State of Tennessee v. Tiffany Clegg
The Defendant-Appellant, Tiffany Clegg, appeals the trial court’s revocation of her probation and reinstatement of her effective eight-year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant-Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by reinstating a sentence of full confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles Owens
The defendant, Charles Owens, filed an unsuccessful Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence, the alleged illegality being that he was not present, either in person or by video, at his sentencing. He asks that his conviction and sentence be declared illegal and void. The trial court concluded, without a hearing, that the motion failed to state a colorable claim for relief, and this appeal followed. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the motion, pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tyler Fitzgerald Raybon-Tate
The defendant, Tyler Fitzgerald Raybon-Tate, pled guilty to five counts of aggravated burglary; one count of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more; two counts of theft of property valued at $500 or less; one count of carjacking; one count of kidnapping; two counts of felony evading arrest in a motor vehicle; and one count of driving on a suspended license. The defendant had agreed to be sentenced as a Range II offender, and the court was to determine the alignment of the sentences. Subsequently, the court imposed eight-year sentences for each of the five counts of aggravated burglary; seven years for the theft of property over $10,000; eleven months and twenty-nine days for each of the two counts of theft of property $500 or less; seventeen years for carjacking; nine years for kidnapping; three years for one evading arrest charge and six years for the other; and six months for driving on a suspended license. Concluding that the defendant had an extensive record of criminal behavior and was a dangerous offender, the trial court ordered that the sentences for the carjacking conviction and for two aggravated burglaries be served consecutively, for a total effective sentence of thirty-three years. The defendant appealed, arguing that consecutive sentences should not have been imposed, for he was not a dangerous offender. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In re Estate of Terry Paul Davis
Christinia Davis (“Wife”), Terran Denise Davis (“Terran”), and Taylor Ann Davis (“Taylor”) appeal the April 17, 2015 order of the General Sessions Court for Bount County Probate Division (“Probate Court”) upholding the Last Will and Testament of Terry Paul Davis (“the Will”). Wife, Terran, and Taylor raise an issue regarding whether the Probate Court erred in finding that the presumption of undue influence arising out of the proven confidential relationship between Terry Paul Davis (“Deceased”) and Olive K. Davis (“Davis”) was rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. We find and hold that although a confidential relationship was proven between Deceased and Davis, clear and convincing evidence was proven to rebut the presumption of undue influence. We, therefore, affirm. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
In re Benjamin A.
This is a termination of parental rights case, focusing on Benjamin A., the minor child (“the Child”) of Brent H. (“Father”) and Brandice A. (“Mother”). The Child was taken into protective custody by the Tennessee Department of Children's Services (“DCS”) on November 4, 2010, upon investigation of a spiral fracture to his right arm and suspected child abuse. On December 17, 2013, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Father. Mother previously had surrendered her parental rights to the Child in June 2013 and is not a party to this appeal. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that statutory grounds existed to terminate the parental rights of Father upon its finding by clear and convincing evidence that Father had (1) abandoned the Child by willfully failing to provide financial support, (2) abandoned the Child by failing to provide a suitable home, and (3) failed to substantially comply with the reasonable responsibilities and requirements of the permanency plans. The court further found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Father's parental rights was in the Child's best interest. Father has appealed. Having determined that, as DCS concedes, the element of willfulness was not proven by clear and convincing evidence as to Father's failure to support the Child, we reverse the trial court's finding regarding the statutory ground of abandonment through failure to support. We affirm the trial court's judgment in all other respects, including the termination of Father's parental rights to the Child. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Robert Blondin
Automobile insurance company brought action to recover from the defendant payments made under the policy to its insured and her passenger for personal injuries and property damage resulting from an automobile accident between the insured and the uninsured Defendant’s daughter. Judgment was entered in favor of company in the amount of $20,575.00, which was reduced by 20% to $16,460.00 in accordance with the court’s apportionment of 20% fault to the policy holder. Defendant appeals the denial of his motion to dismiss, the award of damages, and the allocation of fault. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
James R. Sterchi, Jr. v. Louis B. Savard, Jr., As Executor of The Estate Of L. Basil Savard, Sr.
