Naomi Gentry v. Lumbermens Mutual Co., et al. 01S01-9608-CH-00165
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. C. K. Smith,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. This action was filed January 18, 1995 seeking benefits for a back injury sustained on April 6, 1994 while employed by the defendant hospital. The allegations of the complaint were generally denied, thus requiring the plaintiff to prove every element of her case by a preponderance of the evidence, except when relying upon TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-242 which requires clear and convincing evidence as a predicate. The appellee allegedly suffered a back injury while lifting a patient. She was initially treated by a general practitioner in Gainsboro, Dr. E. M. Dudney, who referred her to Dr. Ray Hester, a neurosurgeon in Nashville, on May 5, 1994. Dr. Hester had treated the plaintiff for injuries she sustained in an automobile accident in 1982. These injuries involved, inter alia, a ruptured disc. She was released from treatment in 1983 with a 15 percent permanent partial impairment, and her activities were restricted. As stated, Dr. Hester saw the plaintiff eleven years later for this workers' compensation injury. He ordered a CT scan which revealed no significant pathology or findings and ultimately diagnosed her complaint as a lumbar strain. On July 19, 1995, he advised the employer by letter that: " . . . Mrs. Gentry apparently had a back strain. She had underlying degenerative joint disease in her back which was the result of her previous injuries to her back and not the more recent one where she was doing some lifting. I don't think she has any permanent impairment in relation to her lifting incident and no anatomical changes as a result of it." At some point before his deposition was taken for proof, Dr. Hester changed his opinion. He testified that the appellee had a five percent permanent impairment solely as a result of her 1994 injury. He found no objective signs of radiculopathy or loss of structural integrity. He imposed moderate lifting restrictions, and thought the appellee should be able to return to work. He found no anatomical changes in her back. Significantly, he testified that his impairment ratings of 15 percent for the 1982 injury and five percent for the 1994 injury were "separate and not a part and parcel of 2
Smith
Workers Compensation Panel
Margaret Ann Scruggs v. National Health Corp. 01S01-9504-CH-00052
Authoring Judge: John Maddux, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Tyrus H. Cobb,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. For the reasons set forth below, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. The plaintiff, Margaret Ann Scruggs, injured her neck on December 25, 1991, while employed as a nurse's aid by the defendant, National Healthcorp, L.P., d/b/a/ Merihil Health Care Center, Inc. The plaintiff, was 52 years old at the time of trial. She did not finish the seventh grade. Her employment history consists of working as a private sitter and in various restaurants and factories. She has had training as a nurse's aide. Plaintiff was first treated for her work-related neck injury by Dr.Kenneth J. Phelps. She informed Dr. Phelps that she was experiencing pain from her neck that was radiating down into her left arm causing loss of grip strength in her hand. Dr. Phelps confirmed plaintiff's complaint of pain and loss of grip strength, scheduled physical therapy and imposed lifting restrictions. Dr. Phelps continued to see plaintiff through October, 1992, because she continued to complain of symptoms similar to those she had complained of after the accident. She also indicated she had additional problems such as pain down her back and into her left leg, spasms in her back, difficulty sleeping and panic attacks. From January of 1993 through January of 1994, plaintiff was treated by Dr. Richard Fishbein, an orthopedic surgeon. Dr. Fishbein diagnosed plaintiff as 2
Marshall
Workers Compensation Panel
Michael Siniard v. Saturn Corporation 01S01-9609-CV-00175
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Jim T. Hamilton,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff, age 43, remains employed by Saturn Corporation, where he began in 199. He developed carpal tunnel syndrome in both wrists in 1994 and was provided with splints, medication, and access to physical therapy. In time the plaintiff was referred to Dr. James W iesman, an orthopedic surgeon, who performed a carpal tunnel release on his right hand. He returned to work for Saturn which assigned him a job not involving repetitive use of his hands. The plaintiff filed this complaint seeking benefits for a permanent partial disability occasioned by the asserted impairment caused by the carpal tunnel syndrome. The trial judge awarded benefits based on a finding of ten percent permanent partial disability to his right arm. The plaintiff appeals, insisting the award is inadequate for the reasons hereafter discussed. The treating physician testified that the release surgery was successful and that the plaintiff retained a two (2) percent impairment to his right arm. The plaintiff was referred by his attorney to Dr. David W. Gaw, also an orthopedic surgeon, for evaluation. Dr. Gaw saw the plaintiff only on one occasion. He conducted various tests and concluded that the plaintiff had a ten percent permanent partial impairment to his right arm. He disdained as unauthorized by the AMA Guides an evaluation of two (2) percent impairment as found by Dr. Wiesman. Our review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 584 (Tenn. 1991). The plaintiff criticizes Dr. Wiesman for his alleged failure to use the AMA Guides. While Dr. Wiesman apparently was not enamored by the Guides, he testified that "I used those Guides," and that "I did the impairment rating based on 2
Maury
Workers Compensation Panel
Donald Groton, Etc. v. Traverlers Insurance Co. 01S01-9607-CV-00154
Authoring Judge: Robert S. Brandt, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Bobby Capers,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. This Court is once again called upon to decide wither an injury sustained en route to work is compensable. We conclude that it is not and reverse the trial court's finding that it is. Regrettably, this case involves more than an injury. Donald Groton died from injuries he sustained in a car wreck while traveling to work on January 14, 1994. He worked for John Coleman Hayes, P.C. an engineering firm under contract with Nashville's airport authority to supervise noise abatement modifications being made to homes in the Antioch and Donelson neighborhoods close to the airport. Groton was one of two inspectors who examined the work of the contractors. He used his own vehicle in his work. The employer paid Groton mileage for driving from the office to job sites and from one job site to another. The employer did not pay Groton for driving from his home to the office or to the first job site of the day if Groton went there first. Likewise, the employer did not pay Groton for travel away from the office or from the last job site at the end of the work day. On the date of the accident, Groton did not report for duty at either the office or a job site as usual. James Michael Smith, John Coleman Hayes's construction manager, called Groton the day before and instructed him to go to a job site of a sister company, John Coleman Hayes Construction Company. Smith needed some surveying work done and Groton knew how to do it. -2-
Wilson
Workers Compensation Panel
Franklin Hartsell v. Dallas & Mavis Forwarding Co., et al. 01S01-9608-CH-00164
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Ellen Hobbs Lyle,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff, age 54, suffered a job-related myocardial infarction on March 1, 1994. A coronary arteriogram revealed an 8% blockage of his left anterior descending artery which was alleviated by an angioplasty procedure which reduced the blockage to less than 15%. Conservative treatment followed, and he was released to return to full employment on January 1, 1994. From that day forward, the plaintiff has worked steadily and without incident. In July 1991, the plaintiff was hospitalized with chest pains. A cardiac catheterization was performed, which revealed a serious lesion in his left circumflex coronary artery at the left ventricular ridge, with another lesion in his left anterior descending coronary artery. After the 1994 infarction, the lesion in the left anterior artery was substantially worsened. The employer insists that the award is excessive because it was improperly onerated with liability for impairment resulting from pre-existing coronary artery disease. Liability for benefits resulting from impairment as a consequence of the myocardial infarction is conceded. The dispositive issue at trial was the extent of the plaintiff's partial permanent disability. The Chancellor found that the plaintiff had a 5% permanent partial disability and awarded benef its accordingly. Our review is de novo on the record, accompanied by the presumption that the trial court's judgment is correct unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. T.C.A. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). The treating physician, Dr. K.P. Channabasappa, testified that the plaintiff's impairment was 29%, which may be extrapolated to Category II of the AMA Guidelines. He stated in a pre-deposition letter that "it is 29%" and on direct examination testified that the impairment was 29%. There was no countervailing testimony offered. 2
