Peggy J. Skaggs v. Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance Company
03S01-9603-CV-00029
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Ben K. Wexler,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer's insurer contends the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that the employee's fatal heart attack arose out of his employment. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed. The claimant, Peggy Skaggs, is the widow of Charles R. Skaggs, deceased. At the time of his death, Mr. Skaggs was employed by the First Baptist Church of Morristown as Maintenance Supervisor. On August 8, 1994, following several hours of manual labor at the church, he developed severe neck pain and numbness and tingling in his hands and arms. Mrs. Skaggs, also a church employee, called an ambulance. He was taken to Ft. Sanders Hospital, where he died on August 1, 1994. According to the Death Certificate, death was caused by (1) heart attack, (2) coronary artery disease and (3) sudden cardiac death. The cause of the heart attack was confirmed by a medical doctor, who testified by deposition, "I believe the activity (he) engaged (in) may indeed have precipitated the onset of his myocardial infarction." The doctor conceded on cross-examination that undiagnosed pre-existing coronary artery disease may have been a contributing cause. The trial judge found the employee's heart attack to have been caused by physical exertion at work, thus compensable. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(2). A heart attack is compensable, as an accidental injury, if it can be shown by competent evidence that the attack was precipitated by physical exertion or stress at work. Downen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 811 S.W.2d 523 (Tenn. 1991). The key, it has been held, to the recovery or denial of benefits is whether the heart attack is precipitated by the physical activity and exertion of the employee's work. Wingert v. Government of Sumner County, 98 S.W.2d 921 (Tenn. 1995). Moreover, an employee's death or disability resulting from a heart attack is causally related to his employment and therefore compensable, 2

James W. Smith v. Wilson County Concrete Co., et al.
01S01-9604-CR-00073
Authoring Judge: William S. Russell, Retired Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon.

James W. Smith v. Wilson County Concrete Co., et al.
01S01-9604-CR-00073
Authoring Judge: William S. Russell, Retired Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon.

Douglas W. Taylor v. Bgl Mining Co., Inc., et al.
01S01-9604-CH-00066
Authoring Judge: Robert S. Brandt, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Jeffrey F. Stewart,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The fundamental issue in this case is whether an injury on the way from work occurring on a road neither owned nor maintained by the employer, but which is the only available route from the work place, was an injury "arising out of and in the course of employment." Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-12(a)(4). We conclude that it is not and affirm the trial court's summary judgment for the employer. Tennessee Consolidated Coal Company (TCC) uses independent contractors to mine coal on its 35, Cumberland Plateau acres by leasing individual mines to individual operators. The plaintiff's employer, BGL Mining Company, leased mine 34, and mined TCC's coal for which TCC paid BGL a per- ton fee. TCC hauled the coal away from mine 34 and other mines on a haul road TCC built and maintained along the Marion-Sequatchie county line. The haul road was the only way to get to and from mine 34. The private road leads from a county road a short distance from the county road's intersection with Tennessee Highway 18. TCC's haul roads are strictly private roads, and TCC limits access to them. Victoria Arlene Anderson did not have permission to use TCC's haul road on the afternoon of March 11, 1992, but she drove her Dodge pick-up on it anyway and collided head-on with the plaintiff's car as he was driving from his work at mine 34. The severely injured plaintiff was air-lifted to Chattanooga's Erlanger Medical Center. -2-

Angela Thurman v. Cna Ins. Co., et al.
01S01-9605-CH-00089
Authoring Judge: William S. Russell, Retired Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon.

Brian Wolney and wife, Melissa Wolney, v. Lisa M. Emmons and Wells Fargo Armored Service Corporation
02A01-9508-CV-00169
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly Kirby Lillard
Trial Court Judge: Judge George H. Brown, Jr.

This is a suit for damages brought by Plaintiff Brian Wolney (“Wolney”), with his wife Melissa Wolney, against Defendants Wells Fargo Armored Service Corporation (“WFA”) and Lisa M. Emmons (“Emmons”). Wolney sued for personal injuries he sustained in an accident while riding as a passenger in a vehicle driven by Emmons, but owned by WFA. The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of WFA, finding that Wolney’s tort claim against WFA was barred because Wolney was WFA’s statutory employee. The Wolneys appeal the grant of partial summary judgment. We affirm.

Brian Wolney and wife, Melissa Wolney v. Lisa M. Emmons and Wells Fargo Armored Service Corporation
02A01-9508-CV-00169
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly Kirby Lillard

The petition for rehearing filed in behalf of the Appellants is denied.

Ikie Briggs, v. Estate of Odessa v. Briggs
02A01-9603-PB-00052
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Leonard D. Pierotti

This is a will construction case. Respondent, Ikie Briggs, appeals from the order of the probate court construing the Last Will and Testament of Odessa V. Briggs in favor of the petitioner, Frances Duncan Briggs.

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01C01-9604-CR-00129
01C01-9604-CR-00129
Trial Court Judge: Thomas H. Shriver

01C01-9604-CR-00147
01C01-9604-CR-00147
Trial Court Judge: J. Randall Wyatt, Jr.

01C01-9508-CC-00244
01C01-9508-CC-00244
Trial Court Judge: L. Terry Lafferty

01C01-9510-CC-00323
01C01-9510-CC-00323

01C01-9512-CC-00422
01C01-9512-CC-00422
Trial Court Judge: L. Terry Lafferty

01C01-9601-CR-00027
01C01-9601-CR-00027

01C01-9602-CC-00079
01C01-9602-CC-00079
Trial Court Judge: John H. Gasaway, III

01C01-9603-CC-00093
01C01-9603-CC-00093
Trial Court Judge: Walter C. Kurtz

01C01-9603-CR-00113
01C01-9603-CR-00113
Trial Court Judge: Thomas H. Shriver

01C01-9601-CR-00032
01C01-9601-CR-00032
Trial Court Judge: J. Randall Wyatt, Jr.

03C01-9512-CV-00394
03C01-9512-CV-00394

State vs. Curtis Newbern
02C01-9702-CR-00071

Joseph Chidester and wife, Kathleen Chidester v. L. D. Elliston, O.D.
02A01-9602-CV-00029
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph H. Walker, III

In this medical malpractice action, the Plaintiffs, Joseph and Kathleen Chidester, 2 filed suit against the Defendant, Dr. L. D. Elliston, for failing to diagnose the Plaintiff’s malignant tumor. The trial court granted the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment holding that the Plaintiffs’ cause of action is barred by the one year statute of limitations. The Plaintiffs’ have appealed the trial court’s order arguing that the statute of limitations does not bar this action because the Plaintiffs’ cause of action did not accrue until the Plaintiff’s malignancy recurred. For the reasons stated hereafter, we reverse the judgment of the court below and remand.

X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX

X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX

03C01-9406-CR-00205
03C01-9406-CR-00205
Trial Court Judge: James E. Beckner