Mary Jane Bohlen Duggan v. Frederick Louis Bohlen, III
01A01-9611-CV-00535
Authoring Judge: Judge Samuel L. Lewis
Trial Court Judge: Judge Marietta M. Shipley

This is an appeal by petitioner/appellant, Mary Jane Bohlen Duggan, from the decision of the trial court modifying the child support obligation of respondent/appellee, Frederick Louis Bohlen, III, and interpreting the parties’ marital dissolution agreement (“MDA”) and a later amendment to the MDA. The court concluded Mr. Bohlen was not in contempt and required him to pay $860.00 per month for the parties’ youngest child, $250.00 per month for each child over eighteen and under twenty-two provided the child is receiving a postgraduate education, andone-half of the children’s postgraduate education expenses. The facts out of which this matter arose are as follows.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Mid-State Trust, IV v. Randall W. Swift
01A01-9703-CV-00145
Authoring Judge: Judge Samuel L. Lewis
Trial Court Judge: Judge Leonard W. Martin

This is an appeal by defendant/appellant, Randall W. Swift, from the decision of the Cheatham County Circuit Court dismissing his appeal from the general sessions court. The facts out of which this matter arose are as follows

Cheatham Court of Appeals

Susanna Gillespie, A/K/A Susanna Grezegorcyk, A/K/A Susanna Kantack A/K/A Susanna Gregg, v. Stephen D. Graham and Lori G. Graham
01A01-9702-CH-00083
Authoring Judge: Judge Samuel L. Lewis
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Henry Denmark Bell

This is an appeal from the decision of the Williamson County Chancery Court. Plaintiff/appellant, Susanna Gregg, claims the chancery court erred when it denied her claim to attorney’s fees, and defendant/appellee, Steven D. Graham, claims the chancery court erred when it failed to dismiss the claim as outside the statute of limitations. The facts out of which this matter arose are as follows: Defendant and his ex-wife, Lori G. Graham, entered into an agreement with Plaintiff and her husband, Donald Kanatack, for the lease/purchase of a piece of real estate. Defendant executed a note and a deed of trust in favor of Plaintiff and her husband on 15 March 1986. In exchange for the note, Plaintiff and her husband gave Defendant and Ms. Graham $10,477.17, which they used to pay real estate commissions and to set up an escrow account for repairs. The note listed the date of maturity as “on or at closing,” and the lease/purchase agreement listed the date of closing as 17 February 1988. Both the note and the deed contained provisions allowing Plaintiff to recover attorney’s fees if Plaintiff had to file suit to recover under each agreement. At the time of execution, however, the parties modified the note by drawing an “X” over five consecutive paragraphs. One of these paragraphs included the provision allowing the note holder to recover costs and expenses under certain circumstances.1 The parties failed to pay the note on 17 February 1988. The parties extended the original lease/purchase agreement for an additional year by executing an addendum on 27 May 1988. The new closing date passed without incident and both parties continued as they had in the contract for two additional years. A fire occurred on the property in 1990 while Plaintiff still occupied it.  After the insurance company paid the settlement to Defendant, he evicted Plaintiff from the property.

Williamson Court of Appeals

Shirley Jean McCracken and Alan McCracken, et. al., v. Brentwood United Methodist Church
01A01-9511-CV-00531
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Cornelia A. Clark

This appeal involves a woman who broke both ankles in a fall at church. The woman and her husband filed suit in the Circuit Court for Williamson County against the church and others. The trial court granted the church’s motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations and the joint enterprise rule.The woman and her husband perfected this appeal after obtaining post-judgment relief from an inappropriate interlocutory appeal. We have determined that the trial court properly granted the post-judgment relief but erred in summarily dismissing the complaint.

Williamson Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee vs. Clinton Darrell Turner
03C01-9604-CC-00151
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Ben W. Hooper, II

The Defendant, Clinton Darrell Turner, appeals as of right his conviction and sentence for DUI. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant and driving on a revoked license in the Cocke County Circuit Court. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven (11) months and twenty-nine (29) days on the charge of driving while under the influence and six months for the charge of driving on a revoked license. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently. The trial court suspended the entire sentence for the conviction of driving on a revoked license. On the DUI, the Defendant was ordered to serve seven days in jail with the balance to be served on probation. In addition to challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, Defendant also argues the trial court erred by allowing an officer to testify as to field sobriety tests when the officer was not trained to administer those tests. The last issue the Defendant raises is that the trial court erred by sentencing him to serve seven days rather than the two (2) day minimum provided by law. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee vs. Joseph L. Fletcher
03C01-9606-CC-00229
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge James E. Beckner

Defendant, Joseph L. Fletcher, appeals as of right a jury conviction for driving under the influence (DUI), second offense. He was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days and fined $610. Fletcher presents four issues for our review: 1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction; 2) whether the state is required to prove a culpable mental state for a DUI conviction; 3) whether the trial court abused its discretion in allowing testimony about certain drugs; and 4) whether the sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Greene Court of Criminal Appeals

Johns v. Howmet
03S01-9609-CV-00092
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. William Jenkins,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordancewith Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer contends (1) the claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, (2) the trial court erred by setting aside a previously approved settlement and (3) the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence. The panel has concluded the claim is time barred. The employee or claimant, Wadey Johns, suffered a compensable injury to her thumbs and received the medical and temporary total disability benefits to which she was entitled under the Workmen' Compensation Act. After returning to work, she negotiated, without the assistance of counsel, to settle her claim for future medical and permanent partial disability benefits. On February 18, 1992 she petitioned, jointly with the employer, the circuit court to approve a settlement. The petition she signed said, among other things, "...that said settlement is in substantial accord with the Tennessee Workers' Compensation Law and is in the best interest of the plaintiff." The settlement provided the claimant would receive, in addition to those benefits already received by her, $3,263.94 in permanent partial disability benefits and an additional $3,236.6 for her future medical benefits, in a lump sum. The settlement was approved the same day by Judge Wilson, who expressly found the settlement to be in the best interest of the claimant. More than one year and five months later, on July 29, 1993, the claimant filed a "Petition to Set Aside Judgment," wherein she averred the employer was guilty of "fraud and gross misrepresentation" in procuring the settlement. The particular facts and circumstances constituting fraud and misrepresentation were not stated. After an evidential hearing, Judge Wilson granted the petition on the ground of mutual mistake of fact. After an oral hearing on April 11, Judge Jenkins awarded additional benefits. 2

Knox Workers Compensation Panel

02A01-9609-CV-00218
02A01-9609-CV-00218
Trial Court Judge: Whit A. Lafon

Madison Court of Appeals

Ronald E. Leonard, and wife, Vickie J. Leonard, v. Butler Markland, Contractor
03A01-9611-CH-00370
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Judge Thomas Seeley, Jr.

This controversy arose as a result of a contract entered into between Robert E. Leonard and his wife, Vickie J. Leonard and Butler Markland. The contract provided that Mr. Markland would build a house on a lot owned by the Leonards at a total cost of $96,000.

 

Washington Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee vs. Teri L. Hopson
03C01-9601-CC-00007
Authoring Judge: Judge Gary R. Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge Arden L. Hill

The defendant, Teri L. Hopson,1 was convicted after a bench trial of DUI second offense. The trial court sentenced her to eleven months, twenty-nine days; the defendant is to serve forty-five days in jail at 100 percent with the possibility for work release. Her driver's license was revoked for two years. Proof on a defense motion to suppress evidence was presented during the course of the bench trial; a ruling that the arrest was lawful was made at the conclusion of the trial.

Washington Court of Criminal Appeals

Westand Land West Community Association, et al. v. Knox County, et al.
03S01-9610-CH-00098
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Judge Sharon J. Bell

We granted this appeal to determine whether Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-105(a) mandates submission of a newly proposed zoning classification amendment to the regional planning commission following the commission's rejection of a similar but different proposed classification. The Court of Appeals held that the statute does not require futile resubmissions of revised proposals. We, however, find that the proposal in question was not merely a revised prior
proposal but was a new and previously unsubmitted proposal. The statute clearly mandates submission of new proposals to the regional planning commission. We reverse the Appellate Court and hold that the new zoning proposal should have been submitted to the regional planning commission.

Knox Supreme Court

James Crittenden v. Memphis Housing Authority
02A01-9609-CV-00211
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly Kirby Lillard
Trial Court Judge: Judge Wyeth Chandler

This is an action for breach of an employment contract and deprivation of civil rights under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff employee. We
reverse.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Ann Elizabeth Dudenhoeffer v. George Daniel Dudenhoeffer
02A01-9607-CH-00160
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Joe C. Morris

In this action for separate maintenance, the trial court awarded Ann Elizabeth 2 Dudenhoeffer (“Wife”) a decree of separate maintenance and dismissed George Daniel Dudenhoeffer’s (“Husband”) counter-complaint for divorce. The trial court ordered Husband
 to maintain Wife as an insured on his medical insurance policy until Wife reaches age sixty-five and ordered Husband to maintain his three preexisting life insurance policies designating Wife as the sole irrevocable beneficiary. Wife was awarded the following: the marital residence, an automobile, Wife’s IRA account, Husband’s IRA account, one-half of Husband’s retirement benefits, the remaining balance of Husband’s 401-K account, a certificate of deposit, eighty-eight shares of Tenneco stock, the proceeds from a savings account, all savings bonds in Wife’s possession, two burial plots, an annuity, and the parties’ jointly owned personal property and household goods which Wife had in her possession. Husband was awarded the personal property which he had in his possession, a truck, a bass boat, a motor, a trailer, boating accessories, and proceeds previously withdrawn by him from his 401-K account. The trial court awarded Wife $6,638.50 as alimony in solido to aid Wife in paying her attorney fees and alimony in futuro in the following amounts:
$2,000.00 per month beginning 10/1/95 and ending 12/31/95;
$1,800.00 per month beginning 1/1/96 and ending 12/31/96;
$1,500.00 per month beginning 1/1/97 and ending 12/31/98;
$1,200.00 per month beginning 1/1/99 and ending 9/5/2001,

Wife’s sixty-fifth birthday; and $600.00 per month from 9/2001 until Wife’s death or remarriage.

Madison Court of Appeals

Beverly Fay Melton v. Danny Joe Melton
02A01-9701-CH-00022
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Michael Maloan

In this divorce action, Danny Joe Melton (hereinafter, “Husband” or “Mr. Melton”) appeals the trial court’s determination regarding the division of the marital estate, custody of the parties’ minor child, and the award of certain farm equipment to his former father-inlaw.
 

Weakley Court of Appeals

Chong Y. Struck v. Gary L. Struck - Concurring
01-A-01-9612-CH-00547
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Robert E. Corlew, III

The question in this case is whether the alimony set by the court was subject to modification.  The trial judge terminated the alimony upon the wife’s remarriage.  We affirm.

Rutherford Court of Appeals

Kathy L. Moyers, v. Roald A. Moyers
01A01-9612-CV-00556
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge Muriel Robinson

This appeal followed a long course of post-divorce litigation that prevented the parties from enjoying the peace that should have come from the dissolution of their unhappy marriage. The trial court found the husband guilty of five counts of criminal contempt for failing to comply with the court’s orders regarding division of marital property and payment of alimony in solido, and ordered him to serve ten days in jail for each count. On appeal we reverse the trial court as to four of the five counts.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Paul J. Myer and Carole A. Myer v. Mark Whitacre, Ginger Whitacre and Fran Haworth, individually and D/B/A Century 21 Haworth Homes
01A01-9701-CH-00014
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge Henry Denmark Bell

In this case involving a breach of a real estate contract, the appellant asserts that the evidence preponderates against the amount of damages found and the award of prejudgment interest. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Williamson Court of Appeals

Joe E. Armstrong v. Tennessee Department of Veterans Affairs, Commissioner Fred Tucker and Tennessee Civil Service Commission and Eleanor E. Yoakum
01A01-9610-CH-00476
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Robert S. Brandt

The question in this case is whether a state employee protected by civil service has a right to be heard before being reclassified to the unprotected executive service. The Chancery Court of Davidson County held that the employee had a right to grieve the reclassification. We affirm.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Helen S. Rogers vs. Tom E. Watts, Jr. - Concurring
01-A-01-9611-CV-00500
Authoring Judge: Judge Samuel L. Lewis
Trial Court Judge: Judge Thomas W. Brothers

This is an appeal by defendant/appellant, Thomas E. Watts, Jr., from the decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Davidson County finding Mr. Watts liable for malicious prosecution and awarding plaintiff/appellee, Helen S. Rogers, $18,000.00 in damages. The facts out of which this matter arose are as follows.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Helen S. Rogers v. Tom E. Watts, Jr. - Dissenting
01-A-01-9611-CV-00500
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H Cantrell

I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion on two grounds: (1) probable cause and (2) damages -- neither of which is presented with  much clarity in the briefs. But the issues are of such importance to the practice of law in this state that I feel they should be addressed.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Mary S. Fendley v. Mart G. Fendley
01A01-9509-CH-00418
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Thomas E. Gray

This appeal involves the classification of property in a divorce case. The wife filed for divorce in the Chancery Court for Montgomery County after seventeen years of marriage. Following a bench trial, the trial court declared the parties divorced and awarded the wife custody of the four minor children. In its division of the parties’ property, the trial court classified the parties’ home as marital property and awarded it to the wife but classified the household furniture, funds inherited by the wife, and a limited partnership interest in an athletic club as the wife’s separate property. The husband takes issue on this appeal with the allocation of the responsibility for the debt on the home, the classification of separate property, and the overall distribution of the marital estate. We have determined that the trial court should have allocated the debt secured by the home to the wife and that the trial court correctly classified the disputed assets and equitably distributed the marital estate.

Montgomery Court of Appeals

William Jones v. Jeff Reynolds, Commissioner, Tennessee Department of Correction - Concurring
01A01-9510-CH-00484
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor C. Allen High

This is the second appeal concerning a dispute between a prisoner and the Department of Correction over the calculation of the prisoner’s sentence reduction credits. After the Department summarily denied his second request for recalculation of his sentence credits, the prisoner filed a petition for declaratory judgment in the Chancery Court for Davidson County asserting that the Department had miscalculated his sentence credits. The trial court granted the Department’s motion for summary judgment, and the prisoner again appealed to this court. We have determined that the summary judgment dismissing the prisoner’s ex post facto claims should be affirmed but that the summary judgment dismissing the remaining claims must again be vacated.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Reba V. Davis and Tyler Wayne Davis, by next friend, Reba V. Davis, v. Harriman City Hospital, the City of Harriman, et al.
03A01-9701-CV-00016
Authoring Judge: Judge Don T. McMurray
Trial Court Judge: Judge Russell E. Simmons, Jr.

This is a medical malpractice case. Plaintiff, Reba V. Davis brought suit, individually and on behalf of her infant son, Tyler, against Dr. Elbert Cunningham, Harriman City Hospital and the City of Harriman, for injuries sustained by Tyler shortly after his birth. After reaching a settlement with Dr. Cunningham, the physician who delivered Tyler, Ms. Davis amended her complaint to include allegations of negligence against the attendant Harriman City Hospital nurses.

 

Roane Court of Appeals

Samuel R. Adams, et al., v. Margaret C. Culpepper, et al. - Concurring
03A01-9701-CH-00017
Authoring Judge: Judge Don T. McMurray
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Sharon Bell

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Chancery Court of Knox County, affirming the decision of The Department of Employment Security Board of Review in denying all the appellants unemployment compensation benefits.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Knox Court of Appeals

Sandra J. Scott, v. Dr. Gerald B. Calia
03A01-9608-CV-00270
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Judge James B. Scott, Jr.

This medical malpractice suit arises out of surgery performed on Sandry Scott's freet by Dr. Gerald Calia on May 17, 1989. Ms. Scott contends that Dr. Calia was negligent in his medical care of her. She insists on appeal that the Trial Court was in error in directing a verdict against her at the close of her proof.

Anderson Court of Appeals