In re Gabrielle R., et al.
Following an announcement in open court that the parties agreed to the terms of a permanent parenting plan, the trial court entered an order purporting to adopt the agreed-upon plan. Father appeals from this order, arguing that certain terms of the plan entered by the trial court do not match the announced agreement. Having reviewed the record, we observe that there is neither an attached child support worksheet reflecting what Father's child support would be based on the modified parenting schedule, nor any ruling on child support by the trial court. Accordingly, we conclude that the order appealed is not a final judgment so as to confer jurisdiction on this Court. Tenn. R. App. P. 3. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In re Gabrielle R., et al. - Dissent
The majority holds that because a reconsideration of child support is necessarily “[i]ncident to” the reconfiguration of a parenting plan, the trial court’s failure to rule on the child support modification action implicit in all successful modification of parenting time proceedings deprives this Court of jurisdiction to consider this appeal. Because I cannot accept that an agreed upon change in a parenting plan automatically necessitates an unrequested reconsideration of the parties’ child support obligations, I must respectfully dissent. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Hester Croy
The defendant, Hester Croy, was convicted of theft of property under $500, a Class A misdemeanor. On appeal, she argues that the trial court erred by ruling that her prior convictions for theft of property would be admissible for impeachment purposes if she testified. Following our review, we conclude that this issue is waived due to the defendant‟s failure to file a motion for new trial and that plain error review is not warranted. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Christopher Kinsler v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Christopher Kinsler, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel elicited inadmissible hearsay testimony on cross-examination and then failed to object to the testimony. Following our thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Hamblen | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Donald Yount v. Fedex Express
This is an age discrimination case. The 50-year-old plaintiff worked for the defendant company as a manager. In 2007, an internal investigation revealed that the plaintiff had violated two of the company’s policies. The plaintiff was ultimately terminated for violating the policies. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit alleging age discrimination. The company filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that the plaintiff could not establish a prima facie claim for discrimination or that the company’s explanation for terminating him was a pretext for discrimination. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the company. The plaintiff now appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Mark T. Harthun v. Joan M. Edens
This appeal arises from a contract to purchase real estate. Appellee contracted to sell Appellant the property at issue, subject to the property appraising at a certain value and the Appellant obtaining financing. Upon discovering that the property was subject to an easement held by the Tennessee Valley Authority, Appellant refused to purchase the property, contending that Appellee could not convey good and marketable title. Appellee filed suit for specific performance and also sought injunctive relief to prevent Appellant from purchasing other real property. In response, Appellant first filed a motion for summary judgment. Later, Appellant filed an answer and countercomplaint, seeking damages for breach of contract. Appellant then filed a motion for voluntary nonsuit of her countercomplaint and, on the same day, filed an amended motion for summary judgment. Appellee then filed a motion for leave to take a voluntary nonsuit. After Appellee filed his motion for nonsuit, Appellant filed a motion for attorney's fees, costs, and the return of earnest money. The trial court granted Appellee's motion for nonsuit, notwithstanding the Appellant's pending motion for summary judgment. The trial court denied Appellant's motion for attorney's fees and costs, but granted the motion for return of earnest money. Appellant appeals. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
World Classic Productions, Inc. v. RFD-TV The Theater, LLC, et al.
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Elizabeth Ann Morrow Granoff v. Andrew Scott Granoff
This second appeal of this post-divorce case concerns the husband's continued occupation of the marital residence. Upon remand, the trial court imposed a rental obligation upon the husband and established a reserve price for the auction sale of the residence. We modify the court's decision to reflect an imposition of rent that conforms to the marital dissolution agreement. We affirm the decision in all other respects. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
Rashe Moore v. State of Tennessee
In this post-conviction case, we clarify the appropriate prejudice analysis for ineffective assistance of counsel claims arising from the failure to properly request jury instructions on lesser-included offenses where, as here, the jury was given no option to convict of any lesser-included offense. The jury convicted the petitioner as charged of one count of aggravated burglary and multiple counts of aggravated rape, especially aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated robbery in connection with a home invasion. On direct appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions and declined to address the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on lesser-included offenses because the petitioner’s trial counsel did not request the instructions in writing as required by statute. Thereafter, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, a majority of the Court of Criminal Appeals granted a new trial on the especially aggravated kidnapping charges based on ineffective assistance of counsel. We hold that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in concluding that the petitioner was prejudiced by his trial counsel’s failure to request a jury instruction on aggravated kidnapping as a lesser-included offense of especially aggravated kidnapping. We conclude that no reasonable probability exists that a properly instructed jury would have convicted the petitioner of any of his asserted lesser-included offenses instead of the charged offenses. Because the petitioner suffered no prejudice, he did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel as to any of his convictions. We reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals’ judgment granting a new trial on the especially aggravated kidnapping charges and reinstate the post-conviction court’s judgment denying relief on these convictions. We further hold that the Court of Criminal Appeals properly affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief on the petitioner’s other convictions. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Adam Moates
The appellant, Adam Moates, was convicted in the Knox County Criminal Court of two counts of attempted first degree premeditated murder, three counts of attempted second degree murder, and five counts of employing a weapon during the commission of a dangerous felony. After a sentencing hearing, the appellant received an effective twenty-six-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his attempted first degree murder convictions because it fails to show premeditation. Based upon the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Terrance Heard v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Terrance Heard, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his August 2001 Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of first degree murder and especially aggravated kidnapping. Because the petitioner failed to prepare an adequate record for our review, we presume the ruling of the post-conviction court is correct and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Reggie Carnell James v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Reggie Carnell James, was convicted in 2007 of first degree murder and tampering with evidence. He was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole for the murder conviction and ten years for the tampering with evidence conviction, with the sentences to be served consecutively. This court affirmed his convictions on direct appeal. State v. Reggie Carnell James, No. W2007-00775-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 636726, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 10, 2009), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 17, 2009). In April 2010, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that trial counsel had been ineffective for not filing a motion to suppress a statement the petitioner had made to police officers. Following a hearing on April 11, 2011, the post-conviction court entered an order on January 31, 2012, denying the petition. The notice of appeal for this decision was not filed until August 27, 2015. The State argues on appeal that the notice of appeal was untimely and that, as a result, the appeal should be dismissed. We conclude that the interest of justice does not require our waiving the late filing of the notice of appeal and, therefore, dismiss the appeal. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Deangelo Key
The defendant, Deangelo Key, was convicted of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and sentenced to nine years at 85% in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In re Jasmine G.
At issue is whether the juvenile court abused its discretion by denying Mother’s request for attorney’s fees. Mother filed a petition to modify child support. Father filed an answer denying the petition and a counter-petition requesting, inter alia, that he be awarded primary custody of their child. The case was initially tried before the magistrate who denied Father’s petition and granted Mother’s petition to increase child support; however, the magistrate did not rule on Mother’s request for attorney’s fee. Both parties filed motions asking the juvenile court judge to conduct a de novo review. The juvenile court judge affirmed the magistrate’s recommendations; the judge also denied Mother’s request for attorney’s fees without explanation. On appeal, Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by refusing to award any of her attorney’s fees. Given the significant disparity in the parties’ income and realizing that Mother prevailed on the issues of child support and custody, we have determined that Mother is entitled to recover the attorney’s fees she reasonably incurred that relate to the issues of child support and custody and that she is entitled to recover attorney’s fees incurred on appeal. Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions for the juvenile court to award the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees Mother incurred relating to her petition for modification of child support and Father’s petition for custody. We also remand for the juvenile court to award Mother her reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees incurred in this appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Ashton B.
Petitioner adoption service filed a petition to terminate Father's parental rights, alleging several grounds under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-1-113(g)(9)(A) and abandonment pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-1-113(g)(1). The trial court denied the petition, finding no grounds to support termination. Based upon the Tennessee Supreme Court's holding in In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d 586 (Tenn. 2010), that the grounds contained within Section 36-1-113(g)(9)(A) cannot apply to putative biological fathers, we affirm the trial court's denial of termination on those grounds. We also affirm the trial court's finding that Petitioner failed to prove abandonment pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-1-113(g)(1) by clear and convincing evidence. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brenda Haynes Jackson Claughton
The appellant, Brenda Haynes Jackson Claughton, pled guilty in the Dickson County Circuit Court to two counts of felony theft and received concurrent, four-year sentences to be served on supervised probation. The trial court also ordered that she pay $36,000 restitution. On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking probation for her failure to pay restitution when the evidence shows that she had no ability to pay it. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ricky Flamingo Brown
The defendant, Ricky Flamingo Brown, appeals the summary dismissal of his motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, to correct what he believes to be an illegal sentence. Because the grounds for relief raised by the defendant have been previously determined and because the defendant failed to state cognizable grounds for relief under Rule 36.1, the interests of justice do not require the waiver of the timely filing of the notice of appeal in this case. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ann Dodd
The petitioner, Ann Dodd, appeals the Williamson County Criminal Court’s denial of her petition to expunge the record of her 2009 Williamson County General Sessions Court guilty-pleaded conviction of simple possession of cocaine. Because we conclude that the petitioner failed to satisfy the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-32-101(g), we affirm the trial court’s order. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Huston Foley Lloyd, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Huston Foley Lloyd, Jr., appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, and the State concedes that summary dismissal was improper. Because the petitioner stated a colorable claim for post-conviction relief, the post-conviction court erred by summarily dismissing the petition. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is reversed, and the case is remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the petitioner’s claims. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Roy Thomas Rogers
Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Roy Thomas Rogers, was convicted of initiating the manufacture of methamphetamine, a Class B felony; promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine, a Class D felony; possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor; and criminal impersonation, a Class B misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-16-301, -17-425, -17-433, -17-435. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of twelve years. On appeal, the Defendant contends (1) that the trial court erred by admitting evidence from a garbage bag found near his residence and (2) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. However, the Defendant failed to timely file his motion for new trial, and, subsequently, his notice of appeal. Because we conclude that the interest of justice does not require us to hear the appeal, we dismiss it as untimely. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
The Estate of James Alfred Jenkins v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company
Two years after he left work for the employer, an employee alleged that he sustained a compensable hearing loss. He died prior to filing suit. His estate subsequently filed this action. The employer denied that the condition was work-related and also asserted that the claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The trial court found for the estate and awarded benefits. The employer has appealed, and the appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We conclude that the action was barred by the statute of limitations and reverse the judgment. |
Obion | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Lakeith Moody
Following a jury trial, Defendant, LaKeith Moody, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and first degree felony murder of the victim, with whom Defendant had a long-time romantic relationship. He received a sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred by admitting acts of prior domestic violence committed by Defendant against the victim; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; and (3) the trial court failed to merge Defendant's convictions for premeditated and felony murder into one judgment for first degree murder. After a thorough review, we affirm the convictions for first degree premeditated murder and felony murder and remand the case for entry of corrected judgment forms noting merger of the two convictions as set forth herein. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Henry Holt, Sr., et al v. City of Fayetteville, Tennessee, et al.
Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and a deceased family member, sued the City of Fayetteville and others for wrongful death and personal injuries resulting from an automobile accident involving a stolen police car. Plaintiffs alleged a police officer negligently failed to secure a suspect after placing her in the police car. The suspect then stole the police car, drove away at a high rate of speed, and collided with the plaintiffs’ vehicle. The City moved to dismiss on the grounds that it was immune from suit based upon the public interest doctrine, and the trial court granted the motion. We affirm the dismissal. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
Diane C. Hanson v. Gary D. Meadows
The mother of two minor children filed a petition on May 5, 2014, in the Chancery Court of Rutherford County seeking an order of protection against the children’s father for her benefit and for the benefit of their two minor children. When the petition was filed, the parties were operating under a parenting plan from Wisconsin state courts, and the Chancery Court of Rutherford County exercised only temporary emergency jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-6-201 to -243. The chancery court granted the petition pending an evidentiary hearing. Unfortunately, the matter stalled for eleven months due to pending criminal charges against the father arising out of the same incident. Following the evidentiary hearing in April 2015, the trial court extended the order of protection as to the mother but dismissed the petition as to the children on the finding the children were not in any danger. Mother appealed. At oral argument, both parties informed the court that custody modification proceedings were ongoing in Tennessee and that the parenting plan had been temporarily modified pending discovery and a full hearing. The only issues on appeal pertain to the welfare of the parties’ two minor children. The chancery court now has jurisdiction over the order of protection, which was filed two years ago, and exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the parenting plan; therefore, the chancery court is responsible for ruling on all current issues concerning the welfare of the children. For these reasons, we conclude the limited issues on appeal are moot because we are unable to provide meaningful relief. Our ruling on the order of protection could conflict with recent rulings by the chancery court that are based on current events, as distinguished from the singular incident on appeal that is now two years old. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
William Wyttenbach v. Board of Tennessee Medical Examiners, et al.
This is an appeal under the Administrative Procedures Act. After the Tennessee Department of Health mailed notice to a physician of alleged violations of the Tennessee Medical Practice Act, the physician retired his Tennessee medical license. Unsatisfied, the Department of Health filed a notice of charges. After a hearing at which the physician did not appear, the Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners revoked the physician’s medical license and placed conditions on any future application by the physician for a medical license in Tennessee. The physician appealed to the chancery court, which affirmed the decision of the Board of Medical Examiners. On appeal to this Court, the physician challenges whether the Board possessed personal jurisdiction over him and sufficiency of service of the notice of charges. The physician also argues that his due process rights were violated and that the Board of Medical Examiners lacked authority to revoke a retired medical license. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |