Robert Howard Lubell v. Deborah Jo Lubell
This is a divorce action involving a long-term marriage between parties whose primary source of income throughout the marriage was their respective employment by a nonprofit corporation they had co-founded. The wife alleged that the nonprofit corporation was the husband's alter ego and should therefore be classified as the parties' marital asset. The trial court found, inter alia, that the nonprofit corporation could not be classified or distributed as a marital asset. The wife appeals this finding, as well as the trial court's (1) capping of the husband's child support obligation in combination with an award to the wife of transitional alimony, (2) denial of her requests for alimony in futuro and in solido, (3) allocation of certain marital debts to the wife, and (4) inclusion of extraordinary educational expenses in the calculation of the husband's income for child support purposes. Having determined that the trial court placed an improper cap on child support by linking it to the transitional alimony award and improperly considered extraordinary educational expenses as an adjustment to the husband's gross income rather than as a deviation, we vacate the trial court's determination of the husband's child support obligation. We remand for recalculation of the husband's child support obligation. We modify the award of transitional alimony to an award of alimony in futuro and separate the amount from the calculation of child support. Having also determined that the wife is entitled to an award of alimony in solido to more equitably adjust the distribution of the marital estate, we reverse the trial court's denial of alimony in solido and remand for the trial court to determine the amount to be awarded. We affirm the trial court's judgment in all other respects. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Khadijeh Naraghian v. Darryle K. Wilson
In this case, Appellant sued to recover for injuries she allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle accident that occurred in Shelby County, Tennessee. Following a trial of the case, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Appellant but also found her to be partially at fault for the accident. The trial court reduced the awarded damages by the percentage of Appellant's comparative fault as found by the jury, and a judgment on the jury's verdict was entered. Although Appellant subsequently filed a motion for new trial, asserting various errors, that motion was denied by the trial court. Appellant then appealed to this Court reiterating the same concerns that she raised in her motion for new trial. Because we conclude that the jury's damages award is not supported by material evidence, we vacate the trial court's judgment and remand for a new trial. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Antonious Jamal Brown v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Antonious Jamal Brown, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his first degree murder and aggravated assault convictions, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the petition. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
The Metropolitan Government of Nashville And Davidson County, Tennessee v. The Board of Zoning Appeals Of Nashville And Davidson County, Tennessee, et al.
We granted permission to appeal in this case to determine whether The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee (“Metro”) has standing to file a petition for a writ of certiorari against The Board of Zoning Appeals of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee (“BZA”) in chancery court in order to challenge a BZA decision. We hold that Metro does have standing in this case. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals, and this matter is remanded to the chancery court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Randy Cary
A Carroll County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Randy Cary, of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony, aggravated rape, a Class A felony, aggravated assault, a Class D felony, and evading arrest, a Class A misdemeanor. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the aggravated assault conviction into the aggravated rape conviction and sentenced the appellant as a Range III, career offender to an effective sentence of 120 years to be served at 100%. On appeal, the appellant claims that the trial court erred by denying a motion in which he requested that private counsel be allowed to assist with his trial, that the victim's injuries did not qualify as “serious bodily injury,” and that his effective sentence is excessive. Based upon the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Carroll | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
William Ford v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, William Ford, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for first degree murder. Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a continuance in order to be able to retain private counsel. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Felix Hall
Appellant, Felix Hall, was convicted of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000; burglary of a building other than a habitation; and theft of property valued at $500 or less. The trial court sentenced him to an effective term of twenty-seven years. On appeal, appellant contends that the trial court should have granted a mistrial during the State's rebuttal closing argument and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael David Martin v. Franklin Cool Springs Corporation, et al.
Plaintiff filed suit against the company providing billing services for the water and sewage utilities at his apartment; the complaint alleged that the company’s fee for late payments violated, among others, the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. Defendant moved for dismissal pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6), which was granted by the trial court. Defendant then sought recovery of the attorney’s fees it incurred in defending the TCPA claim and Plaintiff’s motions for sanctions. The court granted Defendant’s motion, awarding one-half of the amount sought. Plaintiff appeals the award of attorney’s fees; Defendant appeals the amount awarded. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects; concluding that an award of fees incurred by Defendant on appeal is appropriate, we remand the matter to the trial court for determination of the amount to be awarded. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee Ex Rel. Victor S. Johnson, III, et al. v. Mark Gwyn, et al.
This appeal arises from a lawsuit seeking access to the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (“the TBI”) file concerning former Knox County Criminal Court Judge Richard Baumgartner (“Baumgartner”). The plaintiffs, Gary Christian, Deena Christian, Hugh Newsom, and Mary Newsom (“Plaintiffs”), sued TBI Director Mark Gwyn (“Gwyn”) in the Chancery Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”), both in their individual capacities and in the name of the State of Tennessee, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, Plaintiffs sought a declaration that Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-504(a)(2)(A) is unconstitutional, as well as an order requiring the TBI to turn over its records concerning its investigation of Baumgartner. Gwyn filed a motion to dismiss, asserting lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of standing, and failure to state a claim. The Trial Court granted Gwyn’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs appeal to this Court, raising a number of issues. In view of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision in State v. Cobbins, No. E2013-02726-CCA-WR-CO (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 4, 2015), Rule 11 appl. perm. appeal denied August 13, 2015, we hold that the doctrine of res judicata serves to bar Plaintiffs’ claims. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court on the basis of res judicata. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Andrew Hall
Following a jury trial, Defendant, Andrew Hall, was found guilty of driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUI). He had been charged in the same indictment with violation of the implied consent law, and the trial court found him guilty of that offense in a bench trial. Prior to the jury trial, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charges because no lawful prosecution was initiated within the applicable statute of limitations. After a hearing, the motion was denied. Defendant’s sole issue on appeal is that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Roane | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Amy Diane Riggs v. Farmers Mutual Of Tennessee
This is an appeal from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in an action on a homeowner’s insurance policy. The home of the insured party was damaged by a fire on May 29, 2011. The insured submitted proof of loss to the insurer pursuant to her homeowner’s insurance policy. The insurer requested additional information from the insured to complete the proof of loss, which the insured provided. The insurer subsequently denied coverage. The insured party filed suit against insurer. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurer, finding that the insured party’s claims were barred by the one-year contractual limitations period. We reverse. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
John Ivory v. State of Tennessee
Following the apparent denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, the Petitioner, John Ivory, filed a pro se motion to reconsider the denial of relief, which the post-conviction court denied without a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to reconsider the denial of post-conviction relief. Because the Petitioner does not have an appeal as of right from the denial of such motion, we dismiss the appeal. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In re Addison M.
This appeal arises out of juvenile delinquency proceedings in Knox County Juvenile Court. Due to numerous deficiencies in the proceedings below, we vacate the delinquency adjudication and remand for dismissal of the petition. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Battery Alliance, Inc. v. T & L Sales, Inc., et al.
Plaintiff brought suit after defendant-company defaulted on its obligation to pay for goods it received on credit. Plaintiff also brought a claim for breach of contract against defendant-president and defendant-employee of the defendant-company pursuant to an individual guaranty agreement signed by both. A default judgment was entered against the president of the company, but the employee disputes that he signed the individual guaranty in his individual capacity. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, concluding that the individual guaranty was unambiguous and the employee was thus liable in his individual capacity. We vacate the trial court‘s decision granting summary judgment because the individual guaranty is ambiguous and remand with instructions to consider parol evidence. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Niuklee, LLC v. Commissioner, TN Dept. of Revenue
The Commissioner of Revenue assessed a tax based on the taxpayer’s use of an aircraft purchased out of state. Taxpayer sought review from the Tennessee Department of Revenue but was denied relief following an informal hearing. Taxpayer paid the tax and filed a complaint in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking a refund on the ground that it qualified for the sale for resale exemption in the Tennessee Retailers’ Sales Tax Act because it provided the seller with a certificate of resale and immediately leased the aircraft to third party users. The Department responded, arguing that the leases did not satisfy the exemption’s “bona fide sale” requirement. Following a non-jury trial, the Chancery Court reversed the Department’s assessment, concluding that the exemption applied because (1) the leases were legitimate and not illusory and were not chiefly motivated by tax avoidance, (2) the economic substance doctrine has not been adopted in Tennessee to analyze the “bona fide sale” requirement, and (3) the Department failed to present proof sufficient to pierce the corporate veil of the taxpayer. The Department appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jeffrey A. Miller v. State of Tennessee
A parking lot attendant injured his neck in the course of his employment with the University of Tennessee. He claimed that he was not able to return to his previous work and filed for total and permanent disability. The Claims Commission found that he was permanently and totally disabled. The University has appealed, contending that the Commission erroneously admitted certain testimony from the employee’s vocational evaluator. It further contends that the evidence preponderates against the finding of permanent total disability. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. After our review, we affirm the judgment. |
Davidson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Frederick Alexander Avery v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Frederick Alexander Avery, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Bobby McEarl v. City of Brownsville
This is a premises liability case. The plaintiff alleges he slipped and fell in a leaf-filled gutter maintained by defendant. Plaintiff filed suit against the defendant, alleging that the defendant failed to properly maintain and warn pedestrians of a dangerous condition. Because the trial court granted defendant summary judgment without making findings of fact or stating the legal basis for its decision before instructing defendant to prepare an order, we vacate the trial court’s order of summary judgment and remand. |
Haywood | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dennis Haughton Webber
A jury convicted the defendant, Dennis Haughton Webber, of driving with a suspended license, a Class B misdemeanor; disorderly conduct, a Class C misdemeanor; failure to display his registration plates, a Class C misdemeanor; and failure to carry a registration, a Class C misdemeanor. The defendant on appeal challenges the jurisdiction of the trial court. We interpret his other issues to be challenges to the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. We conclude that the trial court had jurisdiction to impose its judgments on the defendant. However, we reverse the defendant’s conviction for disorderly conduct because the evidence was not sufficient to support it as it was charged in the indictment. We affirm the remaining judgments of the trial court. |
Perry | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Frederick L. Moore v. State of Tennessee
Frederick L. Moore (“the Petitioner”) filed his second petition for writ of error coram nobis, presenting “newly discovered evidence” in the form of expert testimony regarding cell phone towers accessed by the Petitioner's cell phone at the time of the offense. The coram nobis court denied relief without a hearing, finding that the Petitioner's claim was time-barred, that the evidence was not newly discovered, and that it was not the type of evidence which might have produced a different result at trial. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Scott L. Bishop
The Madison County Grand Jury indicted Scott L. Bishop (“the Defendant”) with four counts of aggravated sexual battery. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted as charged, and the trial court ordered concurrent sentences for an effective sentence of eleven years' incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred in denying the Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal; (2) the trial court failed to act as a thirteenth juror; (3) the trial court should have granted the Defendant a new trial based on newly discovered alibi and impeachment evidence; (4) the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed the prosecutor to ask leading questions during the direct examination of the nine-year-old victim; (6) a juror's sleeping during the jury instructions requires a new trial; (7) the sentence imposed by the trial court was excessive; and (8) cumulative error necessitates granting a new trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Carl Brown
The defendant, Carl Brown, sought relief pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 to vacate and correct what he believes to be an illegal sentence, the judgments in question not stating whether they were to be served concurrently or consecutively. The trial court concluded the motion was without merit, and, following our review, we affirm the court’s order denying the motion for relief, pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Adrianne Kiser v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Adrianne Kiser, appeals the post-conviction court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for two counts of attempted voluntary manslaughter and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. On appeal, he asserts that: (1) the post-conviction court applied an incorrect standard in evaluating trial counsel's performance and the resulting prejudice, and (2) if the post-conviction court applied the correct standard, then the court's interpretation of that standard renders Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-106(e) and Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 13 section 5(a)(2) unconstitutional as applied to him. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Seddrick Curry
The defendant, Seddrick Curry, pled guilty to two counts of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; one count of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, a Class C felony; and one count of theft of property valued at $1000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony. He was sentenced as a career offender to serve an effective sentence of thirty years at 60%. Subsequently, he filed a motion to withdraw his pleas of guilty, which was denied following a hearing. He appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw the pleas. Following our review, we affirm the order of the trial court denying the motion. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
CBS Outdoor, Inc. v. Tennessee Department of Transportation
Owner of back-to-back billboards filed a petition for review challenging the decision of the Tennessee Department of Transportation (“TDOT”) to revoke his billboard permits on the ground that the billboards were not in compliance with the TDOT spacing requirements. We find substantial and material evidence to support the decision of the TDOT Commissioner and, therefore, affirm the chancellor’s decision. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |