Shava Lynn Kendrick vs. Larry Bert Kendrick M2004-00540-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Leonard W. Martin
This case involves a father's efforts to protect his children from their mother's sexually abusive relatives. When the mother filed for divorce in the Chancery Court for Houston County, she also filed a notice of intent to relocate with the children to the State of New York to be closer to her family, including a stepfather who had sexually abused and raped her when she was a child. Following a bench trial, the trial court declared the parties divorced, designated the mother as the primary residential parent, and permitted the mother to move to the State of New York with the parties' children. The father has appealed, arguing first that the trial court's custody and relocation decisions have exposed the children to an unreasonable risk of sexual abuse and second, that the trial court erred by refusing to designate which of the parties should be permitted to claim the children as tax exemptions. We have determined that the trial court erred by allowing the mother and the children to move to the State of New York without sufficient proof regarding their safety. We have also concluded that the court erred by refusing to address the parties' tax exemption issues.
State vs. Wesemann 03C01-9404-CR-00144
Trial Court Judge: Edgar P. Calhoun
Sullivan
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs. Hayles 03C01-9603-CR-00113
Trial Court Judge: Ray L. Jenkins
Knox
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs. Houston 03C01-9608-CR-00297
Trial Court Judge: Richard R. Baumgartner
Knox
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs. Weaver 03C01-9607-CC-00263
Trial Court Judge: James B. Scott, Jr.
Anderson
Court of Criminal Appeals
Luther T. Beckett v. Gaylord Entertainment Company 01S01-9610-CV-00209
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Walter C. Kurtz,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The issue is whether the defendant should be estopped to plead the bar of the Statute of Limitations. The trial judge ruled that waiver and estoppel were not implicated and dismissed the suit. The plaintiff alleged that he was injured while working for the Opryland Hotel on May 28, 1994. The defense of the Statute of Limitations was raised by motion for summary judgment, the hearing of which was bifurcated. The trial court determined that the plaintiff was aware of a job-related injury no later than June 8, 1994,1 but conducted a separate hearing on the issue of waiver and estoppel, following which he ruled that the delay in filing suit was the fault of the plaintiff. Plaintiff was employed at the Opryland Hotel in Nashville on May 28, 1994, as a doorman. On the early afternoon of May 28, 1994, he felt a pain in his lower right abdomen, and thought he had pulled a muscle and reported this to the door captain. He then told the bell services manager that he thought he had pulled a muscle and requested permission to go home, which was granted. He returned to work on his next scheduled work day, and continued to work without complaint until he was terminated for an unrelated reason on August 13, 1994. Plaintiff went to see his personal physician, Dr. Jacokes, about this injury on June 8, 1994. After examining the plaintiff, Dr. Jacokes advised him that he had a hernia. Plaintiff knew that his injury had occurred at work, but he made no mention to Opryland of his hernia before leaving his employment. Plaintiff testified that the pain in his lower abdomen worsened in April, 1995, and he sought additional medical treatment. His physician told him that he would need surgery and, as a result, he contacted defendant to file a workers' compensation claim. He was referred to Willis Corroon, the third party administrator of Opryland's workers' compensation claims, and spoke with Ms. Ann Parker, claims adjuster, at Willis Corroon. 1The Complaint was filed July 26, 1995. 2
Davidson
Workers Compensation Panel
Empire Berol , U.S.A. v. Nancy Lee Estes 01S01-9610-CH-00205
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Tyrus H. Cobb
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The posture of this case is somewhat unusual. The plaintiff is Empire Berol U.S.A., the employer of the defendant Nancy Lee Estes. It sought a declaratory judgment on March 11, 1993 of the respective rights of the parties under the workers' compensation law, alleging that Estes was asserting a job-related accident resulting in physical injury. Estes filed her answer, admitting that she was injured, but that her condition was one that progressively occurred and was not diagnosed as carpal tunnel syndrome until December 28, 1992. About four months later, Estes filed another answer, coupled with a counter-claim, through different counsel, in which she alleged that she sustained an injury by accident on or about November 17, 1992 during the course of her employment by the plaintiff. All this was followed by the filing of another complaint, by the plaintiff, on May 2, 1994, against Estes and Golden Corral, alleging as a result of discovery, that the injury to Estes arose out of her employment at the Golden Corral, which was designated as a third-party defendant. Golden Corral filed a motion to dismiss, alleging, in effect, procedural errors. The plaintiff thereupon amended its complaint, alleging that Golden Corral was a necessary party under RULE 19, but the procedural problem was unaddressed. Before the motion to dismiss was heard, the parties agreed that it was well- taken, and Estes averred her intention to file a complaint against Golden Corral, which soon followed, in which she alleged that a "gradual injury did occur and that [she] was employed by Golden Corral during a time frame in which the injury may have begun" and that she "sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of her employment while performing work at the place of business of Golden Corral in Shelbyville, Tennessee." Golden Corral denied that Estes was injured as alleged, but if so, her suit was time-barred under TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-21. Upon the trial of the case, the central issue was causation, since Ms. Estes' carpal tunnel syndrome was evident and not disputed. She testified that she began 2
Bedford
Workers Compensation Panel
Darla Gail Farmiloe v. Saturn Corporation 01S01-9610-CV-00199
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Jim T. Hamilton,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. This complaint was filed June 23, 1994. The plaintiff alleged that she sustained various job-related injuries arising from her employment, the first being November 21, 1991 involving upper back and shoulder pain which developed gradually. The defendant admitted the report of these injuries. Trial of the case in February 1996 resulted in a finding that the plaintiff's job duties advanced the severity of her pre-existing conditions and that she had sustained a 75 percent occupational disability with benefits payable in a lump sum. The employer appeals, and presents for review the issues of (1) whether the plaintiff sustained a compensable injury to her neck, back and left upper extremity, (2) whether the award is excessive, and (3) whether the award should be paid in a lump sum. W e will consider these issues jointly. Our review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 584 (Tenn. 1991). Where testimony is presented by deposition, this Court is able to make its own independent assessment of the proof to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.
Ssi Services, Inc. v. Howard L. Baker 01S01-9609-CV-00191
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Gerald L. Ewell, Sr.,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. This action began as one for a declaratory judgment under the workers' compensation laws that the accident suffered by the employee ("hereafter, plaintiff") resulted in minimal impairment only. The plaintiff counterclaimed, alleging that he sustained a job-related rotator cuff tear of his left shoulder with a biceps tendon tear requiring surgical repair on May 2, 1993, and that he aggravated the condition in the Spring of 1994 when further surgery was required. The plaintiff is 59 years old, employed as a painter, with an excellent work ethic. It is not controverted that he suffered the injury as alleged. He returned to full, uninterrupted employment in December, 1994 with restrictions. The trial court found that the plaintiff had sustained a 13 percent permanent partial disability to his whole body, and that the "cap embodied in the 1992 Amendment should apply since the plaintiff has returned to meaningful work activities." The plaintiff appeals, insisting (1) that the award of 13 percent permanent partial disability to the whole body is "contrary to the evidence and the law," and (2) that the plaintiff is "entitled to more than 13 percent permanent partial vocational impairment to the body as a whole." Our review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 584 (Tenn. 1991). Where the medical testimony is presented by deposition, this Court is able to make its own independent assessment of the medical proof to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.