This appeal concerns a conflict of law choice between Tennessee and Florida law. James R. Sterchi, Jr. (―Mr. Sterchi‖) sued L. Basil Savard (―Mr. Savard‖) in the Circuit Court for Bradley County (―the Trial Court‖) for the wrongful death of Mr. Sterchi’s mother Rosalind Savard (―Mrs. Savard‖) in a car accident in Florida.1 Mr. Savard filed a motion for summary judgment. Florida law prevents Mr. Sterchi from pursuing his claim while Tennessee law does not. All interested parties were domiciled in Tennessee. The Trial Court held that Florida law applies and granted Mr. Savard’s motion for summary judgment. Mr. Sterchi filed an appeal to this Court. We hold that under ―the most significant relationship‖ test as adopted by our Supreme Court in Hataway v. McKinley, 830 S.W.2d 53 (Tenn. 1992), Tennessee has the more significant relationship to the occurrence and parties in this case, and, therefore, Tennessee substantive law applies to Mr. Sterchi’s wrongful death action. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
James R. Sterchi, Jr. v. Louis B. Savard, Jr., As Executor of The Estate Of L. Basil Savard, Sr.-Concurring
I concur fully in the majority’s decision in this case. I write separately solely to express my opinion that inasmuch as this action was initiated subsequent to July 1, 2011, the standard of review for summary judgment delineated in Tennessee Code Annotated § 20-16-101 (Supp. 2015) applies. See Rye v. Women’s Care Ctr. of Memphis, MPLLC, 477 S.W.3d 235, 249 (Tenn. 2015) (noting that in contrast to the action in Rye, which was initiated in 2009, Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-16-101 “applies to actions filed on or after July 1, 2011.”) (citing Act of May 20, 2011, ch. 498, 2011 Tenn. Pub. Acts § 3 at 471). The statute provides: |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dana Yearwood
The Defendant-Appellant, Dana N. Yearwood, appeals the trial court’s revocation of her probation and reinstatement of her effective five-year, eleven-month, and twenty-nine day sentence in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, Yearwood argues that the trial court improperly reinstated a sentence of confinement without consideration of her presentence report and improperly revoked her probation. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Van Buren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Holmes
The Defendant, James Holmes, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder during the attempt to perpetrate a robbery, attempted especially aggravated robbery, attempted first degree murder, attempted carjacking, and employing a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202(a) (2014) (first degree murder), 39-13-202(b) (2014) (first degree felony murder), 39-13-403 (2014) (especially aggravated robbery), 39-12-101 (2014) (criminal attempt), 39-13-404 (2014) (carjacking), 39-17-1324(i)(1) (2014) (dangerous felony), 39-17-1324(b) (2014) (employing a firearm during the attempt to commit a felony). On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court and remand for correction of the judgments. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Melanie Jones, individually and on behalf of Matthew H. v. Shavonna Rachelle Windham, et al.
This Rule 10 appeal stems from a vehicular accident involving a minor child who was struck by a van driven by the employee of a children's daycare. The child's mother filed suit alleging negligence against the employee-driver of the vehicle and asserted claims for negligent hiring, negligent retention, and negligence per se against the driver's employers. The mother also averred that she should recover punitive damages based on the conduct of the Defendants. The employers, the individual owners of the daycare, admitted vicarious liability for the negligence of their employee and moved for partial summary judgment on the direct negligence claims asserted against them. They argued that it was improper to proceed against them on an independent theory of negligence when they had already admitted vicarious liability. The employers, along with the employee-driver, also sought summary judgment with respect to the punitive damages claim. Although the trial court granted the employers' motion with respect to the direct negligence claims, it denied the motion with respect to the claim for punitive damages. On appeal, we reverse the trial court's dismissal of the direct negligence claims asserted against the employers and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Melanie Jones, individually and on behalf of Matthew H. v. Shavonna Rachelle Windham, et al. - Dissent
I must respectfully dissent from the majority's Opinion, and I believe Tennessee should adopt the preemption rule. In my view, once an employer has admitted respondeat superior liability for an employee's negligence, it is improper to allow a plaintiff to proceed against the employer on a negligent hiring or negligent supervision theory of liability. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In re Candace J., et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition seeking to terminate the mother’s parental rights with respect to the minor child. The juvenile court found that statutory grounds existed to terminate the mother’s parental rights upon its finding by clear and convincing evidence that the mother (1) abandoned the child by her willful failure to visit, (2) abandoned the child by her willful failure to provide a suitable home, (3) failed to substantially comply with the requirements of the permanency plans, and that (4) the conditions that led to the child’s removal still persisted. The juvenile court further found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests. Having thoroughly reviewed the record and considered the arguments presented on appeal, we affirm the juvenile court’s judgment in all respects. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
In re K.F.R.T. et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case. The case proceeded to trial on the amended petition of the Department of Children's Services seeking to terminate on multiple grounds the parental rights of L.M. to his children, K.F.R.T., L.E.M.R., and B.A.M.R. (collectively the children). The trial court dismissed the petition after a bench trial, finding and holding that DCS “ha[d] failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence any ground sufficient to justify termination of [father's] parental rights.” Whittney N.L. Good, guardian ad litem for the children, appeals. We reverse because we hold that the evidence clearly and convincingly shows that father is guilty of a pattern of criminal conduct “exhibit[ing] a wanton disregard of the child[ren].” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv) (2014). We find clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the children to terminate father's parental rights. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
In re K.F.R.T. et al. - Concurring and Dissenting
D. MICHAEL SWINEY, C.J., concurring and dissenting. I concur in most of the majority’s opinion. I, however, cannot concur with the majority in its decision to reverse the Juvenile Court’s finding as to wanton disregard. I would affirm the Juvenile Court on this issue as well as on all other issues. As such, I also cannot agree with the majority’s decision concerning best interest as that issue never is reached if there is no ground for termination.
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Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John Russell Giles, Jr.
Following a jury trial, the Defendant, John Russell Giles, Jr., was convicted of premeditated first degree murder and sentenced to imprisonment for life. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) that the trial court erred “in refusing to fashion a remedy” for alleged discovery violations made by the State; (3) that the trial court admitted in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) evidence that, the day before the murder, the Defendant had conducted internet searches for and visited pornographic websites depicting women being raped; (4) that one of the State's witnesses “perjured himself,” and the trial court did not allow the witness to be recalled for further cross-examination; and (5) that the State was allowed to argue a time of death that differed from the time of death provided in the bill of particulars. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Cumberland | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Orlando Freeman
Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Michael Orlando Freeman, was convicted of attempted second degree murder, as a lesser included offense of attempted first degree murder; aggravated assault by infliction of serious bodily injury; and attempted aggravated rape by use of a deadly weapon. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-202, -13-102, -13-502. He was acquitted of especially aggravated kidnapping. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-305. The Defendant received an effective sentence of twelve years as a Range I, standard offender with release eligibility at thirty percent. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support each of his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss based on the State's failure to preserve evidence pursuant to State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912 (Tenn. 1999); (3) the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument, which prejudiced the outcome of his trial; and (4) the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial. Following our review, we conclude that the Defendant's issues are without merit, and the judgments of the trial court are affirmed in all respects. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Daniel Cruze, II
In 2013, the Defendant, James Daniel Cruze, II, pleaded guilty to sale of a Schedule II controlled substance, and the trial court sentenced him to ten years, to be served at 35%, suspended after the service of 365 days. In 2015, the Defendant's probation officer filed a probation violation report in which he alleged that the Defendant had absconded, thereby violating several of the rules of his probation. After a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant's probation and ordered him to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. On appeal the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it ordered that he serve his sentence as a result of what he deems “minor infractions” of his probation. We affirm the trial court's judgment. |
Sevier | ||
Bryan McNeese v. Wendolyn Carol Williams, et al.
This appeal involves a Rule 60 motion to set aside an agreed order on the basis that the petitioner withdrew his consent to the agreement prior to the entry of the agreed order. The trial court denied the Rule 60 motion. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
In re Landon T.G. et al.
This appeal concerns a mother’s petition to set aside an order terminating her parental rights and permitting the adoption of her minor children. The mother alleged that the order is void for lack of personal jurisdiction because service of process was ineffective. The trial court denied the petition. The mother appeals. We hold that the order is void for lack of personal jurisdiction. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for further hearing to determine whether exceptional circumstances justify the denial of relief in accordance with Turner v. Turner, 473 S.W.3d 257 (Tenn. 2015). |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Kathryn E. Mitchell Et Al. v. Charles Wesley Morris Et Al.
This action concerns the decedent’s purchase of several investment products from the defendants. Following the decedent’s death, his daughter filed suit, alleging violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, codified at 47-18-101, et. seq., breach of contract, promissory fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty. The defendants sought summary judgment. The court granted summary judgment, finding that the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act claims were untimely and that the evidence was insufficient to establish the other claims without consideration of parol evidence and inadmissible hearsay testimony. The daughter appeals. We affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Kathryn E. Mitchell et al v. Charles Wesley Morris et al. - Concurring
I concur fully in the majority’s decision in this case. I write separately only to express my opinion that the appropriate summary judgment standard to be applied by Tennessee courts now is as set forth in Rye v. Women’s Care Center of Memphis, MPLLC, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2015 WL 6457768 (Tenn. 2015), rather than Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-16-101. I believe our Supreme Court intended for the retroactive application of Rye when it stated: “In civil cases, judicial decisions overruling prior cases generally are applied retrospectively.” Rye, ___ S.W.3d at ___n.9, 2015 WL 6457768 at *35 n.9. While there may be very little, if any, difference between the summary judgment standard as set forth in Rye and as contained in Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-16-101, I believe Rye sets the standard and is controlling on the courts of this State. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
David Bryan Hawk v. Crystal Goan Hawk
This post-divorce appeal concerns the mother’s petition to modify the residential schedule in an agreed parenting plan. Following a hearing, the trial court found that a material change in circumstances had occurred that necessitated a change in the plan. The court modified the plan by order and further required the parties to attend parenting classes and mediation before seeking further relief from the court. The mother appeals. We affirm the court’s modification of the plan. We reverse the requirement imposed upon the parties to attend parenting classes before seeking further relief from the court. We remand for entry of a permanent parenting plan and child support worksheet. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Branden Michael Toth
Defendant, Branden Michael Toth, appeals after a jury found him guilty of one count of theft of property valued at $60,000 or more and five counts of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more. Defendant was sentenced to an effective sentence of twelve years in incarceration. On appeal, Defendant challenges the trial court‘s failure to charge lesser-included offenses, the trial court‘s handwritten notations on the verdict forms, the trial court‘s failure to dismiss Count 4 of the indictment, the sufficiency of the evidence, and his sentence. After a review, we determine that the trial court dismissed the original Count 5, renumbered the remaining counts of the indictment (Count 7 became Count 6, Count 6 became Count 5) and submitted Count 4 to the jury on a lesser-included offense. Consequently, we affirm the convictions. On remand, the trial court should correct the judgment form in Count 3 to reflect a conviction of theft of property valued at $60,000 or more, hold a hearing on restitution, and correct the offense dates in Counts 5 and 6 to December 16, 2009 and January 2, 2010, respectively. Accordingly, the convictions are affirmed and remanded. |
Washington | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bobby Lynch
The Defendant, Bobby Lynch, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of third offense simple possession or casual exchange of a controlled substance, a Class E felony. See T.C.A. § 39-17-418 (2010) (amended 2014). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a career offender to six years' confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying him alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals |