H & J Ditching & Excavating, Inc. v. Cornerstone Community Bank
Plaintiff H & J Ditching & Excavating, Inc. (Contractor) was hired by JRSF, LLC (Developer) to perform excavating and grading work on a subdivision construction project (the project) in West Knox County. Defendant Cornerstone Community Bank (Lender) provided financing for the project with a $2,512,500 construction loan. Complications arose, including the bankruptcy of one of Developer's primary members. Developer defaulted on the construction loan. Lender foreclosed and took possession by bidding on the property at the foreclosure sale. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In re Phillip I.P., Jr. et al.
This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of Michelle P. (“Mother”) to her children Phillip and Emily (“the Children”). After a trial, the Juvenile Court found that clear and convincing evidence established the grounds of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan and persistent conditions, and that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. Mother appeals to this Court. We affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Keyvin Lanier Glass
Appellant, Keyvin Lanier Glass, pleaded guilty to aggravated assault and failure to appear. He received an effective sentence of four years, one year in confinement with the remainder suspended to supervised probation. His probation officer filed a probation violation report based on his breaking three probationary rules, and the trial court subsequently entered an order revoking appellant’s probation and ordering him to serve his full sentence in confinement. On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Coffee | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Bobby J. Croom v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Bobby J. Croom, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery convictions. The petitioner argues that he is entitled to relief because: (1) the State failed to make a proper election of offenses at trial; (2) his convictions violate double jeopardy; (3) his conviction for aggravated sexual battery violates due process; and (4) he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Keith Trammell
The defendant, Keith Trammell, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of theft over $1000, a Class D felony; vandalism over $500, a Class E felony; and two counts of coercion of a witness, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced him as a career offender to twelve years for the theft conviction, six years for the vandalism conviction, and twelve years for each of the coercion convictions. The court ordered the theft and vandalism sentences to be served concurrently to each other and the coercion sentences to be served concurrently to each other but consecutively to the theft and vandalism sentences, for a total effective sentence of twenty-four years at 60% in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by sentencing him as a career offender and by allowing the State to introduce evidence of uncharged crimes. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Donald Wayne McCall v. State of Tennessee
Donald Wayne McCall (“the Petitioner”) filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Crockett | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John E. Carter v. Herbert H. Slatery III, In His Official Capacity As Attorney General And Reporter
Father filed a petition to reduce child support. Mother sought to have their almost eighteen-year-old daughter testify that she did not intend to exercise visitation with Father to the extent previously ordered by the court after she turned eighteen. The court refused to let her testify. The trial court used the number of days of parenting time previously ordered in calculating child support instead of zero. The trial court also ordered Mother to pay a portion of Father’s attorney’s fees. Mother appeals these issues. We affirm the trial court as to the testimony of the child and the calculation of child support. We reverse the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Alleyanna S.
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Smith | Court of Appeals | |
In re Estate of John Paul Lewis, Sr.
