State of Tennessee v. Alex Hardin Huffstutter
In conjunction with the entry of a nolo contendere plea to first offense driving under the influence (“DUI”), Defendant, Alex Hardin Huffstutter, reserved a certified question for appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(A) in which he asked this Court to determine whether Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-313 excluded DUI as an offense for which judicial diversion was available. On appeal, this Court determined that the question was not dispositive and dismissed the appeal. State v. Alex Hardin Huffstutter, No. M2013-02788-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 4261143, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 28, 2014), no perm. app. filed. Subsequently, Defendant filed a motion in the trial court seeking reconsideration of his eligibility for judicial diversion. The trial court considered the motion and issued an order denying relief. Defendant appeals the denial of the motion to reconsider. After a review, we determine that the appeal is not properly before this Court. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony Bobo
Prior to his indictment, the defendant entered into a written and signed plea agreement with the State in general sessions court, where he waived his right to a preliminary hearing and presentment to the grand jury and indicated he intended to plead guilty to one count of aggravated burglary. After the matter was transferred to criminal court but before the court could accept the plea agreement, the State indicated that it would refuse to abide by the terms. The defendant was ultimately granted a preliminary hearing and indicted, and he then entered an open guilty plea to one count of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, one count of vandalism of property valued at $10,000 or more, a Class C felony, and one count of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant to serve four years on supervised probation for each conviction, with all the sentences to be served concurrently. In entering his guilty pleas, the defendant reserved a certified question of law asking this court to decide whether a written plea agreement, executed in general sessions court, was binding on the State prior to its acceptance by the criminal court. We conclude that the certified question is not dispositive of the defendant‘s aggravated burglary conviction, and accordingly dismiss the appeal of that offense. We further hold that such an agreement is not enforceable absent detrimental reliance by the defendant, and we conclude that the trial court did not err in remanding for a preliminary hearing and indictment rather than granting the defendant specific performance of the agreement. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Quinton Sanders v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Quinton Sanders, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the petitioner argues that the post-conviction court failed to make adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding one of his claims, and he argues that trial counsel was ineffective. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Roscoe Graham v. State of Tennessee
In August 2013, Roscoe Graham (“the Petitioner”) was convicted of aggravated sexual battery and sentenced to ten years' incarceration. Thereafter, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was denied after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by: (1) failing to assert a viable defense; (2) coercing the Petitioner to waive filing of a motion for new trial and direct appeal; and (3) operating under an actual conflict of interest. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Donte Dewayne Watson
Donte Dewayne Watson, the Defendant, was sentenced to eight years on community corrections under the supervision of the Davidson County Drug Court Program (“DCIV”). Following the issuance of a warrant alleging violations of the drug court agreement order and an amended warrant alleging as an additional ground an arrest for a criminal offense, the Defendant filed a request that his case be transferred back to the court that sentenced him to drug court. The criminal court judge, who also presided over DCIV, denied the request. Following a hearing, the criminal court revoked community corrections, resentenced the Defendant to nine years, and ordered the sentence to be served in the Department of Correction. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court revoking the Defendant’s community corrections. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Justin R. Rogers v. Blount Memorial Hospital, Inc. et al.
This appeal involves a health care liability action filed by the plaintiff against Blount Memorial Hospital, Inc. (“BMHI”) and the doctor who treated the plaintiff at BMHI from September 8, 2012, to September 13, 2012. The plaintiff filed his complaint on December 13, 2013, alleging that the defendant doctor had misdiagnosed his illness, causing a delay in treatment and resultant permanent injuries. Both defendants filed motions to dismiss, which were converted into motions for summary judgment with the filing of additional affidavits. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of BMHI based on, inter alia, the applicable statute of limitations and BMHI's immunity as a governmental entity. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Justin R. Rogers v. Blount Memorial Hospital, Inc. et al. - Concurring
I concur fully in the majority’s decision in this case. I write separately only to express my opinion that the appropriate summary judgment standard to be applied by Tennessee courts now is as set forth in Rye v. Women’s Care Center of Memphis, MPLLC, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2015 WL 6457768 (Tenn. 2015), rather than Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-16-101. I believe our Supreme Court intended for the retroactive application of Rye when it stated: “In civil cases, judicial decisions overruling prior cases generally are applied retrospectively.” Rye, ___ S.W.3d at ___n.9, 2015 WL 6457768 at *35 n.9. While there may be very little, if any, difference between the summary judgment standard as set forth in Rye and as contained in Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-16-101, I believe Rye sets the standard and is controlling on the courts of this State. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Cathy Turnbo Franks v. Ronald Franks
This is the second appeal of this case involving various financial issues relative to a divorce. Husband appeals the trial court‘s determination of several factual findings relative to alimony, including Wife‘s ability to secure employment, Husband‘s ability to earn in the future, the award of attorney‘s fees to wife, and the value of several marital assets divided in the property division, including the value of an LLC jointly owned by the parties. We now vacate the order of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. |
Hardin | Court of Appeals | |
Timothy L. Diggs, Sr. v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Timothy L. Diggs, Sr., appeals the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for aggravated child abuse and felony murder and his effective life sentence. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief on his due process and ineffective assistance of counsel claims. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Donquise Tremonte Alexander
The Defendant, Donquise Tremonte Alexander, pleaded guilty pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement to second degree murder and received a thirty-year sentence. More than three years later, the Defendant filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Criminal Procedure Rule 36.1 requesting that the trial court correct an illegal sentence because his sentence exceeds the sentencing range for a Range I offender convicted of a Class A felony. The trial court summarily dismissed the motion after determining that the Defendant knowingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty and agreed to a sentence outside the appropriate sentencing range pursuant to Hicks v. State, 945 S.W.2d 706 (Tenn. 1997). On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his motion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Antonio M. Crockett
A Davidson County jury found the Defendant, Antonio M. Crockett, guilty of first degree felony murder, for which the Defendant received a life sentence. On appeal from his conviction, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s motion to sever his case from that of his co-defendant; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (3) the trial court erred in admitting the statement of the victim under the dying declaration hearsay exception; and (4) the trial court erred in ordering the Defendant’s life sentence to be served consecutively to a prior sentence. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Shuan Terrell Marsh
The defendant, Shuan Terrell Marsh, appeals his Marshall County Circuit Court jury conviction of third offense possession of a controlled substance, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Courtney Wesley v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Courtney Wesley, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2013 Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of aggravated burglary and theft of property valued at $1,000 or more, alleging that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Richard W. Gibbs, et al v. Clint Gilleland, et al.
Buyers of unimproved real property seek rescission of a Lot/Land Purchase and Sale Agreement on the ground of mutual mistake. Buyers purchased the property for the purpose of constructing a house. It is undisputed that at the time of contracting, Buyers and Sellers believed the property was suitable for that purpose. One week after obtaining the necessary building permits and commencement of construction, Buyers were informed by the county that the property was substantially below the required Base Flood Elevation (“BFE”) and that construction must cease immediately. Buyers halted construction and hired a professional engineer to address the issue. Based on unique drainage and flooding concerns, the engineer concluded that the property was not suitable for construction of a residential building and it had not been suitable for such purpose since the land was subdivided in 1999. After Buyers sued for rescission of the contract, both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court found that when the contract was entered into the property was suitable for construction of a house and it only became unsuitable due to the subsequent action of the county in setting the BFE. Therefore, the court concluded there was no mutual mistake of fact. Based on this finding the court granted Sellers’s motion for summary judgment and summarily dismissed the complaint. Buyers appeal. We conclude that, at the time of contracting, the parties were operating under a mutual mistake as to a contemporaneously verifiable fact; nevertheless, the contract assigned the risk of mistake to Buyers. Therefore, rescission on the ground of mutual mistake is not available. Accordingly, we affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
William L. Jenkins v. Tennessee Department of Corrections, et al.
Certiorari proceeding in which an inmate seeks review of a disciplinary proceeding finding him guilty of assault on another inmate. Petitioner asserts that the disciplinary board violated various Tennessee Department of Correction regulations in the conduct of the hearing and that the trial court erred in dismissing the petition. Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Wayne | Court of Appeals | |
Shemeka Ibrahim v. Mark Williams, et al.
Plaintiff filed a health care liability action against multiple healthcare providers but did not comply with the statutes governing healthcare liability actions. Defendants filed motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motions. Plaintiff appeals, and finding no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Daniel W. Mithcell v. Tricia Lurlene Hall
This appeal arises from a dispute over modification of child support. Daniel W. Mitchell (“Petitioner”) filed a petition against his ex-wife Tricia Lurlene Hall (“Respondent”) in the Circuit Court for Sevier County (“the Trial Court”) seeking a modification of his child support obligation given the parties’ second oldest child turning 18. The matter was referred to a Special Master. The Trial Court designated the date of the final hearing, March 31, 2014, as the effective date for the modification of child support rather than the date when the child at issue reached age 18, and ordered Petitioner to pay an arrearage accordingly. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Stephanie Nichole Lee v. Christopher Cornell Eskridge
The trial court, upon finding that Christopher Cornell Eskridge (Respondent) repeatedly violated orders of protection issued to protect Stephanie Nicole Lee (Petitioner), sentenced him to ten days in jail and required him to post a $2,500 bond in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-610(b)(2) (2014). On appeal, Respondent challenges the constitutionality of this statute. None of the issues raised on appeal, including the constitutional issue presented by Respondent, were raised with the trial court. Furthermore, Respondent did not timely notify the Attorney General of his constitutional challenge, as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-14-107(b) (2000) and Tenn. R. Civ. P. 24.04. We hold that Respondent waived these issues. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Jay Earl Haynes v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Jay Earl Haynes, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his two rape convictions, arguing he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Marlon Yarbro v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Marlon Yarbro, was convicted of selling .5 grams or more of a Schedule II controlled substance within 1000 feet of a school zone, a Class A felony; simple possession of a controlled substance, a Class A misdemeanor; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced to twenty-five years at 100% for the Class A felony; two years for the simple possession conviction, and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the drug paraphernalia conviction, with all sentences to be served concurrently. On direct appeal, this court affirmed the convictions and remanded for correction of the judgment for simple possession to reflect the conviction as a Class A misdemeanor and a sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days. Following his convictions, but while his direct appeal was pending, he filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing, as best we can understand, that he was being illegally detained because his Class A felony conviction should be served at 35%, rather than 100%; the indictment was defective in stating the offenses with which he was charged; the indictment was defective because it failed “to state the facts of the crime scene;” the judgment violates the plain language requirement of Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 17; and the judgment is “absent of Counsel,” resulting in the trial court’s losing jurisdiction and voiding the judgment. The trial court dismissed the motion, determining that the petitioner could not simultaneously maintain a direct appeal and a petition for writ of habeas corpus. We agree and affirm the dismissal of the petition, according to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Hardin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony Hill
In 1991, the Defendant, Anthony Hill, pleaded guilty to two counts of unlawful possession of more than 26 grams of cocaine with intent to sell, in case numbers 90-09874 and 90-15702, with agreed concurrent sentences of 7.2 years’ incarceration for each of the two convictions. In 2014, the Defendant filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 seeking to correct an illegal sentence, and the trial court held a hearing on the motion. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court held the Defendant’s sentences should have been ordered to run consecutively and thus were illegal. The trial court denied the Defendant’s 36.1 motion, holding that his sentences had expired which rendered the issue moot. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred because he should have been allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because his illegal sentence was a material component of his plea agreement. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, and in accordance with the Tennessee Supreme Court’s recent holding in State v. Adrian R. Brown, __ S.W.3d __, No. E2014-00673-SC-R11-CD, 2015 WL 7748275, at *7 (Tenn. Dec. 2, 2015), we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James Burton v. Faye Barna
Due to the inadequacies of appellant’s brief and appellant’s failure to provide a transcript or statement of the evidence, we conclude that he has waived consideration of this appeal, and we affirm the judgment of the chancery court. |
Fentress | Court of Appeals | |
S. Carmack Garvin, Jr., et al v. Joy Malone
Plaintiffs and Defendant were involved in a motor vehicle accident. Plaintiffs allege Defendant was negligent in causing her van to run into the rear of their car and that as a result of Defendant’s negligence, Plaintiffs suffered damages. During trial, Defendant introduced photographs of the vehicles taken immediately after the collision, which the trial court permitted, over Plaintiffs’ objection, for the purpose of impeaching Plaintiffs’ testimony. The evidence was heard by a jury, which determined Defendant was not at fault. Plaintiffs filed a motion for a new trial, which the trial court denied. On appeal, Plaintiffs argue the trial court erred by allowing the jury to consider Defendant’s photographic evidence for purposes of impeachment. We conclude the trial court did not err and affirm its judgment. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Lilly C. et al.
This appeal involves termination of a father's rights to three children. The trial court found the father, who was incarcerated at the time of the final hearing, had abandoned the children by engaging in such conduct prior to incarceration as to exhibit a wanton disregard for their welfare, in that there was a history of domestic violence between the father and the children's mother. Further, the father had violated his probation by failing a drug screen. The court also found clear and convincing evidence revealed the father had not substantially complied with the provisions of the permanency plans. As a result, the court found termination was in the best interest of the children. The father appeals. We affirm. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Lamar Tennessee, LLC DBA Lamar Advertising of Knoxville v. City of Knoxville, Tennessee, Et Al.
In 2006, Lamar Tennessee, LLC began the conversion of two of its billboards from ―vinyl-faced to ―digital display‖ utilizing light-emitting diode (LED) technology. Before Lamar could complete these conversions, a sign inspector for the City of Knoxville issued a stop-work order on each of the billboards. A zoning inspector for the City, in her own name, subsequently filed a complaint against Lamar, grounded in Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-208(a)(2) (Supp. 2005), seeking temporary and permanent injunctive relief prohibiting Lamar from ―repurposing‖ the two vinyl-faced billboards into billboards featuring LED digital displays. In response, Lamar filed a complaint against the City seeking a declaration that the two billboards were not in violation of the zoning regulations and/or that the provisions of the zoning regulations pertaining to billboards with digital displays were unconstitutional. These cases were eventually consolidated. Each party filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the City‘s motion and permanently enjoined Lamar from converting the billboards at issue from vinyl structures into billboards with LED digital displays. Lamar appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals |