convicted of aggravated rape and aggravated robbery. He contends on appeal that 1) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions, and 2) the trial court erred in instructing the jury as to aggravated rape. The judgment for aggravated robbery is affirmed. We conclude that a constructive amendment of the indictment for aggravated rape occurred because the jury was permitted to convict the defendant based on an element different from that which was charged or included within the indictment. Accordingly, the judgment for aggravated rape is reversed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Stacey F. Baldon v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Stacey Baldon, appeals from the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. The issues presented for review are whether the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel and whether the guilty pleas were knowingly and voluntarily entered. The judgment is affirmed. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gary Allen Larkins, Jr.
A Sullivan County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Gary Allen Larkins, Jr., of attempted aggravated assault, a Class D felony; resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor; and disorderly conduct, a Class C misdemeanor, and the trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of seven years, six months, and thirty days, respectively. The defendant appeals, claiming that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm the defendant’s convictions but remand the case for entry of a corrected judgment for the attempted aggravated assault. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Lusk, Jr.
The defendant, James Lusk, Jr., appeals from his twenty-five-year sentence imposed by the Hamilton County Criminal Court following his guilty plea to attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony. The defendant claims that the trial court failed to apply and weigh mitigating factors properly. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jimmy David McElroy
The state in this interlocutory appeal challenges the McMinn County trial court’s order granting the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant. In suppressing the evidence, the trial court found the informant’s information in the affidavit referred to a different property location than the property authorized to be searched; therefore, the trial court found a lack of probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant. Upon review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s order granting the motion to suppress. |
McMinn | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kimberly Clark v. Hardee's Food Systems, Inc.,
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Sumner | Workers Compensation Panel | |
John Thomas Still v. Commissary Operations, Inc.
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Robertson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Robert Terry Moore v. The Town of Collierville, et al
In this workers’ compensation appeal, we must determine whether an employer is liable to a health insurer who paid necessary and reasonable medical expenses incurred by an employee but did not intervene in the workers’ compensation claim to protect its interest. Although the trial court found that the treatment was necessary and reasonable, it further found that the employer was not liable for the medical expenses paid by the employee’s health insurer because the insurer failed to intervene and prove its interest. The employee appealed to the Special Workers’ Compensation AppealsPanel, which transferred the case for full Court review without a recommendation. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we have determined that the employer is liable to the employee’s health insurer for all reasonable and necessary medical expenses and that the health insurer is not required to intervene in the workers’ compensation suit. Because the record does not fully develop the nature and extent of the expenses paid by the health insurer, we remand to the trial court for that purpose and further action consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Ginnie Leach and J.T. Hill, Jr. v. Tim Taylor and Larry Taylor, individually and doing business as Hunt Funeral Home
We granted permission to appeal in this case to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the complaint failed to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. We also consider Defendants' contention that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Plaintiffs' cause of action was not time-barred because the discovery rule applies to this case. We hold that Plaintiffs' complaint is sufficient to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The complaint alleges all the elements of the cause of action. We also hold that the discovery rule tolled the statute of limitations in this case. Plaintiffs could not have been expected to know, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, that Defendants' alleged statements were false, and therefore could not have been expected to know that an injury had occurred because of the false statements. Accordingly, the holding of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and this case is remanded to the trial court. |
Gibson | Supreme Court | |
Mary Lee Dotson v. William Ennis Dotson
This appeal involves the dissolution of a 28-year marriage by default. The wife filed for divorce in the Chancery Court for Maury County and, after the husband failed to file a timely answer, filed for a default judgment. The trial court granted the default judgment even though the husband had filed an answer and counterclaim on the day before the hearing and later denied the husband's Tenn. R. Civ. P. 55.02 motion to set aside the default. The husband has appealed. We have determined that the trial court properly granted the default judgment but erred by refusing to later set the default judgment aside. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Derrick L. Dillard
Defendant, Derrick L. Dillard, argues in this appeal that the trial court erred by imposing an illegal sentence following a hearing in which the trial court found that Defendant had violated the terms and conditions of his Community Corrections sentence. The State agrees that the trial court erred. After a full review of the record, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for entry of an order consistent with this opinion. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Alexander C. Wells, v. Tennessee Board of Regents, et al.
This appeal is the continuation of a protracted dispute between Tennessee State University and a faculty member stemming from his termination for sexually harassing a student. After the courts vacated the dismissal, the university and the Tennessee Board of Regents established a process of transitional reinstatement. The professor objected and refused to report to work. Thereafter, the professor filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Davdison County to hold the university and the board in contempt. The trial court heard the matter without a jury and declined to hold either the university or the board in contempt. The professor has appealed. We affirm because orders declining to grant contempt petitions are not appealable. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Janet Lynn Ditzer v. Curtis J. Ditzer
The Trial Court ordered the father to pay one-half of the daughter's college expenses pursuant to the parties' Marital Dissolution Agreement, and reimburse the mother for one-half of expenses already paid. On appeal, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Dinah Faye Coffman v. Dtr Tennessee, Inc.
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Knox | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Nps Energy Services, Inc., Appellant v. Nelson E. Moore, Appellee
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Moore | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Jerry McGeehee, et al., v. Michael W. Davis
This case is an appeal from a wrongful death claim in which the Defendant was found only fifty percent at fault. The Plaintiffs appeal to this Court for review of two procedural issues. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
In Re S.M.
This appeal involves the termination of the parental rights of a biological father whose daughter was surrendered to a licensed child-placing agency without his knowledge. Soon after notifying the biological father that it had custody of the child, the agency filed a petition in the Davidson County Juvenile Court seeking to terminate the father’s parental rights. Following a bench trial, the juvenile court concluded that the biological father had abandoned his daughter and that the child’s best interests required terminating her biological father’s parental rights. We have determined that the agency has failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the biological father has abandoned his daughter. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re S.M. - Concurring
I disagree with the standard of review employed by the court in this case for the reasons |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Harry David Johnson v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Harry David Johnson, was convicted in the Sullivan County Criminal Court of the first degree murder of his wife, Katherine Trotter Johnson, and he received a sentence of life imprisonment. Subsequently, the petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, alleging that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel during his trial. The post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing, ultimately determining that the petitioner had failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that trial counsel was ineffective. The petitioner timely appealed this ruling. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for a new trial. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gregory Skinner
The defendant, Gregory Skinner, was convicted of two counts of sale of a Schedule II controlled substance, a Class C felony, and one count of sale of a counterfeit controlled substance, a Class E felony, and sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to ten years for each of the two counts of sale of a Schedule II controlled substance, to be served concurrently, and to three years for the sale of a counterfeit controlled substance, to be served consecutively, for a total sentence of thirteen years. This sentence was ordered to be served consecutively to a previous sentence. The defendant appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred in applying a nonstatutory factor in setting his sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of corrected judgments in Counts 2 and 3. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dexter Jones v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Dexter P. Jones, appeals from the Wilson County Criminal Court's denial of post-conviction relief from his four convictions for assault, a Class A misdemeanor, and resulting consecutive eleven-month, twenty-nine-day sentences. He contends that his guilty pleas were not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made because the trial court did not advise him that he was waiving a double jeopardy claim. We affirm the trial court's denial of the petition. |
Wilson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Glen Holt
A Morgan County jury found the Defendant, Glen Holt, guilty of first degree felony murder and aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to nine years in prison for the aggravated robbery charge, to be served concurrently with a life sentence for the murder conviction. The Defendant appeals, contending: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) that the trial court erred when it allowed a photograph, offered by the prosecution, to be admitted into evidence without a proper foundation; (3) that the jury did not follow the trial court’s instructions with regard to felony murder; and (4) that he did not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waive his constitutional right to testify in his own defense. Although we conclude that issues (1), (2) and (3) are without merit, the record is insufficient for us to determine whether the Defendant personally and knowingly waived his right to testify. Therefore, we remand the case to the trial court for a hearing to determine whether the Defendant’s right to testify was violated, and if so, whether the violation of the Defendant’s right to testify was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. |
Morgan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Glen Holt - Concurring and Dissenting
I concur in most of the conclusions and reasoning in the majority opinion, but I dissent from the remand in this case. I believe that the record sufficiently shows that the defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to testify. The failure to follow the specific Momon requirements should not disturb the judgment in this case. Counsel told the trial court, in open court with the defendant present, that he had advised the defendant of his rights to testify and not to testify and that he thought the defendant understood those rights. When the record states that the “Defendant indicates affirmatively” in response to the trial court’s asking him if he understood his rights and was not going to testify, I have no problem in concluding that the defendant intentionally relinquished his right to testify. Moreover, given the fact that counsel at the motion for new trial hearing indicated that the defendant had consulted with him and had made a decision not to testify further justifies my conclusion. To require a Momon hearing under the circumstances in this case would be putting form above substance. I would affirm the trial court.
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Morgan | Court of Criminal Appeals |