The plaintiff in this action and the decedent were formerly husband and wife. Before they married, the decedent husband and the plaintiff executed an antenuptial agreement, which provided, inter alia, that the decedent would maintain a $500,000 life insurance policy with the plaintiff as beneficiary until his death. When the parties divorced in 2009, the divorce court determined that their antenuptial agreement was enforceable, including the life insurance provision. Although the decedent appealed certain issues in that action regarding alimony and arrearages, the divorce court's determination regarding enforceability of the antenuptial agreement and the life insurance provision contained therein was not appealed. Furthermore, no relief was sought pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60. At the time of the decedent's death in 2014, he had not maintained the required life insurance, and the plaintiff filed a claim against the decedent's estate for $500,000. The personal representative of the estate filed an exception to the claim. The probate court allowed the claim to proceed, concluding that the issue regarding the life insurance provision in the antenuptial agreement had been previously litigated in the divorce action, which judgment had since become final and nonmodifiable. The personal representative has appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Maurice Fitten v. The City Council of The City of Chattanooga
The petitioner, an employee of the City of Chattanooga (“the City”), was demoted in his employment position after a city accident investigator found that the petitioner had failed to report an accident involving a city vehicle he was driving while on duty. The petitioner sought to appeal the City's decision through the Administrative Procedures Division. Upon the City's motion to dismiss the appeal, the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) found that the petitioner's appeal had been untimely filed and dismissed it for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The petitioner subsequently filed a petition for review with the Hamilton County Chancery Court (“trial court”). Following a hearing, the trial court affirmed the dismissal of the petitioner's administrative appeal. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Timothy Lambert
Defendant, Timothy Demond Lambert, appeals from the trial court's dismissal, without an evidentiary hearing, of Defendant's motion filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. After review of the record and the briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Curtiss Carlos Talley v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Curtiss Carlos Talley, pled guilty in 2002 to aggravated assault and was sentenced to serve five years concurrently with a federal sentence which, apparently, was later imposed. Twelve years later, in 2014, he filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, asking, as we understand, that the court “vacat[e] his state judgment/conviction on the merits and in the interest of justice.” The trial court determined that he had failed to state a claim for coram nobis relief, and we agree. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of the petition, pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Aurora Loan Services LLC, et al. v. Linda S. Elam, et al.
This is an appeal of a grant of summary judgment. Defendant Linda Elam conveyed property owned by her individually to Defendant Trust. This property was then pledged as collateral to secure a construction loan for the Trust. Defendants Fred and Linda Elam then obtained another loan in their individual capacities. Appellee’s predecessor in interest obtained ownership of the Defendants’ individual loan and brought suit seeking to have the conveyance of the property to the Trust declared void. On the Appellee’s first motion for summary judgment, the trial court found the conveyance of the property to the trust to be valid. On Appellee’s second motion for summary judgment, the trial court found that the property owned by the trust had been pledged as collateral for the second loan made to Defendants Fred and Linda Elam. Appellant, Fred Elam, appealed in his individual capacity. We conclude that Appellant cannot prosecute the appeal, and the appeal is dismissed. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
Cecil McNatt, et al. v. Jane Vestal (Kanizar); Henderson Villa Inc. v. Cecil McNatt, et al.
This is a construction case. Appellee, Cecil McNatt, contracted to build and obtain the required licensing for an assisted living facility for Appellant Jane Vestal. The facility was constructed and licensed according to the parties' contract. Following completion, Appellant refused to pay the balance of the contract amount, citing the Appellee's lack of a contractor's license and numerous construction defects. Appellee filed suit against Appellant for breach of contract, and Appellant counterclaimed for violations of the Contractors Licensing Act and Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The trial court concluded that Appellee did not violate the Contractors Licensing Act or the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, dismissed Appellants' counterclaims, and awarded Appellees a judgment in the amount of $96,280.11. We conclude that trial court erred in concluding that the Appellee did not violate the Contractors Licensing Act, but we affirm the judgment to Appellee, with some modification of the amount awarded. |
Chester | Court of Appeals | |
Marchelle Renee Buman, Executor of the Estate of Kenneth Jenkins v. Alycia D. Gibson, P.A., et al.
This is a health care liability case. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant-medical providers after the exclusion of the plaintiff‟s standard-of-care expert due to failure to comply with discovery requests. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Henry | Court of Appeals | |
National Public Auction Company, LLC v. Camp Out, Inc., et al.
An auctioneer filed suit against a recreational vehicle dealer for injunctive relief and damages; the dealer counterclaimed for fraud and other causes of action. A jury returned a verdict in favor of the dealer. Distribution of funds held by the court clerk was held in abeyance. This appeal is a post-judgment dispute as to whether the trial court erred in allowing the purchaser of a recreational vehicle at the auction to intervene after the trial court entered its judgment on the jury verdict to seek the return of money deposited with the court clerk, and whether the trial court erred in dismissing the dealer’s counterclaim against the purchaser and awarding the purchaser the return of his purchase price. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the purchaser to intervene, but that the trial court erred in failing to allow the dealer to conduct discovery to determine whether the purchaser contributed to the loss in value of the vehicle. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Joseph C. Thomas, et al v. The Standard Fire Insurance Company, et al
This appeal arises from an insurance claim for storm-related damage to the property of the plaintiffs. The case was resolved on a motion for summary judgment. According to the plaintiffs, the trial court erred by giving effect to the decision of the appraisal panel because the policy's appraisal provision is unenforceable. The plaintiffs contend the policy's appraisal provision constitutes an agreement to arbitrate subject to Tennessee's version of the Uniform Arbitration Act (Tenn. Code Ann.§ 29-5-301, et seq.). The plaintiffs further argue the appraisal provision does not comply with Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-5-302(a) of the Uniform Arbitration Act, which requires agreements to arbitrate over issues relating to property used as residences must be signed or initialed by the contracting parties. We affirm the trial court's findings |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Joseph C. Thomas, et al v. The Standard Fire Insurance Company, et al - Concur
I concur fully in the majority’s decision in this case. I write separately only to express my opinion that the appropriate summary judgment standard to be applied by Tennessee courts now is as set forth in Rye v. Women’s Care Center of Memphis, MPLLC, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2015 WL 6457768 (Tenn. 2015), rather than Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-16-101. I believe our Supreme Court intended for the retroactive application of Rye when it stated: “In civil cases, judicial decisions overruling a prior cases generally are applied retrospectively.” Rye, ___ S.W.3d at ___n.9, 2015 WL 6457768 at *35 n.9. While there may be very little, if any, difference between the summary judgment standard as set forth in Rye and as contained in Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-16-101, I believe Rye sets the standard and is controlling on the courts of this State. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Lee Priest
The appellant, Michael Lee Priest, pled guilty in the Sequatchie County Circuit Court to robbery in case number 2013CR84 and received a four-year sentence with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. As a result of his guilty plea, the trial court revoked a four-year sentence of probation for aggravated assault in case number 2012CR136. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the appellant serve both sentences in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by allowing the State to cross-examine his mother about conduct that occurred as a juvenile and by not granting his requests for alternative sentencing. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sequatchie | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tony Fulton Wells v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Tony Fulton Wells, was initially charged with first degree (premeditated) murder, and he later pled guilty to second degree murder, a Class A felony. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was denied. On appeal, he argues that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because it was coerced. He also argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to have a hearing to suppress his written confessions; failed to obtain more time for him to consider the plea agreement; failed to interview the petitioner's neighbor; failed to investigate the crime scene; and failed to explain adequately the law or to listen to the petitioner. Following our review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Union | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Wayne A. Howes, et al. v. Mark Swanner, et al.
This is an appeal of the denial of Appellants’ Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 motion to set aside the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees. Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, the appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
In re Estate of John J. Burnette
This case grew out of the administration of the estate of John J. Burnette. G. Michael Luhowiak, successor administrator of the estate, filed a motion seeking approval of fees and expenses and asking the trial court to assess those charges against John G. McDougal, the previous administrator. The trial court adopted a master's report granting the successor administrator the requested relief. The court denied the previous administrator's motion to alter or amend. The previous administrator appeals. We vacate the trial court's judgment because the court failed to hold a hearing and failed to independently assess the merits of the master's report. This case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Jordan Leggett
James Jordan Leggett appeals claiming that the trial court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Terry Eugene Fisher, Jr.
Terry Eugene Fisher, Jr. (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to robbery and was sentenced to nine years’ probation. Thereafter, the Defendant’s probation was revoked based on the accrual of new charges, including a charge for a homicide that occurred prior to the Defendant’s being placed on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it revoked probation based on criminal conduct that occurred prior to the Defendant’s being placed on probation. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lashonda Moneak Williamson
LaShonda Moneak Williamson, the Appellant, appeals the summary denial of her Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence that she claims was imposed as the result of a coerced guilty plea. Because the Appellant’s motion failed to state a colorable claim, we affirm the trial court’s summary denial of the motion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals |