Portland Utilities Construction v. Chase Creek M2002-02886-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.
A utilities contractor sued a subdivision developer for payment for work it performed on the subdivision's infrastructure. The court found that the developer was obligated to honor its contract by paying for work with a value of $313,829. The court also found that the developer was entitled to an offset of $55,955 for damages resulting from defects in the contractor's performance. The developer argues on appeal that the trial court erroneously declined to grant it additional offsets. We affirm the trial court.
Nance vs. Nance 01A01-9611-CV-00515
Trial Court Judge: Muriel Robinson
Davidson
Court of Appeals
Estate of Edward P. Russell, Deceased 01A01-9611-PB-00516
Trial Court Judge: John A. Turnbull
Tracy Moore, B/N/F/ Shirley Moore vs. James Prescott, II 02A01-9609-CV-00227 View
Court of Appeals
Gentry vs. Gentry 01A01-9611-CH-00512
Trial Court Judge: Alex W. Darnell
State vs. Miller 03C01-9608-CR-00300
Trial Court Judge: R. Jerry Beck
Sullivan
Court of Criminal Appeals
Clarence Wayne Dunn v. Sequatchie Concrete Services, et al. 01S01-9606-CV-00121
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Lee Russell,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The appellant is seeking review of the findings of the trial court with respect to the following issues: (1) Whether the employee's claim against it is barred by Tenn Code Ann. section 5-6-23, a one-year statute of limitations1; (2) Whether the claim should be disallowed for the employee's failure to give timely written notice of his claim, as required by Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-21; (3) Whether the appellee was an employee of the RDF at the time of the injury; (4) Whether the award of permanent partial disability benefits is excessive; and (5) Whether the trial judge abused his discretion by commuting permanent partial disability benefits to a single lump sum. The employee contends the appeal is frivolous. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed. The employee or claimant, Dunn, is thirty-eight years old and has an eighth grade education. He has a commercial driver's license and has worked as a truck driver for some ten years. He gradually developed a ruptured disk in his lower back while driving a truck owned by the employer, RDF Transportation, Inc. After back surgery, he returned briefly to work for the appellant but resigned because the work exceeded his medical limitations. As to issues (1) through (4), this appeal turns on factual determinations. Appellate review is therefore de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6- 225(e)(2). This tribunal is required to conduct an independent examination of the record to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.
Wayne
Workers Compensation Panel
Patricia Dunn v. H.D. Lee Co. 01S01-9604-CH-00061
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: PER CURIAM
This case is before the Court upon motion for review pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 50-6-225(e)(5)(B), the entire record, including the order of referral to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel, and the Panel's Memorandum Opinion setting forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law in dismissing as untimely plaintiff's claim for workers' compensation benefits.
Lincoln
Workers Compensation Panel
Carrier Air Conditioning, et al. v. Henry Maguffin 01S01-9607-CV-00135
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Gerald L. Ewell, Sr.,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employee or claimant, Maguffin, contends the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that he did not suffer an injury by accident. The panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed. The claimant was working for Carrier in August of 1993 when he sprained his wrist while operating an air gun, thereby aggravating a pre- existing fracture, or "non-union of the scaphoid bone." His wrist swelled and he felt immediate pain. He received first aid from the company nurse, but continued to work. Almost a year later, because of continuing complaints of pain, he was referred by the employer to an orthopedic surgeon. The doctor operated and returned the claimant to work with some restrictions. In his deposition, the doctor opined that the injury aggravated the pre-existing condition by increasing pain, but did not create any permanent anatomical change. The surgeon was properly paid by the employer. The trial court found that the claimant had not suffered an injury by accident as contemplated by the Workers' Compensation Act. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(2). Under the Tennessee Workers' Compensation Law, injuries by accident arising out of and in the course of employment which cause either disablement or death of the employee are compensable. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-12(a)(5). An accidental injury is one which cannot be reasonably anticipated, is unexpected and is precipitated by unusual combinations of fortuitous circumstances. See Fink v. Caudle, 856 S.W.2d 952 (Tenn. 1993), and cases cited therein. An employer takes its employee with all pre-existing conditions, and cannot escape liability when the employee, upon suffering a work related injury, incurs disability far greater than if he had not had the pre-existing condition; Rogers v. Shaw, 813 S.W.2d 397 (Tenn. 1991); but if work aggravates a pre-existing condition merely by increasing pain, there is no injury by accident. Townsend v. State, 826 S.W.2d 434 (Tenn. 1992). The undisputed medical proof from the operating surgeon is that this claimant's aggravation of a pre-existing condition merely increased his pain 2
Randy F. Shadden v. ITT Hartford Ins. Co., et al. 01S01-9607-CH-00148
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Billy Joe White,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer's insurer, Hartford, argues (1) the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that the employee or claimant, Shadden, suffered a work related injury, (2) the evidence preponderates against the trial court's award of permanent total disability benefits and (3) the trial court erred in awarding medical expenses not disclosed in response to discovery requests and not "properly proven at trial." The Second Injury Fund (the Fund), which was made a party by an amended complaint, contends the evidence preponderates against the trial judge's finding that the claimant is permanently and totally disabled. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed. As a result of a previous compensable injury in 1984, while working for another employer in another state, the claimant was awarded benefits equating to fifty-three percent to the body as a whole. In a vehicular accident in 1989, which was not work related, he suffered spinal injuries which necessitated the insertion of metal rods in his back. The rods were removed in 1994. The employer at all relevant times knew of his pre-existing disabilities. He continued to work with pain and received a number of awards for sales excellence. In January of 1995, he was sales manager for a company in Cookeville which sold copiers. There is conflicting evidence with respect to the exact date of the occurrence, but during the week of January 9, 1995, the claimant noticed a truck driver unloading a large copier, weighing over six hundred pounds, from a truck. He attempted to assist the driver with the unloading when something "popped" in his back and he felt immediate pain. He told a co-worker immediately about the occurrence and had her write it down. He also gave timely written notice. The co-worker testified she had seen the claimant with his hands on the copier, one hand on the side and one on the bottom. The same day, the claimant drove to Fentress County General Hospital's emergency room where he received a shot to relieve his pain. He may or may not have also played racquetball that afternoon, but there is no medical evidence that his new injury was from something other than the lifting incident. He also worked for a few days immediately following the injury but was soon forced to quit because of severe pain. The treating physician, Dr. Leonard Carroll, who was familiar with the claimant's medical history, testified the claimant suffered a new spinal cord injury causally related to the lifting incident and an exacerbation of the pre- existing conditions and that, as a result, he developed, in addition to severe low back pain, bladder incontinence and depression to the extent of being suicidal. 2
